Aspects of building contracts : a comparative view of English and French law in the light of potential harmonisation. by Thomas, Christopher S
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Aspects of building contracts : a comparative view of English and French law in the
light of potential harmonisation.
Thomas, Christopher S
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
ASPECTS OF BUILDING CONTRACTS:
a Comparative view ot English and French law
in the light ot potential halmonisatiorL
christopher S.. llKxnas









Candidate:	 Christopher S. Thomas
Title:	 Aspects of Building Contracts - a comparative view of
English and French law in the light of potential harmonisation.
The approach to and mechanisms of building contracts in England and
France are securely entwined in their respective systems of law and histories,
but merely acknowledging separate existence is no longer acceptable. The
traditional Imposition of national law is surrendering to uniform rules for
the furtherance of trade and in the interests of competition, and construction
cannot remain immune.
The protective wall of national legal systems was distinctly exposed by
proposals for a community strategy for the construction industries in the EC,
and confluence will be the future. How it will be shaped will depend on the
reactions to each other of the heritages of the common law and civil law
systems, but contribution is due from both.
Part I investigates comparative influences and approaches that lie behind
some of the main features of building contracts, to see under what principles
they operate, where their ends are similar, and what represents the perceived
great divide.
Part II looks at areas where particular legislation has been introduced to
overcome problems, and at the influence of fault and the experience with
tort.
Part III in conclusion examines approaches to harmonisation and identifies
principles behind some aspects that are being considered in the European
Commission. Future direction in England may involve proposals to
renounce the third party rule in common law. These are viewed in the
context of construction. There is also the question of the potential impact of
competition law on standard forms. In England their adoption will,
practically, represent the law of building contracts to the parties, whereas in
France the overriding effects of the Code Civil are felt in and alongside
standard form. The potential for a European standard form is recognised,
although the way forward to harmonisation will depend on what are seen to
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Preface
Before the last two decades the law relating to building and construction was
regarded by many as an unspectacular area, devoted to detail of little interest
beyond that of the disputing parties, and hardly a subject for academic study.
That has changed. In England, building cases were at the forefront of the
common law growth in the law of tort in the seventies, and in its retreat.
This change has accompanied and derived from a recognition of the impact
of construction in society. The recognition has also taken place at European
Community level and has led to calls for a community strategy for the
construction industries with the aim of harmonisation. What that means in
practical terms is still being worked out, but the nature of the debate has
prompted the investigation in this thesis.
To debate in the wider Community ring the respective mechanisms of
nations in isolation of an appreciation of fundamental concepts of the legal
systems that utilise those mechanisms is unsatisfactory, and will give rise to
misunderstanding. A true comparative view is desirable for the
achievement of successful solutions. This thesis seeks to appreciate and
uncover the influences and principles that lie behind the mechanisms.
There is an undoubted fear in England that the common law and English
ways will be submerged in a civil law based Europe. It is not forgotten that
achievement in exporting the Code Napoleon has been by force of arms,
altough common law system has been implanted through colonisation.
Undoubtedly the great legal systems of the common law and civil law have
developed separately, and their influences have reflected the colonial power
of England and France and their development of commerce with countries
in which their respective interests lay. In this sense the legal systems have
been adversaries.
Now, with Europe under one body politic, and with a confluence of trading
nations, whose expansionist policies have carried their respective legal
approaches with their commercial dealings, there is no longer scope simply
9
for acknowleged separate existence. Confluence and harmonisation involve
choice, and whereas choice under conflicts of laws rules results in the
application of a single national law, the confluence of harmonisation creates
the prospect of a derivative from both common law and civil law, rather
than that one or other should reign supreme.
If the strategy for harmonisation is to do more than produce a regulation and
leave its application to the diversities of the recipient legal systems then to
reach beyond the divide it is principles that must be identified and applied.
The common law requires cases and reasoned decisions for the evolution
and development of principles, where civil law has the results of reasoned
identification of principles encapsulated and codified, with decisions as
applications of them, and whilst the methods of operation of the legal system
must be comprehended, common ground can be sought beyond them.
Language and intellectual approach in methods of reasoning are two areas
which lead to misunderstanding, and in seeking to overcome this in a view
of aspects of fundamental concepts in building contracts it has become
apparent that there is a large measure of similarity in the aim of respective
principles under common law and civil law. The influence of standard
forms in the construction field means that reference to them is inevitable.
Equally there is danger in too great an emphasis on the detail of such forms.
The latter may obscure principle, but, taken as representing norms in the
process of a construction projec,t standard form provisions provide useful
insights for examination, whether by application of or departure from
principles. Standard forms also provide a perspective of different approaches
in practice.
This is not a subject where investigation has led to a q. e. d. answer to
questions, such as whether the English peculiarity of the quasi-arbitral role of
the architect/engineer should prevail, or, whether there is an insuperable
gulf between the ending of the contractor's performance obligations and the
start of his guarantee obligation at reception under French law and the action
for damages under common law when coupled with the effects of substantial
completion in respect of liability for payment. The result has been to benefit
10
from a comparative examination.
The consequence suggests that a protective attitude to the national system is
not justified and that mutual benefit will derive from greater understanding
of the systems of others; that there is a prospect for harmonisation to
increased economic and competitive ends; that the process gains from study
beyond the terms of competing standard terms which may represent no more
than the lowest common denominator of sectional interests rather than the
presentation of principle; and, that legislation can introduce successful
regimes, overcoming the complexities of contract terms and giving
protection where thought fit.
However, nothing achieved is immutable, and in that sense there is no end
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1	 Historical and fradical Back2jound
In October 1988 the European Parliament adopted a resolution that there
should be a Community strategy for the construction industry to provide for a
more unified market, whilst allowing for local peculiarities. The promotion
of free trade in a single market is an overriding aim, but, within that,
harmonisation of control, contracts, liability and insurance have been under
consideration.' The apparent difficullies of comprehension facing European
neighbours in viewing the mechanisms in England relating to building
contracts are no less than for the English in viewing the civil law system.
This study sets out to explore aspects of building contracts in England and
France, to examine approaches, features and their backgrounds in an attempt
to appreciate and understand them in the light of potential harmonisation.
In England there has been no special place for the building contract within
which its development has taken place, 2
 and the functional definition of "any
contract where one person agrees for valuable consideration to carry out
building or engineering works for another" 3
 indicates the basis of the
Commission of the European Communities. C. Mathurin: Controls, Contracts, Liability and
Insurance in the Construction Industry in the European Community, NStudy of Responsibilities,
guarantees and insurance in the construction industry with a view to harmonisation at Community
level", February 1990.
2 When seen against sate of goods for example.
Keating on Building Contracts, 5th Edition.
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application of established principles of law. 4
 This is not saying that statute
does not impinge on the building contract, nor that the field does not warrant
specialist treatment. To the contrary, there are features that have led to the
distinctive study of building contracts in order to appreciate the regime.
Particular features are the use of standard forms, the role of the engineer or
architect, the multiplicity of sub-contractors, the assumption of design
responsibility, the time span involved in works and in the manifestation of
defects, and the carrying out of works on land of another.
The civil law classification of contracts extended in France to the contrat de
Iouage d'ouvrage et d'industrie , the contract of hire of work and skill, so that
the development of law relating to building contracts evolved from a source
of an identifiable relationship and responsibility. To a European mind this
creates a "rational logic" 6
 against which the common law of England "gives a
contrasting general impression which can be summed up in two words:
pragmatism and uncertainty" 1
 and where under its legal basis "standard
contracts have acquired a legal value which goes beyond the particular scope
of each contract."8
From this perception iewand with uncomfortable deductions from the
minutiae of certain forms of contract it is apparent that the identification of
principles against which harmonisation may be viewed is desirable. It is the
lack of a perceived overriding regime in England that presents the challenge
"When parties enter into a detailed building contract there are ... no oveniding rules or principles
covering their contractual relationship beyond those which generally apply to the construction of
contracts", Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd. v Modern Engineering
(Bristol) Ltd. (1974) AC. 689.
Equally and sometimes preferred, the cont,t d'entmpzise.
• The Mathurin Report identified this: "In the Latin countries the laws in force are included in Civil
Codes, which have developed from the Code of Justice of ancient Rome, and subsequently the Code
Napoleon, promulgated in 1804. In Anglo-Saxon countries the legal system is a system of customaly
law. In the fonne cases are judged through interpretation of the Code, in accordance with rational
lOgic."
The Mathurin Report introduced the U.K. system as one: "Based on standard contracts, decisions of
the high court, parliamentary laws and government orders, this system is truly unique within the
European Community. It gives a contrasting general impression which can be summed up in two
words: pragmatism and uncertainty. Pragmatism because contract is of primary importance,
because government clients are not governed by special rules, because the protection of house-
buyers is a success. Uncertainty because unwritten law is difficult to apprehend, because some
traditions are challenged, because diversity sometimes leads to confusion."
The Mathunn Report presents the "Legal basis" as: "Like the constitution of the United Kingdom,
the Common Law is not written down; it consists of significant decisions by the judiciary and it can
never be amended by contract. Standard contracts have acquired a legal value which goes beyond
the particular scope of each contract. This characteristic of the British system is explained not only
by tradition but also by the lack of legislation on government contracts and by the lack of
government jurisdiction."
14
in a comparative study to examine whether a basis does exist for sharing a
perception of future direction.
The work and labour element
The origins of building contract law are in the rules developed from contracts
for work and labour in their barest form, albeit that current sources of
applicable rules are contained in a multitude of contract forms and
voluminous general conditions that provide a detail far greater than any
private law codification. A comparison between aspects of English and civil
law, particularly in France, may briefly consider work done on materials as
distinct from sale.9
 Work on materials covers their manufacture and their
supply;'° and the point where the labour element is regarded as an essential
part of the transaction, and its provision, has been the key element for
distinguishing a contract for work and labour from a contract for sale.
In nineteenth century England it was relevant whether the work and labour
resulted in something "that can become the subject of a sale". 1 ' The need for
classification continued after the Sale of Goods Act 1893, but the distinction
expressed derived from the substance of the contract as to the skill and labour
exercised.' 2
 It was not dependent on the comparative value of work and
labour against the materials, for where the purpose of the transaction is the
F. Nicklisch: Sales Contracts against Construction Contracts. (1988) l.B.L 16, 253.
'° Work on goods formed a basis for the comparison by Professor W. Lorenz in Volume VIII, of the
International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law,, chapter 8, Contracts for Work on Goods and
Building Contracts. A commentary on this work is in I .N. Duncan Wallace, Construction Contracts:
Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract.
" Lee v Griffin (1861) 1 B. & S. 272. The decision of Blackburri.J. in the case was that the agreement by
the dentist to make a denture for one of his patients was a sale of a chattel rather than a contract for
work and labour. The notion that the relationship between the value of the work and the value of the
materials used had any significance was rejected, with the example of a sculptor employed to
execute a work of art: "... greatly as his skill and labour, supposing it to be of the highest description,
might exceed the value of the marble on which he worked, the contract would ... nevertheless be a
contract for the sale of a chattel".
12 Robinson v Graves (1935) 1 K.B. 579 (CA.). An artist orally commissioned to paint a portrait for
payment of a sum would by the Sale of Goods Act 1893 have had no enforceable contract for lack of
the formal requirements. The Court of Appeal held that the contract was for work and labour and
not for the sale of goods on the basis that the substance of the contract was that skill and labour
should be exercised upon the production of the portrait,, and it was only ancillary to that contract that
paint and canvas would pass from artist to customer. By section 4 of the 1893 Act contracts for sale of
goods of the value of £10 and above were not enforceable by action unless the buyer had accepted
and received part, or given something in earnest to bind the contract, made part payment, or unless
some note or memorandum in writing had been made and signed by the party to be charged.
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supply of a complete article its nature was the determining feature.
The implication of warranties in contracts for work and labour are equivalent
to those implied by the Sale of Goods Acts,' 4
 and there is no practical necessity
to invoke the different classification.' 5
 There is no logical distinction between
obligations which ought in general to be implied with regard to quality and
fitness between a sale of goods and a contract for work and materials,'6
although it has been suggested that the obligation under the latter might be
greater.'7
The paramount nature of the work element itself which differentiates a
building contract from a sale, is likely to be the subject of separate reliance.
The attached obligation of care and skill is within the trilogy of warranties
normally applicable to a building contract:
"... when a purchaser buys a house from a builder who contracts to
build it, there is a threefold implication: that the builder will do his
work in a good and workmanlike manner; that he will supply good
and proper materials; and that it will be reasonably fit for human
So, for a plaintiff who agreed to build a steam engine which had to be completed and installed for
the price, the proper nature of the claim was either for the work,, labour, and materials or,
straightforwardly, for erecting and constructing an engine; Clark v Bulmer (1843)11 M. & W. 243, per
Parke B..
C. H. Myers & Co. v Brent Cross Service Co. (1934) 1 K.B. 46, per du Pan J at 55: "... the true view is
that a person contracting to do work and supply materials watrants that the materials which he uses
will be of good quality and reasonably fit for the purpose for which he is using them, unless the
circumstances of the contract are such as to exclude any such warranty" This was a repair case
where one of the new parts proved to have a latent defect.
' A condition of reasonable fitness for the purpose in a contract for dentures was implied without
finding it necessaly to decide the precise nature of the contract, Samuels v Davis (1943) K.B. 526
(CA); in my viei. it is a matter of legal indifference whether the contract was one of or the sale of
goods or one of service to do work and supply materials", per Scott U. at page 527.
This point was made in Young & Marten Ltd v McManus Childs Ltd. (1969) 1 A.C. 454 (l-l.L.) in
deciding that a contractor when supplying and fixing specified tiles for roofing in the course of the
construction of houses impliedly warrants that the tiles are of merchantable quality: "The
distinction between a contract for the sale of goods and a contract for the provision of work and
materials is one which depends on the particular nature of each individual contract, as was said as
long ago as 1856 ... and it is frequently a question of fine distinction, It would be a severe blow to any
idea of a coherent system of common law, if the existence of an implied obligation depended upon
such a distinction. That there are distinctions between the two types of contracts is undoubted;
questions of pleading (in the old days), passing of property,and so on. But, of course, the real
distinction upon which so many decisions were focused depended upon the fact that for 277 years
until 1954 a contract for sale above a small value required evidence in writing to be enforceable,
whereas a contract for work and materials did not."
Lord Upjohn in Young & Marten Ltd v. McManus Childs Ltd at page 473, "Indeed, for my part I
think, as a matter of common sense and justice, one who contracts to do work and supply materials
ought to be under at least as high, if not a highec degree of obligation with regard to the goods he
supplies and the work that he does than a seller who may be a mere middleman or wholesalet" The
reference to 1954 is to the repeal of s.4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 by the Law Reform
(Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954, sections 2 and 3 (2).
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habitation.
The distinction may be of legal Indifference for the attachment of warranties,
but the relationship of the supply of goods to the work element Is relevant to
the similarity of the terms to those arising under a contract of sale. 19
 Such a
result, 2° is now achieved for the supply element by the Supply of Goods and
Services Act 1982.21 Beyond this category the result is achieved as to the work
to be done by Part II of the Act applying to contracts "for the supply of a
service". A building contract is such a contract and there is implied under
statute that the supplier will carty out the service with reasonable care and
skill,22 with the common law supplying any other necessary implication for
the materials and end result.
There is a practical importance in the distinction in civil law systems,23
particularly because of the remedies available in respect of building defects.
An example is that under Italian law it is only in the case of a contract for
work and labour that rectification of the defects may be demanded whereas in
a contract of sale, cancellation of the contract or reduction of the price is
Hancock v B. W. Brazier (Anerley) Ltd. (1966) 2 All E.R. 901 (CA), approving Diplock J
. 
at (1966) 2 All
E.R. 1, and deriving from Peny v Sharon Development Co. (1937) 4 All .R. 390 (CA).
Young & Marten Ltd. v McManus Childs Ltd. (1969) 1 A.C. 454, per Lord Wilberforce at 477,
'Authority apart, it would seem reasonable that, the larger the element of supply of particular goods
in the contract, the closer should be the similarity of wananties to be implied with those arising on a
sale. In many cases there would be no logical reason for not importing a condition or warranty
identical with that arising under section 14(1) of the Act (1893). On the other hand, if the acquisition
of an identifiable object is of minima or no, interest to the purchaser" then, if any warranty is to be
implied, it should properly relate either to the quality of the work to be done or to the use of suitable,
and non-injurious, materials."
Lord Wilberforce in Young & Marten Ltd. v McManus Childs Ltd. (1969) 1 A.C. 454 at 477; "1 do not
think that much citation of authority is required to show that, in fact, the law has developed just in
this way. Before the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the courts had to consider questions of implied warranty
under the common law and they did so, both in relation to sales, proprio senst and to analogous
contracts, not strictly or at least not purely sales, in precisely the same way. Their conclusions as to
sales were taken into the Act, but the pre-existing principles remained and continued to be applied."
21 Applicable as it is to a "contract for the transfer of goods", where one agrees to transfer to another
property in goods immediately or in the future but not being a contract of sale.Part I came into force
on 4 January 1983.Fmm section 4, the fact that services are also provided does not affect the impact
of the legislation which includes the importation of the like terms as to quality and fitness as on a
sale.
Section 13. Part II of the Act came into force on 4th July 1983.
Whilst in England special remedies are available under contracts for sale in respect of the goods
themselves these are analogous to a fonu of security for payment On the Seller's part: a lien on the
goods for the price while the seller is in possession of them, section 41(1); a right of stopping the
goods transit after parting with possession in the case of insolvency, section 44; a right of re-sale,
section 48; on the buyers part a right to reject, section 30. These arise by implication of law and can
be excluded or varied by express agreement, Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 39(1).
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normally the only remedy open to the buyer. 24 For the purposes of the
distinction, where materials supplied are merely instrumental and accessory,
meramente strumentale ed accessoria, when compared with the skill and
labour to be engaged in the production of the article, the Italian courts, it
seems, tend to assume there to be a contract for work and labour, appalto,
rather than a sale, vendita. Both objective and subjective criteria are applied
and the fact that the value of materials supplied and used exceeds the value of
the work done will not, taken alone, be decisive. The common intention of
the parties is also important in deciding whether the obligation is one to do
something, fare, or to give something, dare
In France the classification lies ordinarily in favour of a contract of sale,
simple vente a livrer , whenever the supply of materials dominates, as
compared with the work to be done, and in favour of a contract for work and
labour when the converse applies. 26
 Such considerations apply to work on
movables, but there is a different view if the obligation concerns the delivery
of movables to be incorporated into immovables when the sales element
becomes absorbed by the marclie d'entreprise •27
' The Italian Codice Civile Article 1662 gives the right to demand that the contractor conforms with
the conditions of the contract and after the expity of a period of time fixed for this purpose the
contract is terminated upon failure. Article 1662: "... When in the course of the work,, it is ascertained
that performance is not proceeding in accordance with the conditions established by the contract
and according to the standards of the trade, the customer can establish a suitable time limit within
which the contractor must conform to such conditions. If such time limit expires without results, the
contract is tenninated without prejudice to the right of the customer to be compensated for
damages. Trans. Beltramo, Longo & Menyman.
25 Cass. 8th October 1973, no. 2528, Mass. Giust. civ 1973, 1330.
20 A practical consequence of such characterisation under French law is that the provisions of Article
1641 governing the sellers warranty against hidden defects apply to sales, whereas the scheme of
guarantee obligations under Article 1792 applies to those taking on work in connection with a
building contracts.
27 Under German law legislation expressly covers borderline cases on the line between sales law and
the law relating to work and laboui for the BGB 11 651 covers a situation where a workman supplies
the materials from which the work is to be made (contract for the delivery of work -
Werklieferungsvertrag) and it is treated as if it were a contract of sale except in those cases where
the product cannot be replaced by a simple purthase of another (nicht vertretbare Sache) in which
case ¶1651 provides a number of applicable rules. In this way the wananty against defects of quality
under sales law is effectively replaced by specialised rules prevailing in the area of contracts for work
and labour. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB): 11 651. (Contract for delivery of work). (1) If the
contractor binds himself to produce the work from material provided by him, he shall deliver the
thing produced to the customer and convey ownership in the thing. The provisions applicable to
sale apply to such a contract; if a non-fungible thing is to be produced, the provisions relating to a
contract for work, with the exception of 11 647, 648 take the place of ¶1433, 336 (1)-i, and of ¶1 447,
460, 462 to 464,. 477 to 479. (2) If the contractor binds himself only to provide additions or other
accessories, the provisions relating to a contract for work apply exclusively Trans. Forrester, Goren,
ligen. North Holland Publishing Co.
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2	 Roman Law Origins
The roots of the civil law systems for work on goods and building contracts,
whilst material to the distinction between such contracts and contracts of sale,
more importantly assist in an understanding of principles unfamiliar to the
common lawyer which will inevitably lie behind regulation or
harmonisation, 29
 and which might otherwise remain hidden by points of
practice or the wording of standard forms of contract. Bare rules may mislead
when looking for functional equivalents, 30
 just as distinctive modes of
thinking in the legal families may affect the identification of principles. The
approach of the English common lawyer will require adaptation in order to
participate properly in the debate with those from the Germanic and
Romantic families with their well articulated systems. To develop a new
approach it is necessary to examine the solutions their rules provide.
To this end some aspects of Roman law that have influenced principles of
civil law applicable in the building field are material, but one must beware
that common lawyers when viewing civil law frequently fall into the trap of
regarding it as no more than modernised Roman law, and so emphasise
resemblance between various civil law systems leaving out of account
particular facets of a nation's approach.3'
A view of Roman Lw
The contract Iocatio conductio was a letting and hiring where someone
agreed to give to another the use, or use and enjoyment, of a thing or his
services or his labour in return for remuneration. 32
 Although in terms of
rules closely resembling a contract of sale it was legally distinct and referable
to a hiring. Like a contract of sale it was completed by the agreement of the
25 The body of Roman Law is from the Digest, induding the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian.
References where specified are to Mommsems edition of the Digest in "Corpus Iuns CMlis' (1880)
with references identifying the relevant artides of the Digest and the Institutes of Justmian.
20 Commission of the European Community C. Mathurin, "Study of Responsibilities, guarantees and
insurance in the construction industry with a view to hamionisalion at Community level", 2nd
February 1990.
3° Zweigett and Kötz: An Introdudion to Comparative Law, Part.!.
F.H.Lawson,. The Approach to French Law. (1959) 34 Indiana U. 531, where, subjed to the warnin& it
is suggested that it is wise for a student of French law to start with a brief study of Roman law.
32 F.H.Lawson, The Approach to French Law. (1958-9)34 Indiana U. 531,
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parties and fixing of the price, and it produced only personal obligations not
real rights.33
The locatlo conductio took on three forms: the hire of a thing, locatlo
conductio rel ; the hire of services, locatlo conductio operarum; and the hire
of a piece of work, locatio conductio opens . Different meanings became
attached to the word locare and its derivations such that in the first two cases
someone supplying the thing or the services was the locator and the person
who paid was the conductor . Conversely in the third case, the Iocatio
conductio opens, the person giving the order was the locatur (he 'places' the
order), and the person executing the work or provides for its execution the
conductor .
Whilst the concept of labour producing or creating a piece of work originated
in the category of hiring, the distinction shown by the different meanings that
became attached to the same words indicates that under Roman law the third
form, the contract for work or building contract, outgrew its origins and
terminology.36 It is understandable that the locatlo conductio opens did this
when there was a need to cater for the placing of an order. 31 Paulus considered
that this was a contract of hire, 38 but Sabinus provided a different reason; that
the principal thing comes from 'me' namely that the building accedes to 'my'
soil, 39 being a central feature of building operations and impacting on rules
governing them.
" 
"The contract of letting and hiring approaches very nearly to that of sale and is governed by the
same rules of law. As the contract of sale is formed as soon as a price is fixed, so a contract of letting
and hire is fanned as soon as the amount to be paid for the hiring has been agreed on; and the letter
has an action locatj and the hirer an action conducti ." Institutes Book 3-24 from Digest 1922, and
Proomium, Translation: T. C. Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian.
Pernice suggests that in contracts "opera" was the technical expression for the work of the
contractor. (Digest 19-2.2. and l5pr. "Si aurum dedem mercede pro opera constituta").
This was because the Roman junsts generally looked at the work itself that was to be done, and
spoke of the person who contracted for its performance who gave it out", as the locator, and the
person who engaged to perform or execute it, or "took it in, as the conductor.
This would have followed from limitations on the contract of hire where in early forms there was
always something "placed": I place a thing at your disposal; I place myself at your disposal; I place
in your hands something on which you are to expend your labour, for example, material to construct
a house.
For example, to construct a building.
Digests. 19 - 2.22 (2).
This reason may have derived from the Sabinian school for, despite difficulties of application and
some inconsistencies, the point of acceding to the soil was a reflection of the law relating to
acquisition by occupation and other methods, for instance a person who used materials might either
give them new form or make something from them, different from the materials themselves, a nova
spedes, so that a person who made wine with anothers grapes was considered the owneç Digests. 18
- 120..
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Locatlo Conductio Rel , and Operarum
The duty of someone hiring out a thing, locator rel, was to procure to the
hirer its use and enjoyment for the purpose contemplated by the contract
during the period agreed. The duty ceased upon prevention by impossibility
arising from no fault of his own, in which case he could not demand the hire
money.4 ° There was also a duty to keep the thing hired in repair and a duty to
compensate the hirer for necessary and useful expenses.41
The first obligation of the locator in this case, was to deliver the thing free
from defects so as to be fit for its purpose, for example the supply of wine vats
that leak was not the supply to which the hirer was entitled; and there was
liability based on the status of the contract, and not on fault. 42
 So that when
considering the locatio conductio opens, and appreciating the mutation of
meaning, the contractor, conductor, was similarly liable without question of
fault.43 Just as the conductor, hirer, was at risk as to the fee in a hiring of
services when an extrinsic cause intervened to prevent the locator providing
his service, it became equally so in the locatio conductio opens . The work
was at the risk of the conductor, contractor, so that if it was destroyed whilst
in the contractor's hands, the price was not due, but if the work was destroyed
due to defects in the material supplied by the locator, employer; then there
was no such liability on the contractor without fault on his part.44
The standard of care required of the conductor was "as great care for the safe
custody of the thing he hires, as the most careful father of a family bestows on
the custody of his own property", although "if he bestows such care, but loses
The meires; Digests 19- 2.9.3-4.
Digests 19 - 2.55, 1. Necessaty expenses were such as were requited to preserve the property from
destruction or depreciation. Useful expenses increased the value of the property, though their
omission did not renderitlessvaluable. There was an exception in that the hirerwas responsible for
tnfling repairs.
42. Thatstatuswas a'clocato.
Digests 13. 1 to 6. An example was when a fuller loses cloth given to him to dean, or allows mice to
gnaw it.
This found its way into the French Code civil. Planiot: Traite Ilémentaire de Omit Civil (1939) on the
Code Civil. Article 1790. "The workman who has received the material of a thing to be made, for
which he has furnished only his labour, has no right to any wages, when the object made perishes
before having been delivered, unless such loss was due to a vice in the material."
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the thing through some accident, he is not bound to restore it." 45 The risk was
on the contractor, so also the burden of showing the defect in the material.
The hiring of services, locatlo conductio operarum , gave rise to the
obligation on the hirer or receiver of the services, the conductio here, to pay
the wages or price for the full period agreed if the person hired was ready to
render the services, and whether such services were used by the hirer or not.
Prevention from doing the work by some cause extrinsic to the workman
hired did not disentitle him from his wages where he had not obtained other
work, but failure to deliver the services did disentitle him. Additionally, the
person hiring himself out had to be competent for the work he undertook47
and negligence or fault made him liable for the consequences.48
The remuneration had to consist of money. It had to be certain or
ascertainable. Provision for the fixing of the remuneration by a third person
came within these requirements so as to constitute it a contract of hire,
provided the third person actually fixed the amount.49
Locatlo Conductio Opens
The locatlo conductio opens contemplated an engagement for a particular
piece of work involving a physical subject matter. There was the familiar
difficulty over the dividing line from sale contracts: 5° where a goldsmith was
to make rings, himself supplying the material it was ultimately decided that
"Qualern diige:itissirnus pateziamillas suis zthus adhi bet ", Institutes 3-24.5, 11ans. Sandars.
Digests 19-2 14.9. Digests 2.25. The price of or consideration for the letting was again the nie,res.
' Digests 19-2.9.5.
Digests 19-2.19.9 to 38.
If the amount was not fixed, so as to constitute a contract of hire, compensation for services
rendered could be claimed by actio pmiescriptis vethis. The Institutes record: "What we have said
above of a sale in which the price is to be fixed by the decision of a third person, may be applied to
the contract of letting and hire, if the amount to be paid for the hire is left to the decision of a third
person. Accordingly, if any one gives clothes to a fuller to be cleaned, or to a tailor to be mended,
without fixing the sum to be paid for their work, a contract of letting and hire cannot properly be said
to be made; but the circumstances furnish ground for an action praescliptis vethis ; Institutes 3-
24.1, from Gaius 3-143, Digests 14-2.25.
° Lee v Griffin, and Robinson v Graves op. cit..
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this was sale, not hire.5t
Someone contracting to build with his materials on another's land was
conductor opens ,52 whether because as the land was part of the finished
product he was only providing an element, or, because the result of the work
merged in the land and had no separate existence.
The Iocatio conductio opens might be made for the whole job at a sum
absolutely fixed, as distinct from so much per diem, or so much for each
portion completed. The conductor opens had to execute and deliver the
work according to the specifications, and was answerable for all defects,
whether due to his own want of skill or that of his workmen and
subordinates. Acceptance or approval of the work by the locator had the
important effect of extinguishing this liability except where there had been
dolus, wilful injuly on the part of the conductor.
For the locatlo conductio opens the same niles as to remuneration as in the
locatlo conductio rei applied, and the price fixed might be a lump sum, or so
much for each part of the work. The latter did not prevent an employer's
claim for bad work at completion of the whole, unless it was arranged that the
work should be approved, and so accepted, at each stage. 55
 The locator had to
pay the sum agreed provided the work was satisfactorily executed, but was
permitted to withdraw from the contract if the ultimate cost exceeded the
estimate given by the conductor .
This is the root of the approach of civil law systems to the important feature
of acceptance of work57 It was critical to risk and its transfer. When the work
' Nor as Cassius had determined, sale of the materials and hire of the goldsmiths labour. Gaius 3 -
147; Institutes 3 - 24.4: "It is also questioned whether, when Titius has agreed with a goldsmith to
make him rings of a certain weight and pattern, out of gold belonging to the goldsmith himself, the
goldsmith to receive, for example, ten aurei, whether the contract is one of sale or locatio et
conductio. Cassius says that there is a sale of the material, and a letting and hire of the goldsmiths
work; but it has been decided that there is only a contract of sale. If Titius gives the gold, and a sum
is agreed on to be paid for the work,, there is no doubt that the contract is then one of Iocafio et
conductio. 7 Trans. Sandars.
52 Digests 19 - 2.22. 2.
Buckland, A Textbook of Roman La 3M Edition. This was the thinking of Sabinus.
Digests 19-225.7. The work was the opus.
Digests 19-251.1.
Digests 19-2. 60.4.
La Reception under French law.
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was to be done subject to the locator's approval of the whole, it remained at
the risk of the contractor until approved, and equally if the work was to be
done by measure or section then the risk in respect of such remained until
reached and approved. An agreement that work was to be completed so as to
satisfy the locator, or subject to his approval, was interpreted as subject to
reasonable, not arbitrary, approval.58
This approval could be that of a nominee of the locator but reasonable
approval remained. The standard required was that which ought to satisfy
the approver, with the judgment that of a bonus iiT. This derived from the
standard of obligation imposed on the conductor in relation to the contract of
locatlo conductio under which "the conductor ought to do everything
according to the terms of his hiring, and if anything has been omitted in these
terms, he ought to supply it according to the rules of equity" 59 Approval
obtained by fraud was void so a claim for defects fraudulently concealed
existed even after the work had been approved.60
The timing of approvals to which work was subject was significant as it bore
on the question of risks. Approval had to be made within a reasonable time
of demand,6 ' and the risk was on the locator, with an obligation to pay the
merces whatever happened to the worlç so far as approved, or, if approval
had been delayed, mora , such as ought to have been approved. 62 The
conductor was entitled to payment for the work done if it was accidentally
destroyed before completion, and the work was and remained at the risk of
the employer in the event of destruction by vis major, although fault on the
part of the contractor was not excused by this.63
58 Digests 17-2.77.
"... ida" bono et aequo debet praetarn 1 Institutes 3-24.5, Digests 19-1.253.7, Trans: Sandars.
Digests 19-2.24 pr. 51.1. Whilst rational, there is some doubt as to the clarity with which this aspect
was approached, per Buckland: Albertano, Larbitranum bonis yin del debitore, 14, does not accept
the psvposition as clear law.
Implied by Digest 19-2.36; Cato, de agr. 144 2.
Digests 14 2.10.
Digests 19-236, 37, 59, 62.
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Influences and Risk
These facets of Roman law have been influential in the derivation of
principles now applicable to construction in France, and in other European
countries which received the Code Civil. Difficulties relating to construction
work on land were addressed but were not separately or clearly resolved, and
this may be seen as the reason why few detailed rules relating to building
contracts were to be found in the codes based on Roman law.
No building can exist without ground support, which may be an unknown in
construction, 64 and preliminary investigations may offer little protection
against sudden surprises. 65 Roman law considered the distribution of typical
spheres of ground risks in a manner that has proved influential in civil law
on the responsibilities of owners and contractors as they exist today. 66
 The
central principle was that where there was doubt the contractor bore the
ground risk until he could prove that he had fulfilled his portion of the work
in accordance with the contract. 67
Beyond this the impact of extraordinary geological forces outside that sphere
of risk lay with the owner of the site, as where it was demolished by
earthquake." Equally where destruction of a building occurred accompanied
by the owner's delay in acceptance then the risk of accidental destruction
rested with him. 69 There was also conscious risk allocation in the period prior
Geological faults, erosion,, unexpectedly shifting soil strata, hidden obstacles concealed old building
foundations, unforeseen underground water tables, surprising deposits of bedrock and many other
unforeseeable impediments make ground conditions the cardinal risk in evesy construction
contract.
So that nearly all work undertaken becomes to a certain extent a proto-type. The unseen part of a
floating iceberg that lies beneath the surface is the most fitting comparison for this situation:
Jacques Cat. Les Constructeurs et le Risque du So!, Editions du Moniteur, Paris, 1985, p. 253.
66 Professor W. Lorenz, Contracts for Work on Goods and Building Contracts, International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Vol. VIII, chap. 8, p. 124.
67 
'When you commit yourself to build a sewer and begin the work, and then this collapses due to a
cave-in before it has been approved, then you must carly the risk ...", per Labeo, Digests, 192.62.
68 
"Flaccus had taken over the construction of a house for Marcius, which again collapsed following
completion of a part of the house due to renewed settling of the soil; Massunus Sabinus stated in
this case that when it occurs on the part of the force of nature, such as earth slide, the damage
affects Flaccus (as owner)", per Javolemus, Digests 19237; there was a similar statement from
Paulus, Digests, 192.62.
When a work for performance has been given out in its entirety the contractor carries the risk until
the structure has been accepted by the ownet Howevei in the event of a contract for measurements
at the site with uniform prices, the risk lies with the contractor only as long as no measurements have
been made; and in both cases, the owner is responsible to the extent that he is responsible for non-
acceptance or non-measurement", per Florentius, Digests 19236.
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to acceptance for " ... when the work performance is destroyed by an act of God
prior to acceptance, the owner bears the risk, in so far as nothing to the
contrary has been agreed upon."
3	 OaraderiSücs
Development of Construction Law
A comparative view with harmonisation in mind should extend to the
manner of receipt of principles of Roman law, for their application is material
to an appreciation of the approach of French law, and its national
characteristics. In France the revolutionary events were critically important
for the Code Civil and its formulation, but there was absorption of the results
of a long development of the ancient droit and an influence of the
conceptual thinking of Pothier.71 Whilst the Code was founded on the creed of
the Enlightenment and the law of reason, that social life could be put into
rational order if only the rules of law were restructured according to
comprehensive plans, an influence remained from the droit coutumier
which evolved in the century before the Revolution, and of the droit écriL
Historically the dmit coutumier had been more prevalent in the north and
influenced by Germanic-Frankish customary law, while the droit écrit as
developed in southern areas bore the mark of Roman Law, although there
was overlapping.72
The original Code Civil was the law book of the third estate, the bourgeoisie,
and the model in the minds of the draftsmen was not the artisan, but the
man of property, judgment and reason, depending on guaranteed personal
freedom to engage in economic activity free from dominance by the feudal
From Florentius, Digests 19.2.36.
Zweigert & Kötz,, An Introduction to Comparative Law. Pothier lived [mm 1699 to 1772.
72 In the century before the revolution the Coutunie de Pans had become generally accepted as
applicable, and the influential work of Bouzjon (1720) was, interestingly, called "Le Droll commun
de Ia France et La coutunie de Pans reduit en pnnciples ."
The Commission of four appointed by Napoleon to draft the Code were experienced practitioners:
Tronchet, President of the Cour de Cassation, and Bigot de Preameneu had both been advocates at
the Parlement of Paris and represented the droll coutunuer while Portalis a high administrative
official, and Maleville, a judge of the Cour de Cassation, represented the droll écnt. Napoleons
significant contribution included achieving clarity of expression and language in relation to the
realities of life and the ideas incorporated in the Code.
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groups of the ancien regime ? Consistent with social aims in introducing the
Code Civil, forced execution of obligations was not permissible where the
contractual obligation was to 'doç for "every obligation to do resolves itself
into damages in case of non-execution". 75
 Restriction on the requirement to
pay damages for breach of contract depended on the ability to escape upon
proof, provided for in Article 1147, that an external event, cause etrangère
qul ne peut Iui être imputee , was the reason for the non-performance; and by
Article 1148 the duty to make compensation ceased in the event of force
majeure orcas fortuit.
The structures for construction law in England and France reflect the fact that
common law and the Code Civil provide some articles of principle, with the
growth in a body of standard rules to guide the practices derived from the
participants having been left to develop their own regulation for the
operation of the construction process.76
 They also reflect legislative activity of
a protective nature towards the ultimate consumer and those less able to
influence contractual rights and obligations, but in differing degrees. The
strength of the professions and associations or groups within the building and
engineering industries, particularly in England, has created almost standard
self-made rules, or norms." Such rules may be regarded as law in the sense
that the thing done becomes the done thing, and mutation occurs, for
instance, by group activity depending upon economic or other strengths. In
France, however, the influence of the state is substantial by the lead given in
the formulation of rules governing public contracts, in addition to its
willingness to legislate to the perceived benefit of sections within the
industry as in the case of the sub-contractor and retentions.
In his Discours préiiminaire Portalis explains the thinking of the draftsmen of the Code Civil,
suggesting that the French concept of the law rests on three fundamental principles: a code ought to
be complete in its field; it out to be drafted in relatively general principles rather than detailed rules;
and it ought at the same time to fit them together logically as a coherent whole and to be based on
experience. From P. Fenet, Recuell compiel des fiavawt preparatoires du code civil, 1827; and
discussed byA. Tims, Methodology of the Civil Law in France. (1976) Tulane L.R, 459.
Planiol, Traite Elémentaire de Droit Civil, (1939). The Code Civil did not provide regulation of the
astreinte, the legal mechanism for enforcing judicial orders for performance, subsequently
developed by the Courts, and involving a pecuniaW judgment imposed as a penalty at a rate per day,
which is considered under Performance and Damages.
" The role of the deductive methodology as the basis of French legal reasoning is impoitant. It is seen
to be obvious in the French school of legal thought that problems cannot be resolved by specific
wording which foresees and provides for them in advance. The fradition is to rely on basic principle
thoughtfully formulated so as to govern the wide variety of cittumstance, rather than looking at
individual events in order to determine into which pigeon-hole to place them.
" The German term is selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft - self-made law of industzy.
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The developed provisions of building and engineering contracts, and the
length of time over which they have been implemented renders them
important in understanding the construction process, and a proper source for
consideration alongside legal principle. For an English lawyer there are
numerous decisions on and castigations of provisions of standard forms by
courts and others which have led to reconsideration and changes in
subsequent editions, and parties adopt and adapt provisions of the forms for
their particular perceived needs.
The development of standard provisions through economic or sectional
groupings has brought in its wake legislative control impinging on freedom
of contract.78 In this sense legislative control is endorsing standard provisions
provided they conform with legislative policy, and this aspect, so far as
England is concerned, will have a greater impact than an approach that has
previously depended on control by judicial activity with its fortuitous case by
case consideration, and with limited artillery in the shape of attitudes to
exemption clauses, rules of construction and implied terms. The impact of
decided cases in construction law in France is it seems of increasing
significance, with the use of the principle of good faith as part of a
development which may be flowing conversely to the common lawyer's
perception of civil law sources.79
Standard forms of building contract have a long history. For example, in the
Netherlands the oldest form dates from 1839, one year after the introduction
of the Dutch Civil Code. This contract, issued by the Ministry of Waterways,
was modified and the 1938 edition, "Algemene Voorwaarden" (General
Conditions), underwent major changes in 1968 to form the Uniform
As in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Defective Premises Act 1972, Supply of Goods and
Services Act 1982.
Decisions of the Cour de Cassation in France in the field of construction are seen as having an
increasing impact in settling, or unsettling, the application of principle. In the Netherlands the
authority of the specialist court of arbitration for the construction industty is high, and its decisions
are published and substantially relied on. Judgments of the Cour de Cassation are carefully worded
in a concise way in order to facilitate the development of principles of more general use. It is not
that judicial opinions are never published or relied upon This may run counter to Article 5 of the
Code which prohibits a judge from pronouncing a judgment by way of a general ruling not
exclusively related to the case. The courts are sometimes close to these limits. In the French
tradition, the wording of the most significant decisions are as precedents regarded as similar to
provisions of the Ioi, and when considering any contract, reference is first made to the Code Civil.
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Administrative Conditions. 8° The reforms in the UAV Conditions were
made after consultation with the building industry Whilst drafted for
government contracts their use in private contracts became widespread, albeit
frequently subject to altered provisions, and the growing need to adapt the
UAV resulting from decisions in cases and arbitrations led to a new UAV
form in 1989.81
English Features
In England "a building contract is an entire contract for the sale of goods and
work and labour for a lump sum price, payable by instalments as the goods
are delivered and the work is done", 82
 with a special feature being
permanency of its result on land of another.
The scope of the law relating to building contracts and some of the problems
that arise derive from the nature of the construction process, its organisalion
and the relationship of the parties involved. The employer will ordinarily
engage the services of an architect or engineer to carry out the design. He may
directly or through the architect engage a quantity surveyor and other
consultants to draw up the measurements and quantities for the work the
subject of the architect's design for the purposes of seeking estimates. The
design itself will require detailing, and parts of this may be done by or in
conjunction with specialists who carry out that element of the work as a
subcontractor. The placing of the contract will generally be by seeking tenders
on the basis of the work shown in architect's or engineer's drawings,
specifications and other documents, and upon unqualified acceptance of a
tender, a contract comes into existence. The basis upon which the
documentation is drawn will frequently be the terms of a standard form of
contract, whether modified or not. The works will be carried out by the
contractor under the supervision of the architect or engineer, whose authority
will be governed by the terms of the form of contract. Numerous difficulties
invariably arise for which the terms of the form of contract may or may not
° limforme Administratieve Voorwaanien.
Published by the Netherlands Institute for Construction Law. Mopted by the Ministries of Housing,
Planning and Envimnment, Transport and Communications and Defence in August 1989.
82 Lord Diplock in Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. v Gilbert Ash (Northern) (1974) A.C. 689 at 717
(H.L.).
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have made provision. The contractor may have been required to sub-contract
parts of the works or may have done so of his own volition, and the
estimating and entering into sub-contracts will have followed a similar
process.
The organisation of this process and the roles of the respective parties have
been moulded in England by the use of forms of contract the drafting of
which has variously reflected the administration of the building industiy, or
constrained it, or ignored its practices. The influence of standard forms of
contract is important because they have, in many cases, become adopted as
reflecting norms, from organisation to responsibility and from terminology to
perceived risk.83
A feature of the English system is the role of the architect or engineer, to
which is attributed the requirements of an agent acting on behalf of the
employer vis-a-vis the contractor, as well as obligations as to certification,
expression of opinions and making of decisions to be carried out in a manner
that balances the interests of the employer and the contractor The
importance attached to the architect or engineer may well have contributed to
attitudes towards responsibilities that fostered the notion of a division
between liabilities for design and liabilities for putting that design into effect,
with the former remaining in the sphere of the architect or engineer. This
aspect represents a distinguishing feature between attitudes in England and
those in France, where the English approach to the role of the
architect! engineer is decidedly foreign. Whatever may have been the cause or
effect, they are undoubtedly reflected in the respective legal regimes.
The Standard Form of Building Contract, issued by the Joint Contracts
The result in practical terms is that the alteration or modification of standard terms proposed by an
employer when seeking tenders may well result in a cautious and costly reaction from contractors,
simply deriving from the fact of the proposal without regard to study of the potential effects of the
alteration.
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Tribunal, JCT, was formerly known as the RIBA contract." There are variants
of the form, each of which is regularly the subject of suggested amendments.
The earliest version was issued in 1909, although a form had been in use at
the latter part of the nineteenth century.' 5
 Of the variants, forms for use with
or without bills of quantities are available, together with a Local Authority
and a private version. After 1909, editions were issued in 1931, 1939, 1963 and
1980. The 1980 edition adopted many of the provisions and followed
substantially the drafting of the 1963 edition. Related documentation is
available for use with the 1980 form in connection with nominated sub-
contractors and suppliers the terms of which are linked to the 1980 form. For
use in smaller projects the JCT has produced an Intermediate Form of
Building Contract, 86 and an agreement for minor building works. Further,
the JCT has produced a standard form of building contract with contractor's
design and also a form of management contract.
Royal Institution of British Architects. The RIBA is now but one of the organisations that constitute
the body of the JCL The histoty up to 1963 was described in the restrictive trade practices case of In
re: Birmingham Association of Building Trades Employers' Agreement (1963)1 WL.R. 484, (referred
to under Future Directions: Standard Conditions and EC competition law) in the following terms:
"The main forms of contract had their origin as far back as 1903 when, as the result of collaboration
between the R.I.BA and the federation, the first standard form of building contract was issued.
Revised versions were issued in 1909 and 1931, and in the latter year there was set up a permanent
standing committee of the federation and the R1BA. which later came to be known as the Joint
Contracts Tribunal (the "JCI"). In 1947 its membership was widened to include representatives of
the RICS, the body representing quantity suiveyors, and in 1957 it was further enlarged by the
indusion of representatives of six bodies representing local authorities ... The JCT contains no direct
representation from the body of private building owners, but it is claimed, with some justification,
that such direct representation is impracticable and that the interests of private building owners are
looked after by the members from the RIBA and RICS. There is no representative on the JCT from
any govemmerit department. In 1937 an edition of the main contract forms adapted by use by locai
authorities was issued and the forms for use by private building owners were reissued in revised
form in 1939. There have been minor revisions of all four main contract forms since then, the fomis
cun-ent at the time of the hearing of the reference having been issued in 1957. During the year
ended March 31, 1961, over 91,000 of the main contract forms were sold.
The form of tender to be used by nominated suppliers was negotiated between the federation, the
RIBA and the RICS, and issued in 1956. The purpose of this form is to ensure that the architect
invites quotations from prospective nominated suppliers on temis which are not at variance with the
terms of the main contracts. It was not explained in evidence why a similar form of tender had not
been produced for use by nominated sub-contractors whose function is, apart from supplying
materials, to execute and complete sub-contract works.
As regards the two forms of sub-contract, neither the JCT nor the RIBA was responsible for their
drafting or issue. The buff forn. designed for use as between the builder and sub-contractors
nominated by the architect, was first published in 1936, the current edition having been issued in
1950. The blue form, designed for use as between the builder and sub-contractors not nominated by
the architect, was published in 1956. During the year ending March 31, 1961, 47,637 copies of the
buff form and 6,032 of the blue form were sold.
Finally, the form entitled conditions of estimate for use in small works was recently prepared by the
federation without consultation with any other body and first published in July, 1961. During the first
four months after publication 26,000 copies were sold."
85 Clements v Clarke (1880) 1-ludsons Building Cases (4th Ed.) Vol.2. p.54, and the form is set out in the
3rd Edition, Vol.2. p. 630.
' D. Royce, "Tugging at the Contract: Some Preliminaxy Reflections on the ja Management Form of
Building Contract (1984) 1 Const. U. 97.
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The JCT 1963 form was criticised both in and outside the courts on numerous
occasions, and described in one case as a "farrago of obscurities". The 1980
form was produced in an attempt to meet some of the criticisms, which
included, apart from complexity, failure to deal adequately with problems
encountered in practice, the placing substantially all the risk of the
unforeseen on the employer, and pretending to be a lump sum price when
including a multitude of propositions for increases. The 1980 form has also
been criticised for failing to grapple with the major problems of the 1963
form, 89
 but it must be appreciated that the wording may represent a balance
between views amongst the representatives of the constituent bodies, rather
than the will of the draftsman.9°
In familiarity, the JCT form is the major form in relation to building work in
England, whilst its counterpart for engineering works is that produced by the
Institution of Civil Engineers. The ICE form of contract is now in its 6th
edition, published in 1991, after a comparatively late first edition in December
1945. The ICE conditions were used as the basis for the preparation of the
Conditions of Contract (International) for Works of Civil Engineering
Construction by FIDIC. 91
 The FIDIC 4th edition was published in 1987 and
represents a markedly English approach such that: "it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that at least one primary object in preparing the present
international contract was to depart as little as humanly possible from the
English conditions". 92
 Notwithstanding the derivation and the drafting, the
FIDIC conditions are extensively used in international civil engineering
work, 93
 and under legal systems not restricted to those based on common
law94
' Professor Duncan Wallace has been a consistent critic, for example, Construction Contracts:
Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract, Ch. 29, p. 501: A Criticism of the 1963 RIBA Joint
Contracts Tribunal Contracts, (originally puhlished in The Quantity Surveyor, 19Th).
Edmund Davies U. in English Industrial Estates Corporation v Wimpey (George) & Co Ltd. (1973) 1
lloyds Rep. 118 at 126.
89 Pmfessor Wallace op. cit. Ch. 30, Resistance of Standard Forms to Change.
9° In relation to the ICE conditions, described as: "a delicate compromise", Humphrey lloyd Q.C. 5
l.C.L.R. 31.
a	 Fédération Intemationale des lngénieurs Conseils.
92 Professor Duncan Wallace, The International Civil Engineering Contract, stated in relation to the
3rd Edition, but equally applicable to the 4th.
9° FIDIC also haveconditions for Mechanical and Electrical Works, and terms for use in dredging
projects.




The Code Civil categonsed the building contract as it had been under Roman
law, du louage d'ouvrage et d'industrie ,96 of the hire of work and skill; a
contract by which someone entrusts the execution of a definite work to a
contractor who will carry it out in an independent way by the performance of
material or intellectual acts, but importantly without the power of an agent
for the employer.
There are particular features attaching to the personnel. The maître de
l'ouvrage is the client/ employer, and in public works there is control by
virtue of the Code des Marches Publics, which regulates procurement and
administration of projects in that sector.98 The project developer, promoteur
immobiier , is and was seen as an agent of the maître de I'ouvrage , and
while in principle an agent has no liability for latent defects, this point
coupled with the promoteur falling outside the scope of responsibilities
attaching to those subject to the rules du louage d'ouvrage left a Iacunae in
the protection of purchasers. Amongst the legislative reforms of 1971, 1972
and 1978,' the promoteur became subject to like responsibilities as others
involved in the construction process, notwithstanding the work being
executed by others on behalf of the maître de l'ouvrage.
The engineer in France is highly respected being the principal designer for
Land Development in France and Belgium, Law and Practice, British Institute of International and
Comparative Lav Special Publication No 5 (1964) provides an histoncal guide. Also, G. Liet-Veaux,
le droit de Ia construction, 1987.
Book 3, Chapter 111 of the Code Civil bears this title.
87 C. Cavallani andY. Kaffestin. La Guide de Ia Construction: les hommes, les m'ennes, les méthodes,
Ed. Moniteur, 1988. This provides a full review
For example, the maftm de I'ouwage is constrained in the manner of appointment of designers and
contractors. In the private sector the maître de I'ouge may include a package deal operator,
ensenthlier. The promoteur is the project developer who puts together the scheme, takes on
responsibility for working it out and co-ordinates its execution or has it co-ordinated, with a view to
transfening ownership to others.
" Lol no. 71-579 of 16 July 1971, Articles 32 and 51, Du contrat de promotion immobilière, brought in
new Aitides 1831-1 to 1831-5.
°° The 1972 amendment was by Loi no. 72-649 of 11th July 1972, Articles 21 and 22. The 1978
amendment was by Loi no. 78-12 of 4th July 1978. In 1978 also particular rules regulating the contrat
de pmmotion immobiliêre by Decrees nos. 78-621 and 622 of 31st May 1978.
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most infrastructure and public works, t0 ' whilst architecture has been regarded
as an important liberal profession strongly associated with the fine arts. 102
 As
a result of their background, French architects were, until the 1960s,
unequalled in the preservation of historic and the design of grand buildings
but were not regarded as in tune with the latest techniques, such practical
details being delegated. The maître d'oeuvre is the client's representative,
and may be an architect.n
In both public and private sectors the law requires that an architect sign the
application for a permis de construire for work on most buildings. There is
no obligation to employ the same architect, or indeed any architect, for work
on the project once the permis is obtained. In the private sector use is made
of bureaux d'études or the contractor for design work so that some only of
maltres d'oeuvres are architects. 104
 The architect does not issue certificates,
and does not have an impartial role as between employer and contractor, as in
England. He acts for the employer and in his best interests. Bills of quantities
are not generally used in France in the form known in England and there are
Engineering as a profession in France is dated from 1672, when Vauban formed a corps of military
engineers In 1720 this became the Corps des Fonts et Chaussées and in 1747 the Ecole des Fonts
et Chaussées was formed. This is the premier school for civil engineers, in that it not only has a
great reputation but also provides a significant number of engineers for the construction industry
each year
*02 M. Huet, Le Droit de L'Architecture, 1990. France was the first country in Europe to establish a
central organisation for architects when, in 1671, Colbert created a Royal Academy of Architecture to
provide a suitable artistic background for the reign of Louis XIV. Architects were trained to design
palaces and public buildings. During and after the Revolution, the need for more military and
public works introduced a requirement for more practical design skills. Civil engineering was placed
on a firm foundation by Napoleon and architecture, separated from civil engineering, was linked for
educational purposes with other fine arts in the beaux al-Is system. It continued until 1%8 to be a
part of this system through the Lcole Nationale des Beaux A,ts (EN BA) and associated ateliers.
*03 In the public sector, there is a requirement that there be a group of specialists capable of ensuring
the satisfactory execution of the designs. The function of the contn3leur technique is to check the
structural soundness of the building, its construction and its safety. The employment of the
contnMeuris obligatory for establishments open to the public or which present particular technical
difficulties. It usual to engage a contnIeur technique employed by, or part of, bureaux de contrOle. in
order to secure the now compulsory insurance.
*04 There is no firm figure as to the proportion, though estimates put the architect as being responsible
for about 30% of private wolc J.L. Meikie and P.M. Hillebrant, The French Construction Industry, A
Guide for U.K. Professionals, Construction Industry Research and Information Association, Special
Publication 66, 1989. Sometimes an architect will simply be used as a stamp a design prepared by a
BET so that the pernüs de construire may be obtained.
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no standard rules of measurement.'°5
The Insurance regime has a significant practical effect in France. It was
introduced as compulsory in 1978, together with changes in guarantee
obligations to widen their sphere of application to all those involved in the
construction process. The insurance scheme, dommage ouvrage cover, aims
to ensure that the maître d'ouvrage will secure money to repair damage,
with the result that employer's claims for defects are litigated less, with
litigation after the distribution of insurance proceeds determining
responsibility between those actually involved. A second scheme of
insurance is the police unique du chantier. This is a project, rather than a
blanket, policy which includes both the dommage ouvrage and
responsibiite civile décennale insurance.'06
The traditional method of contracting has been the lots separes; the letting of
separate contracts to each trade or group of trades. 107
 This avoids the problems
of nomination of subcontractors or suppliers in the English system.
Otherwise, methods are to appoint a general contractor responsible for the
whole project; alternatively contractors group together, taking joint
responsibility for all parts of the work, groupement des entrepnses solidaires,
105 The métreur vézificateur is the nearest to the quantity surveyor that exists in France Métreu,-s and
vérificateuis perfonn a nan'ower range of tasks, have traditionally held technical status only, and
are not regarded as being on the same level as architects or engineers. Historically the niétreur and
the venulcateur were separate and the functions perfonned are still essentially distinct, though they
are now noimally performed by the same professional practice. They are usually appointed by the
architect or enginee rather than by the employer, and also work for contractors. The niétreur is a
measurer and is involved in the construction process before and after the tendering stage. The
métreur assists in the comparison of tenders submitted, the preparation of cost estimates and
specifications. He may also undertake some coordination of the works on behalf of the client.
Working for the contractor, the rnétreur will measure the quantities from the drawings, assist in
estimating tender prices, measure on site for monthly valuations, measure for the settlement of
subcontractor or inter-contractor accounts and assist in the preparation of the final account. He
may assist in coordination of a groupenlent. The vérificafeur essentially checks the work done by
the contractor's métreur on behalf of the architect, bureau d'études , or employer.
toe Bloch, Responsabilitès et assurances dans le batiment et les travaux publics, 1982 Edition Eyrolles.
The cost of the construction insurance system is substantial, especially as there tends to be double
insurance by client and design and construction team, with many participants to be insured.
Estimates range from 3-4% to 7-8% of the cost of buildingfor such insurance. The organisation and
operation of all building construction insurances is closely linked to the buieauv de con tn5le or
contra/ems techniques agrees.
107 French building contractors are broadly divided into those undertaking Bros oeuvre , structural
works, and those undertaking second oeui, more likely specialist contractors. The entmprise is
the contracting company. Many are small separate trades contractors, and a general or main
contractor is the I'entreprise générale. The ensernblier is an organisation which puts together
package deals (dé en main). New approaches are unlikely to alter the basic premise of overall
responsibility of the contractos M. Frilet, Management Contracting: A Civil Law Approach Based on
the French Bample. (1993) 10 l.C.LR. 337.
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or for a particular piece of work, groupement des entreprises conjointes •b08
Invitations to tender, i'appel d'offres, are frequently made on specification
and sketch drawings rather than on bills of quantities and detailed drawings,
leaving a design element and choice to contractors such that the lowest price
will not necessarily be the yardstick for selection.'°9 Negotiated contracts,
marches de gre a gre, are permitted by the Code des Marches Publics where
the project is virtually a repeat order; where the work is so complex or
specialised that there is only one contractor able to undertake it; or if the
tendering process has proved unproductive. Contracts in the private sector
frequently adopt the standard AFNOR terms and, by reference, the cahier des
clauses administratives generales (CCAG), to which may be added specific
matters relating to the project.'1°
Anecdotally, there appears to be less dispute on contractual matters between
contractor and employer, and a greater degree of mutual trust than obtains in
England." In France the contractor's broad responsibility to build a viable
project, together with his involvement in the final design, means that he
carries obligations towards the owner that in England are frequently the
source of argument where they straddle the lines of the functions and
responsibilities of contractor and separate designers.
The construction process is positively perceived as different from the British
process. 112 The tradition of the construction industry in England is such that
many of the technical functions necessary for the proper execution of works
Gmupement des entreprises solidaires is effectively a joint venture, in that each of the contractors
is responsible for the whole project and takes the risk that others contractor may default. In the
groupernent des ent,epnses conjointes the work is formally dided up and no contractor bears
responsibility for another. This system is used substantially.
'°° The Gxfe des Ma,vhés Publics permits the tender which is "economically the most advantageous"
to be accepted. There are exceptions, notably if the submitted bids are infructueux , that is
unfruitful or unproductive, when the employer may so declare and either go out to tender again or
negotiate.
Villard, Bachelot and Romero, Droit et Pratique des marches publics de travauç 1981, Edition du
Moniteur. The CCAG will be referred to in the contract document but not appended (any more than
British Standards Institution standards are attached).
This may well have a foundation in the approach to the construction process and the insurance
system.
112 M. Frilet, How certain provisions of the FIDIC Contract operate under French Law. (1992) 9 I.C.LR.
121. Qualitative comparison is impossible. Both systems get projects completed, more or less
satisfactorily. From the employert's point of view the process is possibly less painful in France
through the influence of the insurance regime, whic tends to reduce an area of confrontation. The
actual control of physical development in France based on the permit for virtually all construction
works is regarded as comprehensive.
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are not performed within the contractor's own organisation, but by the
engineer or Architect.' 13
 To French eyes this is a limiting of the role of
contractors, and may be more, an interference in the tradition for contractors
to undertake technical functions." 4
 While commercial instincts appear to be
influencing this, the difference between the traditional function of the
engineer under the English approach and the maître d'oeuvre in French
projects remains substantial, and the legal foundation from which the FIDIC
conditions are derived affects their application under civil law, instanced not
only by different results under the same clause, but by different legal routes
required to achieve the same practical result."5
The Framework for Public Works
The French system has developed over two centuries an approach towards
contracting deriving from the origins of the Code Civil provisions and their
interpretation, but also from the principles and practices developed by the
administrative courts under the droit administratif -
	 In 1799 the
administrative courts were given jurisdiction over disputes relating to public
works,"6
 and this was the commencement of the development of principles
governing such contracts which have departed in notable respects from the
Code."7
 The reason for applying different legal solutions to public contracts,
which is a corner stone of the approach of French law to contracting, lies in
the fact that these contracts are performed for the benefit of the public interest,
so coming before private interest. The administrative courts have been free
to develop this aspect since, unlike the civil courts, they are not bound by the
Code Civil provisions, albeit in practice, when there is no need to develop
specific principles for public contracts, the Code is applied."8
" Save for the particular JCT form with Contractor's Design", but even here the contractor's design
element is contemplated and provided for as a distinct portion of the whole wotks.
" With the exception of artistic works to which many contractors wished to limit the role of architects.
Comment by Frilet (1992) 9 I.C.LR. 121 suggests that this view of the architect may have been
influenced by the decennial liability and ease by which the employer in many instances may have
recourse to the contractor when the default is not attributable to him.
" M. Frilet, How certain provisions of the FIDIC Contract operate under French Law. (1992) l.C.L.R.
121.
Article 4 of the law 28 PIuvióse , An VIII, 16th Februaiy 1799. This provides: "The Conseil de
prefecture shall have the authority in respect of difficulties which may arise between public works
contractors and the administration in relation to the interpretation or the execution of their contract
provisions".
A particular feature considerered under Relief from Performance is La théorie d'imprevision. The
administrative court is the lithunal Adninisa,with the Counseil d'Etat at the highest level.
Jacques Catz, Les constructeurs et le risque du sol, Edition La Moniteur 1985, p. 225.
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It is not practically possible to contract out of the CCAG provisions, 12' and as
major works undertaken in France and those French-speaking countries
following the French tradition are mostly public works, the CCAG conditions
play in reality a leading role in civil contracting activities and are at least
equal to the role played by the ICE conditions in the UK. It is noteworthy in
this respect that there is no set of standard conditions published in France
exclusively for engineering works of a private nature.'22
In practice, French contractors are used to relying upon the CCAG, and for
private works the AFNOR, standard conditions which differ in approach
from the FIDIC conditions, and which have resulted from many years of
implementation and refinement. In the circumstances where employers and
contractors alike have been governed over time by accepted principles, some
written in the CCAG and others not, although generally acknowledged,
practice and usage plays an inevitable role. Important issues, such as
contractors' liability, allocation of risks, limits of architects' and designers'
responsibility are well-trodden aspects and it is frequently felt that there is no
need to address them in detail in general or particular conditions.
It is understandable with this background why FIDIC provisions may create
misunderstandings if they are sought to be utilised in France and countries
following the French tradition. It is clear that a range of usages and civil law
premises Will be in the minds of those parties having a practice of contracting
in France and the impact will restrict, supplement and sometimes alter the
impact of the FIDIC conditions, and a court in a civil law state may well
interpret and apply particular clauses in a different fashion from a court in a
121 Departure fmm a CCAG provision must be express and exceptional in cases of absolute necessity
Guide for the attention of employers and engineers, Cntular of 19th Oct. 1976.
122 J Montmerle and A Caston, Passation et execution des marches des travaux privês, 1979, Edition
du Moniteur. The AFNOR terms, 1991, is a set of standard conditions primarily applicable to private
building works and not engineering worics.
39
in a common law countTy.123
123 FIDIC departs from the general principle found in Article 1788 of the Code Civil that the risk is on
the contractor up to taking over, in that while part of the risks derives fivm causes which may be
characterised as force majeule and as such under French laws not attributable to anyone, other
risks can in fact be attributable to an identifiable party, being the employer, clause 20.4(0 or a third
party designer, clause 20.4(g). Under French la these categories of "risks do not fall within the
scope of force majeure and unforeseeable circumstances, which have separate consequences of
their own. In addition, the question will arise as to whether the risks specified in clause 20.4(a), (b),
(c), (d), (e) and (h) cover faire inajeure as understood under French law and whether any other
force majeurecause will be an employer's risk or not. Although clause 20.4 in the light of clause 20.2
leads to the conclusion that any force rnajeuze event, not expressly listed, is at the risk of the
contractor, it is not unlikely that the French courts would consider (based on Articles 1156, 1162 and
1164 of the Code Civil) that a force majeum event of the same nature should to be at the
employer's risk. Another point may lie in the recognition by the French courts that the "risk" of loss
or damage due to faulty design not provided by the contractor or for which he is not responsible is
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1	 Qxilrad FormaIki, Oassificatic*i and Conditions
A legally binding agreement" describes a contract under common law, but
not the concept. The bargain is a central aspect of contract formation, and is
at least partially responsible for the doctrine of consideration, 1
 the historical
antecedents of which distinguish common law from civil law notions of
contract, and its scope; but for the purposes of building contracts, a feel for the
contrast may be gained from the approach to the elements of contract
formation and a view of the concepts of offer acceptance and intent.
The elements required at common law in England are generally expressed to
be that a contract must be based on mutual assent and there must be mutual
agreement, that is: "a final and unqualified expression of assent to the terms
of an offer", 2 with consideration, 3 an intention to make a contract, legal
capacity, and no statutory or common law rule that renders the contract void.
In France the means of formation of a contract are based on the definition in
Article 1101 under which a contract is an agreement by which one or more
persons oblige themselves toward one or more others to give, to do or not to
I
P. S. Atiyah, Consideration: A Restatement, in Essays on Contract (1986) p. 179, reproducing
Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations (1978) 94 L.Q.R. 193.
2 chitty on Contracts, 26th Edition, para 54.
After the creation of the Law Commission in 1%5, item 1 of the First Programme of law reforms was
the codification of the law of contract. Item 3 included the topic of third party rights in connection
with which a substantial amount of work was done in conjunction with work on consideration. It was
then felt that reform of privity could not usefully be undertaken without reform of the doctrine of
consideration. In 1973 it was decided to suspend work on the production of a contract code (8th
Annual Report 1972-73 No. 58 paras. 3-4) but other projects have proceeded without any
reassessment of the doctrine of consideration, including the question of third party rights in the
recent Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 121. Meanwhile in Williams v Roffey Bros. &
Nicholl (Contractors) Ltd. (1990) 2 W.L R. 1153 (CA.), "All three Judges agreed that the promise of
additional payments was supported by consideration but did not agree as to where (it) was to be
found. The adoption ... of a factual, rather than a legal definition of consideration affects a suble
but significant change in the law relating to modification of contract', R. Halson, Sailors, Sub-
contractors and Consideration. (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 183.
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do something. 4
 Contract is considered as resulting from an agreement
between the parties under which to be given the force of law the parties must
intend to create legally enforceable obligations between themselves.5
The concept of contract in France appears wider than that of the common
law, in the sense that whilst the principle that a contract represents the result
of agreement is central, there are fewer strictures that derive from the
common law understanding of a contract as a promise in return for good
consideration.6
 The distinction is felt in the differences that flow from this.
There being no doctrine of consideration in civil law as a requirement for the
validity of a contract that the parties intend to make, 1
 other features exist to
achieve a requisite degree of seriousness, namely the concepts of objet and
cause.
Article 1108 of the Code Civil identifies four elements that must be present
for a contract to be valid. 8
 (1) The most important is assent of the parties,
expressed in terms of offer and acceptance. Where dispute exists the court
will decide if the parties have reached a meeting of minds on the essentials of
any contract, a meeting of two unilateral acts of will. (2) The parties must
have the legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. (3) There must be a
definite object, objet certain, forming the subject-matter, matière , of the
agreement. 9
 (4) There must be a valid reason, cause licite, for entering into
the agreement, being a twofold requirement of a cause and that it must be
Artide 1101: "Le contrat est une convention par laquelie une ou plusieurs peionnes s'ob1igen.
enveis une ou pIusieuz autres, a donne,, a faire ou a ne pas faire quelque those.
Planiol, Ripest and Esmein: Traité Pratique de Dmit Civil, 68, 99. The word contract is translated both
as contrat and convention, albeit that in French law contiat is a class of conventio4 and are all
conventions; but the reverse is not so, not all conventions are contracts. Contzat creates obligations,
and the distinction is that conventions may create another legal consequence such as the transfer of
an obligation, B. Nicholas: French Law of Contract, 1982, 36. Italian legal terminology uses only the
single word "contratto".
Lorenzen: Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 621; von Mehren, Civil
Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis (1959) 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1009.
de Moor Contract and Agreement in French and English Law (1986) 6 Oxford J.L. Studies, 275.
a Article 1108: "Quatre conditions sont essentie!Ies pour Ia valiidité d'une convention: Le
consenternent deJa partie qul s'oblige;Sa capacité de contlactet Un objet certain qui fonne Ia
matié,e de ['engagement; Une cause lidte dans I'obligation." [Four conditions are essential for the
validity of a contract: The consent of the party who obligates himself: His capacity to contract: A
certain objet forming the subject matter of the engagement: A valid causa in the obligation.J
Objet is used in general senses in the Code Civil: the objet of the contract is in the obligations it
creates, the objet of a vendor's obligation is included in the prestation consisting in the delivety of
the thing and the objet of the prestation is the chose itself.
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licite •l Whilst not easy to transpose, it reflects the need for a serious reason
for a person to have bound himself.
Objet and cause as concepts assist in understanding the approach of the civil
law All legal systems have to resolve whether eveiy bilateral agreement is
to be treated as a contract, or whether some additional element is required to
make transactions enforceable. Capacity and consent or agreement are
universal, and in France cause fulfils a view that a serious promise must be
based on some comprehensible and permitted purpose within society.' 1
 The
concept has altered over time but represents something akin to the typical
reason for which people make the agreement in question.
By Article 113111 an obligation without cause, or with a false or mistaken
cause or with an illicit cause, cannot have any effect. This additionally
reflects the impact of an impossibility.' 3 Article 113214 provides that an
agreement is none the less valid even though the cause is not expressed, and
Article 113315 renders a cause illicit when prohibited by law, or when contraly
to morality or public policy. 16 There has over time been much debate as to the
true function of cause, and by reference to motif, not motive, Capitant
described cause in a manner that represented a classic statement,17
concluding:
["...an obligation cannot be separated from its cause it remains with
the obligation throughout its whole existence, it is the fundamental
'° By Article 1321 of the Italian Codice Civile a contract is the agreement of two or more parties to
establish, regulate or extinguish a legal relationship among themselves, having economic content.
The essential elements as described in Artide 1325 are agreement of the parties, lawful cause,
object, anc in certain circumstances, form. Article 1173 requires that the performance that is the
object of a contractual obligation must be of such a nature as to be capable of economic evaluation.
" Markesinis, Cause and Consideration in the Law of Contract: A Study in Parallel (1978) Camb. U. 53.
12 Article 1131: "L'ob!igafion cans cause, ou cur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause ill/cite, ne peut
avir aucun effet. -
Considered further under Relief from Performance.
' Article 1132: "La convention n'est pas moms valable, quoique Ia cause n'en pas e'tpiiniee.
Article 1133: "La cause est ilhicite, quand eYe est pmhiitée par Ja Jo,,. quand eYe est contrai,e aux
bonnes mw ou a I'o,dm public."
10 The comment of the English Law Revision Committee in 1937 that: "The Prench Civil Code
recognises cause as an element in a contract, but this requirement, which seems to refer to the
motive underlying the making of the contract or the purpose for which it is made, appears to be
largely academic in characteE It does not resemble "consideration or give rise to any of the
difficulties ... - has been put in context by the view that there was overstatement if the suggestion
was that other systems either enforce all promises intended by the promisor to have legal effects or
have managed to render easy of solution the basic problems approached in the common law
through consideration,; A.T. von Mehren, Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in
Comparative Analysis (1959) 72 Haiv. L Re 1004.
Capitant, De Ia Cause des Obligations, Librairie Dalloz, Paris, 1923.
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and indispensable condition of its validity."118
Validity of a contract under French law also requires that there be no defect in
the objet, the object of the transaction, the acte juridique. It is the element
or performance, prestation, promised in the contract, and that which exists
or the feasibility of performance at the time of contracting. Certain qualities
must exist in it, namely for performance it must be juridically possible, legal,
certain or ascertainable. The utility of debate here as to the theory is
doubted,19
 but it is to be noted as a mechanism for rendering invalid
contracts which the common law would categorise under impossibility
where the impossibility was extant at the time of contracting.
Common law does not have the same approach to classification of contracts
as in civil law. Unilateral and bilateral are terms well understood and the
promise exchanged for a promise is understood as synallagmatic 2° Civil law
has elaborate classifications of contract viewing transactions as contracts
which common law would regard as unenforceable gratuitous promises, so
that it has distinctions not required at common law for example, gratuitous
and onerous contracts.21
Professor Lawson's analysis, which takes into account the English perception of consideration,
concluded that:" ... in modern French law one could well say that cause expresses three different
notions: (1) Something almost identical with the English consideration, such consideration not being
a legal requirement in all contracts, but being merely the result of analysing the vast majonty of
contracts, which in practice have a consideration; (2) the notion of the inteMependence of premises,
which is vely closely related to the notion of consideration; and (3) the motive, or rather perhaps we
should say the object, of the parties in entering into the contract. French legal opinion seems more
and more disposed to recognise the difficulty of using one word to express these different notions
Objet is what is promised, the content of the premise. Cause is, in onerous contracts, the
consideration for the premise, in gratuitous premises, the liberal intent; and it is unifonu for all
contracts of a type. Motif is the concrete individual motive which has introduced a part to make a
promise or enter into a contract ... "; Buckland & McNair (Ed. Lawson) Roman Law and Common
Law - a comparison in outline, 1965.
A comparative view is in G. Gorla, The Theoiy of Object of Contract in Civil Law A Critical Analysis
by means of the Comparative Method (1954) 28 Tulane L.R. 442.
20 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (1962) 2 Q.B. 26 at 65; United Scientific
Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council (1978) AC. 904 at 928 c.f. contracts and the common law
term "condition".
21 Article 1105: "Le contiat de bienfaisance est celui dans Ieque! tune des paifiespivcwe a I'autre un
avantage purement gratuit." [A gratuitous contract is one in which one of the parties procures a
gratuitous advantage for the other.1 An aleatoiy contract, derived from the Latin aba, dice, refers to
one where a party's duty to perform or the extent of it depends on an uncertain event. Article 1104
distinguishes between commutative contracts in which performance of one party is regarded as
equivalent of the other's, and aleatozy contracts in which the equivalent is the chance of gain or loss
for each party depending on the occunence or otherwise of an uncertain event. Article 1964 renders
an aleatoty contract one where the risk of gain or loss for the parties or one of them so depends, but
the important point is that under neither is the contract one in which performances are exchanged
for each othec The distinction is not used in English law but is relevant to a view of remedies based
on the importance of the term broken.
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In civil law the synallagrnatic contract is not only bilateral in the sense that
each party undertakes an obligation, but it has the characteristic that the
performance promised by one party is to be exchanged for that of the other.
For its creation, both promises must be possible and it will fail if one is
impossible ab initlo. For its function, failure by one party to perform his part
of the promised exchange will justify the other's refusal to perform; so gMng
rise to the defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus. In the Code Civil
Article 1102 uses the expression synallagmatique ou bilateral " and the
concept of exchange appears in Article 1106.22
Justification for refusal to perform can be seen in common law as dependent
on the importance of the term broken by the other party. Condition is used
to refer to a future uncertain event on which the effect of a contractual
obligation depends, and to terms in contracts (conditions of contract). It is
also descriptive of a particular type of term, namely that specifying an event
on which a party's obligation depends and the event may be the due
performance of the other party's undertaking
In France Article 1168 adopts the the sense of condition as an event when it
describes a conditional obligation as one depending on a future uncertain
event, and Articles 1169-1180 which define various types of conditions use
the word in the same sense. But when Article 1184 provides that in all
synallagmatic contracts there is an implied resolutive condition in case either
party does not comply with his engagement, this seems to be by way of
implication rather than a reference to an event. Nevertheless a condition is
an event in its primary meaning and as in Article 1168 it is future and
uncertain.
A term is any stipulation, but 'term' 23 in French law refers more narrowly to
22 By contrast Artide 1103 defines a unilateral contract as one in which one party (or several) is under
an obligation towards another without there being any undertaking on the part of the latter, and the
civil law brings into the category of unilateral contracts many transactions which the common law
would not regard a contracts for lack of consideration. Hence the need to consider the approach to
contracts to benefit third parties and the need to consider restitution as a remedy. In France within
the category there is the gratuitous contract, contrat de bienfaisance. It is nevertheless a contract.
even though lacking the important element at common law in a unilateral contract namely that the
promise only becomes binding when the stipulated act or abstention has been petfonned by the
promisee.
23 Article 1185. I.e tezme différe de Ia condition, en ce qu'iI ne suspend point I'engagement.. dont il
zvtairle seulement I'a'técution.
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provisions that specify duration of a contract or the time when its
performance is to commence or end, and it is distinguished by being certain
to occur from a condition.
In English law, an express term specifying a performance to be rendered by
one party may be a condition precedent or an independent premise, but in
civil law conditions are seen as contingent and "condition" is not used in
relation to the defence of refusal to perform, so that civil law would not say
that A's duty to do the work was a condition precedent to B's duty to pay,
rather that A's duty must be performed in advance of B's.
2	 Eienrds of (Xfcç Acccp(anae and Lnki,t
Under common law the manifestations of assent must be referable to each
other and in this sense there must be offer and acceptance. 24
 The offer must
be definite and certain. Expressions of a general willingness will not suffice
and it must be sufficiently detailed so that acceptance can result in a complete
agreement.25 Offers may be terminated by rejection, counter-offer, lapse of
time, death or incapacity, and, revocation. The common law feature of the
ability to revoke an offer at any time prior to its acceptance, whilst notionally
the same in France, 26 is in contrast with Germany,27 and its impact is only
marginally lessened by acceptance being effective not when received but
when posted, even if this is interpreted as running counter to the consensual
nature of contract.28
24 Although contractual relations may be found where there is not the ability to find a contract by
applying the traditional analysis; G. Petty Trentham Ltd. v Archital Luxfer Ltd and others (1993) 1
Lloyd's Rep. 25 (CA.) "... in this fully executed transaction a contract came into existence during
performance even if it cannot be precisely analysed in terms of offer and acceptance" per Steyn U..
25 It seems that the common law is generally more reluctant than the civil law to classiI' open offers to
the public, advertising and commercial communications as offers rather than as mere invitations to
treat; Nicholas: The French Law of Contract (1992).
26 The principle by which an offer can be withdrawn until acceptance has been substantially modified
by the courts. Without a specified limit a reasonable period, délai raisonnable, is imposed and
premature revocation can then be compensated. The legal basis has been formulated as a tort or
precontract.
27 The offerer is bound by his offer in that he cannot withdraw it for the period specifIed, or if none
specified then for a reasonable time. By the BGB it is not merely a duty not to withdraw but no
power to do so.
28 The absolute revocability of offers was, with safeguards, rejected in the Vienna Convention Relating
to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (1964), Article 16(a).
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In France the offer is a declaration of will, unilateral, and by which there is a
proposal to conclude an agreement. In contrast to the common law, doubt is
more often resolved In favour of an offer, 29
 and characterisation as an offer of
any proposal which does not clearly indicate contraly intent leads to contract
at an earlier stage than under the common law perception, with less
likelihood of the contract/no contract argument that affects the construction
field in England. 3° An offer to contract may be expressed by any means
provided the intention to contract is certain. This intention may be implied
from the circumstances, 31
 and intention appears more readily implied from
the continuation of former contractual relations by the parties in that the
tacite reconduction of a previous contract amounts to the conclusion of a
new contract.32
The legal nature of an offer is a unilateral expression of will and may not be
binding upon the offeror since under French law unilateral acts may not
create obligations. As a consequence, an offer may be withdrawn by the
offeror until accepted by the offeree. The withdrawal prevents the formation
of a contract, but the offeror may be liable in tort for the damage he has
caused to the offeree if the withdrawal is wrongful.
Proposals to enter negotiations do not in France suffice as an offer, and this is
entwined with the general requirement that the material terms must be
within the offer for acceptance to create contractual relations. Where some of
the terms are not within the offer a contract may still be concluded, provided
they are capable of being determined whether by reference to a formula, or by
some other kind of mechanism that does not necessitate another declaration
of will by the parties.33 This feature reflects the Roman law requirement as to
the price being fixed or capable of ascertainment, and the nature of the result
29 Display in a shop window of an artide with a price is an offer, and is not seen as an invitation to
treat.
3° For example, Peter Lind & Co. Ltd. v Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (1972) 2 Lloyds Rep. 235.
This is apart from argument on the nature of disagreed temis.
An illustration of the French approach is in the case of the taxi, the presence of which at a rank with
the driver at the wheel was found to constitute an offer to cany the passenger who by opening the
door accepted it,. with the driver committing a breach in moving off before the passenger could get
In, namely breach of the obligation to transport the passenger safely to the destination; Cour de
Cassation, Cass. civ. 2nd December 1969. D. 1970, 1O4 note G.C.M.
32 Cass. ci 1, 18th Januaiy 1983, Bull In. 6; cass. civ. 3, 6th Jun. 1984. Some legislation prescribes a
written fonn for an offei. for example the Loi of 13th July 1984 protecting borrowers in contracts of
loan designed to finance real estate purchases by providing for a written offer of loan to be made by
the professional lender setting out the prescribed conditions of the proposed loan.
Cass. ci' 3.6th June. 1969.
47
is that achieved in England by the application of two principles.
First is the requirement that the parties must have agreed on all terms which
are regarded, objectively, as essential for the contract and to give certainty,
and also on those terms regarded by the parties themselves as essential.
The like point is found in France in conclusions as to the formation of
contracts where disagreement actually exists on minor elements of the
contract, but where agreement on those elements was intended as a
condition of its formation, the court there determining the real intention of
the parties. 35 The formation of a contract need not be based on a unique
meeting of minds, but may involve several partial agreements by which the
parities reach the final consensus. A partial agreement relating to a contract
under negotiation is sufficient for the contract to be concluded, where it
covers all the essential elements. This is based on Article 1583 governing
sales,36 providing that the sale "is perfected ... when there is agreement on the
article and the price". Agreement on essential elements is necessaly, but also
sufficient for the formation of the contract; formation is not hindered by the
fact that some accessory points remain unsettled. 37
 The parties may
nevertheless decide, expressly or implicitly, that they consider as essential
points still under discussion; in those circumstances the contract will be
concluded only upon final agreement. Further, whenever a question arises
under a contract which does not provide a clear and precise solution on its
terms, the court will interpret the contract in order to discover the parties'
'real' intention. This interpretation may be on the basis of any information,
The formulation of this principle was usefully set out in circumstances of a retrospectively governing
contract for the building of a nuclear power station; it having to be established: "... not only that the
parties were ad idem on all terms which they then regarded as being requisite for a contract, but also
that they had not omitted to agree any term which was, in la essential to be agreed in order to
make the contract commercially workable.", Trellope & CoIls Ltd. v Atomic Power Constructions Ltd.
(1963) 1 W.L.R. 333, per MegawJ. at p337. The facts were that an offer was made in February 1959 to
carry out certain works for Lx. In June 1959, while the parties were still negotiating the terms of the
prespective contract the work started. By April 1960 agreement on the essential terms was reached.
These included a clause previding for the variation of the contract work and for its valuation and
payment with the contract work. By that date the work to be carried out and the price to be paid if
there was a contract was different from the price and work in the February 1959 offer, but the
conclusion was that a contract came into existence on the terms finally agreed in April 1960.
Cass. civ. 4th January 1937.
Article 1583: Wile est paffaite entre les parties. et la propriéte est aCquise de droit a l'achetew- a
l'éga,d du vendeur, des qu'on est convenu de Ia chose et du pn quoique Ia chose n'at pas en corn
été livrée nile prrx payé. LA sale is perfected between the parties and ownership under law is
acquired by the buyer against the seller as soon as they have agreed on the article and the price,
even thought the article has not then been delivered nor the price paid.)
Cass. civ., 26th November 1962, D. 1963, 61; cass. corn. 17th April, 1980, J.C.P., C.I.-1980, i. 8848.
Cass. civ. 1,21st February 1979, J.C.P. 1980.ii. 19482 note Fieschi-Vivet.
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whether deduced from the contract itself, or from any other document,
including pre-contractual discussions.
The second principle in English law is the desire of the law to uphold
bargains,39
 and to give effect to business intentions which may often be
unsatisfactorily expressed. 4° The mechanism of the implication of
reasonableness to overcome lack of definition or certainty fulfils the
functions of the formula itself, and of remedying the want of a formula
where the parties' intent is present save for a lacunae that may be objectively
determined. It covers a substantial area where absence of agreement exists,
but reaches a boundary at the points where lack of agreement on terms that
the parties regard as essential for agreement before conclusion of a contract
reflects lack of intent, 4t and where the state of agreement has reached only
that which it is regarded as an agreement to agree.42
The French concept of not requiring another declaration of will, in order to
result in contractual relations where previously the parties had not reached
agreed all elements, 43
 appears as a valuable generic description of the extant
resolve of the parties sufficiently demonstrating contractual relations, and
one to which applied common law techniques may subscribe, if not expressed
in that manner.44
 An example of a mechanism is specifically established by
Article 1592 by which a third party jointly appointed by the parties to a
contract for sale may be empowered to determine the selling price. 45
 Whilst
° Nicolene vSimmonds (1953)1 Q.B. 543.
4° Hilas v Aitos (1932)147 LT. 503. Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd. (1934) 2 K.B. 1. Where a price "to be
agreed by the parties from time to time" was held to be a reasonable price if the parties could not
agree.
Trollope & Colls Ltd. v Atomic Power Construction Ltd. (1963)1 WL.R. 333.
Therefore Insufficiently concluded and unenforceable; Courtney & Fairbaim Ltd. v Tolaini Btvs
(Hotels) Ltd. (19Th) 1 W.LR. 297 (CA).
G. Rouhette, The Obligatoty Force of Contract in French Law and C. Jauffret-Spinosi, The Domain of
Contract, in Contract Law Today, Anglo-French Comparisons, (Hams & Talon eds.), 1991.
" Even the fact of continued negotiations may not necessarily reflect an intent by the parties that
there is a need to "declare their will' by a further agreement for "where negotiations are in progress
between parties intending to enter into a contract the whole of those negotiations must be looked at
to detemtine when, if at aH, the contract comes into being ... Once the contract comes into bein&
however, subsequent negotiations by either party seekin& for example, to obtain better terms wil
not affect the existence of the previously conduded contract." British Guiana Credit Corpn. v Da
Silva (1965)1 W.LR. 248 at 255 (P.C.).
Article 1591 provides that the price of a sale must be determined and designated by the parties.
Artide 1592: ii peut cependant étre Iaissé a 1'a,bitrae d'un tiess si le tiers ne vent ou ne pout faire
1'estimatio. il n'y a point de vent." lit may nevertheless, be left to athitration by a thiitl party; if the
thini party refuses or is unable to determine if there is no sale.] This reflects the circumstance





this aspect may in England be derived from the fluidity of the imposition of
the objective yardstick of a 'reasonable' price or other element, and the
result achieved from its determination by the court, 47 the provision by the
parties themselves for third party determination is significant in three
respects. Provision for the determination of the element not agreed by
decision of a third party has the function of showing the parties' intent to
conclude an agreement notwithstanding the outstanding point; and, equally,
provision for resolution by arbitration of any dispute or difference covering
the area of the element not agreed has this effect. 48
 It again constitutes both
the actual formula, in that the result fills the place of the element not agreed
or outstanding, and the mechanism for achieving that result. It enables the
intended conclusion to be achieved even where it fails as a mechanism
whether by the positive design, or the negative inactivit> of a party, 49 or
otherwise without default of either party5°
The facility for an offer to be withdrawn may be limited by its own terms, but
in France an offer without such limitation is generally required to be
maintained in time at least for the period necessaiy for the addressee of the
offer to give it due examination. 51 In commercial dealings and without an
express time limit the formulation is "a reasonable period in which to
inform the offeror of his response". 52
 Notwithstanding this limitation on
withdrawal of an offer, there remains the ability of the offeror to refuse to
enter into a contract characterised by personal qualification.0 This is material
in the building field for it gives the offeror the right to refuse to deal with
persons other than those having particular qualifications.54
Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd. (1934) 2 K.B.1.
Beer v Bowden (1981)1 W.L.R. 522.
F & G Sykes (Wessex) Ltd. v Fine Fare Ltd. (1%7) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 53.
Sudbmok Trading Estate Ltd. v Eggleton (1983) 1 AC. 444 (H.L.).
50 For example, as in Sudbmok Trading Estate Ltd. v Eggleton the court could have recourse to its own
procedures, or in the case of arbitration the facility for further appointment exists in the event of
death, incapacity or refusal to act, section 7 Arbitration Act 1950.
Code Civil. Article 932 - and so creates a pre-contractual obligatiion.
52 Cour de Paris, 5th Februaty 1910; Cow de Aix, 15th Jan uaty 1920.
The intuitus pesonae an example is a lease which indudes the implied reservation of agreement
to the actual person of the lessee; Lyon, 16th May. 1928, S. 1928, 135.
Such cirtumstances may arise after an open invitation to tender, and lead to the employer declaring
the tenders infn,ctuewç unfruitful or unpreductive. It is interesting to note that the decision by the
Court of Justice of the European Communities of 20th September 1988, Debr. Beentjes v The State of
the Netherlands acknowledged "specific experience for the work to be executed as a lawful
criterion for technical competence under the tender regime.
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Under common law, acceptance is a final and unqualified expression of
assent to the terms of an offer and its effect is to convert the offer into a
contract. The offeree's answer is an acceptance only if It expresses agreement
on the elements mentioned in the offer. If the offeree changes an essential
element of the proposed contract, his answer is not an acceptance, but a
counter-offer, which must, in its turn, be accepted by the initial offeror. 55
 As
in civil law, silence alone is not sufficient,' but silence perceived as conduct
referable to an offer is. In France acceptance is also a declaration of will and,
without need for consideration, its expression identifies agreement. 57
 It may
be expressed by any means, provided it is not ambiguous. In this way silence
coupled with surrounding circumstances such as a long standing business
relationship or trade usage that acknowledges silence as acceptance may have
the attributes of expression.
The element of intention at common law is objectively determined, so that
the external manifestation is not exposed to inquiry into any inner or hidden
intention. Whether more or less certain in consistency of result than an
English court's view of what must have been intended, the French courts are
not averse to seeking the real intention of the parties to an agreement, not
merely their written and other external expressions of intention. Article
1156 refers to the common intention of the parties, Ia commune intention
des parties contratantes, as distinct from the literal word, so permitting a
wider view of intent. Against this use of the subjective as a means of giving
a practical interpretation reflecting what the parties really meant, the Cour
Cass. crv 3,22nd April 1980, Bull. !Il.n. 82; cass. civ. 1,12th March 1985, Bull.l.n. 89, Rev. tr. cit civ, 1986,
100, obs. Mestre.
Cass. crv 25th May 1870, S 1870, 1,341; D. 1870. 1,257; ilib. civ. Seine 19th April 1893.
The condusion of the contract has given rise to debate in France between the theory of the
transmission, I'a'qedition,. and that of the receipt of the acceptance, as shown in Goudenet: Théone
Generate des Obligations. j-L Aubert: Notions et Roles de l'Offre et de l'Acceptation dans Ia
Formation du Contra F. Rodiere: La Formation du Contrat, but certainly an acceptance must
conform with the offer If offer and acceptance take place between absent parties, the meeting of
minds is taken to be made at the time and place where the offeree dispatches his acceptance,
unless otheiwise provided for by the parties; Cass. corn,. 7th Januaiy 1981, Bull. lVn.14 Rev. tr. dt civ,,
1981, 849, obs. Chabas. Acceptance may create a meeting of minds only if it takes place at a time
when the offer is still in force, but late acceptance is ineffective, Cass. civ. 3, 9th November 1983,
Bull.1ll.n. 222 Rev. tr. cit civ, 1985, 15' abs. Mestre.
Meaning may be given to silence as expressing the requisite intention in the circumstances more
easily it appeazs than under common law, Cass. civ. 1, 20th March 1984, BuII.l.n. 106; existence of
prior business relations between the parties; cass. req.,. 29th March 1938, S. 1938,1,380; D.P. 1939,1,5,
note Voirin: an offer for the exclusive advantage of the off eree may be accepted by silence.
° Article 1156: 'On dolt dans les conventions recheiriier queue a ete La comwie intention des patties
contractantes, p!utôt que de s'arréler au sens littera! des felines [The common intention of the
contracting parties must be sought rather than to stop at the literal sense of them.]
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de Cassation has developed the doctrine of clauses claires et precises by
which lower courts are prohibited from having recourse to or inquiring into
subjective or real intent of parties to a contract where the meaning is plain
and unambiguous.
3	 Fe-axi1ract aIKI Letters of Ink
A frequently arising category of business conclusions in the construction field
cross the boundary from negotiation to contract, but themselves contemplate
a further, or "the" contract. Separately, the pre-contractual stage may involve
parties signifying in writing with varying degrees of formality that work, in a
practical building sense, is to be set in motion or is under way; and letter of
intent has its French equivalent, lettre d'intention •60 An initial step
reflecting a contemplation of a future contract it may be, but legal obligations
may derive from it. The use of the term should more often be taken as a
warning of pitfalls ahead, 61 rather than as descriptive of no obligation, for the
perception that a pre-contractual act is without effect may prove deceptive.62
Ambiguity and uncertainty surround letters of intent both because of the
aspirations or otherwise of the parties to them, whether conscious or not,
and because they lie in an unclear grey zone. 63
 Whatever the legal process
may make of them, they have a practical use where morally binding
commitments are sufficient, and with increasingly complex documentation
in the construction industry their continued use is inevitable.64
Where descriptive of an intent to enter a transaction the potential
60 As also the Italian,. lettera d'intenti , and Spanish, carta de intención. There are other pre-
contractual names, the French protocol d'acco,d, and the Italian accudo di principio. German
speakers appear to have adopted the English phrase.
Fontaine: Les Lettres d'intention dans Ia negotiation des contrats intemationaux. Droit et Practique
du Commerce Internationaux. (1977) vol. 3, 73, where the term is picturesquely cited as "Anarchie
terminologique" because of the frequency that parties are taken to have contractual obligations
whilst using the term.
62 Notwithstanding that "mere letter of intent" may be used in England as terminology to describe a
document found not to be a contract; as in Snelling v Snelling (1972). 1 All E.R. 79.
63 M. Luttei Der Letter of Intent (1982), "Grave Zone des Ungeklarten7
64 There may also be a need for an assurance letter of intent for use by the potential contracting
parties for their own internal or third party use; where appmvals are required or where those making
dependent arrangements such as lenders may be unwilling to make a commitment without wntten
assurance that the parties are near agreement. Equally a party to the negotiations may receive
supposedly non-obligatoty pre-contractual documents as an assurance.
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contracting parties may be assured by such a letter that they have stopped
talking to others so as to give an added element of intent within the
negotiations.'5
 Comfort letters may also be given as, hopefully, substitutes for
guarantees and they too have their French, declarations de patmnag and
German, patronatserk larungen , equivalents. These may contain an
expression of intent, such as for future funding but of moral obligation,
albeit that they may to the contrary be found to contain legal obligations;
and in France declarations de patronage are likely to be regarded as
contractual in nature.'7
At common law a letter of intent is capable of generating a contract, whether
unilateral or synallagmatic, and it is a question of construction whether such
letter is intended to constitute a legally binding undertaking on being
accepted, or is a mere prelude to agreement on terms to be negotiated and
settled by some other document. A letter of intent will ordinarily express an
intention to enter into a contract at some future time, without creating any
liability in respect of that contract. It may however give rise to the
imposition of liabilities in the event of the intended contract not
materialising, whether by way of executory contract or an obligation to
remunerate if a performance, usually contemplated as of an interim nature,68
be carried out.69 This liability may arise in contract, 7° or "in quasi-contract, or,
65 Where amounting to a 'lock-out' agreement preventing the other party to negotiations from
communication with thini parties it represents an enforceable agreement, at least to that extent; Pitt
v PHH Asset Management Ltd. (1993) 4 All ER. %1; B. J
. 
port, Lock-out Agreements. (1991)
107 LQ.R. 366.
° In Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v Malysia Mining Corp. Ltd. (1988) 1 W.L.R. 799, Hirst J
. 
considered that
such a letter constituted a fum undertaking giving rise to a contract, despite the fact that the parent
had previously declined to give a guarantee and the effect of treating the letter of comfort as a
binding undertaking was to make the defendants' liability greater than it would have been under the
guarantee. The Court of Appeal, (1989) 1 W.L.R. 379, reversed the decision holding that in the
circumstances the intent was a moral responsibility only. The letter given by the parent company to
the bank proposing to lend money to the subsidiaiy stated that it was the parent company's policy to
ensure that its subsidiaries were at all times in a position to meet the liabilities.
67 Fontaine: Los Lettres d'intention dans Ia negotiation des contrats intemationaux, 1977, 3 Droit et
Pratique du Commerce lntemationa 90.
66 Arbiter Investments Ltd. v Wiltshier (London) Ltd. (1987) 14 Constr. L.R.16, (reported only in relation
to a condition for a bond). The parties were found not to have contracted, and thus had proceeded
on a letter of intent throughout a substantial part of the works and to a conclusion by a purported
determination. The facts in Monk Constuction Ltd. v Norwich Union Life Insurance Society (1992)
62 B.L.R. 107 (CA.) the entire works were completed with the parties, as found, having failed to
conclude their entire contract, and without the proposed level of remuneration for the
contemplated initial period ("proven costsl being found to have been dur accepted or applicable
to the whole works.
69 A review on the subjectis in, S.N. Bell, Work Carried Out in Pursuance of Letters of Intent:
Contractor Restitution? (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 572.
° Turriff Constrution Ltd. v Regalia Knitting Mills Ltd. (1971) 9 B.L.R. 20.
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as we now say, restitution". 11 The conclusion of the intended contract will
normally govern the rights and the liabilities of the parties with retrospective
effect, so replacing and ending any effects of the letter of intent?2
Some letters of intent may contain virtually all the material terms and record
agreement on them, providing for a formal contract to be prepared. Equally,
all material terms may be concluded but subject to conditions precedent, such
as approvals, and the search then is to determine the extent to which the
approval is more than an immaterial stamp to an existing agreement. In
civil law these are characterised as contracts stated by the parties to become
operative only when one of them has performed one of its obligations under
the contract. In France, Article 1174 renders an obligation void if it is
conditional on a condition potestative being a condition the fulfilment of
which is wholly dependent on the will of the party who benefits from it.73
The phrase, conditional contract, may have any one of at least three different
meanings in English law74 It may refer to a fact or event the occurrence of
which is to be a prerequisite of the very existence of the contract, so that
unless and until the condition is fulfilled the contract does not come into
existence at all and until then either side is free to withdraw from the
transaction. Alternatively the phrase may denote an existing contract under
which the duty of performance by one or both parties is suspended until the
condition is fulfilled. Here there is a legal relationship between the parties,
so that neither may obstruct the performance of the condition or withdraw
from the transaction before it is clear that the condition will not be met
within the time stipulated; and the sole effect of the condition is to suspend
British Steel Corp. v Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co. (1983) 24 B.L.R. 94 at 122.
72 G. Percy Trentham Ltd.vAithital Luxfer Ltd and others (1993) 1 Uoyd's Rep. 25(CA.), "... in this fully
executed transaction a contract came into existence during performance even if it cannot be
precisely analysed in terms of offer and acceptance. The conclusion must be that when the contract
came into existence it impliedly governed pre-contractual performance" per Steyn L.J.. The view
that the existence of a contract finally made justifies the retrospective application of contractual
liability was expressed by the German jurist R. von Jerin& Culpa in Contrahendo, 1861, (referred to
also under Obligations arising During Contract Formation) but it has not been followed in the
French courts; Cass. dv. 1, 24th November 1965 Bull. I no. 651, p. 495; JCP 1966 ll. 14602, obs. Ch.
Gauzy, Rev, trim dr. civ. 1966,310, obs. C. Cornu; and Cass. corn. 27th April 1968 Bull IV No. 141 P. 124,
JCP 1968 IV 95.
B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract (1992). Article 1174: "Toute obligation est nulle lorsqu'elle a éé
contractée sous une condition potestive de Ia part de celui qui s'obligeP [Any obligation is void
when it has been contracted under a condition potestive on the part of the party who obligates
himself]. But the effect is not the same in Italy, or all other countries based on the Code Civil.
G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (8h edn.), p.48 1.
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the duty to perform. The third type of conditional contract is one in which
the condition is not suspensive but resolutive, that Is, the contract has
immediate force but comes to an end if the condition is not fulfilled by the
stated time. Conditions of the second and third category are more common
than those of the first, and in the building field may represent a dependency
for example on a planning or building regulation permission.
Without a neat compartment in either civil law or common law there is no
specific set of rules into which letters of intent fit, and they straddle the
boundaries of contract.'5 The general approach of the civil law remains one
of denying legal effect to working documents exchanged during negotiation,
and derives from the concept of the droit commun of pre-contractual
instruments known as purictuatio having no relevance, at least until
agreement has been reached on all essential elements. There is no separate
classification in either system and the task is to determine on which side of a
boundary any given set of circumstances falls. The formation of a contract is
very much an event in common law eyes, as the culmination of the
bargaining, but to a civil lawyer the contract appears more an expression of
agreement and a relationship than a bargained-for exchange. This appears
from a comparison of the JCT and AFNOR conditions of building contract -
it is easy for a common lawyer to point to the start of the rights and duties
highlighted by the formal parts in the JCT form, (the "Agreement"), but a
similar clear-cut approach cannot be adopted towards the AFNOR terms, and
the necessity arises to adopt a civil law understanding of the notion of
contract formation as a continuum or process rather than as an event.'6
In French law, pre-contractual agreements are more readily considered as
being of a binding nature. This may be explained by three factors: first,
contract law is dominated by the idea that agreement, and not consideration,
This is not surprising in view of the origins of the rules of contract and their development involved
transactions, particularly sales, without long tenn obligations or lengthy negotiations, so that the
rules as to the application of contractual obligations were adequate at an earlier stage of economic
life for the determination of whether and when a contract was made. However in civil law systems
the application of the principle of good faith, and the doctrine of culpa in contmhend4 has been
available as imposing an overall requirement of negotiation in good faith, whether giving rise to a
contractual obligation as in Germany or a liability in tort as in France, Italy and the Netherlands.
" This is also reflected by the courts in civil law countries being more likely to find parties having
entered into contractual relations at an earlier stage than under common law. The AFNOR
conditions make provision for the preparation of documents the lack of which would in England give
rise to argument whether a contract had been concluded.
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is necessary and sufficient to make a contract, second, French courts are
seemingly not very demanding as to the proof of existence of a contract. As a
consequence, a precontract, avant contrat, exists whenever there is proof of
an agreement relating to precise obligations. Thirdly, contractual obligations
may relate to any subject, not contrary to public order, including an
undertaking with regard to the time during which an offer will remain open
for acceptance?7
The French concept of cause is a broader spectrum than the notion of
consideration, and may consist not only of past services received, but of any
economic interest, or even a moral interest of the debtor, so that promises to
conclude a contract or to negotiate a contract are binding. tm
 The
determination of the consequences of letters of intent, memoranda of
common understandings, or other pre-contractual document is based on
these principles, and any such document may be evidence of a precontract, if
it is written in terms clear enough to show an intention to be bound by a
precise obligation. Conflicts may appear between the expressed and the real
intention. If the expressed intention is unclear, it is interpreted to discover
the real intention which is, in principle, the only source of contractual
obligations under French law, but even here the declared intention will bind
if it has been understood as such by the recipient.79
" The concept of the preliminaiy contract was identified by the Cour de Cassation in a case of
withdrawal by a sub-contractor of his offer because of an error in calculation prior to its acceptance
and when it had been used as the basis for a successful tender. The court held that an offer is
binding when it gives rise to an unarguable accord, whether express or implied, that it has been
made so as to remain in foite for an identifiable penod, des lots qu'il résulte d'un acconJ expres
ou tacite.. niais indiscutable, qu'elle a éte formulée puur étre maintenue pendant un deJa!
détenniné but found that in the particular case no such accord existed: when the sub-contractor
made his offer it was not known that it would be used as a basis for making a tender, Cohnai 4th
February 1936, D.H. 1936, 187.
For instance, in an option contract,. prornesse uiulatéiale de contrat, the cause of the beneficiary's
obligation to pay a price to the promissor consists in his interest in concluding the future contract,
Cass. corn., 23rd June 1958, D. 1958, 581, note Malaune; J.C.P. 1958. II. 10857, note P.E. A particular
example is the acknowledgement by Cour de Cassation of a precontract relating to the constitution
of a corporation. Evidence was brought through a meeting minute that the parties had agreed on
the object of the future corporation, on the importance and nature of the shares of capital and on
the director's remuneration. The court decided that such an agreement "succeeded the stage of
mere negotiations" and was a promise to constitute a corporation, prnrnesse de société , and refusal
to participate in the constitution of the corporation amounted to a breach of such promise; Cass.
corn. 28th April 1987, Bull. IV. n. 104.
° This is illustrated in the decision of the Cour de Cassation that an offer to renew a contract could
result from the following letter "We have the pleasure to propose to you a new contract of grant
(concession contrnemiale) for 1975, the detailed previsions of which will be announced to you before
the end of this year." The recipient argued that he understood the letter as expressing the intention
to renew the contract under the same conditions as for the previous year the sender offered proof
that his real intention was to propose a new contract under different conditions. The court
considered that the recipient "was entitled to rely on the terms of the letter." Cass. corn. 9th February




The legal force of a letter of intent Inevitably depends on the precision of its
wording If the letter contains expressions such as "we have the intention to
be engaged", avoir I'intention de s'engager, they are Interpreted as expressing
intention to be bound by contractual obligation. Contrary to the common
law position as seen in the Klein wart Benson decision on appeal, this is
the case with letters written by a parent company to its subsidiary's bank,
Iettres de confort, in order to reinforce the parent's obligation to guarantee
the subsidiaiy's debt. 81 There are few cases in civil law countries bearing on
the effect of letters of intent, but, interestingly, the Italian SME case
concerned a written expression of mutual understandings which made
reference to approvals and authorisations but not to any subsequent
agreement. On a claim for breach of a contract the issue of real intent to
bind, or, to negate that by necessity for a subsequent declaration of will, was
decided in favour of the latter on the basis of the negative intent behind the
requirement for authorisation, while the failure to secure it did not render
the potential vendor liable for fault in negotiating83
In England the effect of remaining an agreement to agree future terms is that
"if the execution of a further contract is a condition or term of the bargain"84
it will fail on the basis of the law not recognising a contract to enter into a
contract.85 Equally the court will not enforce a contract to negotiate, on which
side, and not saved by reference to a reasonable price, or to any available
80 }Ueinwort Benson Ltd. v Malysia Mining Corp. Ltd. (1989) 1 W.LR. 379 (CA.).
81 Cass. corn. 21st December 1987, J.C.P. 1988.112113, concl. Montanier.
82 Buitoni S.p.a. v Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale The decision of the Rome Tnbunal: judgment
of 19th July 1986. Tnb. Rome, 1 Porn It. 2284(1986); the decision of the Court of Appeals: judgment of
9th March 1987, 1 Porn It. 1260 (1987); the Judgment of the Corte di Cassazione: judgment of 11th July
1988, 1 Foro It. 2584 (1988).
83 Studied in Lalce and Draetta, Letters of Intent and other Precontractual Documents.
• Von Hatzfeldt - Wildenbwg v Alexander (1924) 1 Ch. 97.
Unless saved by an implication of reasonableness, and to overcome the absence of machinery for
the resolution of the absent element; for example in Beer v Bowden (1981)1 W.LR. 522 (CA.) and
Sudbrnok Trading Estate Ltd. v Eggleton (1983) A.C. 444 (I-I .L).
The Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 8(2) provides that if no pnce is agreed a reasonable price must
be paid, this is on the basis that there is a contract of sale, but must equally the result in the finding
of a contract which but for price agreement would not constitute one.
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third party decision, fell Courtney and Fairbaim v Tolaini.87
The basis for finding no enforceable agreement was the term to negotiate, for:
"If the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (when
there is a fundamental term yet to be agreed) ... it cannot recognise a
contract to negotiate. The reason is because it is too uncertain to have
binding force. No court could estimate the damages because no one
can tell whether the negotiations would be successful or would fall
through: or if successful, what the result would be. ... a contract to
negotiate, like a contract to enter into a contract, is not known to the
law"
The court was not willing to supply the deficiency of resolution in the event
of any failure to agree fair and reasonable sums. It simply did not permit of a
result that required such resolution. 89
 There the parties had not progressed
under the agreement to the extent of permitting or commencing work. This
feature had an acknowledged influence in Sykes v Fine Fare,9 ° where it was
present alongside the important arbitration provision as to "the meaning of
or effect of this Agreement or as regards the performance by either party of
their obligations hereunder or in relation to any matters incidental thereto
9, 9 1
Courtney & Fairbaim Ltd. v Tolaini Bros (Hotels) Ltd (1975) 1 W.L.R. 297 (CA.), where the plaintiff
contractors made an agreement by exchange of letters that the contractor would secure finance for
the defendant developers in return for their promise to execute a building contract to give the
contractor work on several sites in the area. The important concluding words were: "Accordingly, I
would be very happy to know that, if my discussions and arrangements with interested parties lead
to an introductory meeting, which in turn leads to a financial arrangement acceptable to both
parties, you will be prepared to instruct your Quantity Surveyor to negotiate fair and reasonable
sums" The decision was followed in Mall o221 v Carapeffi S.pA (1976) 1 Uoyd's Rep. 407 (CA), and
approved in Walford v Miles (1992) 2 A.C. 128 (H.L.).
• Lord Denning at page 301, expressly overruling dicta in Hilas & Co. v Anos Ltd. (1932) 147 L.T. 503.
In any event the appropriate remedy may not be damages for lost expectation under a prospective
ultimate agreement,, but rather damages caused by the injured party's reliance, just as under a lock-
out agreement which is enforceable.
The result followed May & Butcher v The King (1934) 2 K.B. 17, where a contract with terms
providing for agreements at future dates and without a mechanism in default of agreement, was
thus incomplete and nugatory. The International Chamber of Commerce has promulgated rules for
the regulation of contractual relations that provide for the appointment of a third person whose task
it is to complete an incomplete agreement by either a recommendation or a binding decision, as the
parties have provided. Adaptation of Contracts ICC publication, No. 326, 1978.
9° F. & C. Sykes (Wessex) Ltd. v Fine Fare Ltd. (1966) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 58.
' A more recent approach to terms requiring future agreements is in Didyrni Corp. v Atlantic Lines
and Navigation Co. (1988) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 108, (CA), where a charterparty's price adjustment clause
providing for an "eqUitable" reduction in price "tO be mutually agreed ... but in any case no more
than that required to indemnify the Charterers was determined not to be a mere agreement to
agree. It was categorised as a procedure for calculation of the amount of the indemnity, and so
"machinery", with "equitable" to be applied as fairly and reasonably". The Courtney decision was
rightly distinguished it is suggested, as being concerned with a contract in which more, and more
signifIcant, terms were undetennined; but again Courtney differed in its lack of any commencement
of the contemplated performance.
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Where parties have negated the conclusion of a contract in their
documentation pending execution of the formal contract, whether by
"subject to contract" or other words showing that further matters or
negotiations are contemplated, it may be taken that the English courts will
respect their intention.92
 Against this, if the supposedly pre-contractual
instrument contains the terms of the complete agreement save for the
formality of execution then the necessity for the subsequent contract is
treated as a formality representing the record of the already concluded
agreement. The matter is one of construction of the particular terms to
determine objectively the parties' intention as to whether the production of
the formal document is a condition of the bargain or merely an expression of
desire as to the manner in which the agreed transaction will be recorded.94
In France an agreement to make a contract, pmmesse de contrat or
premesse synallagmatique de con trat, is an agreement by which a party
commits itself to enter a contract on the terms of the premesse de contrat if
the other party manifests in appropriate form an intention to be bound. This
savours of an option, but it is a bilateral or multilateral agreement. There is a
separate concept in the precontract, avant contrat, and although the term has
been criticised as imprecise and not capable of describing any kind of
preliminary agreement in negotiations,95 it actually encompasses those
agreements reached in negotiations that are binding on the parties, but which
require to be complemented by agreement on other elements. Its function is
that it provides the basis upon which Article 1135 may be invoked to resolve
02 Chillingworth v Esche (1924) 1 Ch. 97; and Tiverton Estates Ltd. v Wearwell Ltd. (19Th) Ch. 146, 1
cannot myself see any difference between a wnting which (I) denies there was any contract; (11) does
not admit there was any contract,; (III) says that the parties are in negotiation; or (iv) says that there
was an agreement "subject to contract" for that comes to the same thing."
Rossiterv Miller (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1124 (l-1.L.); Lewis v Brass (1877)3 Q.B.D. 667 (CA). In Okura &
Co. v Navan'a Shipping Corp. SA (1982) 2 Uoyd's Rep. 537 where documents contained the essential
temis of an agreement, the stipulation "to be incorporated in a memorandum of agreement in a
mutually acceptable manner" prevented enforcement, although the parties were found to have
intended further agreements to which those words looked. The context of an oral performance
guarantee to be confirmed in wntin& being part of a larger undisputed oral agreement, assisted the
conclusion that the guarantee howevei, complete in its terms but contemplating reduction to writing.
was enfotteable, as explained in Ciippor Maritime Ltd. v Shipstar Container Transport Ltd. ("The
Anenome") (1987)1 Uoyd's Rep. 546.
Von l-lazfeldt - Wildenburg v AlexandeL (1924) 1 (1. 97. For example, in J.H.Milner & Son Ltd. v
Percy Bilton Ltd. (1966) 2 All ER. 894 the use of the word "understanding" has been found to
constitute a purposeful ambiguity of expression implying that a letter of intent was to be a
gentleman's agreement only and not a final contract.
G. Ripert andJ. Boulange Traité de Dmit Civil, 2, 144.
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those elements not agreed.96
Consistent with civil law understanding of the contract as a relationship,
French law presumes that the execution of the formal contract is not the
event that creates the contractual rights and obligations, 97
 rather that it exists
from the time of the perceived agreement. A clearly expressed intention to
create a condition whereby the rights and obligations are subject to a formal
contract would be upheld, 98
 although there appears no direct equivalent of
the phrase subject to contract. The broader question is how and whether a
person may express an intention not to contract. If a party states during the
pre-contractual process that he does not wish to undertake a contractual
obligation, such a statement prevents the formation of a contract,but an
expressed wish to undertake only a moral obligation without being legally
bound does not prevent a contractual obligation as to this where the terms
are clear and precise.1
The term 'subject to contract' may be comparable in France to clauses looking
towards a subsequent agreement, accord ultérleur, on some elements of the
contract. Such clauses are effective in the sense that the definitive contract
will be formed only upon the definitive agreement for which the parties
have to consider those elements as essential for the conclusion of the
contract.101
Artide 1135. '1es Conventions obh,qent non seulen?ent a Ce qui yest a'pdm4 mais encore a touter
les suites que I'equit4 I'usage ou Ia Ioi donnent .à I'obiigation d'apres sa nature". [Agreements are
binding not only in respect of what is expressed, but also as to all matters which equity usage or law
attach to the obligation according to its nature.]
de Moor, Contract and Agreement in English and French law. (1986) Oxford J.L. Studies 6,275.
R. Schlesinger, Formation of Contracts, 1968.
For example a client of a night club hung her coat on a hanger above which a sign read: "We do not
accept to become a depositazy of the clothes". The court decided that no contract was formed and
the owner was not liable for its theft; Cass. civ. 1, 1st March 1988 Bull. 1. n. 57.
100 Cass. civ. 2.. 27th November 1985, Bull. II. n. 178; Rev. tr. dr civ. 1986, 749, obs. Mestre.
'°' Cass. corn. 11th Februazy 1980, Bull. IV. n. 71. Unlike in France the Italian Codice Civile prevides for
the contzatto preIinziare or precontratto, where the parties commit themselves to condude another
contract a contralto definitivo within a given time. For the contralto pmlinziare to be binding, the
terms of the contra tb deimnitivo must be identified in it. They do not become effective until the
execution of the contratto deflnithv but such execution is a legal obligation, breach of which may be
remedied by an order for its specific performance. The contratto pielirninam represents a binding
commitment not merely an element of the phase of formation of the terms of the contract.
Gabrielli, 11 Contratto Preliminare, 1970, Sacco, La Preparazione del Contratto, 1982. As a pre-
contractual document the minuta, comprising a draft document covering points already discussed
or under discussion, is not of bonding effect or enforceable and appears the closest Italian equivalent
to a letter of intent.
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5	 Otligalkxis arising during Ccithad Fcrmalkii
Whilst the premise exists in French law as to revocability of offers at any
time prior to the formation of the contract, t02 the concept of culpa in
contrahendo, fault in negotiating, in practce affects it. An obligation of good
faith is applied to the conduct of contract negotiations,' 03
 so exerting the
pressure of potential challenge when the legal right to revoke is exercised in
circumstances transgressing the obligation.
Pre-contractual relations and liability are important subjects for the
construction industry, not least because projects In the majority of cases
require thorough and as a result time-consuming and expensive
preparations. Before sensible offers or tenders can be submitted designs and
drawings have to be available both for realistic estimates of price and to
identify the conditions applicable to the works.'° 4
 Two linked aspects warrant
attention, namely, whether costs of preparation of offers or tenders under
certain conditions justify compensation by the prospective employer, and,
whether and to what extent obligations attach if pre-contractual negotiations
have reached a certain stage.
Culpa in contrahendo is not a true exception to the premise of revocability of
an offer nor is it limited to revocation. It is a distinct principle applicable to
that dawn zone prior to contract formation. By its application the
commercial effect may well be to render withdrawal uneconomic or
unpalatable, and in this sense only it impacts on revocability, for civil law has
been willing to impose pre-contractual liability based on what may be seen as
an obligation of perceived fair dealing. So, a withdrawal of an offer in bad
faith entitles the offeree in Italy to reliance damages, interesse negativi, the
reimbursement of expenses incurred during the pre-contractual phase of a
contract not concluded, and loss arising from missed opportunities in
102 This premise does not apply to Gemiany and its legal family
'°s Italian Codice Civile Article 1337 "The parties, in the conduct of neotiations and the formation of
the contract, shall conduct themselves according to good faith, Trans. Bertrams, Lingo and
Meriyman.
104 Detailed ground investigations may be necessaRy, or complicated technical work with analysis of
design criteria. The French tradition of seeking tenders on sketch drawings frequently places a
requirement on contractors to effect design work as a necessaiy part of submitting a tender.
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consequence. Further, in circumstances where an offeree has begun
performance in good faith, before notice of revocation an offeror is liable for
expenses and losses incurred as a consequence of the commencement of
performance.105
The German jurist Jhering advanced the thesis that parties to precontractual
negotiations are contractually bound to observe the "necessary diligentia ". A
party who commits a breach of this contractual obligation, a culpa in
contrahendo , becomes liable for damages measured by reliance.' 06 Jhering
concerned himself primarily with problems such as the effect of culpa on
contracts concluded by mistake rather than failed negotiations, but the
French scholar, Saleilles advanced the view that after parties have entered
into negotiations, both must act in good faith and neither can break off the
negotiations arbitrarily without compensating the other for reliance
damages.107
German courts have relied on Jhering's thesis as a basis of pre-contractual
liability in the formulation that "a fault in contractual negotiations that
renders one liable for damages can also exist in that one party awakes in the
other confidence in the imminent coming into existence of a contract -
subsequently not concluded - and thus causes the latter party to incur
expenses."108
In France it is not the negotiations themselves that create obligations for the
purposes of liability, but their interruption may result in such, particularly,
but not exclusively, where wilful misconduct or gross negligence exists.'°9
Obligations do however arise upon promises to contract pmmess de contrat
105 Italian Codice Civile, Artide 1328.
R. von Jhering, Culpa in Contrahendo, Privatrechts 1, 1861; (De Ia culpa in contrahendo, tr.
Meulenaere). On Jhenng's analysis, a party who could avoid a contract for a mistake due to lack of
diligence should compensate the other party for loss resulting fmm a change of position in reliance
on the validity of the contract.
107 Raymond Saleiles, De La responsabilité precontractuelle, 6 Rev. Trim. Dr Civ. 697, 718-19, 722, 1907.
108 The court continued: ["the mere breaking off of negotiations by one party does not, without more,
constitute a fault in contract negotiations... Either of the parties can create or strengthen in the other
party, simply by the fact that he participates in such negotiations, the more or less certain
assumption that he is ready to contract. But this alone does not reduce his freedom of decision
respecting the conclusion of the contract and does not yet render him... liable, if he breaks off
negotiations."], 6th February 1969, Bundesgerichtshof, West Germany, Nachschlagewerk des
Bundesgerichtshofs, BGB 276, no.28 (1969).
soa Faute intentione!Ie ou lourde,,. Cas. req. 11th June 1925.
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and precontracts, avant contrats. There has been a similar development of
reasoning as in Germany, although such pre-contractual liability is imposed
not for breach of a contractual obligation but as a civil wron& deliL "° The
wrong is viewed as an abuse of right, abus de droit, for which bad faith
without malice will suffice."' Bad faith may exist not only where a party
negotiates with no serious intention of contracting" 2
 but also where a party
breaks off negotiations abruptly and without Justification. For example, a
French businessman negotiated for the purchase of an American machine
for the manufacture of cement pipes from the exclusive distributor in France.
After the prospective buyer had travelled to the United States to see the
machine, and prolonged and advanced negotiations, the distributor broke off
negotiations abruptly, brutalement , and "without legitimate reason",
refusing to sell to the prospective buyer. The Cour de Cassation affirmed
that the distributor was liable for the cost of preparations made by the
prospective buyer on the ground that there had been an "abusive rupture" of
the negotiations.' 13
 French courts are not frequently asked to find an
obligation of fair dealing arising out of negotiations to a point where one of
the parties had relied on a successful outcome. It seems that the potentially
generous measure of precontractual liability for lost opportunity is not
widely appreciated, or perhaps the desire for future business restrains
pursuit.
The affirmation in England in Walford v Miles, that a bare agreement to
110 j Ghestin, Traité de droit civil. ii: Les Obligations: Le Contrat: formation, 228, 2nd. ed. 1988. J . G.
Vines Traité de droit civil, 196-200, 1982, discussing precontractual liability in French law. It is
suggested that German courts are willing to Impose liability where a party has conducted himself in
such a fashion that the other party could, and did, justifiably count on a contract with the negotiated
content coming into existence and then refuses to contract without an appropriate ground;
Mazeaud & Tunc, Traité theorique et pratique de Ia responsabiieté civile délictuelle et
contractuelle, 116-21, 6th ed, 1965; P. Durry, La nature contractuelle ou délictuelle de Ia
responsabilité, 7 Rev. Tnm. Dr. cn 779, 779-80, 1972.
1 Judgment of 8th July 1929, Cour d'appe Rennes, Fr., 1929 Recueil Penodique Hebdornadaire de
Jurisprudence 548.
112 Judgment of 20th Mar.ch 1972, Cass. civ. corn,, Fr., (1972) Bull. civ. iv no. 93. The basis on which
damages were calculated is obscure. The unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeal of Colmar,
Judgment of 13th July 1970, cour d'appel, Colmai Fr, indicates that the defendant claimed that the
expenses of the plaintiff's trip to the United States were paid by the American firm but that the
plaintiff claimed its costs in constructing a shed. The awanl of 7,500 French francs was not
explained. It may be that damages were based on the loss of a chance.
" In an interesting Dutch case, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden went beyond this, It ruled that if
negotiations had pivgressed so far that the parties reasonably could assume that a contract would
be concluded, damages could include prefits that would have been made had the contract been
concluded. It also ruled that even before the negotiations had progressed this far, a disappointed
party might be able to recover expenses incurred in negotiating. Judgment of 18th June 1982, Hoge
Raad der Nederlanden, Neth, 1983, NJ, no. 723. J
. J . Goudsmit, Construction Contracts, in The
Dossiers of the Institute of International Business Law and Practice, ICC, 1990.
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negotiate cannot constitute a legally enforceable contract, was based on
uncertainty; tested there against time and grounds for terminating
negotiations. The conclusion was that "a duty to negotiate in good faith is as
unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a
negotiating party", 4
 which inevitably follows from a presupposition of no
duty on a negotiating party. There is justification for judicial opposition to
an obligation of fair dealing on parties to pre-contractual negotiations.
Although it is in society's interest to provide a regime under which the
parties are free to negotiate contracts, the outcome of any particular
negotiation is not ordinarily a matter for interference." 5
 Further; it was
considered that there was no established reason to believe that imposition of
a general obligation of fair dealing would improve the regime under which
such negotiations take place." 6
 Determining when in negotiations an
obligation of fair dealing arises might have an undesirable chilling effect,
discouraging parties from entering into negotiations if chances of success
were slight. The obligation might also have an undesirable accelerating
effect, increasing the pressure on parties to bring negotiations to a final, if
hasty conclusion.
As long as no contract has been concluded, damages may be compensated
only in tort. This is an established premise of French law. 117
 There are no
specific conditions of liability relating to the pre-contractual process. As a
consequence, the negotiator who suffers damage which he ascribes to another
negotiator's behaviour during the negotiations, must bring evidence that all
the requirements for liability in tort are present: compensatable damage,
fault, and a causal relation between them. The damage may consist of loss of
time and money spent towards concluding the contract, in the loss of
economic value of a confidential information used or disclosed by the other
party after the end of negotiations, or in any other present loss, damrium
" Walford v Miles (1992)2A.C. 128 (H .L.) at 138.
115 
"I-low can a court be expected to decide whether, subjectively, a proper reason existed for the
termination of negotiations?', Walford v Miles, Lord Ackner at 138.
" "The concept of a duty to carly on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the
adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations", Walford v Miles, Lord Ackner at
138. E. Peel, Locking out and Locking in: the enforceability of agreements to negotiate. (1992) C.LJ.
211.
'	 Cass. corn. 20th March 1972: Bull. IV. n. 93; J.C.P. 1973, 17543, note J
. 
Schmidt Rev. tt dr. civ 1972, p.
779, ni. obs. Dur cass. corn. 11th January 1984: Bull. IV. n. 16.
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emergens, or missed gain, lucrum cessans.'18
The requirement of certainty of the compensable damage sets limits on the
compensation of missed benefits. Pre-contractual negotiations may not be
considered as leading certainly to the conclusion of the contract; accordingly,
breach of negotiations entails a loss of a chance, perte d'une chance , to
conclude the contract and receive its benefits which is compensable. Such
damage is considered as a question of fact, 119
 which effectively leaves the
decision in the particular circumstances to the juge du fond, and without
any ordinary prospect of interference or guidance from the Cour de
Cassation •120
Pre-contractual Default
With precontractual liability considered in France under the rules of tort, the
fault must be subsumed under the general definition of wrongful behaviour
"which would not have been committed by a reasonable man under the
same circumstances.", 121
 and it is not necessary to show either an intentional
or a serious wrongdoing. French courts do however remain cautious in
acknowledging pre-contractual wrong in order not to hamper freedom in
business. The similarity of sentiment as in Walford v Miles was apparent in
dismissing an action for damages on the grounds that "it would amount to a
serious injury towards individual freedom and business security if one could
easily be liable for breach of negotiations and dealing with a competitor, the
pre-contractual fault must, in other words, be obvious and undisputable.",
rather than in nullifying the principle.'22
As a test, a reasonable man's behaviour would consist of loyalty and good
I 5 Precontractual fault may entail damage which appears only after the conclusion of the contract.
This would be so when the contract has been concluded in spite, or because, of wmng or insufficient
infonnation given dunng the negotiations. In such cases, the question of pre-contractual liability is
associated with the question of damages for misinformation or nullity of the contract.
"° This is not specific to the pee-contractual damage, and applies to all compensation in tort.
120 This renders it difficult to analyse compensation under French law, and it is additionally so because
the judges do not ordinarily make explicit the elements on which they assess compensation.
Ordinarily, the plaintiff is awarded a lump sum on the basis of a statement such as the Court has
sufficient elements to evaluate the damage to the amount of.?.
121 B. Starck, Droit civil. Obligations: Responsabilité délictuelle, H. Roland and L Boyer eds. 3rd ed.
1988, n. 265, p.150.
Pau, 14th Januaoy 1969, 0. 1969, 716.
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faith in negotiating conversely bad faith and lack of loyalty are labels of pre-
contractual wrongful behaviour. In practice, bad faith may consist of any
behaviour that impeaches the other party's confidence, such as breaking off
negotiations when the other party could reasonably expect the contract to be
concluded,123
 refusal to renew a contract when the other party could
reasonably rely on a promise to renew, 124
 disclosure of confidential
information,' 25 or erroneous information given about the the elements of the
negotiated contract.
When wrongful intent, dol, is shown, misinformation is a fraud with the
sanction of the avoidance of the contract under Article 1116.126 Lacking such
proof, misinformation may be regarded as a breach of a contractual
obligation, with examples in the warranty against latent defects, the
obligation to deliver merchandise conforming with contractual provisions,
or an obligation to inform about the conditions of use of the merchandise,
and the scope of such obligations is wider for a professional dealing with a
consumer.127
In this respect, the French courts consider the parties' knowledge as to the
required information. If the recipient of the information is a professional, he
has the duty to seek information himself about the elements of the contract.
In negotiations between car manufacturer and dealer the former had shown
to the latter a business forecast of a numerical annual sale of cars, but in fact
the dealer was able to sell only about one-third due to the market decline.
The dealer claimed damages in tort under Articles 1382 and 1383 from the
manufacturer against whom he alleged wrongful misinformation, and on
his case the manufacturer had all the available economic information and
should have foreseen the shortfall. The action was dismissed on the grounds
Cass. civ. corn., 20th Mar.ch 1972, Pr., (1972) Bull. civ iv no. 93.
124 Cass. corn., 9th Februaty 1981, D. 1981, p. 4, note J . Schmidt.
125 Cass. corn., 3itI October 1978, d. 1980, 55, note J
. 
Schmidt.
126 Article 1116: Le do! est wi cause de nullitee de la convention !orsque les nianoeuvis p,atiquees
par l'une des parties sont telles, qul! est é4dent que, sans ces rnanoeuwes, !'autre partie n'aurait
pas cont,acté. - [Dol (fraud) isa cause of nullity of the agreement when the artifices practised by on
party are such that it is evident that without them the other party would not have contracted.]
127 He is treated as if he were aware of the defects, J
. 
Ghestin, op. cit. s. 476. If these contractual
obligations against which misinformation is tested are not applicable then damage caused by
misinformation may be compensated in tort, with negligent misinformation considered as a fault;
Cass. corn., 24th November 1973, Bull. IV. n. 370. J
. 
1-fuet, Responsabiliê contractuelle et
responsabilie délictuelle, (1978).
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that the dealer himself was a professional and could have procured
Information to check "the seriousness of the forecast made".' The approach
is strikingly similar to that in Esso v Mardon 129 where the respective
positions of the parties determined the court's attitude to the reliance placed,
although on the facts the claim succeeded.
Causation is material in the approach of French law in this area. Where a
party has broken off the negotiations it is sometimes argued that the breach
was caused by the other negotiator's misbehaviour; and it is then necessary to
analyse both parties' conduct in order to determine causation at the break in
discussions. A party's precontractual fault does not necessary entail a breach
of the negotiations by the other party, but it may for instance cause the
conclusion of a less advantageous contract. If the breach has been caused by
both parties' misbehaviour, then contribution is available.
The common law mechanism for recovery of expense in the area of
performance effected either at the request of another or for his benefit in
circumstances not amounting to contract, and giving rise to remuneration, is
on the basis of a quantum meruit.' 3° Equally, where the parties have dealings
with each other on the footing that there is a valid contract when in fact their
agreement is devoid of legal effect or becomes so because, for example, a party
exercises his right to rescind or invokes a right to treat the contract as
unenforceable, then the terms of the agreement cannot be enforced, but a
party who has received a benefit under the contract or supposed contract, can
be required to restore the benefit or its money value in a quasi-contractual
claim for restitution.131
English contract law draws a sharp, although potentially unreal, distinction
between negotiating statements that are intended to form part of the promise
or bargain, and those which at the time they are made are not intended to be
promissory in character but are merely made to induce the other party to
'' Cass. corn., 25th Februaiy 1986, Bull. IV. n. 33; J.C.P. 1988. 1110995, note Virassarny Rev. tr. dr. civ.,
1987, 85, obs. Mestre.
'	 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v Mardon (1976) Q.B. 801 (CA).
'° William Lacey(l-lounslow) Ltd.v Davis (1957)1 W.LR. 932.
P. Birks, An lntmduction to the Law of Restitution.
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enter into contract. 132 A statement of the latter kind is a mere representation,
and the innocent party's remedy if it is false is not a claim for breach of
contract but a claim for rescission of the contract and/or damages in tort for
deceit or negligence or under the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Where a
misrepresentation later becomes incorporated as a term of the contract, the
innocent party has the option of treating it as a mere representation or a
breach of contract.
In English law the opening of negotiations for an intended contract, even if
none finally results, may impose liability in tort for fraudulent or negligent
misstatements causing loss. Since such statements can attract liability under
general principles of tort even if not made with a view to inducing a contract
between the maker and recipient of the statement, the fact that they are a
prelude to an intended contract which does not matenalise is not seen as a
barrier. The disclosure of confidential information solely for the purpose of
an intended contract may be protected by imposing on the recipient of the
information the duty to respect the confidence, and a breach of such duty is
actionable, although the juridical basis of the claim remains obscure.t33
Misrepresentation involves some positive misstatement, expressly or by
conduct for the mere failure to disclose a material fact is not by itself
sufficient, except under contracts uberrimae fideli . However, active
concealment of the facts, for example deliberately covering up defects in
property, may constitute a misrepresentation, as may a failure to correct a
statement which was true when made but subsequently becomes false as the
result of supervening events prior to the contract.135
English law equates its position of freedom to withdraw from the proposed
132 The statement may not feature as a term of the contract, but is actionable as a misrepresentation
which, whether innocent or fraudulent, entitles the buyer to rescind the contract and, unless it was
made in the reasonable belief that it was true, also entitles him to damages.
Having been based variously on equity, tort, contract and property; described generally, in the Law
Commission Report, Breach of Confidence (Law Comm. No. 110, 1981). An example of a successful
action for the misuse of information imparted in confidence during negotiations is Seager v
Copydex Ltd. (1967) 2 All ER. 415, followed in Fraser v Thames Television Ltd. (1983)2 All E.R. 101.
134 French jurisprudence appears to be evolving a principle of :ticence dolosive , wmngful/fraudulent




' This is because a representation is deemed to be continuously made up to the time of the contract, a
principle now in section 2(1) of the Misrepresntation Act 1%7.
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transaction until a contract has been concluded with no duty of good faith in
negotiations, but where a contract is concluded the court may imply an
agreement to negotiate further terms in good faith.no It is not easy to see why
such an implied agreement, or an agreement to use best endeavours, should
be any less open to the charge of uncertainty than an agreement to negotiate
which is not based on an existing agreement. The mechanism of implication
is available however because of the framework of the contract, which itself
narrows the area in which to agree and renders it easier to find what the
parties should have agreed.
The lack of a remedy for a party to negotiations where the other party breaks
them off arbitrarily or prematurely flows partly from there being no halfway
house between contract and no-contract as well as from the absence of the
concept of culpa in contrahendo. It does not necessarily follow though, from
the assumption of risks associated with withdrawal,' 31 that a party to
negotiations is completely immune from consequences of his conduct for
there are forms of estoppel by which someone may be bound by his promise
even where there is no contract.'
If someone invites a tender from another knowing that he will not in any
circumstances accept that party's tender the latter may recover his abortive
expenditure in an action in tort for deceit;' 39 and if a party incurs fruitless
expense in negotiations because the other party has deliberately or by
negligence misled him as to the nature or terms of the proposed contract
there seems no reason why he should not have a claim in tort for the
recovety of his outlay. Further, where services are provided in expectation of
a contract and go beyond what is normally to be expected of a negotiating part
or are provided in the mistaken assumption by both parties that a contract
was in existence or would be concluded the law may imply a promise on the
part of the recipient to pay on a quantum meruit."°
'' Donwin Productions Ltd. v EMI Films Ltd. (1984) Times L.R. 9th March 1984.
To advance (his) ... interest he must be entitled, if he thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw
from further negotiations or to withdraw in fact, in the hope (of) ... improved terms", Walford v Miles,
per Lord Ackner at 138.
' Crabb v Arun District Council (1976) Ch. 179. There is also a potential liability of a party in tort
where his statements are fraudulent or negligent and cause loss, and these tort principles are
capable of being applied to the negotiating process itself.
'° Richardson v Sylvester (1873) L.R. 9 Q.B. 34.
'° William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis (1957) 1 W.L.R. 932, where the authorities are reviewed.
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It is only where a party's expectations are engendered improperly, or in such
circumstances as give rise to an estoppel, that English law will allow a
remedy for his reliance loss or allow him to treat a promise or other
statement made to him as temporarily or permanently binding. The absence
of good faith is not of itself a cause of action; it must be buttressed by conduct
which the law recognises as tortIous or as estopping the part concerned from
resiling from his promise or representation. It has been said that "the hard
edges of contract formation may be crumbling"," 1
 but English law has set
itself against a general concept of good faith in the bargaining process.
Conversely to this, in the Netherlands emphasis is placed on principles of
good faith and of "reasonableness and equity", the latter term seemingly
replacing the former and, particularly where the application of extant rules
do not give an acceptable and fair solution, the principle is applied unless
parties have made their intentions and expectations sufficiently clear. 142
 This
development has been important in respect of pre-contractual relations. A
milestone was reached in 1957, establishing that where parties commence
negotiations as to a possible agreement, then at that moment a relationship is
created which is ruled by good faith. This imports that each party must
acknowledge that his conduct is controllable by the justified interests of the
other. It in fact creates a positive defence to claims for the avoidance of
contractual obligations on the argument that when entering into the contract
the claiming party had been in error as to certain facts and circumstances. On
the basis of the doctrine of good faith it has been found that such party has
an obligation to exercise reasonable care and to investigate the circumstances
which may be essential as to his decision to enter into the contract. 143
 Whilst
the result was negative in character the importance of the decision was that it
established the existence of a legal relationship between the parties simply as
a result of entering into negotiations.
*41 PS. Atiyah, An Intmduction to the Law of Contract, 4th ed, 108.
J. J . Goudsmit, Construction Contracts, in The Dossiers of the Institute of International Business Law
and Practice, I.CC, 1990.
143 FIR. 1957 Bans - Riesekamp.
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Tenders '"
At common law an invitation to tender is not ordinarily an offer binding the
employer to accept the lowest or any tender so that the provision often made
that the employer does not undertake such acceptance would be
unnecessary145
 Nevertheless where construed as an express offer to accept the
lowest tender the invitation would be binding as such,' 46
 and so close to the
French perception. If the express offer were regarded as giving rise to a
unilateral contract in the sense of: "If you make the lowest bid I will accept it"
then the likely effect would be to impinge on the ordinary freedom to
revoke once an offeror started to perform the condition.' 41
 The result would
give a remedy beyond breach of the obligation to maintain the offer for the
time necessary for due examination under Article 932 and would reflect
more closely that achieved by the civil law principle of culpa in
con trahendo.
Indeed the common law does permit remedies in situations that would be
understood by a civil lawyer as referable to the principle of culpa in
contrahendo ,despite the absence of such a principle, and, additionally, the
presence of an approach that gives a wider margin for non-effective offers'48
than perceived in civil law; the rigidity of the search for the conclusion of the
bargain as the watershed from no contract to contract; the facility for
revocation prior to actual acceptance; and no statutory assistance. Where,
under unambiguous and familiar procedures, tenders from known parties
were sought, a tenderer duly complying and submitting his tender was
contractually entitled to have it considered alongside others, and the failure
to open or consider it was held to be a breach of contract.149
"You just sat there thinking that this piece of hardware had 400,000 components, all of them built by
the lowest bidder", David Scott, Apollo 15 astronaut, on waiting for blast-off.
'	 Moore v Shawcross (1954) C.LY. 342, (J.P.L.431).
t48 South Hetton Coal Co. v Haswell Coal Co. (1898) 1 Ch. 465 (CA.).
Harvela Investments Ltd. v Royal Trust Co. of Canada (1986) AC. 207 (H.L.) per Lord Diplock at 224.
Danlia Ltd. v Four Millbank (1978) 1 Ch. 231 at 238 (CA.).
'' In the sense that the common law ascribes only the quality of an invitation to treat.
Blackpool & Fylde Aero CLub v Blackpool Borough Council (1990) 1 W.L.R. 1195 (CA). This was
despite the expression in the invitation to tender of the statement that the employer does not
undertake to accept the highest, or indeed any tender at all. The court did not go on to reach a
decision on the alternative finding of negligence. J.N. Adams and R. Brownsword, More in
expectation than hope: the Blackpool airport case. (1991) 54 ML.R. 281.
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In the English construction industry it is an accepted usage that the costs of
the preparation of tenders are borne by the tenderers. Each contractor is
aware of the limited chances he has of success and tendering costs are
contractors' overheads, consequently employers pay indirectly for
unsuccessful tendering costs. Only in very limited cases is remuneration
provided for competing tenderers, and it seems economically acceptable for
tenderers to bear their own costs
Where negotiations are commenced and continued with one contractor
there may exist a different situation observable under civil law, which will of
importance if the negotiations are broken off notwithstanding the fact that
substantial costs have been made by the contractor during this period. Thus
in the Netherlands a municipality commenced negotiations with contractor
C which became prolonged and detailed after it transpired that C's sole
competitor's price was higher. There had been no formal tender procedure.
C therefore had reason to believe and to trust that he would be awarded the
contract, but the municipality terminated negotiations and awarded it to a
third contractor who during the period of negotiations offered a lower price.
C's action for the costs incurred and lost profit was successful. The court
concluded:
"Negotiations as to an agreement entered a stage, where the breaking
off of such negotiation must be considered under the circumstances to
be in violation of the principle of good faith in particular as the parties
vis a vis each other could assume that an agreement would be the
result of the negotiations in question."151
The rules for tendering for public works are one aspect where harmonisation
has been invoked in order to stimulate competition within the EEC and
across national boundaries. 152
 Their perceived magnitide of impact in
England reflects the English isolation from the influence of the principles of
good faith and culpa in contrahendo, which, as developed in civil law,
rendered regulation of tendering desirable within national contexts. In 1986
the Netherlands introduced new tender regulations offering a practical
150 This reflects the perception that the design function has been carried by the professionals, and is
abetted by the use of detailed bills of quantties and the rules for measurement under the Standard
Method of Measurement.
Supreme Court of the Netherlands, J
. 
J. Goudsmit, op. cit..
152 Professor W. Heierrnann, The EC Directive Concerning Coordination of Procedures for the Arard of
Public Works Contracts. (1990) 7 !C.L.R. 76.
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solution to problems encountered with precontractual obligations,
particularly the question whether by the invitation to tender and
participation by a tenderer a legal relationship is created comparable with
that pertaining during negotiations. With no contract awarded no
contractual relationship existed to remedy the consequences of acting in
defiance of the rules, and difficulties abounded. The 1986 tender regulations
contained an arbitration clause entitling those involved to submit any
conflict to an arbitration tribunal.' 53
 Organisations representing the interests
of contractors were so entitled, and this was introduced to safeguard the
anonymity of contractors not wishing to raise disputes with prospective
clients,' 54 so that by accepting the invitation to tender, a legal relationship is
created which reflects aspects of a complete contractual relationship.
Generally arbitration agreements are required to be entered into in wnting and be clear and
unambiguous, but under the new tender regulations the sole fact of submission of a tender to the
employer binds the tenderer and employer to arbitration. The impact is dependent on the speed
with which the arbitration procedure can be completed. The issue in most cases is that the contract
is being awanled incorrectly to a tenderer who does not fulfil the tender conditions. To restrain this
the award must be given before a contract has been entered into, although it has been postulated
that under certain ciitumstances a contract already entered into may be declared void.
A concern well explained by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities in
its Report, Compliance with Public Procurement Directives, 12th Report 1987-88, H L 72. para. 53, "It
is likely that the tenderer still hopes subsquently to do business with the procuring authority and
he will not want to bite the hand that feeds him.'
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Performance is the aim of any contract, in accordance with the terms and
obligations attaching to it. On failure the aggrieved party may seek relief by
way of requiring actual performance, but more usually relief will be by
substitution of the obligation to pay compensation. Even specific relief will
inevitably not give the actual promised performance if only because the
enforced performance is likely not to take place at the time stipulated. A
basic obligation of the contractor is the achievement of the promise within
the time agreed, with such performance being in a workmanlike manner,
and, while problems abound on facts as to whether work done is in
conformity with the contract, inevitably the timeliness of the overall
performance is connected.
Analyses of delay in performance are frequently focused on questions of fault
as introduced by contract provisions, but delay and its consequences may
occur without regard to whether it derives from fault. Delay by reference to
fault can ordinarily be distinguished from those contingencies which would
otherwise affect or prevent the timely performance of the obligation, but
which may be provided for within the contracts as giving rise to new or
extended dates by which performance is to be completed. Fault itself though
is inadequate as the distinguishing line between performance and breach, for
whilst fault may lead to failure to perform, or to delay in performance, the
central questions in assessing a given performance will be to ascertain where
the parties have provided for the responsibility for anticipated eventualities
to lie, and, if they have not anticipated them, where the law places
responsibility
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The partial or total failure to perform may additionally require that the
contract obligations as a whole be resolved between the parties, so that the
aggrieved party may wish to refuse to accept further performance and recover
back any performance that he has rendered. In French law this is known as
the resolution. The common law term rescission has a variety of shades of
meaning but the process is clear, as one of terminating or simply putting an
end to the contract. The need for such a measure may not arise where the
facility for the aggrieved party simply to withhold further counter-
performance is invoked. Equally this process may be an addition to a claim
for compensation. These features can be separated for consideration into the
compartments of enforced execution, monetary compensation for breach,
circumstances giving rise to relief from performance, time for performance
and damages for late completion, and the bringing to an end of the execution
of works.
2	 SpecifIc Pefixmance
A failure by the contractor to execute the work whether in whole or part, or
by the employer to permit the work to be executed, gives rise to consideration
of specific performance as a remedy. It seems that in civil law jurisdictions
where the remedy of specific performance is available the same features and
difficulties that have led to the commonly held view that the English courts
will not award specific performance of a building contract, have impinged on
the practical use of such remedy, and the unwilling workman or contractor
will not ordinarily be directly compelled to do the promised work
French law distinguishes between various forms of reparation or execution
in permitting enforced performance. The content of the obligation is critical.
Deriving from its social aims the Code Civil was concerned to safeguard the
debiteur from personal constraint resulting from obligations, and it was
considered less oppressive to owe money than to be liable to compulsion to
perform. In consequence enforced performance in France may constitute the
restoration or fulfilment of the state of affairs which should have existed,
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reparation ou execution en nature , or of compensation by a substitute,
reparation par	 ,or execution en equivalent.
The nature of obligations is contrasted between those to do or not to do, de
faire ou de ne pas faire, which resolves itself into damages in case of non-
performance, and the obligation de donner or to transfer property.' The
latter is concerned with the transfer of ownership, and the contrast renders
the complexities of the availability of execution en nature2 of little practical
importance in building contracts. However, where the fulfilment of the
obligation to do or not to do, distinct from the obligation to transfer property,
does not depend upon personal participation, performance may be procured
by a substitute, and in France 3, Italy4 and in Germany 5
 the claimant may be
authonsed by a court to have work completed by another person and charge
the debiteur with the cost.6
This is not specific performance in its English sense, but there is available a
means of securing performance by the defendant himself. The French courts
have retained the remedy of awarding a penalty, astreinte , of a sum of
money per day to compel a recalcitrant contractor to fulfil his obligation in
specie.
In English law the power to order specific performance of a contract to build
or repair exists, 7 notwithstanding the general premise that specific
performance of a building contract will not be ordered. This premise relates
to an ordinary contract for works and although there have been broad
judicial statements of old which deny the very possibility of specific
performance,8 it is at least qualified by "a building agreement where the
consideration is the grant of a lease, where the court will order the grant to be
The description of a contract in Article 1101 is in terms of an agreement to give, to do or not to do
something.
2 Article 1184 al. 2, "loiter I'aulre a i'axécution "; Artide 1610 "demander ... sa mise en possession".
Article 1144.
Codice Civile Article 2931.
BGB 11887.
Although where perfonnance has become impossible French law does not impose liability for
delivety of a substitute.
These are still sometimes used, Price v Strange (1978)1 Cli. 337 at 359 (CA).
$ In Lucas v Commerford (1790) 3 Bre. C.C. 166 at 167, per Lord Thurlow; Merchants' Trading Co. v
Banner (1871) LR. 12 Eq. 18; Cubitt v Smith (1864) 11 LT. 298; and, Wilkinson v Cements (1872) 8 Ch.
App. 96.
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made after the building is done."9
As an equitable remedy a hurdle to obtaining such an order is the
requirement that damages will not adequately compensate the plaintiff, and
secondly, the definition of the performance in order that compliance or non-
compliance may be ascertained. It was on the need for precise definition that
the presumption arose such that "it is settled that, as a general rule, the court
will not compel the building of houses". 5° The courts though have not
applied this consistently. Whilst on occasions regarding the objection that
they cannot adequately supervise building contracts as conclusive,11
acknowledgement exists that "they could order specific performance in
certain cases in which the works were specified by the contract in a
sufficiently definite manner."t2 Another factor is possession of the land on
which the construction takes place. This element is unlikely to be available
to a contractor on a claim to restrain an employer from terminating work, for
in the ordinary building contract his occupation is by way of licence.13
Much nineteenth century litigation involved railway construction, and
whether action was brought by contractor or employer the result was a
refusal to grant specific performance when the works were indefinite; but in
Wolverhampton Corporation v Emmons 14 the conditions of sufficiently
defined work and possession were present. 15 Nevertheless in Carpenters'
°	 Halsbuzy's Laws, 4th Edn, para. 1287.
'° Sir G. Mellish U. in Wilkinson v Clements (1872) L.R. 8 Cli. 96 at 112.
Blackett v Bates (1865) 1 Cli. App. 117; Powell Dufftyn Steam Coal Co. vTaff Vale lUy Co. (1874)9 Ch.
App. 331; Wheatley v Westminster Btymbo Coal Co. (1869) L.R. 9 Eq. 538.
12 Wolverhampton Corpn. v Emmons (1901) 1 K.B. 515 at 524, per Collins U. Equally, City of London v
Nash (1747) 3 Atk 512 at 515-6, per Lord Haniwicke L.C.. Moseleyv Virgin (1786) 3 Ves. 184 at 185, per
Lord Loughborough: Brace v Wehnert (1858) 25 Beav. 348 at 352, per Lord Romffly M.R,. South Wales
RI>' Co. v Wythes (1854)5 De G.M.& G. 880 at 888, per Turner U.. In Hepburn v Leather for example
the court ordered the defendant purchaser of land to perform his premise to build a wall to a
specifIed thickness and height; (1884) 50 L.T. 660, but not well reported.
' As considered in Hounslow L.B.C. v Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd. (1971) Ch. 233.; where
the contract was on the 1963 Edition of the JCT Standard Form of Building Contract.
' (1901) 1 Q.B. 515 (CA). The plaintiff had conveyed land to the defendant in respect of a scheme of
street imprevement and the defendant had covenanted to erect buildings within a certain time.
Whilst there was undoubtedly a public interest element in permitting implementation of an
imprevement scheme for insanitary conditions, the court did not regard this as determinative in
granting specific performance.
The fact of the conveyance that gave the purchaser/defendant absolute possession of the land was a
critical feature, and the building work was part of the consideration, so enabling the court to
conclude "that the plaintiff has a substantial interest in having the contract performed which is of
such a nature that he cannot adequately be compensated for breach of contract adequately be
compensated for breach of contract by damages", per Romer U. at 525.
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Estates v Davies 16 it was not regarded as essential that the defendant should
have obtained possession of the land on which all the work was to be done
under the contract the subject of the claim. Further, to identify a rule that the
building works must be clearly specified does not mean that the contract has
to be so specific that it leaves "no room for doubt", for in Molyneux v
Richard ' the covenant of which performance was ordered was to erect
dwellings similar to those in a particular street and it was not fatal that there
was "some little variety" in the cottages to be copied.
Cases where attempts to compel building works succeeded were not mirrored
in converse attempts of contractors to prevent by injunction either the
interference of employers in the execution of works, or the exercise of rights
of termination. The justification was that damages would be adequate
compensation, and it would be improper to force on the employer a person
"to perform these works whom they reasonably or unreasonably object to",19
so reflecting objections found in refusals to order specific performance of
contracts for personal services. 20 Further, in such cases courts would not have
compelled specific performance, and the grant of an injunction would
necessarily have amount to indirect specific performance. 2' Similar
reasoning was used in restraining a contractor from preventing the employer
from exercising a contractual right to complete the works in the event of the
engineer not being satisfied with the contractor's progress.22
In Hounslow v Twickenham the contractor refused to leave the site,
Carpenters' Estates Ltd. v Davies (1940) Ch. 160. It was there ordered that the defendant should lay
the sewers on her own land as she had promised. If this had not been done the plaintiffs could not
have built on the land which the defendant had sold to them, and adequate compensation at law
would not have resulted.
Molyneuxv Richard (1906) 1 Ch. 34 at 40, per Kekewichj..
Ganett v Banstead and Epsom Downs Rly Co. (1864) 12 LT. 654.
'° Garrett v Banstead and Epsom Downs RlyCo. per Kekeich J.
20 That it would be "hard" to thn.ist on to a defendant a person "who is objectionable to him", Pickering
v The Bishop of Ely (1843) 2 Y & C. Ch. Cas. 249.
Munm v Wivenhoe and Brightlingsea Rly Co. (1864) 12 L.T. 655 at 657. Knight Bruce U. accepted
that an injunction might lie if it were "plair quite uncontested" that there was no title to declare the
contract void.
Cork Corpn. v Rooney (1881) 7 L.R. Ir. 191, where Chatterton V.C. suggested that the result might
have been different if it had been the plaintiffs own wmngful acts or defaults whch had prevented
adequate pmgress. The defendant contractor was regarded as adequately protected by the
plaintiff's undertaking to abide by any order for damages.
23 Hounslow LB.C. v Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd. (1971) Ch. 233. The contractor was
occupying the site for the works and the plaintiff determined the contractor's employment under
the building contract. The validity of the deteimination was challenged.
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denying the validity of the determination of his employment. In the course
of refusing an injunction it was thought, but left open, that the contract
would be specifically enforceable. The nineteenth century cases, where
contractors had sought the injunctions, were distinguished, but it was not
considered that because the court would not restrain an employer from the
exercise of his powers of removal under the contract he would be entitled to
an injunction to enforce them. 24
 This reasoning would lead to the result that
a contractor might compel an employer to accept building which he does not
in fact want on his land.25
There must be a critical distinction between an action to compel an employer
to allow a contractor to build against the employer's wish, even in breach of
contract, and one to compel a contractor to build. Damages are unlikely to
recompense an employer adequately when facing an unwanted contractor on
his land, and balancing of convenience is unlikely to favour maintaining an
unwanted builder in occupation of the owner's property.26
Specific performance ought to be capable of development in English law, so
as to at least warrant serious consideration for its application in special
circumstances in the construction field, 27
 particularly contracts for vital
elements of a whole scheme where the remedy would form a valuable and
viable option where no other contractor is available to perform them. The
supposed difficulty of supervision of the performance as an objection to
implementation of the remedy is exaggerated. Works of a specialised nature
or those involving the use of a particular contractor's patented method or
24 Hounslow L. B. C. v Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd. (1971) Cli. 233, per Megany J at 251.
"No doubt the doctrine of mutuality is subject to many exceptions, but if in the present case the
contract is specifically enforceable by the Borough, it is not easy to see why it should not also be
specifically enforceable by the contractor".
25 The decision, in 1971, on the affidavit evidence was that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie
case. In American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd (1975) AC. 396 (H.L.) it was decided that there was no
such requirement, and that only a serious issue to be tried had to be shown, If shown and damages
would be an adequate remedy then no injunction is granted. If inadequate then, with the protection
of an undertaking in damages, the balance of convenience detemunes the grant or refusal of the
injunction. Applying this, the outcome would in all probability have been the other way.
20 Where an employer had served notice of determination under clause 63 of the I.C.E. Conditions (5th
Edition) expelling the contractor from site, the contractor challenged it but failed to secure an
injunction restraining its implementation; and the balance of convenience favoured strongly the
court supporting the Engineer's decision, Tara Civil Engineering Ltd. v Mootheld Developments
Ltd. (1989) 46 B.L.R. 72.
27 Added to the longstanding use (as in City of London v Nash (1747) 3 Atk. 512.1 of specific
performance in the landlord and tenant field to enforce a lessee's covenant to build or repair if
sufficiently certain, was Jeune v Queens Cross Properties, (1974) Ch.97, where an order was made
requiring a landlord to reinstate a stone balcony to fulfill his covenant to repair
79
machineiy might render damages inadequate, and such circumstances are
not far removed from a contract for the supply of petrol of which specific
performance was ordered when other supplies might not have been
available.28
Such potential is not fanciful, as indicated in the recent Channel Tunnel
litigation, 29
 concerning the claim by Eurotunnel for an injunction restraining
TML from suspending work on the cooling system, 3° so effectively for specific
performance. At first instance the judge indicated a preparedness to grant a
mandatory injunction requiring the continuance of work, in lieu of which
an undertaking was given.
The appeal was allowed and the stay of the action granted in view of the
disputes over the price and the right to suspend falling within the arbitration
procedure,31
 but of particular interest is that the Court of Appeal would not
have interferred with the view that a mandatory injunction should be
granted, and its judgment recognises that there is sanction available in such
circumstances beyond a liability for damages where performance is witheld.
Whilst recognising that normally a mandatory injunction should only be
granted if the court feels a high degree of assurance that at trial it will appear
to have been rightly granted, 32
 the court acknowledged that there were cases
where a high standard of probability was not made out but nevertheless an
injunction should be granted.33
 The potential harm to Eurotunnel was
thought to be such that it might well have been a suitable case for an
injunction, and not essential to show strong probability of success.
28 Sky Petroleum Ltd. v VIP Petroleum Ltd. (1974) 1 W.L.R. 576.; or the much needed supply of
negatives, music and effects tracks for particular films for which a mandatoty injunction was granted
in Films Rover Ltd. v Cannon Film Sales Ltd. (1987) 1 WL.R. 670.
° Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. and Others v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. and Others (1992) 2 Q.B.
656 (CA) (1993) A.C. 334 (H.L).
3° Eurotunnel had placed a variation order for the cooling system. Its valuation became disputed and
as one of several disputes was refened to the expert panel being the first part of the agreed dispute
resolution procedure. Funding on a cost-plus basis was agreed pending agreement or such
detennination. TML alleged that Eurotunnel had subsequently reverted to paying their own
valuations and stated that unless paid in Full they would suspend work on the system. Furotunnel
sought an injunction to restrain the suspension. TM L cross-applied to stay that action because of
the arbitration previsions.
This result was upheld in the I-louse of Lords but by reference to the inherent jurisdiction to stay
proceedings. In the I-louse of Lords the important aspect was the potential width of scope of
injunctions to extend to the assistance of foreign arbitration but not to effectively supplant the
dispute reosolution procedure that the parties had there agreed to.
32 In accordance with Locabail International Finance Ltd. v Agmexport (1986)1 W.LR. 657 (CA).
3° As in Leisure Data v Bell (1988) FS.R. 367 (CA).
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The need for precision, and the necessity for a lack of constant supervision by
the court, were put into the context of the difficulties where it is a husband
maltreating his wife or an employee who proposing to use his employer's
trade secrets Indeed strict requirements have been relaxed over the last
twenty years, certainly in commercial cases, as can be seen by reference to the
terms of Mareva injunctions, where reasonable living expenses were allowed
to be expended out of frozen funds, and alteration and clarification of terms
is common. Accordingly, although orders will still not be made which
require active supervision by the court the courts may be less unwilling to
order compliance with a construction contract where the balance of
convenience requres it.
Starting from the proposition that a contract should be performed and duly
performed it is suggested that in France a normal remedy is to order specific
performance whenever this is possible. 35
 It is in what is possible that the
proposition of normality fades. Article 1184 al. 2 of the Code CMI provides
that a party to a synallagmatic contract who has not received what he was
promised is entitled to demand resolution of the contract and damages, or to
require the other to perform the agreement in so far as that is still possible.36
The absence of the language of the exceptional nature of the remedy as
applied to specific performance in England is a separating feature, and the
derivation of the difference may lie in the perception of contract. French law
placed emphasis on the moral nature of the obligation, 37 pacta sunt
seivanda, you must keep your word, and if you do not, the State and law
will oblige you to do so. English law emphasises the bargain, and, in the
event of damage suffered in consequence of a breach an award of damages
would be the normal remedy, with ease of enforcement in mind.
French law brought to bear the fundamental freedom of the individual, so as
not to oblige him to carry out personally a piece of work which he has
The principles reiterated in Redland Bricks Ltd. v Morris (1970) A.C. 652 (H.L.) per LonJ Upjohn at
666.
R. David: English law and French law
Article 1184, al. 2.
Stressed by the canonists, for whom it was a sin for a person not to fulfil his promises.
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promised to do, and the antipathy towards enforcement at the inception of
the Code Civil led to the principle provided by Article 1142 that "Eveiy
obligation to do or not to do gives rise to a liability in damages in the event
of non-performance on the part of the obligor." 3° As a theoiy it was too
sweeping,39
 and was considerably curtailed in court so that its terms are not
applied to all obligations to do or not to do. 4° The Article does not expressly
draw any distinction between acts which can or cannot be vicariously
performed; but there is such a distinction made, and Article 1142 only
prevents the direct performance of the latter so as to prevent the specific
enforcement of a contract by a tradesman to render services.
The derivation of Article 1142 is from Pothier 4' who drew the distinction42
between obligations to give something and obligations to do something from
Roman law and, applying the concept that no-one should be forced to do,
concluded that the remedy was in damages. Pothier saw no real distinction
between types of property or between obligations which were hard to enforce
and those which were not, but in adopting his premise the draftsmen of the
Code were giving effect to a distrust of inherent judicial power. In
consequence the Code Civil left a substantial gap in practical effectiveness.
The basic principle was qualified by Article 1144 under which the court might
empower the creditor to procure a third party to do the act promised. 43
 This
provision created the faculté de remplacement. The buyer of generic goods
could obtain goods provided for under a contract from elsewhere at the
expense of the seller, but the principle was inapplicable where no
replacement was possible or where the personal co-operation of the debiteur
was required. The authorisation within Article 1144 has been taken as
° Article 1142: Toute obligations de faJre ou de ne pas faire se zsaut endornrnages et intérêts, en
cas d,néxecution de La part du débiteur"
° It was not adopted by the two Civil Codes of Louisiana or Quebec which are based on French law.
° Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, Vol. VIII, Ch.16, International Encyclopaedia of
Comparative Law. For example a vendor 's obligation to deliver goods was treated as an obhga (ion
de donner and not as an obligation de faire.
Pothie Traité des Obligations, 158.
42 This is found in Artide 1126 by which eveIy contract has as its object either something that the
obligor has premised to give or something he has premised "tO do or not to do".
Article 1144: "Le aancierpeut auss en cas dthéxecution.. étm autorisé a faire iexécuterjui-même
fobligation aw. dépens du débiteur' (The Obligee may also, in the event of non-performance, be
authonsed to perform the obligation himself at the expense of the Obligor.1
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I'autonsation de justice ," so that judgment for substituted performance is
required from the juges du fond who have at their disposal an inherent
power to secure such performance of an obligation.45
Performance at the expense of the debiteur was a form of indirect execution
en nature, and subject to the objection that the expense of the substitute
performance had first to be incurred with the attendant risk of subsequent
non-recovery46
 This has been met by the Law of 9th July 1991 which adds to
Article 1144 provision for an order for advance payment of the necessaty
sum.
Another qualification to the width of Article 1142 follows in Article 114348
which addresses violations of obligations to forbear. If the debiteur is bound
to refrain from certain behaviour the Article empowers the claimant to
require the removal of anything made or done in breach of this duty. To
execute this the claimant may, by authorisation of a judgment, remove
anything constructed by the debiteur in breach of the obligation, such as
building work put up in contravention of terms of a lease, and charge the
debiteur with the expense of so doing.
This enforcement of the negative obligation is of practical value for works in
apartments or in buildings the subject of coproprietorship, a lotissement. By
virtue of Article 1143 an owner within a lotissement has the right to require
that anything done in contravention of the articles binding the co-proprietors
be removed. Provided the breach is established and no question of
impossibility of demolition has been raised this right exists independently of
" Soc. 5 June 1953: Dalloz. 1953,601. Also, Civ. 3e 29th November 1972:J.C.P. 73, IV. 14; Bull. III, n. 642, p.
473.
Civ. 1, 3rd October 1956: Bull. 1 n. 328, p266.
46 Treitel, op. cit.
Loi 91-650, 9th July 1991, article 82. By article 97 this comes into force on the first day of the 30th
month following the month of its publication, namely 1st Februazy 1994. The addition to Article 1144
is: CeIui-d peut être condamne A faire !'avance des sonimes nécessaims A cette a'écution. iThedebiteur may be ordered to make advance payment of the amount necessaiy for such execution.)
46 Article 1143: 'Néanmoins le créanciera le dmit de demander que ce qul au,it été fa it pa r
con tiavention A i'engagement. soit détivit; et il peut se faire autonser A Ie détn,ire aw'. dépens du
debiteur, sans prejudice des domniages et intéréts s'il y a lieu. [Nonetheless, the creditor has the
right to request that what has arisen in contravention of the obligation be destmyed; and he may be
authorised to destroy it at the expense of the debiteur, without prejudice to damages if they arise.)
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whether any or any Significant damage has resulted. 49
 Equally the Article
applies to breaches of planning requirements, 5° giving a private right of
enforcement where personal detriment directly caused by the breach is
sh own.5'
3	 Asfriiule
Despite the notion of freedom from enforcement, judicial coercion emerged
in France within the decades after 1804 in respect of obligations to do or not
to do, and with reference to powers under the previous regime.
After issuing a judgment requiring performance en nature the court fixed a
sum for payment during the time default continued and the obflgation
remained unfulfilled.52 This was by astreinte, a provisional and revisable
measure to reinforce judicial authority, which ultimately could be liquidated
into damages. In this lay the source of debate as to the nature of the remedy
and its effectiveness; whether if it was a measure of damages it was a true
coercion, conversely, if a coercion under the authority of the State, whether a
plaintiff should receive more than compensation measured as damages.
Two forms of astreinte were available; the astreinte provisoire , or
comminatoire , being the provisional sum fixed but by which the court is not
bound when it comes to its final decision; and, the astreinte definitive
where the sum to be paid is final and further proceedings simply multiply
that rate by the time the default remains extant. The threatened astreinte
expires at the end of the period fixed, but a new astreinte can be applied if
performance has not been made within the first period.
An example in the construction field was where a judgment carried an
astreinte and required a defendant to modify works done in violation of a
° Dalloz 1991/2. Civ. 3, 19th May 1981, Bull. civ. 111, 101. Also Revue de dmit lmmobilier, 1990, 192,
observations by Bergel, Violation d'une servitude de lotissement.
5° Pmvided for by the Code de l'LJrbanisme.
Dalloz 1991/2.Clv.3e, 7thjune 1979, Bull.civ. Ill, 124alsoCiv.3e, 18th Februaryl98l Bullciv. 111,38.
The sum fixed was per day or per year. An example was Dejardin v Charpentier S. 45.3.393 (Cour d'
Appel of Douai 1844) where the lessee of farm had failed to fertilize (and and was ordered to restore
it or pay 1000 francs a year for the remaining three year temi.
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landowner's rights. It remained unsatisfied, and the plaintiff sought both to
liquidate the astreinte and to impose a new one for a further three month
period. The court accepted the claim, held the defendant liable for the
astreinte of F.Fr. 900,000 and ordered him "to proceed with the execution of
the works specified in the order ... within a new period of three months
starting from the date of this judgment, on pain of an astreinte of 10,000
francs per day on default ..."."
The astreinte is available for use in circumstances where the means of
surrogate performance offered by Article 1144 would be applicable, as where a
neighbour was ordered to remove a boundary wall, 54
 or a vendor to
dismantle faulty machinery he had delivered. 55
 Courts will give judgment
requiring such positive action, or indeed to name an arbitrator, 56
 and the
astreinte is to persuade compliance.
The fixing of the amount highlighted the argument as to the nature of the
remedy. It was undoubtedly penal. The astreinte had its source in judicial
power prior to the revolutionary period which enabled the courts to find and
apply it despite the absence of express provisions, en marge des textes. This
penalty could not be compared with a penalty due to the State, and it was
taken as a special form of threat and grant of compensatory damages. In the
nineteenth century the threat had been seen as the payment of damages, but
the duality was that as a threat designed to induce co-operation an amount
referable to the harm suffered by the plaintiff would have less impact than an
amount depending on the likely recalcitrance of the defendant and his
capacity to perform. Nevertheless the liquidation of the astreinte was in
relation to the amount of economic harm suffered through failure to
perform or delay in performing There was little point therefore in a threat
of a vast astreinte in the event of non-performance if the conclusion would
be an award of ordinary compensation.
The attitude of the French courts has varied. Undoubtedly there was a
curtailing of the amount payable on the astreinte to that which could or
Riom, 10th December 1956. S. 1957, 112.
Civ. 7th April 1965, Bull. ci 1965. 1. 192.
" Civ. 20th Januaty 1913, S. 1913. 1.386.
Paris, 1st March 1951, D.H. 1951. 1. 315.
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might be justified as damages so as to lead some to view its practical value as
negligible. 57 A resurgence appeared in the late 1950's and early 1960's with
guidance from the Cour de Cassation to the effect that the astreinte was
unrelated to compensation, and should reflect the degree of fault in not
performing and the defaulter's economic drcumstances. Its amount became
dependent on the degree of obstinacy required to be overcome.
The facts of the case referred to above were that the defendant electricity
company, had been ordered sous astreinte to execute building operations on
its land, but failed to comply The plaintiff had the astreinte liquidated, and a
new astreinte for three months was obtained which failed to secure
performance. This astreinte was liquidated and a third granted, per day, for
three months. Nothing happened, and this astreinte was liquidated. 59 The
defendant then reacted, and argued that the astreinte had to be limited to the
extent of the harm actually suffered. The Cour d'Appel rejected this and
upheld the judgment, as did the Cour de Cassatio, concluding that the
astreinte provisoire is a measure entirely distinct from damages, and
designed to overcome the resistance of one who refuses execution. 60 It was
not intended as compensation for the harm that may have been suffered as a
result of the delay in performance, but should be quantified by reference to
the gravity of the fault of the recalcitrant defendant and his circumstances.6'
Although part of French court practice, the astreinte has been criticised on
grounds increasingly strengthened as the penal character of the remedy
increases; for it is the plaintiff who receives compensation for the harm
suffered, and, in addition, the astreinte pro visoire being designed to
overcome the reluctance and fixed in relation to culpability and resources.62
J.P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany. (1959) 57 Michigan L. Rev., 495. M.
Fréyarile, LAstreinte, D. 1949 Chmn. 1., and, La Valeur pratique de l'astreinte, (1951) JCP. 1.910.
' P. Raynaud, La Distinction de l'astreinte et des dommages - intéréts dans Ia junspnidence française
rêcente, Mélanges Secretan, (1964) 249. A Tunc, La Renouveau de l'astreinte en droit français.
(1964) p. 397.
° Riom. 10th December 1956, S. 1957, liZ 90 days at F.Fr. 10,000 per day..
ec Civ. 20th October 1959, D, 1959, 537.
" line mure de ci,ntiinte entiézement distincte des domma8es - intéréts.... un moyen de vaincre
Ia résistance opposée a I'execution dune condamnation. The quantification was to be 'enfonction de La gravite de Ia faute de debiteur récaicitrant et de ses facultes." To the same effect
were decisions in : Civ. 20th Januaiy 1960, JCP 1960. 11. 11483; and, Civ. 12th Ju 1960, Bull. a y. 1.319;
and Civ. 17th March 1965, Bull. civ. 1965. 1. 143..
52 Jeandidier, L'Fxécution Forcée des obligations contractuelles, Rev. Trim. civ. 74 (1976) 700.
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Discussion of the proposal of 1971 to put the astreinte on a legislative footing
drew the suggestion that it should be dMded into two with half being paid to
the plaintiff and half to the State. This was not adopted, and the Lol of 5th
July 1972 provides that the astreinte goes in full to the plaintiff and for the
clear purpose to apply pressure rather measure compensation.'4
Whilst true that a claim for performance in France commences as a
sanction, 65 the wide terms of Article 1142 with its reference to all obligations
to do or not to do have given rise to difficulty; and the contrast with England
may not be as sharp as either such premise or the apparent width of the
Article indicate. 66
 The common law restricts specific performance to where
damages are an inadequate remedy, 61
 which may be seen in parallel with the
provision in Article 1142 of the Code Civil, with the astreinte reflecting a
path concerned with enforcement once the performance has been secured by
judgment, and required because France has no process of contempt of court.
The astreinte has been controversial but it has become the preferred method
to fill a gap in securing performance which Article 1142 leaves. Further, the
facility given by Article 1144 to secure performance by a third party at the
expense of the obligor is a means of achieving satisfaction which may be
essential in circumstances where specialist materials or processes are
involved in construction.
The suggestion may have been prompted by companson with Portugal where that result obtains
(Article 829-A Codigo Civil); or with the money penalties which may be imposed in terrorem under
888 and 890 of the German Code of Civil Procedure in judgments ordering a defendant to cease and
desist or to co-operate in doing the requisite act, where the penalty goes to the state treasuiy.
° Article 5 of the Law empowers the courts, even of their own motion, to impose an astminte "pour
assuner l'exécution de leurs decisions", and Article 6 leaves no doubt: "the astminte is independent
of damages. Chabas, D .1972 Chron 271 explains the Law. Belgium (Article 1385 bis, Code Judiciare)
and the Netherlands (Articles 3.11.5 and ff. of the new Civil Code in force from 1st Januaiy 1992) have
adopted the astreinte.
Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law.
The bringing of the astreinte within the legislative framework has released greater opportunities in
France according to Jeandidier op. cit..
The ground that a plaintiff seeking performance believes his interests are best seived by it may
attract greater weight in relation to the balance of convenience in interlocutoiy proceedings for an
injunction.
• R. David: English Law and French Law.
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4	 Dna!s
It is common that damages are compensatory and are awarded to protect
certain recognised Interests of the plaintiff, for instance placing him in the
position he would have been in had the contract been performed. This may
be the expectation, but it includes two separate expectations, first the receipt
of the promised peformance and second that of putting it to some particular
use. The distinction is identified in Article 1149 of the Code Civil between
actual loss, damn urn ernergens, and lost gains, lucrum cessans , but it does
not appear that any actual use is made of the distinction.
French law does not limit recovery to restitution where the aggrieved party is
able to put an end to the contract, for Article 1184, which provides for
resolution , expressly entitles the aggrieved party to this as well as damages.
These would be assessed on the general principles of Article 1149 to 1151 and
if that party recovers a benefit from some performance as a result of
termination then he would have to give credit for its value. There is not an
option to choose between damages and termination in that termination in
principle requires the intervention and authority of the court otherwise than
in commerce, and resolution is not awarded where damages are adequate
compensation.
The general principle applies where the purchaser is aggrieved by failure to
deliver within the time agreed, so that a purchaser can claim performance or
termination together with damages, but in respect of the time default it
appears that the juges du fond will determine the reasonable time in which
the vendor must effect delivery 70 Latent defects are the subject of a special
regime, but in principle the existence of a latent defect in goods gives a choice
of remedies, either a price reduction or redhibit ion. This latter involves
restoration of the subject matter on the one side and of the price on the other.
It protects the purchaser's restitution interest in performancein his favour,
but not, in principle, the expectation that the subject matter is free from
g Article 1149k. Les dommages et intézts dus au créandersonI en général, de La perte qu'il a faite et
du gain dont il a éfé privé, sauf les exceptions et modifications d-aprês. [The damages due to the
creditor are, in general, from the loss which he incurred and fivm the gain of which he was deprived,
apart frem those exceptions and modifications hereinafter appearing.l
'° Dalloz 1991/2. Civ. 3, 10th April 1973, Bull. civ. III, 274.
88
defect. As to this, if the vendor knew of the defect he must not only restore
the price but is additionally liable under Article 1645 for all damages, tous les
dommages suffered by the purchaser, and by judicial extension knowledge is
imputed in the case of the vendeur pmfessionel. By Article 1646 lack of such
knowledge of the defect restricts the additional reimbursement to the
expenses occasioned by the sale les frais occasiorinés par Ia vente. It seems
that a broad view was attached to the phrase to include consequential losses
caused by defects and justified by the word occasionnés as opposed to the
expenses of the sale itself, but a retreat from this subsequently took place
allowing a distinction between the good and bad faith of the vendor
In France the recovery of an amount based on that required to secure
substitute performance under Article 1144 gave a concrete quantifiable
element, but with the introduction in 1994 of the facility to require the
defaulting party to advance the amount necessary to secure such
performance this element will disappear. The Code Civil lays down no time
for abstract assessment of damages and it seems that cases have fluctuated
considerably. The time of judgment had become generally accepted by the
mid 1970's, rather than the earlier adherence to the time of default,71
although if the claimant has in fact entered into a transaction to meet the loss
that time will prevail. There is however no obligation to take such a step
and there is no perceivable comparison with the English duty to mitigate.
In civil law countries it is common to distinguish between damages for
various kinds of default, and in France there is a sharp distinction between
moratory damages which are available for delay in performance, and
compensatory damages for other kinds of default. The former are not
generally recoverable without a notice putting the debiteur in default, a
mise en demeure , whilst there appears conflict as to whether such is
required for compensatory damages. Moratory damages are often sought for
delay in the payment of money, where ordinarily only interest is recoverable
by virtue of Article 1153, but for delay in performing any other obligation
they are assessed on the same principles as compensatory damages. Article
1147 refers to retard dans I'exécution, delay in performance, which gives rise
to moratory damages, and to inexécution , non-performance, which attracts




The general principle of remoteness Is found in Article 1150, namely that the
debiteur is only liable for such damages as he could have foreseen from the
time of the contract. This restriction does not apply where the default in
performance is due to the dol, fraud, of the debiteur, but dol is generally
agreed to include gross negligence, faute lourde ,72 and effectively means a
deliberate breach of contract, faute intentionelle , or one committed in bad
faith.
The debate in France as to the rationale of this exception to the test of
foreseeability has been between the view that in respect of a contractual
obligation there is attached an implied agreement limiting damages to those
foreseeable, whereas no such implied implied agreement could attach to dol,
and, the presentation of dol in relation to the contractual obligation as a
delictual liability, to which foreseeability simply does not apply. It is too easy
for the common lawyer to favour the former, but it should be remembered
that under civil law contract is treated within the law of obligations and not
in a separate compartment, so it is unsurprising that the element of
deliberateness in a failure to perform a contractual obligation should attract
such an exception.tm
The provision in Article 1150 that the debiteur who but for dol is only liable
for damage which he foresaw or could at the time of contracting have
foreseen is one of a group which define and limit the extent of liability. 74
 It is
to be read with Article 1149 covering both the actual loss and the loss of the
gain, and with Article 1151 providing exoneration from liability for indirect
damages. Direct damages are truly to be kept distinct from foreseeable
damage, for whilst dol creates a liability for damages that may have been
unforeseeable this does not extend to those which are indirect. The
Carbonniei, J. Droit civil, iv, 12th editioi 1985.
" P. Duny La nature contractuelle ou délictuelle de La responsabilite. (1972) 7 Re Trim. Dr. civ. 779. A
distinction as to the circumstances for the release from the constraints of foreseeability also anses in
respect of delay in the to pay money, the obligation péCuniaiIE
Code Civil, Book 3, Articles 1146 to 1153, [Damages resulting from the Inexecution of an Obligation.]
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requirement of directness imports causation independent of foresight, both
of which must be separately satisfied in the absence of dol.
The pnnciple of foresight identified in Article 1150 comprises a major
doctrine of French law. Adjunct to the circumscription of liability to which it
gives rise it reflects the idea of the independence of man and his
responsibility for thought within the framework of the obligation
undertaken. The common lawyer cites as his starting point the rule in
Hadley v Baxendale , and of interest is the citation of Articles 1149, 1150, and
1151 of the Code Civil to the English court and the consideration of them in
the course of the appeal, to such extent that they were described as "the
sensible rule". 76 That the test involved foreseeability was central, and that
natural consequences were foreseeable ones, whether by actual or imputed
foresight.77
A failure to keep the question of foresight (Article 1150) separate from that of
directness (Article 1151) leads to confusion in the form of applying the
criterion of foreseeability to a determination as to whether the damage is
direct. Directness may be more relevant when considering the impact of
extraneous events and matters of causation. Foresight in France was the
subject of debate as to the factors to which it had to extend, and mere
foresight of the cause of the damage and in general terms its kind was
advanced as sufficient, without the necessity of foresight as to the extent of
the damage. This however appears to have been rejected as unduly reducing
the protection of the debiteur from liability for unforeseen consequences
intended by the Code Civil. 79 The current position is that the liability is for
that loss which a reasonable person, the bon pere de famille, could have
foreseen, similar to the limit derived from the Victoria Laundry decision in
Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341. The damages " ... should be, either such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered arising naturally i.e., according to the usual course of things, 1mm such
breach of contract itself. or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of both parties at the time as the probable result of the breach of it. except where special
circumstances are known and communicated. The court was consciously formulating a rule by
which juries should be directed when estimating damages.
" At page 346. Remoteness was considered an unsatisfactory formula: per Alderson B. in argument.
"The very term "too remote" is vague. It admits damages may be remote, but that they must not be
very remote."
As in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v Newman Industries Ltd. (1949) 2 K.B. 528 (CA.).
Similar to the result in Parsons v Uttley lngham (19Th) Q.B. 791.
Y. Chartiei La Rparation du prejudice, 1983.
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England. The standpoint is at the time the contract was made and this in
abstracto test is preferred to a view in concreto, taking account of the
personality of the debiteur and his ability to foresee.
The central point is that liability cannot be reduced by a defendant solely
showing that he in fact foresaw less. Article 1150 carefully refers to the
objective "qu'cvl a Pu pré VOlT "and not to the person "qu'il a pu prevoir ".
The test is of a reasonable man placed in the circumstances of the debiteur ,
and those circumstances reflect matters actually known which may affect
foresight and thus liability. 82
 In France the assessment of damages is in the
discretion of the judges du fond and the Cour de Cassation will only
interfere if it has been exercised on a wrong principle, so that decisions rarely
come under attack and even then turn on issues of fact.
The requirement in Article 1151, where the breach of contract results from
dol, is that the damage that follows must be an immediate et directe
consequence of the non-performance of the obligation. Whilst this is not to
be confused with forseeability, 83
 the restriction on the scope of liability to
which it gives rise may equally be satisfied through the test of reasonable
foresight.84
There are few decisions advanced as illustrations of the requirement of
directness; rather, the prevailing view is that no fixed principles can be laid
60 Victoria Laundzy (Windsor) Ltd. v Newman Industries Ltd. (1949) 2 K.B. 528 (CA).
" Mazeaud and Tunc, Traité theonque et pratique de Ia responsabilité délictuelle et contractuelle.$2 Just as in France so in England; the area of indemnity is what is within the prevision of the defendant
as a reasonable man in the light of the knowledge, actual or imputed, which he has at the time of
contracting: "Damages which arise under the so-called second rule" in Hadley v Baxendale, are
sometimes referred to as if they were an increased sum which the plaintiff could obtain if he could
show "special circumstances", or as if the rule embodied a measure of damage specially beneficial
to the plaintiff which he could invoke if he fulfilled the necessaly conditions. It is, no doubt, true that
it generally operates in favour of a plaintiff rather than against him, but I think that it is capable of
doing either.', Devlin J
. 
at first instance in Biggin Ltd. v Pennanite Ltd. (1951) 1 K.B. 422 at 435.
Where subsale is within the contemplation of the parties "damages must be assessed by reference
to it whether the plaintiff likes it or not."
'3 Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, A Comparative Account.
Although Articles 1150 and 1151 would be incomprehensible ifwhat was unforeseeable was
assimilated to what was indirect, D. Tallon in Contract Law Today - Anglo French Comparisons
(1-lams/Tallon eds.) p. 277. The theories of causation, whether the equivalence des conditions or
causalité adequate, are of little importance in a contractual context.
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down, but only guidelines of a most general kind, 85
 although one decision
reflects precisely the result that would be achieved in England by the
application of reasonable foresight. A carrier in breach of contract caused
damage to agricultural machineiy, so that the plaintiff was unable to perform
a contract which required its use. The plaintiff also claimed damages in
respect of further contracts which they might have secured with adjoining
landowners and this claim was disallowed on the ground that it was not the
immediate and direct consequence of the breach.86
Liability is not dependent on the failure to perform a contract being the sole
cause of the loss. In England "if a breach of contract is one of two causes, both
co-operating and both of equal efficacy ... it is sufficient to carry judgment for
damages."87
 Either the defendant is liable fully or he is not liable at all. In
France there has been a principle that enabled a plaintiff's damages to be
reduced where the loss is partly caused by an extraneous event for which
neither party has responsibility. In the Lamoricière case an unseaworthy
ship sank in an exceptionally severe storm and in an action by dependants of
drowned passengers the defendants were held liable for 20% of the loss on
the basis that this was the extent of the disaster caused by the
unseaworthiness.88
 Whilst the action was framed in delict the same
principle could apply in a contractual action, with no distinction between
delict and contract to limit it.8°
The mathematical division in Lamoricière attracted criticism because of its
arbitrary nature. 9° The decision was an application, in respect of extraneous
events, of an approach to causation that is carried out in England by an
apportionment on a successful plea of a plaintiff's own responsibility, 91
 or as
between defendants under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. That
Carbonnier, Droit Civil. Pothier's famous example is frequently cited: if a person sells a cow
knowing, but concealing, that it is diseased, that is fraud and he is liable for the loss of the cow and
the purchaser's other animals infected by it. He is not liable though for the loss of the ability to
cultivate his land, or for the loss that he so suffers by being thus unable to meet his debts, Pothier,
Traité des Obligations (1761).
9° Cass. civ. 3n1 March 1898, D. 1898, 1, 118.
Heskell v Continental Express Ltd. (1950) 1 All E.R. 589.
88 Cas. civ. 19th June 1951, S. 1952, 1,89.
89 Treitel, op. cit.
° Note Ripert to Cass. corn. 19th june 1951, D. 1951, 717; note Beque to Cass. corn. 19th June 1951, J.C.P.
1951, II, 6426; note Mazeaud and Mazeaud, Rev, trim. dr. civ. 1951,515.
81 Under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
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apportionment is based on responsibility for the resulting damage, and it
allows a plaintiff recovery to ameliorate the old common law rule that in an
action in tort a plaintiff whose fault contributed with the defendant's to cause
the loss recovered nothing. An assumption of full liability of a defendant
which has been reaffirmed by the French Courts is inconsistent with
Lam orcière ," but, despite decisions doubting it, in circumstances of
extraneous events recovery of a low percentage may provide a more
satisfactory solution than no recovery.
Mitigation and Distress
The principle of mitigation in English law covers two areas, first that there
cannot be recovery of a loss which ought reasonably have been avoided, and
second that actual benefits gained in consequence of the breach have to
brought into account. Contributory negligence may also be seen in the
context of mitigation of damage arising from non performance of a
contractual obligation, because the reduction takes account of the
responsibility of the person who suffers damage for the damage whether or
not his conduct contributed to the event causing it.93
French law discusses contribution under the heading of fait ou faute de Ia
victime by which loss due to such act or fault may attenuate or extinguish
liability,94 but it has no recognition of any obligation on a plaintiff to
minimise loss by procuring, however reasonably, a substitute contract.
Extinguishment can arise if the victim's act is the sole cause of the loss, but
faute commune results in a reduction of damages proportionate to the
degree of responsibility for it. There is no provision in the Code Civil which
expressly sets out a doctrine of contribution, and it has been a development
92 Mazeaud and Tunc, Traite; D. Talon in Contract Law Today Anglo-French Comparisons. It seems
the searrh for the efficient cause is vezy similar to that of the effective cause as stated in McGhee v
National Coal Board (1973 ) S. C. 37 (H.L.).
Fivom v Butcher (1976) Q.B. 286.
C.S.P. Harding The Act of the Plaintiff and Concurrent Cause. Fault and causation in French Law of
Delict. (1978) 28 l.C.L.Q. 525.
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of the courts. Controversy surrounds the exact basis of the reduction, 95
 but
the principle clearly applies in contract and is used to explain the rule
whereby the debiteur is not responsible for delay due to the act of the other
party.96
 Further, faute de Ia victime may sometimes appear as a form of
cause etrangere, so as to relieve the contracting party from liability for loss
due to such a cause not imputable to him within Article 1147.
Where a loss depends on a contingency or some external event this is not
regarded as too remote despite the difficulties of assessment. 97
 Causation
though must be established whatever problems are posed by quantification.
Under civil law a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on an appeal
from Quebec reviewed the question of loss of a chance in the medical context
by reference to judicial decisions and academic debate in France, Belgium and
Quebec, concluding that where the pre-existing condition was such that there
was no probability of cure the approach of loss of a chance of cure was
inappropriate.98
French law hesitated to award compensation for dammage moral or
prejudice moral which were notions of injuries without readily identifiable
pecuniary loss, usually associated with a person's honour or reputation. The
right to claim compensation for personal anguish and distress is however
now established in respect of actions in contract and may be taken as giving
the same result in the building field as pertains in England.99
In England the debate as to the application of contributozy negligence in contract has centred on
the definition of "fault" in section 4 of the Law Reform (Contributoiy Negligence) Act 1945 and its
applicability at all to an action in contract, Vesta v Butcher (1989) A. C. 852; Law Commission
Consultation Paper No. 114, Contributoiy Negligence as a Defence in Contract. (1989). It has no
application where liability arises from breach of a contract provision which does not depend on
failure to take reasonable care, Battlays Bank plc. v Fairclough Building Ltd. (1994) The Times 11th
May 1994.
Cass. req. 30th January 1929, Gar. Pal.. 1929. 1. 575. The jurisprudence in France may be rationalised
in terms of mitigation, but it is a concern not to allow a plaintiff to increase the damages for lossses
which were avoidaable, rathe than an emphasis on the response of the plaintiff to a breach.
Chaplin v Hicks (1911) 2 K.B. 796 (CA).
Lawson v Laffenere (1991) 78 D.L.R. (4th) 609. In the building context, lost opportunity to do
remedial work would not, it is thought be taken to be the loss for assessment where such remedial
work would not on the probabilities save the building. This decision deserves consideration in
England as it supports the strong hint for rejection of the lost chance approach in all but the
traditional exceptional cases given in Hotson v East Berkshire Hospital Authority (1987) A.C. 1250
(l-l.L.).
K. Franklin, A Review of the Award of General Damages in Building Cases, 1992, 8 Constt L.R. 318;
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Exceptions to the ordinary consequences of failure to perform bear
significantly on the obligations that parties assume, as where performance is
prevented by circumstances whose occurrence, in accordance with their
intention, is outside the risk of the potential bearer of liability. Appreciation
of these is central to the balancing of risk sought by the parties' own
provision.
Impossibility is such a circumstance acknowledged under both common law
and civil law, whether it is impossibility extant when the contractual
relationship is made or subsequently supervening. Between performance
being or being rendered, totally impossible, and a performance that is still
physically or economically possible, but not practically, sensibly or reasonably
possible, lies a region of potential uncertainty for its application. The
uncertainty is the greater as formulations of the result of circumstances
preventing performance depart from total impossibility to grades of
impossibility
Depending on particular contract terms, events which might otherwise be
treated by the law as giving rise to an excuse from performance are often the
subject of express provision within the confines of the building contract, so
preserving the obligation to perform despite the interruption of those events,
or, subject to their severity, creating a contractual right to end physical
performance.'
Referred to under Termination.
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This requires an examination of circumstances where performance may be
excused at law, and consideration of contract provisions that may preserve
the obligation to perform, whether or not with the addition of an extended
time or increased price by way of relief or compensation, or a provision that
may permit a termination. Whether, and the extent to which, such contract
provisions may be viewed as beneficial or adverse to a party as an allocation
of risk depends essentially on the treatment that would follow without such
provisions, and the extent of benefit from the perceived certainty of express
provisions depends on the relative certainty of result that the law provides.
External forces causing unexpected difficulty or expense ordinarily provide
no grounds for escape from due performance in English law. The doctrine of
frustration is available for those circumstances where some catastrophic or
fundamental event occurs so as to release both parties from their contractual
obligations. The principle may be invoked where the law recognises that,
without default of either party, a contractual obligation has become incapable
of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called
for would render it radically different from that which was undertaken by the
contract.2 The concept of an implied term, that if the event under
consideration occurred then the parties would have regarded each as
released, is not a sound base for inquiry into frustration when lack of
foresight of the parties is an important factor in determining the application
of the doctrine, which is by the law recognising an inability to foresee the
frustrating event.
In the field of construction the circumstances in which performance is called
for are frequently different from the perception of the parties at the outset.
However, their contract, if following a standard form, is likely to have
contemplated changing or different circumstances and to have provided for
many eventualities, and debate, in practitioners' terms, is more usually as to
the application of the provision to the circumstances within the framework
of the contract.
For parties to make provision within their contract for frustration and its
consequences in monetary allocation is to negate the application of the true
2	 Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contictors Ltd.v Fareham Urban District Council (1956) A.C. 696 (H.L.).
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principle, which destroys the contract, necessarily putting an end to the rights
and liabilities of the parties under it. 3
 The effect of contemplation of an event
which the law might have regarded as a frustrating circumstance and of
provision as to its consequences, is to prevent the law from viewing that
event as one of true frustration; and the parties' provision itself resolves the
primary obligations as to performance into secondary obligations on the
occurrence of the circumstance. The ICE form of contract reflects this by its
provision that in the event of the contract being frustrated the sum payable
for the work executed is the same as if the contract had been determined by
the employer under the war clause.4
The doctrine of frustration as developed in England within the last century,
and which has absorbed impossibility of performance, is not known as such
in French law, but its purpose is served by two doctrines, those of force
majeure and cause. The relationship of these to impossibility is important.
A promise to perform the impossible is null, imposibilium nulla obligatio ; if
impossible from the outset the objet is impossible and there is no contract.
Once the contract has come into existence the effect of the supervening event
is to release the obligation to perform but not, without that event amounting
to a cause etrangere, from the liability for damages. Even then the point
remains as to whether and when non-performance permits avoidance of the
contract.
The English JCT and the French AFNOR standard forms of building contract
utilise the term force majeure as a description of that which may give rise to
an extension of time for performance, but, for the purposes of investigating
the effect on a contract itself of events amounting to force majeure in the
context of relief from performance, it is the relief from the physical
performance and the prime obligation to complete that is considered.
Afteiwards governed by the Law Reform (Fmstrated Contracts) Act 1943.
ICE 6th Edition,. 1991. Clause 64.
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In France, Article 1134 identifies the principle to be compared with the
binding nature of contract as in England, 5
 and it forms the basis for
examining the effects of extraordinary events or resulting obligations to be
compared with the factors of impossibility and frustration which may relieve
from it. In Article 1134 the principle is internally qualified by the facility for
revocation for reasons authorised by law. It provides that "Agreements
legally entered into have the force of 101 for the parties thereto. They may be
revoked only by mutual consent or upon grounds allowed by law. They shall
be performed in good faith."6
The Cour de Cassatlon stated its view of this Article in 1876 in the celebrated
Canal of Craponne case, and such view still prevails:
"the rule given in this Article is a general one, an absolute one, and
governs contracts the performance of which is to happen through
payments made in successive times as well as contracts of a different
type; ... the Courts are in no case empowered, however equitable their
decision may appear, to take into consideration lapse of time or other
circumstances in order to modify the contracts entered into by parties
and to substitute new clauses for those which have been accepted by
the contracting parties of their free will."1
The compilers of the Code had included specific matters that were
identifiable as grounds for annulment or dissolution, but the scope of the
Code was not limited to circumstances that rendered contracts a nullity, nor
as to what would be allowed by law. If a certain or determined thing which
constituted the subject matter of the contract was lost, destroyed or taken out
of commercial use, then the obligation was annulled. 8
 Similarly, the death of
the employer or the tradesman, architect or contractor dissolves the contract
Paradine v Jane (1647) Aleyn 26, "When the party by his own conduct creates a duty or charge upon
himself he is bound to make it good, if he may notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity
becuase he might have provided against it by his contract."
Article 1134: "Les conventions leg-alement fomiées tiennent lieu a ceu.'. qu! Ies ont faites. LiJes ne
peuvent étre revoquées que de leur consenten1ent actual; ou pour les causes que Ia Ioi autotise.
Elie doivent étze etécutées de bonne foi'
Cass. Civ. 6th March 1876 1). 1876.1.193, note Giboulet. The case is considered under La Thêorie de
Li mprevision.
Article 1302. Expropriation is an example of the latter. Further, by Article 1601 if at the time of a sale
the article sold had wholly perished the sale is void, and by Article 1722 he destruction of the thing
leased gave rise to the annuilment of the lease.
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for the hire of services.9
A party to a contract must fulfil his promise, but where its fulfilment
becomes impossible owing to an event which is independent of his will and
which raises an insuperable obstacle to its execution then the mutual
obligation disappears.'° This arises because failure to perform an obligation to
do or not do generically results in an action for damages, and by way of relief
from such damages French law interposes the effects of such external force or
event as might fall to be considered as a frustrating event at common law. It
is by Article 1142 that every obligation to do or not do, toute obligation de
faire, resolves itself into damages in the event of non-performance by the
obligor, but the obligee's substituted liability to pay damages is ameliorated by
two important principles, in Articles 1147 and 1148.
Article 1147 provides for payment of damages either for non-performance of
the obligation or for the delay in its performance, wherever the obligor fails
to prove that the non-performance resulted from an external cause, cause
etrangere, which cannot be imputed to him, even though there has been no
bad faith on his part. 11 The nature of this liability is distinguished from the
liability imposed under Articles 1382 et seq, dealing with neglect, délit , for
those Articles have no application when the matter concerns fault
committed in the non-performance of an obligation, obligation de résultat,
under a contract; 12
 although fault does have a role to play in relation to the
proof of cause etrangere . This distinction is also seen in the divergence
between Article 1147, envisaging liability for simple non-performance subject
to cause etrangere, and Article 1137, where, in relation to the obligation to
give something, the attendant obligation to preserve it is one imposing a
duty to exercise due care of a bon pére de famille. It is explained in terms of a
Article 1795: "Le contrat de louage d'ouvzage est dissousparla mort de 1'ouvzie de I'architecte ou
entrepreneur' [A building contract is dissolved by the death of the tradesman, of the architect or of
the contractor.]
R.David: English law and French law.
" Article 1147: Le débiteur est condemmé.. si1 y a lieu, au palernent de donzmages et inté,ts, soft a
raison de 1'inaécution de I'obligation, soit a raison du ,ta,d dans l'exécution, toutes les kLs qu'il
ne justifle pas que 1'inaécut,on provient d'une cause ét,angém qul ne peut 1w étro imputée,
encore qu'il n'y alt aucume mauvais ki de sa part." [The debtor is required,where appropriate, to
pay damages either for non-performance of the obligation or for delay in performance, whenever he
fails to show that the non-performance is due to a cause étrangere which cannot be imputed to him,
even though there has been no bad faith on his part.J
12 Dalloz,, Code Civil, 1991/2, p. 504. Note 14.
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distinction between contracts giving rise to an obligation de moyens or de
diligence, and those which create an obligation de résultat or déterminée;
namely, between those in which a party will be liable only if he fails to show
the diligence due and those in which he is required to achieve the result
promised and from which he can only escape liability by showing a cause
etrangêre.
Article 1148 amplifies Article 1147 and exempts the obligor from liability for
damages for non-performance when as the result of force majeure or
fortuitous event, cas fortuit , the obligor has been prevented from complying
with his obligation, or where it has been prohibited. Article 1148 provides
that "There is no requirement for damages when, in consequence of force
majeure or fortuitous circumstance (cas fortuit ) the debtor has been
prevented from delivering or doing that which he has bound himself to
deliver or to do or has done that which was prohibited."3
There has been debate and dispute about the utility of drawing a distinction
between cas fortuit and force majeure, but the latter had become paramount
in respect of contractual matters by about the 1930's.' 4
 The term force
majeure was not defined in the Code and its breadth has derived from its
application by the courts over time. Natural forces such as flood,' 5 or
drought,' 6 are the more obvious candidates, while government action may
suffice.
In terms of a general rule, three elements are central to the nature of force
majeure. First its character has to be that of an unexpected and unforeseen
event. An act of state is normally taken as a case of force majeure,' 7 whilst
delay by an administrative body in issuing an authorisation may not
'3 Artide 1148: 11 n"y a lieu a aucuns donimages et intéréts Iorsque.. par suite d'une force ma/ewe ou
d'un cas fortuit. Je debiteur & eté empéché de donner ou de faire ce a quo! ii était oblige ou a fait ce
qui Jul était inte,rJlt."
" Bourgoin, Essai sur Ia Distinction du Cas Fortuit et de Force Majeure; Josseraud, Force Majeure et
Cas Fortuit. The distinction may be useful, howevei in respect of tort liability, where cas foituit
signifies an event arising 1mm some cause not external (and so not force ma/euze) but internal to
the enterprise or person involved such as a fire not resulting 1mm lightning, an explosion of a boiler
or defects in materials.
' Durr v Renouard, Trib. Colmar, 27th November 1848, 0. 1851 II. 274. Chemin de fer de Midi v Cénac,
Cour de Pan, 15th December 1909, S. 1910 Il. 13.
ie Credit Fancier v Bollolg Cass. Civ, 3othjanuaty 1923, 0. 1924 1. 148.
Dalloz 1991/2, p. 507, Note 15: Civ. 1, 29 November 1965: 0 1966,101.
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regarded as unforeseen. The Intervention or interference by an
administrative body does not constitute a force majeure in circumstances
where it is brought about by the behaviour or action of the person against
whom it is directed.' 9
 Importantly, whether or not the event is unexpected or
unforeseen must be tested by reference to the time when the contract was
concluded.20
Second, its character must also be that of an irresistible force so that greater
difficulty or a more onerous performance is not sufficient, 2 ' albeit that
occasionally particularly serious impacts may be, even though on one view
they may not be wholly insurmountable. There is no force majeure if the
contractor is capable of performing by means of a substitution or alternative
means even if this renders the carrying out of the obligation more
burdensome.23 Where a seller has it in mind to fulfil a contract with goods
that become destroyed or requisitioned, his obligation will not be treated as
discharged unless the contract requires him to deliver those specific goods.24
Third, there has to be something of the external in its character, something
that is imposed. Insolvency of the contractor would not suffice, but strikes
may, upon analysis of the circumstances, constitute force majeure ;25 for
example, a haulier would have to show that his own personnel were not
behind the behaviour relied on.26
The need for the event to render performance impossible is directly
comparable to specific provisions for annulment. Equally derivative are the
requirements of independence from the will of the party relying on it, and of
not being subject to his subsequent control, together with its occurrence being
of a nature that could not have been reasonably foreseen at the time of the
Dalloz 1991/2, p. 507, Note 15: Corn. 26 October 1954: D 1955, 213.
'° Dalloz 1991/2, p. 507, Note 15: Civ. 3, 20 November 1985: Bull. IV, n. 148, p.113.
20 Dalloz 1991/2, p. 508: Corn. 21 November 1967: JCP. 68 11, 15462: D, 1962,297.
21 DalIoz 1991/2, p. 508: Civ. 2,5th December 1927: D.H. 1928, 84. Soc. 8th Mar.ch 1972: D 1972, 340.
22 Dalloz 1991/2, p. 508: Civ. 3, 24th June 1971: D. 1971, Somm. 138.
Dalloz: p.508: Corn. 12th November 1969: JCP 7111, 16791.
24 Meyer v Miravet, Cour de Paris, 8th November 1916.
25 Dalloz p.508: Cass. Ch. Mixte, 4th Februaiy 1983: Bull n. 1 and 2.
DaIIoz: p. 508: Clv. ire, 3id Ocober 1967: JCP 68 11, 15365; and possibly that he cannot reasonably
employ others, as to which Rivière v Comp. La Seine, Cow de Paris, 13th November 1903, 0. 1904 II.
73, may assist in relation to the position of the French hauliers in late June/early July 1992.
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Contract.27
There has been scope for adaptation in the application of the elements
required for force majeure. In relation to absolute impossibility, as against
ability to render performance in some other fashion, reasonableness appears
as an element. So in the example of strike an employer would not be
required to concede every demand made; and treatment of the event as
beyond the control of the party bound will depend on the court's view of his
diligence in seeking to overcome the obstacle and its conviction as to his
good faith. In respect of defences an illustration of an extraneous event as
force majeure derives from the Cour de Cassatiori in 1972 in an action
against a contractor for damage resulting from leaking sewage pipes due to
corrosion of the metal. There was expert evidence which identified the cause
of the corrosion as bacteria that had not previously been present. The claim
was dismissed on the ground of force majeure because at the time there had
been no effective means of avoiding such damage.28
The doctrine was extended to cases where the foundation on which the
contract was based had ceased to exist. Two cases arising out of the Franco-
Prussian war of 1870 and the First World War were regarded as significant. In
the first those who had taken a lease for hunting on land which became
subject to a government prohibition on the firing of guns in that region had
their obligation to pay rent discharged by virtue of force majeure
Enjoyment of the thing leased related to the rent contracted to be paid, and
with a lessee having a right to the peaceful enjoyment of the leased land the
court found no difficulty in considering the destruction of the ability to fire
guns as the destruction of the right of enjoyment. 29
 By the second, the
doctrine was stretched to circumstances of hardship as distinct from actual
impossibility: a tailor's contract had some years to run when his employer
terminated it on the loss of his select clientele in wartime, and the plaintiff
' Denson-Snuth,. Impossibility of Performance as an excuse in French law: The Doctrine of Force
Majeure, 1936, 45 Yale Law Journal 452.
28 Article 1134: Les conventions legalenrent forniees tiennent lieu de Ioi a ceu qui les ont faitee.
Files ze peuvent eti revoquees que de leur consenteinenf neutraL art pour les causes que Ja Jo!
autozise. Flies doivent et, executees de bonne foi. (Agreements when legally made are binding
under law between those between whom they are made. They may only be rescinded by mutual
consent or on gmunds previded by law. They must beexecuted in good faith.]
29 Aguado v de Beam et Consorts, Cour de Pans, 1st May 1895, D. 1875 II. 204. ("the exercise of this
iight was the essential object of the lease entered into J).
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refused to submit to a suspension of the contract. 3° The court supported Its
decision that the contract was discharged with reasoning that the Intention of
the parties was that its performance would be rendered under normal
economic circumstances, and that the war in destroying the original basis of
the contract constituted force majeure.
Whilst criticised as without legal basis by those who emphasised contractual
rigidity,31 it was viewed by others as a desirable application of a sound legal
principle, and in keeping with the intention of the parties to dissolve the
contract, where it appeared parties had contracted in view of a state of affairs
which, as a consequence of events beyond their control, had essentially
changed. Its proponents labelled their view as Ia théone d'imprevision.
The terms of Articles 1147 and 1148 do not address the question of actual
discharge from performance, but implicit in relief to the debiteur from the
consequences of failure to perform is such discharge, and the imposition of
force majeure on performance leads to this result. Discharge is implicit
when considered conceptually, and as a corollaiy to the function of force
majeure. Questions as to conditions and counter performance are also swept
into a discharge on the result of force majeure. A conditional obligation in
the Code Civil is one made to depend upon a future and uncertain event.32
The condition is identified as suspensive if its effect is to suspend the
obligation until the particular event has occurred, 33
 and resolutory if its
occurrence operates to discharge the obligation and return the parties to their
3° Estève v Dubois et Lacoste, Tnb. Toulouse, 1st June. 1915, D. 1916 11. 112, s. 1916 11. 29.
Capitant, note, D. 1917 II 33 and s. 1916 II 29. Capitant's major work. identified cause as the basis for
analysis of events which might have created such "impossibility1
32 Article 1168: L'obligationest conditionaelle Iorsqu'on Ia fait dépendi d'un évenernent futur et
incertain, soit en La suspendant jusqu'a ce que I'évenenient anive, soit en Ia résiiant,. selon que
I'événement arnvera ou n'anivera pas. LA n obligation is conditional when it is made to depend
on a future and uncertain event, either in suspending it until the event happens or in cancelling it
according to whether the event happens or not.)
3° Article 1181: 'L'obIigation contadée sous une condition suspensive est celle qui depend ou d'un
événement futur et incertain, ou d'un événement actuallement arnv4 mais encore inconnu des
parties. Dans le premier cas. I'obligation ne peut étie aécutée qu'apres I'événement. Dans le
second cas, I'obligation a son effet dujouror} elle a été contiactée. [An obligation contracted under
a suspensrve condition is one which depends upon a future and uncertain event or upon an event
having actually happened, but still unknown to the parties. In the first case, the obligationis only to




 Conditions are further classified as fortuitous or
contingent, potestative, and mixed. The fortuitous condition is defined as
one which depends on chance and which is not within the power of either
party to bring about. 35
 Potestative and mixed conditions by contrast make
performance of the agreement depend on an event which either of the
parties has the power to bring about or to prevent, and, in the case of the
latter, affecting the will of a third party36
Article 1148, as noted, provides that no damages accrue when the obligor is
prevented by force majeure from complying with his obligation. If the use
of the phrase "no damages may be allowed" and the words debiteur and
"bound" were to be taken to mean that the principle applied only to those
under a legal duty with respect to the act involved, a literal application of this
Article would seem to limit the effect of force majeure to obligatoiy matters,
the non-performance of which would, in their absence leave the obligor
liable. If the doctrine of force majeure was not applicable to conditions,
force majeure would not operate to excuse a condition and it would render
absolute the conditional right. This view has not, it seems, been taken by the
courts. The doctrine appears readily applied to stipulations that are true
conditions, namely contract terms, the non-occurrence of which will not
render the party liable for breach of contract.
Further, Articles 1147 and 1148 make no mention of the effect of force
majeure on the obligor's right to a promised counter performance, where
his own performance has been excused by force majeure, and no provision
in the Code specifically covers this point. However, the Cour de Cassation
Artide 1183: 'La condition nsolutoire est ceile qu. lorsqu'elle s'acconiplil. opère Ia revocation de
l'obligation, et qui zemet les choses au niême état que si I'obligation n'avait pes a'aste. Elle ne
suspend point I'exécution de l'obligation. eYe oblige seulernent le crêancier A restituer ce qu'il a
içu. dans le cas oC I'événenient prevu par Ia condition amy. [A resolutory condition is one
which, when it takes effect, operates to revoke the obligation and returns matters to the same state
as if the obligation had never existed.J
Article 1169: La condition casuelle est ceile qui depend du hasa,ri, et qul n'est nullement au
pouvoir du créancier ni du débiteur" (A contngent condition is one which depends upon a chance
and which is in the power of neither the obligee nor the obligor.]
Articles 1170: La condition potestive est celle qui fait dependie l'etécution e Ia convention d'un
événement qu'il est au pouvir de l'une ou de l'autie des parties contictantes de faire amver ou
d'empecher. [A potestative condition is one which renders performance of an agreement depend
upon an event which is in the power of one or the other of the contracting parties to occur or to
prevent.)
Artide 1171: "La condition nrrtte est celle qui depend tout A fois de Ia volonté d'une des parties
cont,actantes, et de Ia tvlonté d'un 6e, [A mixed condition is one which depends on the will of
one of the contracting parties at the same time as on the will of a third party.)
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has approved the application of Article 1184 which provides that a resolutory
condition exists in evety bilateral contract where one of the parties does not
perform his obligation. 37
 This use of this Article was criticised in the past,
and the claim made that the proper interpretation of the language used
would limit its application to cases where the failure of performance resulted
from the fault of the party bound. 38
 The argument was, in effect, that the
phrase "does not perform7 in Article 1184, did not include "cannot perform";
but, whether or not the Article should be applied to such cases, the rule was
well established that force majeure , which destroys the obligation of one of
the parties, destroys at the same time the obligation of the other, just as does
impossibility under English law
There were various explanations of this. Planiol, who objected to the use of
Article 1184, maintained that each performance is the condition of the other;
so that non-performance by one party constituted a failure of a condition on
which his right to the return performance depended.39
 Another writer based
the result on the notion of equivalence between the respective promises.4°
More significant than these in the event was the thesis that such non-
performance constituted a failure of cause with respect to the obligation of
the other party.4 ' All agreed that one party should not be compelled to
perform when he cannot receive the performance promised in return.
Nevertheless the courts appear to find no necessity to resort to the
conditional analysis, their conclusions ordinarily being supported by
reference to Article 1184 without any attempt to deliver or explain the
Article 1184: "La condition résolutoire est toujours sous-entendue ans les contrats
synallagmatiques, pour le cas oü I'une des parties ne satisfera point a son engagement. Dans ce
cas, fe contrat n'est point ,solu de p/em dm/1. La partie envei's laquelle l'engagernent na point ete
e&ut4 a Ia choix ou de loiter rautm a l'exécution de Ia convention lorsqu'eiJe est possible, ou
d'en demander La ré.solution avec donirnages et intéréts. La resolution doit étm demandée en
justice, ef il pout étm aconlé au défendeur un délai selon les thtonstances." LA resolutory condition
is always implicit in synallagmatic contracts, for circumstances where one of the two parties does not
comply with his engagement. In such a case, the contract is not rescinded as a matter of law The
party who has not received the performance has the choice either to enforce the other to execute the
engagement where such is possible orto seek rescission and damages. Rescission must be sought at
law, and the defendant may be afforded a period of grace according to the cicumstances.J
2. Planiol, Elémentaire Traité Omit Civil. For reasons based on the history of the provision which was
traced to the k cominissona of Roman law
3° 2 Planio op. cit. n. 1337.
4° Mauz Notion D'Equivalence. 1920, 31.
' 2 Capitant, Cours de Droit Civil (1924) 299; Capitant, De La Cause Des Obligations (1927)30 (citing
Domat who is considered as the father of the modem doctrine of cause); Lorenzen, Causa and
Consideration in the Law of Contracts (1919) 28 Yale U. 621.
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underlying theoiy, or the notion of cause is employed, 42
 or the case is treated
simply as if the force majeure has prevented performance by the defendant.43
2	 La Th&ie de Thnpiévickvi
Litigation resulting from the effects of the First World War led some scholars
to propound as a true principle a théorie de I'imprevision , a doctrine of
unpredictable circumstances, 44 with the 1915 decision of the justification of
the tailor's dismisal advanced as constituting a useful and appropriate legal
principle. 45
 Theorists drew on canonist writings and the requirement of good
faith,46
 and an inference of a clausela nebus sic stanti bus from Roman law41
By this theory the courts might, in appropriate cases, vary the contents of a
contract in view of unexpected and far-reaching changes in circumstances.
"It (l'imprevision ) implies that the obligor has not foreseen the occurrence
of an event, whatever be its nature, which renders performance of the
contract either absolutely impossible or very burdensome." 48
 The theory
reflects the expression in Taylor v Caldwell ° as to an implied condition
excusing performance where parties contracted on the basis of the continued
existence of a subject-matter which perishes without default of the contractor.
It appears that French courts have been, and are, as chary as their English
counterparts of the defence of supervening events, so that an obstacle to
42 Ceccaldi v Albertini, Cass. Civ,. 14th April 1891, D. 1891 I. 329. Fomier v Gros, Cass. Civ,. 5th May
1920, S. 1921 I. 298.
As illustrative, Cremieux et Cie v Cipriotti, Txib. Seine, 20th Januaty 1915, S. 1916 II.
" Bruzin, La Notion d'Imprevision, 1922, 22; Magnan de Bomier, Essal sur Ia Théorie de 1'Impivision,
1924.
Esteve v Dubois et Lacoste, Tub. Toulouse, 1st June. 1915, D. 1916 II. 112, s. 1916 II. 29; referred to
above as having been subject to criticisms that it was without legal basis referred to above as having
been subject to criticisms that it was without legal basis.
Bruzin, La Notion d'lmpivision, and Magnan de Bornier, Essai sur Ia Théone de l'lmprevision.
M.D. Aubrey: Frustration Reconsidered - Some Comparative Aspects. (1963) 12 1.C.L.Q. 1165. This
latter doctrine made the validity of a contract depend on the continuance of the circumstances
existing at the time of its formation, and can be traced through the Middle Ages from the Glossators
up to Gmtius and into the Prussian General Land Law of 1794. It started with the proposition that in
general one may not refuse to perform a contract on the ground of altered circumstances but
added that if, howeve an unforeseen change of circumstances makes it impossible to achieve the
aim of both parties as expressed in the contract or inferable from the nature of the transaction, then
each of them may resile from the unperformed contract.
Zaki, L'lmprevision en Droit Anglais, 1930, 186.
(1863) 3 B & S. 826 at 833.
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performance releases a party only if it renders it impossible to perform the
contract for its duration. What is impossible however is a matter of fact in
the individual case. Against this attitude writers advanced, historically, a
variety of routes in attempts to widen the impact of a change of
circumstances. The movement by the Conseil dEtat in respect of public
works' contracts did not affect the Cour de Cassation, and it remains settled
there that the conditions attaching to force majeure must be satisfied in order
to justify relief from the obligation, by resolution or résiliation.
Legislative intervention in 1918 gave the courts power to rescind pre-war
contracts,5° and a law of April 1949 similarly provided for pre-Second World
War contracts.5' Other suggestions were to expand force majeure to include
mere difficulties of performance, or to reduce the scope of liability for non-
performance by use of Article 1150 of the Code Civil. 52
 Probable intention of
the parties under Article 1156 was also a proposed route for adapting contracts
to altered circumstances. 53 Lower courts sometimes embarked on these
ventures but the Cour de Cassation held its view, and as a principle of
private law Ia théone de limpre vision was firmly rejected by the civil
courts.
The Cour de Cassation maintains the premise that parties to a contract are
bound to perform the obligations undertaken by them even if with lapse of
5° By Loi Fallot, 24 January 1918, a party to a commercial contract became entitled to terminate it if it
could be established that the War had produced an unforeseeable rise in costs.
' Another historical effect of war was the adaptation of a principle that where an event of fo,ve
nrajeure prevented performance of an obligation only partially, "resolution" may be denied, and a
proportional diminution allowed in the performance promised in return. extension of this principle
to deny resolution where the obstade to performance was only temporary led to what became
known as the theory of suspension. This theory reached fruition through the pressures of the First
World War The effort to sustain a contract in the presence of fo,ve niajeure of only a temporary
nature went back to before the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. Courts, in some of the earliest cases,
allowed a suspension under such circumstances through a finding of intention. The theory of
suspension started during the outset of the war of 1870, but, with its end and a more normal
economic life, the Cour de Cassation decided against it. With the exception of a few apparent
applications of this notion, the law so remained until the period of the First World War. With the
Finn stand taken by the Cour de Cassation, cases that arose during the war period showed efforts on
the part of lower courts again to support their decisions by a finding of intention. With cases on the
effects of this war increasing the Cour de Cassation asserted that a contract is not necessarily
destroyed by temporary impossibility of performance.
The theory of suspension was primarily applied to contracts for so-called "succesSive" performance,
such as contracts of empk'ment and leases.
52 Artide 1150 i.e débiteur n'est tenu que des donimages et intéréts qul ont eté priéus ou qu'on a
psi prewir Iors du contra lorsque ce nest point par sou dol que l'obligation n'est point exécutée."
(The debiteur is liable only for the damages foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the time
of contract, provided it is not as a result of his do! that the obligation is not performed.l
" WahI, note to Civ. 4th August 1915, S. 1916/17. 1.17.
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time the terms may have come to appear unreasonable. It is for the parties to
provide in their contracts for such events. The courts have no power to vaty
terms; so that, except in a case of force majeure proper, a party must fulfil his
obligations whatever the consequences for him, and he cannot successfully
argue that a change in circumstances has destroyed the significance or
identity of the contract.
This view was taken in the mid-nineteenth century, and such was the
conclusion in the Canal of Craponne case where the company operating a
canal had undertaken in 1560 to irrigate the defendant's orchards for a fixed
annual sum which, over three centuries, had become absurdly low. At first
instance, and on appeal, the decisions referred to equite and permitted an
increase in the sum to enable the canal company to avoid operating at a loss.
The Cour de Cassation quashed these decisions and emphatically
pronounced that courts must never use lapse of time or other circumstances
to modify agreements of parties or substitute new clauses for those freely
accepted by them. 54 It was in the Conseil d'Etat that willingness to adopt
contracts to changed circumstances was shown, and, within the scope of
public law, propositions similar to the théone de I'impré vision were used as
a mechanism to relieve from the economic upheaval of the First World
War.55
Construction contracts for public works were in the forefront, followed by
contracts for public utilities, and the need and reason for this approach was
the public interest in their conduct and continuance in new circumstances.
In the leading case it enabled a gas company to escape from the fixed prices In
its contract made in 1904 to supply gas to Bordeaux over a long period of
years. The Conseil d'Etat appreciated that fluctuation in costs should have
been anticipated, but permitted escape from fixed prices by way of an order
remitting the case for adjustment of the prices in default of agreement by the
Cass. Civ., 6 Maith 1876 (Syndicat des armsants de Pélissane v De Gallifet. D. 1876. 1.193 note
Giboulet.
The circumstances are comparable to those that afflicted Germany where under private law the
BCB provision that The debtor is obliged to perform in such a manner as good faith requires,
reganri being had to general practic&', ¶1 242, was used in the decision of the Reichsgericht in 1923,
(RGZ, 107,78,86) during the period of hyperinflation to regularise mortgages in tenns of their value at
the time of their creation.
Cie. Générale d'Eclairage de BoMeaux v Ville de Bordeaux. Conseil D'Etat, 30 March 1916; S.1916
3.17.
109
parties, because the greatly increased cost of coal resulting from the war
exceeded the outer limits of the increases that could have been contemplated
by the parties when the contract was made. It Is of significance that non-
performance was not in issue with no question raised as to discharge, and,
particularly, that the court required the gas company had to bear that portion
of the onerous consequences resulting from force majeure which a
reasonable interpretation of the contract would leave them to bear.
This is an important aspect of the different regime applicable to public works
where the theorie, sometimes termed sujétions imprévues , may be applied.
It Is particularly so in respect of unforeseeable ground or soil conditions,
where the théone may relieve from the principle of the contractor bearing
the risk57
3	 ImpossibIlity
Evely system of law has the task of defining the consequences of a contract
becoming impossible to fulfil because of some external supervening event
for which neither party is responsible. That such eventuality releases both
parties from further performance of any of the stipulations in the contract is
a common denominator. The civil law attitude that impossibility excused
performance of a contract is derived from the Roman law concept that it
operated to extinguish the obligation itself.
Where the contract was plainly on its face, for an impossibility in the nature
of things, it was regarded as void on the imposed or derived ground that it
cannot have been seriously meant under the rule impossibiium nulla
obligatio est This seems to have covered both legal and physical
impossibility.60 By contrast, if performance became impossible after a
The case law of the Conseil dEtat on the application of this theoiy to soil risks is old and extremely
comprehensive. It has been analysed by Jacques Catz in Les constructeurs et le nsques du sol,
Editions du Moniteur, 1985. Undoubtedly relief is given where the tenns of contracts are not seen as
pre-allocating the nsk. Refened to by Dr. C. Wiegand in Allocation of the Soil Risk in Construction
Contracts: A Legal Comparison, 1989, 1.C.L.R., 283.
Possibly ifiustrating the function of contract as less important than that shown by the approach of
common law whereby the question is posed in the context of the rights and obligations which the
parties have created by their agreement; J





stipulatlo was made, without fault on the part of the promissor, then the
supervening impossibility, casu released the party bound from liability to
perform.61
The Roman distinction is carried into French law, so that the rules within
Articles 1147 and 1148 for determining whether an obstacle to performance
amounts to a cause etrangere, whether force majeure or cas fortuit, freeing
the obligor from liability for damages, are not applicable to contracts which
never could be performed at all. These rules serve a separate purpose,
covering those circumstances constituting a subsequent impossibility, with
the result that where it cannot be shown that the non-performance is the
result of a cause etrangere , there is an available claim for damages, even
though not for performance.
Impossibility as a rubric appeared relatively late in English law in historical
terms,' 2
 and when the impossibility is unknown the essentials of a contract
may be regarded as lacking,63 or, if known, nullity may be based on mistake.64
Equally in France the requirements for a legally binding contract cover much
of the ground that relates to impossibility at the time of contracting and
consideration of cause is material, deriving from the premise that an
obligation without a cause or with a mistaken cause can have no effect.65
The Code Civil identified grounds for annulment or dissolution in that the
loss, destruction, or removal from commercial use of the subject matter of
the contract annulled the obligation, 66
 and the death of the tradesman,
architect or contractor dissolved the contract for the hire of services,' 7
 but the
scope of the provision in Article 1134 was not limited to those circumstances
Digest. 12.7.1.2.
62 The description in the first edition of a leading textbook would have been well understood by a civil
lawyer, namely: "Where an absolute impossibility of performance exists at the time of making the
agreement the general rule seems to be that there is no contract", Leake on Contracts, First Edition,
1867 p. 358.
63 Taylor v Caklwell (1863) 3 B & S. 826.
64 Bell v Lever Bros. (1932) AC. 161 (H.L.)
Article 1131.
Expropriation is an example of the latter:
• Article 1795: 'Le contrat de iouage d'ouwage est dissous par/a mort de l'ouvrie de l'architecte ou
entrepzvneur' IA building contract is dissolved by the death of the tradesman, of the architect or of
the contractor.l
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that rendered contracts a nullity, nor as to what would be allowed by law.
Similarly In England the liability of a person to perform personal obligations
ceases with his death, the contract having been rendered impossible, and
equally where personal confidence was relevant.' The employment of a
tradesman or contractor may be personal in that his personal representitives
cannot perform his obligations and the position would be the same, but the
point does not normally apply to the death of the employer69
In contrast to the civil law and the release of a party whose performance
became impossible without fault or fraud, development under common law
started from the parties' presumption of possibility as the basis of the
contract. Its premise, that "When the party by his own conduct creates a duty
or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may,
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have
provided against it by his contract," 7° was later ameliorated by the
mechanism, where appropriate, of an assumption by way of implied
condition. 71 Whilst the judgment in Taylor v Caidwell cited the derivation
of the civil law, the result that moulded the common law was not that the
obligation was a nullity, but one which the parties must have contemplated
as not having intended. This exemplifies the ability of the common law to
graft a self-satisfying reason onto a civil law solution, 72
 and illustrates a
difference between a civil law approach which favours recourse to rules, and
common law which derives the consequences from the supposed will of the
contracting parties.
Actual physical impossibility of performing the contract, by whatever means
This would ordinarily apply to an architect, his death bringing the contract to an end; Stubbs v
Holywell Railway (1867) L.R. 2 Lx. 311.
69 Davison v Reeves (1892) 6 T.LR. 39; this was the employment of a civil engineer by a contractor.
° Paradine vJane (1647) Aleyn 27.
"Where there is a positive contract to do a thin& not in itself unlawful, the contractor must perform
it or pay damages for not doing it, although in consequence of unforeseen accidents, the
peifomiance of his contract has become unexpectedly burdensome, or even impossible ..." but, "...
where, from the nature of the contract, it appears that the parties must from the beginning have
known that it could not be fulfilled unless when the time for fulfilment of the contract arnved some
particular specified thing continued to exist, so that, when entering into the contract, they must have
contemplated such continuing existence as the foundation of what was to be done; there, in the
absence of any express or implied wananty that the thing shall exist, the contract is not to be
construed as positive contract, but as subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be
excused in case, before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing
without default of the contractor", Taylor v Caldwell (1863)3 B & S 826, Blackburn J . at p. 833.
72 B. Nicholas. Rules and Terms - Civil Law and Common Law. (1973-4) Tulane L. Rev Vol. 48. p.946.
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could be employed, which exists at the time of entering into the contract will
under English law excuse non-performance. This is very much subject to
express terms for there is no excuse where the party charged expressly or
impliedly warrants the possibility of the work. 73
 A contractor was liable
where he had positively agreed to erect certain works including such
alterations to them as might be required within a certain time and failed.74
Argued within a few years of Taylor v Caidwell, the contractor had
contended on the basis of an implication that it was impossible for a man to
bind himself so as to exclude a condition that it must be possible to do the
work contracted for within the time. Yet the impossibility was the creature of
the very term of the contract, and such implication would have been at
variance with it.75
The impossibility may also be imposed by some subsequent outside
compelling force. Each party must fulfil his obligations up to that point for
the contract is not avoided by becoming impossible of fulfilment, but the
duty of further performance ceases.
Impossibility as a term appears in FIDIC in respect of the contractor's
obligation: "Unless it is legally or physically impossible, the Contractor shall
execute and complete the Works •,,•76 Physical impossibility would be
difficult to raise where the contractor's methods were unconstrained, but the
application of the same phrase in Turriff v Welsh National Water
Development Authoritygave rise to a construction that mirrors the French
attitude on the intervention of force majeure . Absolute impossibility
according to the laws of nature was rejected, and the preferred conclusion
was physical impossibility within the confines of the contract with the
Clifford (Lord) v Watts (1870) L.R. 5 C.P. 577.
Jones v St. John's College, Oxford (1871) Law Times Reports 803.
" "Certainly if he does in direct terms enter into a contract to perform an impossibility, subject to a
penalty, he will not be excused because it is an impossibility.", per HannenJ.
FIDIC, 4th Edition, Clause 13.1: "Unless it is legally or physically impossible, the Contractor shall
execute and complete the Works and remedy any defects therein in strict accordance with the
Contract to the satisfaction of the Engineer ...". The pruvision derives from the ICE Conditions.
Tun-iff Ltd. v The Welsh National Water Development Authority, McCreath Taylor & Co. Ltd. and
Trocoll Industries Ltd. (1979), now reported in (1994) Constt Law Yearbook 122. The work required
pre-cast concrete segments of a specific tolerance "impossible in normal commercial
manufacturing terms". The judge held that "It was not, plainly, absolutely impossible to
manufacture the units to the required dimensions and tolerance, but in the ordinary competitive
commeiial sense, which the parties plainly intended, I am satisfied that it was quite impossible ... to
achieve the degree of dimensional accuracy required" and so the contractor was not bound to
complete those parts of the work.
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required performance being that in accordance with the drawings and
specification.
Legal impossibity would involve some statutoiy prohibition or interference
that would be likely in any event to represent force majeure under French
law. Again within a few years of Taylor v Cald well it was held in the case of
legislation that a defendant was discharged from a covenant by a subsequent
Act of Parliament which compelled him to assign to a railway company, and
so put it out of his power to performia The reasoning was that the law will
not enforce the fulfilment of a contract where the legislature has introduced
substantial and indefinite limitations which the parties cannot be held to
have contemplated when making the contract.79
At the point of a contract being impossible to fulfil the law has a choice,
either to provide no redress for the consequences leaving the parties where
they stood at the time of the event with loss or gain lying where it falls, or to
make an attempt at some equitable adjustment between the parties to restore
them so far as possible to their pre-contract positions, so lessening the
consequences of the contract having proved abortive. This alternative of
restitution is a separate principle and independent of contract. 8° The English
courts left the parties where they stood. Conjecturing what the parties might
be assumed to have agreed upon if they had contemplated the unforeseen
event was seen as illogical, and impracticable as a mechanism for relief. The
development from Taylor v Caidwell did nothing more than effect a release
' Baily v de Crespigny (1869) LR. 4 Q.B. 180; on the principle that lex non coRjt ad impossibilia.
" 
"There can be no doubt that a man may by an absolute contract bind himself to perform things
which subsequently become impossible, or to pay damages for the non-performance, and this
construction is to be put upon an unqualified undertaking, where the event which causes the
Impossibility was or might have been anticipated and guarded against in the contract, or where the
impossibility arises 1mm the act or default of the promissor. But where the event is of such a
character that it cannot reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the
contracting parties when the contract was made, they will not be held bound by general words which,
though large enough to include, were not used with reference to the possibility of the particular
contingency which afterwards happens.', Hannen J . at p. 185.
° Stated in its broadest terms by Pufendorf in his Law of Nations, first published in 1672: "When the
thing at the time of making the premise or pact appeared possible and afterwards becomes
impossible, we must enquire whether ths happened by mere chance, or by default and deceit. In the
former case the pact is disannulled,if nothing has yet been performed on either side. If anything
have already been done, towards it by one of the parties, the other shall give It back, or pay to the
value of it, if neither of these can be done he is to use his best endeavours, that the man be not the
loser by him. For in contracts, the first regard is had to the thing expressly mentioned in the
agreement, when this cannot be obtained, it is sufficient to give the equivalent; but whatever
happpens, all imaginable care is to be used, that the other party suffer no prejudice", Book 111, ch. 7,
s3. English Trans1atior (1703) 225.
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from future performance, and it did not overcome the inability of one party
to recover what he had laid out against a performance of the other by the
time the impossibility intervened.
That common law proposition, derived from one of the Coronation cases,8'
was identified in the Scottish Cantiare San Rocco caseW as an explanation,
but no justification, for the divergence between English law and the practice
of "all nations of the trading world with the exception of England". To the
forthright comment on the isolation of English law was added:83
"the rule, admitted to be arbitrary, is adopted because of the difficulty,
nay the apparent impossibility of reaching a solution of perfection.
Thereafter, leave things alone: potior est conditio possidentis. That
maxim works well enough among tricksters, gamblers, and thieves; let
it be applied to circumstances of supervenient mishap arising from
causes outside the volition of the parties: under this application
innocent loss may and must be secured at his expense to the other
party. That is part of the law of England...",
but not so civil law, together with the prophecy that this chapter of the law
would fall to be reconsidered.
That remained until 1943 when, first, the courts changed the position. 84
 The
basis for overuling chandler v Webster was that whilst there is distinction
between a contract being wiped out altogether, so destroying the promises ab
81 Chandler v Webster (1904) 1 K.B. 493. The conclusion in the Coronation cases was that as the
contract could not be rescinded at' initio the loss must lie where it fell; whilst liability for payments
due in the future was annulled deposits paid in respect of seats hired could not be recovered and
there was liability for instalments due but unpaid when the cntumstances of the King's illness put
an end to the contract on the basis that one from whom there was due payment at that time should
not be better off than if he had paid.
82 Cantiare San Rocco SA. v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd. (1924) A.C. 226 (H.L.),
"Where, from causes outside the volition of the parties, something which was the basis of, or
essential to the fulfilment of, the contract, has become impossible, so that, from the time when the
fact of that impossibility has been ascertained, the contract can no further be performed by either
party, it remains a perfectly good contract up to that point, and everything previously done in
pursuance of it must be treated as rightly done, but the parties are both discharged from further
performance of it. If the effect were that the contract were wiped out altogether, no doubt the result
would be that money paid under it would have to be repaid as on a failure of consideration. But that
is not the effect of the doctrine; it only releases the parties from further performance of the contract.
Therefore the doctrine of failure of consideration does not apply. The rule adopted by the Courts in
such cases is I think to some extent an arbitrary one, the reason for its adoption being that it is really
impossible in such cases to work out with any certainty what the rights of the parties in the event
which has happened should be. Time has elapsed, and the position of both parties may have been
more or less altered, and it is impossible to adjust or ascertain the rights of the parties with
exactitude. That being so, the law treats everything that has already been done in pursuance of the
contract as validly done, but relieves the parties of further responsibility under it.
83 Lord Shaw(1924) AC. 226 at p.259.
" Fibmsa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. (1943) AC. 32 (1-1 .L). The decision
was given on 16th June 1943.
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Iniio, and cases in which supervening impossibility only releases the parties
from future performance, a claim for recoveiy back of money paid under the
doctrine of total failure of consideration applies where the contract remains
perfectly good up to the time of the supervening impossibility. The claim for
recovery of money paid for a consideration which has failed is a remedy in
restitution for unjust enrichment, and what brings about this facility to
recover is a failure in contract performance and not consideration, in the
sense in which the word is used when it is said that in executory contracts the
promise of one party is consideration for the promise of the other.85
This would have alleviated the harshness of the rule only in some instances
of prepayment but could not be regarded as dealing fairly between parties
generally, as the recipient who had to return the money would be
disadvantaged where greater expense had been incurred in partially carrying
out of the work than the prepayment. The Fibrosa decision left the question
of equitable apportionment to the legislature and the second change in I 943U
The civil law had derived from Roman law the ability for the promisee to
recover what he had paid, a condictio causa data causa non secuta , to
prevent an unjust result even though he could not compel counter
performance. The condictio was a remedy for unjust enrichment, separate
from notions of good faith, and illustrated by the Can tiare San Rocco case,
where, under an agreement to supply marine engines between Austrian and
Scottish companies, performance became impossible on the outbreak of war.
It was held under Scots law that the deposit of the Austrian purchasers paid
15 
"In English la an enforceable contract may be formed l, an exchange of a pmmise for a promise
and thus, in the law relating to the formation of contract, the pmmise to do a thing may often be
the consideration, but when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and of the quasi-
contractual right to recover money on that gmund, it is, generally speakin& not the pmmise which is
referred to as the consideration, but the performance of the pmmise, The money was paid to secure
performance and,if performance fails the inducement which bmught about the payment is not
fulfilled7 per Viscount Simon at p.48. Loul Wright, fmm p. 61, traced the history and use of
restitution in English law.
° Law Reform (Frustated Contracts) Act 1943. The Act passed into law on 5th August 1943.
87 Translated as: "Action to recover something given for a consideration which has failed" per the Earl
of Birkenhead at p. 235.
' (1924) A.C. 226 (H.L.). It is argued that this would not have been a true case of condictio under
Roman law which would have treated the contract under rules of voidness, emptio venditlo,
Buckland and McNair, Roman law and Common Law, (l%5) 2nd ed. The facts were though that
several weeks work had been involved, and necessarily so because of the nature of the design
engineering required before any tangible product could result. It must be unlikely that Roman law
had to address similar facts, but even if the argument is sound the case represents a useful
illustration of civil law development.
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on contracting had to be repaid. They had received nothing and although
between the contract date in May 1914 and the declaration of war in August
plans had been prepared and materials ordered nothing had been built.
The House of Lords invoked the principle of the condictio, that a person
having received property from another and by reason of circumstances
existing at the time or arising afterwards, it was or became contrary to
honesty and fair dealing for the recipient to retain it, citing with approval an
earlier exposition:89
"The general principles of law applicable to the contract of
affreightment are not essentially different from those applicable to
other similar contracts, such as contracts of land carriage, or building
contracts, or any others, in which one party agrees to pay a certain price
as the return for materials furnished or work done, or services
rendered by the other party ... There is no rule of the civil law, as
adopted into all modern municipal codes and systems, better
understood than this - that if money is advanced by one party to a
mutal contract, on the condition and stipulation that something shall
be afterwards paid or performed by the other party, and the latter party
fails in performing his part of the contract, the former is entitled to
repayment of his advance, on the ground of failure of consideration.
In the Roman system the demand for repayment took the form of a
condictio causa data causa non secuta, or a condictio sine causa, or a
condictio indebiti, according to the particular circumstances. In our
own practice these remedies are represented by the action of restitution
and the action of repetition. And in all systems of jurisprudence there
must be similar remedies, for the rule which they are intended to
enforce is of universal application in mutual contracts.
"If a person contracts to build me a house, and stipulates that I shall
advance him a certain portion of the price before he begins to bring his
materials to the ground, or to perform any part of the work, the
money so advanced may certainly be recovered back if he never
performs any part or any available part, of his contract. No doubt, if he
performs a part and then fail completing the contract, I shall be bound
in equity to allow him credit to the extent to which I am lucratus b,
his materials and labour, but no further, and if I am not lucratus at all,
I shall be entitled to repetition of the whole advance, however great
his expenditure and consequent loss may have been".
e	 From Lord President inglis in Watson & Co. v Shankland (1917) 1 S.L.T. 297.
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Apart from restitution of benefits conferred an aspect also arises under
French law as to mutuality of release, and it Is in this respect that the doctrine
of cause is material. Equally important, and practically more so, is
jurisprudence and the application of Article 1184 which provides for the
resolution of the contract by the court itself in cases of non-performance.9°
Whilst this permits an award of damages where appropriate in addition to
resolution , suggesting its ambit relates only to those cases where the non-
performance derives from default, the courts have not treated this as a
limitation. The effect is that as a result of a supervening event the court has a
discretion to award rescission of the contract, and as an addition to restitution
that appears as a balancing of the respective interests of the parties
consequent on the circumstances of that event.
The use of Article 1184 in cases other than default is contrary it seems to
views of writers on doctrine , but the terms of the Article do fit with the
approach of the courts, apart from the reference to damages, but even that
reference is permissive in the sense that it is always a matter for the court's
discretion. The justification is at the commencement of the Article, "... le
cas oi) June des deux parties tie satisfera point a son engagement" [where
one of the two parties does not fulfil his obligation], without reference to the
circumstances bringing that about.
4	 CaLce
Whilst Germany adopted the Roman law principle both for pre-existing and
for subsequent impossibility,9 ' the French Code Civil has no corresponding
statement, although Article 1172 pre-supposes the rule impossibiium nulla
obligatio est in its provision that every condition providing for an
impossibility is void and nullifies the agreement which depends on it. More
than one route exists however to reach the conclusion that a contract for an
impossibility is not valid, even without release of one party from his
obligation through the impact of force majeure on the other.
Referred to further under Termination.
BGB 11306, and 275.
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The doctrine of cause gives effect to the idea that a legally binding force
cannot attach to a promise without taking account of the reason why it was
made and the purpose of the promisor. A lawful cause is essential for a valid
agreement, though it need not be expressed, and an obligation which is not
supported by a cause, as with a false or unlawful cause, is devoid of efficacy.'2
The premise, in circumstances where one party will not obtain the result
contracted for because performance by the other has become impossible, is
that performance is then excused under the doctrine of cause. This covers
territoiy of common law frustration. It also covers circumstances where an
English lawyer would speak of failure of consideration, but without aligning
cause to consideration under English law, for French law does not require
such a criterion to determine whether promises are legally binding. Further,
within the doctrine of cause when a party is excused from performance he
may recover back what he has given if he does not receive what was
intended from the other party. A total failure of consideration is not
necessary for this result, the deciding factor being whether the contract would
have been entered into if the situation that has arisen had been anticipated at
the time the contract was made.
The obligation depends on the cause for its existence and in the realisation of
the cause, and it is in the consequences of this that the effects of impossibility
have been postulated. 93 Inter-dependence of the obligations in bilateral
contracts is embodied in the doctrine of cause, and this answers the point on
release: as each obligation is the cause of the other so as one disappears
through force majeure so does the other. Under the théorie des risques the
obligor whose obligation has ceased by force majeure is not liable for non-
02 Articles 1108, 1132 and 1131.
As described by Capitant in his work E)e Ia Cause des Obligations;" (1) If one of the parties to the
contract demands performance of the obligation which the other has undertaken, he must show that
such performance will not have a result contrary to the end which the obligee had in mind when he
undertook to perform. That is he must show that his end has already been realised, because he has
fulfilled his undertaking or is about to be realised, because he is ready to fulfil his undertaking. (2) If
by the occurrence of some event subsequent to the birth of the obligation (e.g impossibility, vis
major, failure by the other party), the end sought by the debtor cannot be realised, the debtor
ceases to be bound, he is freed. The obligation necessarily disappears with its cause. It is not
equitable that a promise should keep its obligatoiy force when it can no longer lead to the end
envisaged by the promisor. The means is only valid so long as it leads to its end, if it cannot do that
then it should have no effect. This principle is of great importance in mutual contracts, for in such
contracts each party binds himself in order to obtain fulfilment of the promise given him in
exchange. If, for example, vis major prevents that performance, then his own obligation ceases to
have a cause, and he should be freed from it,. either as of right, or by demanding rescission of the
contract and restitution of what he has given7 3rd edition (1927).
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performance but equally he cannot claim performance from the other party,
although where the other party has already performed then he will have to
make restitution. In this way doctrine would give rise to nullity without the
need for a claim for resolution and the required order of the court.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence as to the use of the courts' ability to order
resolution under Article 1184, where the non-performance does not derive
from default, appears established, 94
 despite a leading decision justifying its
application in terms of cause:
"... this Article does not distinguish between the reasons for non-
performance of agreements, and does not render force majeure an
obstacle to rescission, in the case where one of the two parties does not
fulfil his obligation; so in fact, in a synallagmatic contract, the
obligation of one of the parties has as its cause the obligation of the
other and vice versa, so that, if the obligation of one is not fuuilled, for
whatever reason, the obligation of the other becomes without cause."95
5	 Frustration
The divergence between English law and civil law in respect of recoverability
where frustration occurred was removed by the Fibrosa case; 96
 and frustration
could operate retroactively to permit a party to recover what he had paid in
performance of it, provided he could avail himself of a total failure of
consideration. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 then
abrogated the need for total failure of consideration.
The Act applies both where a contract has become impossible of performance,
or where it has been "otherwise frustrated", and the parties have been
discharged from further performance. The recoveiy of sums paid and
payable before the time of discharge creates the like result as in the French
doctrine of cause. Unlike the result in the Cantiare San Rocco case, that
Referred to under Resolution.
Cas. civ. 14. 4. 1891, S. 1894.1391, D. 1891.1329, note Planiol; "... cet artide ne distingue pas entre les
causes d'inexêcution des conventions, et n'admet pas Ia force majeure comme faisant obstacle a la
resolution, pour le cas oü l'unedes deux parties ne satisfait pas a son engagement, qu'en effet, daris
un contract synallagmatique, l'obligation de I'une des parties a pour cause l'obligation de l'autre et
récipmquement,. en sorte que, si l'obligation de l'une n'est pas remplie, quel qu'en sit le motif,
I'obligation de l'autre devient sans cause. - Kahn-Freund, A Sowte-Book on French Law, (1991) p.
479.
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. (1943) A.C. 32 (I-IL.).
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contractor now, if in England, would be entitled to recover such expenses
incurred on the preparation of plans and ordering materials, and he would
also be able to invoke the power to include overhead expenses in respect of
such work or services performed.91
The receipt by one party of a valuable benefit before the time of discharge,
other than money, gives the other party an ability to recover a just sum, not
exceeding that value, in all the circumstances which include the expense
incurred by the benefited party in performance and also the effect in relation
to the benefit of those circumstances giving rise ot the frustration.98
The principle of frustration as developed in English law has been entwined
with a variety of mechanisms by which the courts have regarded that end as
reached, and at least five theories have been advanced at different times for
the jurisprudential foundation of the doctnne. 99
 Frustration is in reality
represented by a jurisdiction which the courts will apply in certain limited
circumstances to reach a decision that contractual obligations, which on their
face appear to be binding, are no longer enforceable between the parties. The
description of the circumstances that justify its application, and consequently
the decision whether those circumstances exist in a particular case, are
questions of law
The implied term route was expressed in terms that: "no court has an
absolving power, but it can infer from the nature of the contract and the
surrounding circumstances that a condition which is not expressed was a
foundation on which the parties contracted."°° The essence of frustration
though is the dissolution of obligations because of the supervention of the
unexpected and unforeseen, and so analysis of the will or hypothetical
expectations of the parties is unsatisfactory, just as is the imposition of the
view of the reasonable man. The formulation in Davis Contractors v
Fareham	 is regarded as "the classic statement of the doctrine".'0t
° By virtue of the pruviso to section 1(2) of the 1943 Act, and the power under section 1(4).
a Section 1(5). Such sum may indude interest under the statutory discretionary power frum any date
after the frustration of the contract; B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (1983) 2 AC. 352 (H.L.).
'a Lord Roskill in National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd (1981) AC. 675 at 717 (H.L.).
F. A Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd. vAnglo-Mexican Petreleum Co. Ltd. (1916) 2 AC. 397, at 403.
lot Wates v G.L.C. (1983) 25 B.L.R. 1 at 27 (CA.).
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Frustration,102
occurs wherever the law recognises that without default of either
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed
because the circumstances In which performance is called for would
render It a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by
the contract. Non haec in foedera yen! [it was not this that I promised
to do]. This imposition of the law's recognition as distinct from
suppositions as to what answers the parties would have given to
questions which, necessary to the inquiry, they would never have
asked is because the decision must be given irrespective of the
individuals concerned, their temperaments and failings, their interest
and circumstanc&°. The legal effect of frustration adoes not depend
on their intention or their opinions, or even knowledge as to the
event"".
As to whether a contract has been frustrated, "the data for decision are, on the
one hand, the terms and construction of the contract, read in the light of the
then existing circumstances, and on the other hand the events which have
occurred."'°5
 It is by virtue of this enquiry that the scope for the application of
the doctrine of frustration to construction contracts is in practice limited.
Performance will inevitably, as a matter of reasonable foresight, involve
uncertainty and physical difficulty. Further, the parties will frequently have
expressly allocated the risk of such events as might otherwise be treated as
frustrating events, even without the premise that an employer does not
impliedly warrant that plans or methods specified by him are practicable.'°6
Nevertheless similarity exists between events that might result in frustration
and those producing relief by force majeure under Article 1148, simply
because of the nature of events that may so affect construction work and fall
within the character required. One senses that relief by way of force majeure
102 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council (1956) A.C. 696 (H .L.), per Lord Radcliffe
at 729.
103 Ho Hinji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd (1926) A.C. 497, at 509 and 510.
Ho Hinji Muiji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd. (1926) A.C. 497, at 510.
Lord Wright in Denny, Mott & Dickinson Ltd. V James B. Fraser & Co Ltd. (1944)A.C. 265 (H.L.) 274.
Further 1n the nature of things there is often no room for any elaborate inquiiy. The court must act
upon a general impression of what its rule requires. It is for this reason that special importance is
necessarily attached to the occunnce of any uncpected event that, as it were, changes the face of
things. But, even so, it is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls the
principle of frustration into play. There must be as well such a change in the significance of the
obligation that the thing undettaken would if performed, be a different thing from that contracted
for., Davis Contractors Ltd. v Fareham Urban District Council (1956) A.C. 6% at 729 (H.L.).
oe Thom v London Corporation (1876) 1 App. Cas. 120.
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under French law is a substantially lesser hurdle than satisfying the doctrine
of frustration in England. This may be a reflection first of the innate caution
with which English courts approach frustration,'°7
 and second, that the
decision in France as to whether a material obstacle has arisen rendering
performance impossible is one of fact at first instance, so that the
reproduction of approved phrases of the Cour de Cassation whilst affirming
that the obstacle was truly insurmountable achieves an unappealable result.1°8
The investigation of frustration in England will always involve a question of
law on the true construction of the contract as a starting point: whether its
terms properly construed apply to the new situation:
"If, ... a consideration of the terms of the contract, in the light of the
circumstances existing when it was made, shows that they never
agreed to be bound in a fundamentally different situation which has
now unexpectedly emerged, the contract ceases to bind at that point -
not because the court in its direction thinks it just and reasonable to
qualify the terms of the contract, but because in its true construction it
does not apply in that situation."109
Where contractors in July 1914 entered into a contract to construct reservoirs
to be completed within six years, there was a term by which the engineer had
power to extend the time if in his opinion the contractors were unduly
delayed or impeded for reasons including any "difficulties, impediments,
obstructions, opposition ... whatsoever and howsoever occasioned." The
works commenced but were prevented from proceeding in 1916 under
Defence of the Realm legislation. The employer claimed a declaration that
In reality it is a rarity "Since the effect of frustration is to kill the contract and discharge the parties
from further liability under it, the doctrine is not to be lightly invoked, must be kept within very
narrow limits and ought not to be extended", per Bingham L.J. in J
. 
Lauritzen AS. v Wijsmuller B.V
(The "Super Servant Two") (1990) 1 Uoyd's Rep. I at p8.. described by him as a proposition
established by the highest authority and not open to question.
'° David: English law and French law p. 121.
'° British Movietonews Ltd. v London and District Cinemas Ltd (1952) AC. 166, per Viscount Simon at
185. This was adopted by Lord Reid in Davis Contractors Ltd. v Fareham U.D.C. (1956) AC. 6%
where the contract made in 1946 was for the construction of 78 houses at a fixed price in eight
months, with an obligation to complete 40 in six months and a further 30 within 7 months. Serious
shortages of labour and building materials, found by the arbitrator to be anticipated, led to
completion with cessation of wori in twenty-two months and at an increased cost approaching
twenty per cent. Attached to the contractor's tender had been a letter stating that the tender was
subject to adequate supplies of materials and labour being available as and when required. The
conclusion reached in the Court of Appeal and upheld in the House of Lords was that the letter was
not incorporated into the contract upon which the basis of findings as to changed circumstances
from those within the terms of the contract realty fall away leading to the condusion that the gradual
effect of the shortages on time and cost did not amount to frustration, and leaving the contractor to
bear the risk of loss.
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the contract remained binding, but the contractor's defence that it had
become impossible and that both parties were released from all further
liability was upheld."° The extension provision was not construed to cover
the case "in which the interruption is of such a character and duration that it
vitally and fundamentally changes the conditions of the contract, and could
not possibly have been in the contemplation of the parties to the contract
when it was made,""' but one concerned with more or less temporary
difficulties rather than occurrences which would render the contract on
resumption very different to that which it was when interrupted. The case
was one where the action of Government had been forced on the contractor
as a vis major ,h12 and the judgment in Baily v De Crespigny in respect of
impossibility through illegality was adopted."3
For the purposes of the 1943 Act the time of discharge is material, and the
identification of this is a necessary part of a conclusion as to frustration."4
The factual necessity to wait and see does not prevent the doctrine being
invoked 115 nor does the fact that the parties continued with the contract;" 6
 but
in the practical context of construction contracts gradual alteration in
circumstances may militate against a finding of frustration which depends
"on its occurrence in circumstances as to show it to be inconsistent with the
further prosecution of the adventure"." 7
 However "what the parties say and
do is only evidence, and not necessarily weighty evidence, of the view to be
taken of the event informed and experienced minds"."8
Fire falls within the range of risks frequently allocated expressly by the
"° Metrepolitan Water Board v Dick. Kerr and Co. Ltd. (1918) A.C. 119.
Lord Finlay L.C. at p. 126.
" Lord Dunedin at p. 128 and p. 130. Apart (mm the point that an interruption might be so long as to
destmy the identity of the work or service, with the delay upon the Minister's order being indefinite,
that order required compliance with the Ministiy's instructions as to the disposal of plant and labour,
and this, separate (mm the delay, was regarded as preventing the contract being the same as it ever
was.
" (1869) L.R. 4 Q
. 
B.180; considered under Impossibility, above.
114 The common law approach of construing the contract terms to determine whether the event falls
outside its previsions, is incorporated into the Act by section 2(3) requiring the court to give effect to
previsions intended to have effect in the event of the circumstances arising which would otherwise
frustrate the contract. The Act only has effect consistent with such previsions.
"5 Pioneer Shipping v B.T.P. Tioxide (The Arena) (1982) A.C. 724 at 752 (H.L), where the Arbitrator's
decision that a charter party was frustrated by delay caused by a strike upheld.
0 Kissavos Shipping v Empresa Cubana (The Agathon) (1982) 2 Lloyds Rep. 211 (CA.).
Lord Wright in Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd V James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd. (1944) AC. 265 at 276.
tie Lord Sumner in Ho Hinji Muiji v CheongYue Steamship Co Ltd (1926) AC.497 at 509.
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parties, for where a contractor undertakes to complete a whole work for a
price and the works are destroyed by fire, flood or the like, he is not, subject to
express terms, released from his obligation to complete and normally the
contract is not frustrated. 119
 Applying the principle exemplified in
Metropolitan Water Board v Dicic Kerr & Co. ,120 the Privy Council upheld
the conclusion that an unforeseeable landslip bringing down a 13-storey
block of flats and hundreds of tons of earth on to a site and obliterating works
in progress was a frustrating event, despite the term that "... should any
unforeseen circumstances beyond the Vendor's control arise ... the Vendor
shall be at liberty to rescind the agreement forthwith and to refund ... and
upon such recession and upon repayment ... this Agreement shall become
null and void as if the same had not been entered into and neither party
shall have any claim against the other in respect hereof." 21
 The clause was in
language wide enough to cover the event, but it was not construed as
providing for the particular unforeseen contingency being an event causing
the circumstances of performance to be radically different from that
undertaken by the contract.
Just as in French law fault may negate the ability to rely on a cause etrangere,
default in the circumstances leading to the event prevents the law in
England from attaching to it the label of frustration. So where a contractor
failed to build timeously or act in a manner which would have given rise to
a renewal of a licence to continue work under wartime regulations, and in
fact deliberately delayed the work in the hope that by doing so its completion
would be prevented, he was liable for breach of contract notwithstanding the
lack of a licence to continue work' 22
 The premise for the result was that: a
 it
has never been held that a man is entitled to take advantage of circumstances
as a frustration of the contract if he has brought those circumstances about
himself."23
Appleby v Myers (1867) L.R. C.P. 651 - albeit that on the particular facts the contract was there
frustrated', but without the use of the term.
° Mettvpolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr & Co Ltd. (1918) AC. 119.
'' Wong Lai Yingv Chinachem Investment Co. Ltd. (1979) 13 B.L.R. 81 (P.C.).
122 Mertens v Home Freeholds Co. (1921) 2 K.B. 526.
123 Lord Sterndale M.R. at p. 536.
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Such result was paralleled in the Italian Corte de Cassatlon in 1986.124 A
builder, having purchased a block of flats which were to be demolished and
rebuilt for a price represented by flats for the owner In the new building
faced a prohibition on construction and performance of his contract by
housing legislation introduced after the date of contract where no
amendment to a master plan was secured. The court did not uphold the
builder's reliance on the prohibition as force majeure in answer to the
owner's claim because of his failure to commence work before the legislation
or to apply for an amendment. The non-performance in these respects had
the same impact as in Mertons v Home Freeholds P125 The Corte de
Cassatione categorised the builder's failure as a breach of duty to perform in
good faith, being in like terms in Article 1134 of the French Code Civil. The
inability to rely on force majeure in circumstances transgressing the
obligation to perform in good faith extends beyond an inability to invoke the
doctrine of frustration where the party relying on it deliberately brought
about the state of affairs preventing the fulfilment of the contract.
The term self-induced frustration has been used to describe circumstances
not within the essential factor of outside events or extraneously imposed
changes which "must have occurred without either the fault or the default
of either party to the contract".' 26 These circumstances include actual and
anticipatory breach of contract. Frustration requires causation between the
event and performance, so that where choice is available between alternative
modes of performance with one becoming impossible, that choice may cause
the impossibility, not the antecedent event. The event must be outside the
control of the parties, and it is in this sense that the event must occur
without default, blame, or responsibility,' 27
 and this approaches the scope of
the civil law result achieved through use of the obligation of good faith.
The unease with which frustration is approached in England may derive
from the operation of having to construe a contract so as to put an end to it.
124 San-guedolce v Bisantis & Sculco, Corte di Cassazione, 10th Apnl 1986. No. 2500 (1986) Giur. It. 1986 1.
501.
'	 (1921) 2 K.B. 526.
' Lord Branden in Paal Wilson and Co. v Partenreden Hannah Blumenthal (1983) IAC. 854 at 909
(H.L.).
J . Lauritzen AS. v Wiysmuller B.V. (The Super Servant Two") (1989) 1 Uoyd's Rep. 148 for Hobhouse
J's extensive analysis of self-induced frustration, and (CA.) (1990)1 Lloyd's Rep. I.
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An approach of construing the contract to exclude frustrating circumstances
from the scope of the obligation of the party concerned, so leading to
exemption from liability because the obligation does not extend to those
circumstances and not because the contract has automatically come to an end,
has been suggested as one which would then parallel the position of force
majeure in French law.' 28
 However, a proposition to the effect that since a
contract as construed does not extend the obligations under it to the
circumstances occurring whereby a defendant cannot be liable, does not
reflect the view of frustration under English law; rather it identifies the
distinction, 129
 that whilst force majeure in French law is relevant to the
exoneration of the obligation of one party, in English law its counterpart
relates to termination, bringing "the contract to an end forthwith, without
more and automatically"."°
The ICE Conditions bring the term"frustration" within the confines of the
contract: "In the event of the Contract being frustrated whether by war or by
any other supervening event which may occur independently of the will of
the parties The word "may" suggests an application beyond the true
legal sense, although "any other supervening event ... independently of the
will of the parties" identifies the common law position. Certainly it is
"intended to have effect in the event of circumstances arising which operate,
or would but for the said provision operate, to frustrate the contract ..."
within section 2(3) of the 1943 Act requiring the court to give effect to it.132
The FIDIC clause contrasts with this in its use of language of exoneration
from the obligation under force majeure, and it reflects the the distinction
between the principles of frustration and force majeure and the potentially
wider application of the latter.'33
126 B. Nicholas, Rules and Terms - Civil law and Common la op. cit.
120 R. David, les Contrats en dmit anglais, 384-5 (1973).
130 Lord Sumner in Ho Hinji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd (1926) AC.497 at 505.
" ICE 6th Edition, Clause 64:"Payment in the event of frustration. In the event of the Contract being
frustrated whether by war or by any other supervening event which may occur independently of the
will of the parties the sum payable by the Employer to the Contractor in respect of the work executed
shall be the same as that which would have been payable under dause 65 (5) if the Contract had
been determined by the Employer under clause 65.
132 Further, by virtue of the term for payment as if the contract had been determined under the War
clause, cl. 65, there would be little liklihood of the court having to give effect to section 1 of the Act.
FIDIC, 4th Edition, Cause 66.1: Payment in Event of Release from Performance. If any
circumstance outside the contml of both parties anses ... which renders it impossible or unlawful for
either party to fulfil his contractual obligations, or under the law governing the Contract the parties
are released 1mm further performance, then ....
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In the term force majeure the French courts were given a symbol for legal
excuse, and they have applied it, practically, to any independent event that
may result in the prevention of performance of a contractual stipulation.
From the general principle that a supervening event of force majeure
discharges the obligor, the civil courts never adopted Ia theorie
d'impré vision employed in the droit administratif in cases where the
economic purpose underlying the contract is destroyed. Through an implied
condition purporting to represent the intention of the parties, the reduction
by English courts of the principle of maintaining the rigidity of the
contractual relationship despite supervening unforeseen events of whatever
nature briefly followed the same pattern. The Coronation cases showed the
English courts applying the theoiy of legal excuse more liberally than would
have been acceptable under the doctrine of force majeure in France. 134
 From
this they have retreated leaving the parties to their contracts for the
allocation of the risks, save in circumstances that are as unforeseeable as they
are exceptional. The objective "disembodiment" of the parties in attempting
to determine what they must have intended in respect of events, the nature
of which had to be of such unexpected moment as not to be contemplated by
their contract, is, however, not required.135
Zak!, L'lmprévision en Droit Anglais (1930) 186.
As Lord RaddifIe makes clear in Davis Contractors Ltd. v Fareham U.D.C. in which he cited
previous judicial description of it per Lord Watson in Dahi v Nelson (1881) 6 App. Cas. 38, "the
meaning of the contract must be taken to be not what the parties did intend (for they had neither
thought nor intention regarding it), but that which the parties, as fair and reasonable men, would
presumably have agreed upon if. having such possibility in view they had made press provision as
to their several rights and liabilities in the event of its occurrences.', and then continued: "By this
time it might seem that the parties themselves have become so for disembodied spirits that their
actual persons should be allowed to rest in peace. In their place there rises the figure of the fair and
reasonable man. And the spokesman of the fair and reasonable man, who represents after all no
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1	 lime for Performance
Performance on time involves the identification of the due time for
completion, but what that due time is under the circumstances prevailing
during the carrying out of works necessitates consideration in practice of
contract provisions for an extended time for completion, and their
application in particular circumstances. Provisions also address the
consequence of delayed performance beyond any contractually extended date.
As a general rule in English law time is not ordinarily of the essence,' and
the provision of a time for completion coupled with grounds for extension
fortifies this. The standard forms give a plethora of circumstances which
disentitle an employer from relying on a specified date for completion and
which give rise to an extension of time. The significance of the grounds for
such extensions is often missed, for the benefit to an employer is in having
grounds to grant extensions in circumstances which otherwise would
constitute breaches or hindrances by the employer or his agents and negate
the ability to rely on the contract date for completion in claiming liquidated
damages for delay.2
 The JCT and AFNOR standard forms of contract enable
comparison to be made of the particular circumstances where delay in
performance is excused, and in a wider sphere of the allocations of risk FIDIC
provides a vehicle for examining how the approach of French and English
law may differ.
There will under English law always be a due time when the required
Referred to under Termination.
2	 Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd. v McKinney Foundations Ltd. (1971) 69 L.G.R. 1 (CA).
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performance of works under a construction contract ought to have been
completed. The due time will be either that provided by agreement, as to
what is or is to become the due time for completion, or that which is
interposed as the parties' intent, being the end date of a reasonable time for
completion.
2	 Damages k- late Ci*njelion
The remedy of damages for the non-fulfillment of the obligation to perform
within the time specified in the contract is viewed under civil law as an
aspect of fault to which in France the rules in Articles 1142 and 1146 apply.3
There is a point of difference between French law and the position in
England for it is not sufficient in France in an action for damages for delay
simply to show that performance had become due and was not rendered by
the due date. Whilst in England notice may be necessary to identify the due
date,4
 in France damages may commence only when the defaulting party has
been put into delay, misc en demeure.
Article 1146 provides that "Damages are due only when the obligor is in delay
in fulfilling his obligation, except, nevertheless, where the thing which he
was bound to convey, donner , or to do could only be conveyed or done
within a certain time which he has allowed to elapse." 5
 In order to place the
obligor in delay the service of a notice on him is required, and Article 1139
refers to this as by formal notice or other equivalent act.'
Article 1142: Toute obligation de faire ou de ne pas faire se isouf en dommages et zntéréts, en cas
d'inavécution de La part du debiteur lAny obligation to do or not to do is resolved into damages in
the case of inéxecution on the part of the debiteur .1 In Germany BGB 636 and in Italy Codice
Civile Articles 1453 - 1458.
Charles Rickards Ltd. v Oppenheim (1950) 1 K.B. 616 (CA).
Article 1146: "Les dommages et intéréts ne sont dus que lorsque le débiteur est en demeure de
remplir son obligation, excepté néanmoins bisque la chose que be débiteur s'était oblige de donner
ou de faire lie pouvait étre donnée ou faite que dans un certain temps qu'ii a Laissé passer"
Article 1139: "Le débiteur est constitué en denieu,e.. self par une sommation ou par aut:e acte
equivalent (Loi no. 91-650 du 9 juillet 1991, a,t84 ) felle une lettxe missive borsqu'ii isozt de ses
termes une intezpeilation suu/Isante, soit par l'effet de Ia convention, borsqu'elle porte que.. sans
qu'il soit besoin d'acte et par La seule écheance du temie, le débiteur sera en demeure." The
amendment comes into forte on the first day of the thirtieth month following the month of its
publication (14th July 1991). The sonirnation is the formal notice served by court of icei huissier , but
the autre acte equivalent is left to the judge's discretion.
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There has been division as to what is sufficient, 1
 and the 1991 amendment
clarifies matters. In commerce an ordinary letter suffices, and even oral
communication if of the necessary specific nature. The parties may agree to
dispense with the mise en demeure, and whilst the Article requires that the
contract must contain provision for such exemption, it may be implied.
The purpose of the mise en demeure is to make it clear to the party in
default that he is required to perform, and significantly, failure to serve raises
a presumption of acquiescence in the delay. The giving of the notice may
also assist in satisfying any requirement of fault where such ingredient is to
be relied on. To be effective it must follow the time when the performance
has become due, but it also requires the party not in default to be ready and
willing to perform his part where there are concurrent conditions or to have
performed any that are required in advance. In addition to fixing the date
from which damages run it causes certain risks to pass, 9
 so that the defaulting
party becomes liable for loss ocunng during the period of delay unless he
shows that the loss would have occurred even if he had performed in time.
The justification for the requirement of notice is making the defaulting party
aware that performance is due. There is no exception where the contract
specifies a time for completion and that time has passsed, for the obligation
can still be performed. Article 1139 permits agreement to dispense with a
mise en demeure in circumstances where there is a fixed time within which
to complete, and importantly, without that agreement the arrival of the date
is not sufficient.' 0
 The result, complained of but settled, is that even where
the contract provides for completion by a fixed time, failure to perform does
not date from that time but only from the mise en demeure , unless the
contract is regarded as having waived the requirement.
Where a contract fixes a date for a performance which can be done only on
Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract. p. 133.
Notice of default need not precede commencement of proceedings, and the receipt of process may
itself constitute the notice. Caution normally dictates strict observance rather than awaiting the
decision of the court on the point.
o Artide 1132.
'° This way of identifying default derives from Roman law, and although changed in the ancien droit
to the position where the arrival of the due day took the place of the demand for performance (which
remains the rule in German la ii 284. and in the Italian Codice Civile, Article 1219). French law
before the Code had reverted to the Roman rule.
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that date and there is default, a mise en demeure is unnecessary; and equally
so if the obligation is to refrain from an act when non-performance by its
nature is manifest. The reason for the former is that non-performance is
total non-performance by impossibility due to default. Where a mise en
demeure is required to be given, damages for delay dommages-interets
mciratoires are not available in its absence, and there has been debate as to
whether lack of notice also bars compensatoly damages dommages-intérets
compensatoires .' This distinction is reflected in the distinction between
delayed performance, to which the former are applicable, and non-
performance, including defective and partial performance, to which the latter
measure applies. The line between the two does not appear clearly, but
reflects whether the failure to perform is irremediable or not.
In an ordinary building contract failure to complete on time would not be
treated as irremediable and notice would be required. The remediability or
irremediability depends on analysis of the particular agreement. For
example if under a contract to fit out a stand for an exhibition the work
remained unfinished when the exhibition ended then this would constitute
irremediability, and seems that jurisprudence has moved in favour of the
requirement of a mise en demeure in cases particularly of delay, but other
circumstances may make awareness resulting from notice essential.'2
Conversely, there is no general requirement at common law for notice of
default as a precondition to a claim for damages. Performance is due without
demand, even where the contract has not fixed a time for completion, when
the obligation becomes one of completing within a reasonable time.' 3 Where
there is a resemblance is in connection with stipulations as to the time for
performance which unless otherwise expressly stated are not of the essence,
as for building contracts, and the point is only material to termination by way
of repudiation, although it is customary for provisions for determination to
contain notice terms.
Treitel, op. cit. p.135.
Nicholas, The French Law of Contract.
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. s. 14(1).
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3	 liquidated Damas
The common law "penalty" and "liquidated damages" are both
comprehended by the civil law clause penale , for, In France, it is a
contractual stipulation for payment of a fixed amount of money by the
obligor in the event of his default. Much of the doctrinal debate on this
subject in civil law systems arises from the fact that clauses pénales have a
hybrid nature, being used both to guarantee the performance of a contractual
obligation, and in order to provide a pre-estimate of the damage likely to
flow from the particular breach in question. Some legal systems place greater
emphasis on sanction as a penal clause function,' 4
 but in France it is the
element of evaluation of damages that predominates, although both
elements are at the root. This aspect is largely absent in English law due to
the distinct separation of the penalty from liquidated damages.
Of interest in this area is the use that is sometimes made of similar reasoning
to achieve divergent results, and that similar results are often obtained from
different reasoning. The sanction aspect of penal stipulations in Roman law
prevented the reduction of the sum, 15
 whereas in English law and in French
law prior to 1975 the aspect of prior evaluation of damages halts judicial
interference with liquidated damages provisions or clauses penales. The
attitude in any legal system towards liquidated damages, penalties, or penal
clauses reflects public policy and so varies not only between countries, but
also within one country at different periods of time.
Under English law where a contract provides that should one of the parties
fail to perform or to comply with a particular contractual obligation such
party shall pay to the other either a specific or ascertainable sum of money, it
is a question of construction whether the clause in question will be regarded
as providing for the payment of liquidated damages or a penalty.' 6
 The
t4 Austrian, German, and Swiss law.
This is reflected in Belgium where reduction is not allowed unless the contractual obligation has
been fulfilled in part and the penalty is only due in part.
" 'The distinction between penalties and liquidated damages depends on the intention of the parties
to be gathered from the whole of the contract. If the intention is to secure perfomiance of the
contrad by the imposition of a fine or penalty, then the sum specified is a penalty, but if on the other
hand the intention is to assess the damages for breach of the contract, it is liquidated damages, Law
v Redditch Local Board (1892) 1 Q.B. 127 at 132.
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distinction is critical for the legal effect of each is different.17
The decision on the construction is to be made on the terms and inherent
circumstances of each particular contract, judged at the time the contract was
made and not at the time of breach or the date of decision, 18
 and the classic
statement of the rules laid down by the courts is that:'9
"(a) It will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated for is
extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the
greatest possible loss that could conceivably be proved to have
followed from the breach.
(b) It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not
paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than
the sum which ought to have been paid
(c) There is a presumption (but no more) that it is a penalty when a
single lump sum is made payable by way of compensation on the
occurrence of one or more or all of several events, some of which may
occasion serious and others but trifling damage.
(d) It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-
estimate of damage, that the consequences of the breach are such as to
make precise pre-estimation almost an impossibility. On the contrary
that is just the situation when it is probable that pre-estirnated damage
was the true bargain between the parties."
"Unconscionable ... is merely a synonym for something which is extravagant
and exorbitant", 2° and it is referable to the contract and the obligation to
which it relates, not to inequality of bargaining power that might have
resulted in the term. The agreed sum may not be a true pre-estimate of
damages and the question arises as to whether the liquidated damages are the
limit of recovery. The provision may constitute a limitation on very heavy
damages that are foreseen to result from a potential breach, and this will be
upheld. 2' In Temloc Ltdv Emil Prnperties Ltd. 22 the parties' provision that
The fact that the parties have used the expression "penalty" or that of "liquidated damages" is by no
means conclusive, for the court still has to ascertain whether or not the parties have genuinely
attempted to assess the damages; Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v Don Jose Ramos
Yzquierdo y Castaneda (1905) AC. 6 at 9.
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. (1915) AC. 79 (H.L.); Lord
Dunedin at 86, citing Public Woits Commissioner v Hills (1906) AC. 368 (P.C.).
'° (1915) A.C. 79, at p. 87f.
20 Lord Wright MR. in Imperial Tobacco Co. Ltd. v Parsley (1936)2 All E.R. 515 at 521.
21 Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v Widnes Foundiy (1925) Ltd. (1933) AC. 20, where it was expressly left
open whether if construed as a penalty it would give rise to a limitation on damages.
22 (1987) 39 B.L.R. 30 (CA.). The insertionof the " nil" was made in the Appendix to the JCT standard
fomi for the amount of liquidated damages.
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the liquidated damages for delay should be " nil" was regarded as an
agreement for no damages for late completion, and exhaustive of what was
or was not to be paid so excluding a claim for general damages for delay.
This reflects the attitude of English law towards liquidated damages that it
will neither increase nor decrease the amount agreed upon provided the
contract in which it is inserted is valid, and that the circumstances gMng rise
to payment have in fact arisen, for such an alteration would be an
unwarranted interference with freedom of contract.23
Lack of flexibility may impose its own dificulties in conjunction with the
distinction between a penalty and liquidated damages, for when the amount
stipulated is construed as providing for liquidated damages it is payable in
full whether the damage suffered be greater or lesser, or even non-existent.24
The inability of the law to reduce liquidated damages or to adjust for partial
performance can itself lead to the provision being construed as a penalty,
particularly in building contracts where a single sum is stipulated but the
works are required to be completed in sections or equally where the employer
takes possession of part of the works. Where there is no effective provision
by the parties for dividing the sum between sections or between parts taken
into posession, then upon failure to complete a section in time or to hand
over possession of the whole of the works neither the whole sum can be
claimed as liquidated damages nor can a claim for a part of the sum be
maintained. In both instances the sum represents a penalty.25
Where construed as providing for the payment of a penalty the effect is that,
since a penalty is as such a security for the contractual performance, the
promisee is adequately compensated if he recovers his actual loss, and he is
regarded as acting unconscionably if he attempts to recover a sum of money
which, although fixed by the contract, is disproportionate to the amount of
damage suffered.2' Where the damage suffered is less than the amount of the
23 On the principle of freedom of contract in English law see the judgment of Jessel M.R. in Pnnting
and Numerical Registenng Co. v Sampson (18Th) L.R. 19 Eq. 462, at p. 465.
24 Waffis v Smith (1882)21(1.0.243.
25 Bramall & Ogden Ltd. v Sheffield City Council (1983) 29 B.L.R. 73; Stanor Electric Ltd. v K. Mansell
Ltd. (1988) CJ.LL 399.
Watts, Vvtts & Co,, Ltd. v Mitsui & Co, Ltd. (1917) A.C. 227 (H.L).
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penalty recovery is limited to the actual amount of damage suffered. 27 Where
the actual damage is more than the amount of the penalty the authorities are
less than clear; a claimant may be able to disregard the penalty and sue for the
actual damage, 28 unless the clause is construed as a limitation of liability.29
 If
a penalty is not to be imposed as by nature not a genuine pre-estimate of loss
then to ignore it to allow a claim for an even greater sum would be an
extraordinary result. It is unlikely that both the elements of a specified sum
not being a genuine pre-estimate and greater actual loss will be present, but a
just result may be found by not denying the defaulting party the benefit of the
limitation because of deficiencies in the other's pre estimate. This would be
consistent with liquidated damages that are less than a genuine pre-estimate
operating as a limitation on the consequences of the default.3°
One of the characteristics of a clause construed as providing for liquidated
damages is that it removes the burden on a claimant to prove damage. The
position is otherwise where construed as a penalty, 3' and the distinction
avoids the theoretical discussions in continental legal literature on the
nature of penal clauses. A perceptible tendency is to uphold clauses as
liquidated damages rather than strike them down as penalties, 32
 even though
they may constitute not only an attempt to assess loss from a breach but an
endeavour to insure against a breach of contract itself. In this approach the
former dislike of penal clauses has given way to reluctance to interfere with
27 Wilbeam v Ashton (1807) 1 Camp. 78.
28 Wall v Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude (1915) 3 K.B. 66; Watts, Watts & Co., Ltd. v Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
(1917) AC. 227 (H.L.); and dicta of Lord Mansfield in Lowe v Peers (1768) 4 Burr. 225, at 228. The
above question was not regarded as decided by the House of Lords in Cellulose Acetate Silk Co.,, Ltd.
v Widness Foundry (1925) Ltd. (1933) AC. 20.
29 Watts, Watts & Co., Ltd. v Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (1917) A.C. 227(H.L.).
30 As in Temloc Ltd. v EMil Properties Ltd. (1987) 39 B .L.R. 30 (CA).
' K v London Guarantee and Accident Ca, Ltd. (1920) 2 W.W.R. 85, at p. 88.
32 Atiyah,. The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Robophone Facilities Ltd. v Blank (1966) 1 W.L.R.
1428, the court should not be astute to descry a 'penalty clause", Diplock U. at 1447. For "The fact
that in certain circumstances a party to a contract might derive a benefit in excess of his loss does
not ... outweigh the very genuine estimate, formed at the time the contract was made of the probable
loss", Law Commission Working Paper No. 61, Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid.
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the freedom of confract, unless to relieve oppression.34
An important and recent review of the established law was produced in
Phillips v A. G of Hong Kong and the tendency to uphold liquidated
damages provisions moved to an unwillingness to entertain contrary
argument on hypotheses, where thought has been given to the calculation
and in the commercial context of both parties having agreed the sum.
Phillips' attack on the liquidated damages provision was based on
hypothetical situations under which the sum payable would be out of
proportion to any loss that might be suffered. This was regarded as
unsatisfactory for "Arguments of this nature should not be allowed to divert
attention from the correct test as to what is a penalty provision - namely is it
a genuine pre-estimate of what loss is likely to be? - to the different question,
namely are there possible circumstances where a lesser loss would be
suffered?" 36 The historical approach to penalties of equitable relief and the
guidance in the Dunlop case was referred to, but the established premise of a
determination objectively made at the time of making the contract "does not
mean what actually happens is irrelevant" 31
 in relation to the reasonable
This reluctance was expressed as - ... paramount public policy ... that you are not lightly to interfere
with this freedom of contract", per Jessel M.R. in Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson
(1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 462, at p. 465. Such affirmation is comparable with the terms Article 1134 of the
Code Civil: "Les conventions legalement formés tiennent lieu de loi a ceux qui les ont faites."
(Agreements legally entered into have the force of law for those who make them.J
"It is now evident that the power to strike do a penalty dause is a blatant interference with
freedom of contract and is designed for the sole purpose of providing relief against oppression for
the party having to pay the stipulated sum. It has no place where there is no oppression." per
Dickson J
. 
in Elsey v J.G.Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd. (1978) 83 D.L.R. at p. 15, Supreme Court of
Canada. as cited with approval in the Australian High Court in Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd. v
Plessnig (1989) A.LJ. 238.
Phillips Hong Kong Ltd. vA. G. of Hong Kong (1993) 61 B.L.R. 41 (H.L.). Phillips contracted with the
Hong Kong Government to design, supply, install and commission acomputerised supeivisoty
system for reads and tunnels to be built under separate contracts under which the prograrmnes and
flow charts identified Key Dates that had to be met to allow other contractors to continue work
unimpeded. The contract provided for liquidated damages if those Key Dates were not met, the
sums vaiying according to the section of work to which they related, and additionally for liquidated
damages at a daily rate if the whole work was not completed within the specified time. A provision
for the reduction of the liquidated damages by virtue of prior occupation or use, which had founded
the successful argument as to the penal nature at first instance, was held not applicable because of
the nature of Phillips' work. Phillips did not allege that the sum sought to be recovered was
excessive in comparison with the actual loss suffered.
" At page 63. The analysis of the approach was that "Except possibly in the case of situations where
one of the parties to the contarct is able to dominate the other a to the choice of the terms of a
contract, it will normally be insufficient to establish that a provision is objectionably penal to identify
situations where the application of the provision could result in a larger sum being recovered by the
injured party than his actual loss. Even in such situations so long as the sum payable In the event of
non-compliance with the contract is not extravagant;, having regard ti the range of losses hat it could
reasonably be anticipated it would have to cover at the time the contaitt was made, it can still be a g
flume pee-estimate of the loss that would be suffered and so a perfectly valid liquidated damages
provision."
'On the contrary it can provide valuable evidence as to what could reasonably be expected to be the
loss at the time the contract was made', at page 59.
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expectation of loss.
4	 English aiil French law antecedents
The origin of the English distinction between penalties and liquidated
damages appears as an historical incident arising from the conflicts of
jurisdiction between the courts of common law and equity. 38
 Common law
made no distinction between penalties and liquidated damages and enforced
what would be regarded as penalties. Equity intervened to grant relief where
appropriate. It appears that during the fifteenth centuiy 39 the courts of equity
granted relief in the case of common money bonds 4° where fraud was
involved, where default in payment was justified, and whenever payment
with interest was tendered. This was subsequently extended to cover cases
where bonds were given not only to secure payment of a specific sum of
money on a given date, but to secure or prevent the performance of some act.
The principle applied, 41 was to reduce penalties which were regarded as
oppressive and unconscionable, 42 on the basis that it was contrary to natural
justice to have contract provisions that were in terrorem.
In the seventeenth century the lack of distinction at common law between
penalties and liquidated damages changed, for those courts acquired
jurisdiction over penalties by means of the Administration of Justice Acts,
1696, and 17O5. The latter Act provided that the debtor on a bond could
plead a defence that he had by the time of the action paid the debt and
interest; and that he could pay the principal, interest and costs into court and
obtain a discharge by judgment.
There is disagreement as to how the jurrsdiction in respect of penalties evolved; Law Commission
Working Paper No. 61, Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid.
30 C, Marsh, Penal Clauses in Contracts, Journal of Comparative Legislation, 3rd senes, 66 at 69.
40 A bond entered into in order to secure the payment of a given sum of money with interest, coupled
with an undertaking to pay a greater specified sum of money if payment is not made on the agreed
date.
Probably from the latter part of the eighteenth century; for as late as the middle of the eighteenth
centuly there are reported cases in which the courts of equity refused to examine the amount
stipulated in the parties' contract and in which they refused to intervene although the clauses in
question would undoubtedly be regarded as in te,rorem today; Roy v Duke of Beaufort (1741) 2 Atk.
190.
42 Sloman v Walter (1783) 1 Bro. C.C. 418.
8&9Will.3,c.11;and4&5Anne,c.16,s2.
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The result of these statutes was that at common law,44
 whenever the claimant
sued to recover a fixed or ascertainable sum of money as being payable by the
respondent on breach of contract, the court had to determine whether or not
such sum of money was a penal sum within the meaning of the statute.
Where the sum of money was regarded as penal, the entitlement was to the
actual loss suffered which had to be proved. Where the sum was not
regarded as penal the courts were bound to award the amount agreed upon
in full, neither more nor less, 45 and without proof of damage.
The hybrid nature of clauses penales in civil law as both a guarantee of
performance of a contractual obligation and a pre-estimate of damage on the
breach of it, is a direct consequence of the function of these clauses varying
historically. The origin of the uncertainty that civil law had towards these
provisions is found in Roman and canon law where the repressive nature of
penal clauses gave way to the hybrid natured'
Under early Roman law, the stipulatio poenae was a single conditional
obligation,47 used as a sanction to promises that were not legally enforceable,48
and the penalty was payable in full notwithstanding partial performance, or
even where the subject matter had been destroyed by circumstances beyond
the debtor's control. 49 This early form surrendered to a second formula of a
principal obligation followed by a penal stipulation for non-performance
which was both repressive and a means of assessing damages for non-
performance, 5° which resulted in the creditor having to choose between
Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the courts of equity over penalties lingered on until the
Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, 1873-1875.
On the manner in which the courts of common law came to adopt the dodrines of equity see the
judgment of Bramwell B. in Betts v Burch (1859)4 H. & N. 506.
' Maruani,. La clause penale, p.17.
The formula used being si Paniphilurn non dedens, centuin daie spondes? If you do not transfer to
me the property in Pamphilus, do you promise to pay me a hundred -?
48 Such as where A promised B that he would give money to X in ottler that X should perform some act.
This sanction formed part of the system of private penalties common to all systems of early law.;
Savigny, Droit des obligations, 1863, French edition, II, p.421.
Flinlaux. L'evolution du concept de dause penale chez les canonistes du Moyen Age, Melanges
Fourniei 1929, p. 234-235. More stiiking was that where the penalty was insufficient to cover the
damage suffered, the penal stipulation did not prevent the creditor recovering both the amount of
the penalty and damages, and even though the amount of the penalty exceeded the actual damage
it was fully recoverable.
° Buckland. A Textbook of Roman La p.428-429 in3d. ed. Pamphilum dan spnides? Si non
dedens centim dare spondes? Do you promise to transfer to me the property in Pamphilus? If you
do not transfer the property to me, do you promise to pay me a hundred?
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recoveiy of a penalty and recovety of damages.5'
Penal stipulations were developed as a means of avoiding proof of damage,52
but subsequently they became regarded solely as a means of securing the
performance of an obligation, and not as assessing the damages prospectively
arising on default, although this use reappeared with the development of
canon law in the middle ages. 53 The medieval canonists attempted to
establish a distinction between penal clauses that were bona fide and those
that were not, but there were difficulties in applying such a subjective
distinction. An advance appeared in the application of the doctrine of
interesse, which, borrowed from the civil law, permitted a distinction to be
drawn between usury, regarded as so much per cent, and interesse , or
damages. The distinction led to debate as to whether a penalty could exceed
the amount of damage, and the proposal of a further distinction between
cases where the penalty was an assessment of damages, when it must not
exceed the damages, and cases where the penalty was a punishment of the
debtor, in which case it could not be reduced.54
On the question of whether or not a judge should be allowed to reduce the
amount of the penalty where it was in excess of the damage, opinions
remained divided, even into the drafting of the Code Civil, and beyond. The
reduction was favoured on the ground that as the whole object of the penal
The principal obligation was regarded as extinguished once the penalty was sought, and there was a
mechanism to prevent a creditor seeking to recover both damages and the penalty.This was the
exceptio do/i. Maule; De Ia nature de Ia clause pénale, 1898, p28. There is a text in the Digest that
allowed the creditor to sue for damages after payment of the penalty, where the amount of the
penalty was less than the actual damage. However, there was no suggestion of the amount of the
penalty being reduced where it was greater than the amount of damage suffered, and it was not until
the development of canon law in the thirteenth century that this question first began to be disussed -
D. 19.1.28.
52 Justinian stressed the central point that a penal stipulation avoids the necessity for a creditor having
to prove damage arising from a breach of contract and that it also avoids the judge having to assess
the evidence regarding such damage, Institutes, III, 15, 7.
Penal clauses may serve several functions, and under Roman law an ancillary benefit was make
actionable certain obligations that were not as a matter of strict law enforceable. In canon law it
would seem that penal clauses first came to be used because they offered a means of avoiding the
usury laws which were stifling economic development; so that, instead of conduding a contract
whereby A lent B 100 with a proviso that B would pay A fIve per cent interest if he did not repay A by
a certain date, which would have infringed the usury laws, A would lend B 100 and B agreed to pay
the penalty of 105 if he did not repay A on the agreed date; and on the agreed date A could sue B
directly for the penalty. Glasson,. Histoire du droit francais et des institutions de Ia France, Paris,
1887-1903, Ill, p. 235. At first applied solely to the cler the usury laws were applied to everyone in
A.D. 789 by Charlemagne.
Provided it was not used in fraud of the usury laws. P. Benjamin, Penalties, Liquidated Damages and
Penal Clauses in Commercial Contreacts: A Comparative Study of English and Continental Law.
(1960) 9 I.C.L.Q. 600.
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clause was to provide a pre-estimate of damages a judge should be allowed to
reduce the amount where it was more than the damage, and opposed on the
ground that the sole object of a penal clause was not so much to assess the
damages as to avoid difficulties of the burden of proof. The importance of
the former was that this doctrine passed out of the realm of canon law into
the civil law, and until the Code Civil, the dmit commun had adopted the
idea of the reduction of an excessive penalty by a court of law on the ground
that the object of a penal clause was solely to assess the damages.
5	 Th aaIL Iria1e
In France the clause pénale is in principle valid, unlike the description in
English law produced by literal translation. Its straightforward definition in
Article 1226 is broad enough to include things other than the payment of
money: "A clause penale is one whereby a person, in order to assure the
performance of an agreement, binds himself to something in the event of
default."56
It is a provision made at the time of making the contract, for Article 1152,
limiting recovery to the stipulated sum, refers to an agreement providing for
payment of a certain sum if he shall fail, man quera , to perform his part of
the of the contract; and it has been described as a form of astreinte .' The
sensible object of fixing damages in advance which gives certainty and a
known limitation is coupled with the degree of coercion that results from the
consequences of failure in the obligation to which the clause relates. This
latter aspect may attract complaint when legitimate anticipation becomes
economic abuse.
The clause penale is attached to the principal obligation so that nullity of the
latter has the same effect on the clause penale, but the converse does not
Pothier underlined the nature of a penal dause in terms: "La peine est compensatnce des
dommages et int&ts que le c,ander souffle de l'inexécution de l'obligation pzindpale.' Traite
des obligations, Paris-Orleans, 1763, I, No. 342, p. 417. [The penalty is compensation in damages
which the creditor suffers fmm inexecution of the principal obligation.)
' Article 1226: "La clause penale est celle par laquele une personne, peur assu,er l'as.écution d'une




 Whatever the ingredients for default under the principal obligation
they must exist before the clause pénale can be invoked, so that the time at
which a penalty becomes due depends on the time at which the performance
under the principal agreement is properly due. This is not limited to the
fulfilment of the express provisions of the agreement but includes any
applicable rules of law. If a mise en demeure is required for the purpose of
putting the obligor in default then it must equally be given to sustain a claim
under the clause penale. This derives from Article 1230:
"Whether the original agreement does or does not contain a provision
requiring compliance, the penalty is only incurred when he who is
under the obligation to deliver or take up or do is in default."59
It is possible though for the clause penal itself to stipulate a dispensation
from the requirement of a mise en demeure ,60 but this may be achieved
even by implication where for example the provision is that the penalty shall
become due by the mere expiry of the time fixed.
The clause pénale is not an alternative to performance of the principal
obligation, and payment under it does not discharge the obligation.
Conversely, how far is the obligee bound? Article 1228 gives a apparent
choice:
"The creditor, instead of requiring the penalty stipulated from the
debtor who is in default, may proceed for execution of the principal
obligation."61
However, the perception of non-performance of the obligation, lexécution
de l'obligation, is not limited to the continued physical performance, but
rather as inclusive of the wider obligation to pay damages for inexecution of
which the penalty is but an evaluation. Accordingly, Article 1228 is not
presenting an option between performance or penalty, but emphasises the
fact that the existence of a clause penale does not exclude pursuit of
58 Article 1227, La nuiité de lobligation principale ent,atne celle de Ia clause penale. La nullité de
celle-d n'entrafne point celle de lobligation pnncipaie." [Nullity of the principal obligation involves
that of the clause penale. Nullity of the Latter does not involve that of the principal agreement.]
Artide 1230:'Soit que Iobligation pnmitie contienne. soft qu'elle ne contienne pas un (ernie dans
lequei elle doive etie accomplie. La peine nest encounie que lorsque celui qul s'est oblige soft a
I/vie, soit a prendre.. soit a faire. est en demeuie."
° Mazeaud and Tunc, Traité de droit civil.
' Article 1228: "Le creancier, au lieu de demander la peine stipulée con tie le débiteur qui est en
demeure, peut poursuivl-e l'eécution de lobligation pdndpale.'
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performance.'2
The substance of this is found in Article i229:'
"The clause pénale is the compensation In damages which the creditor
suffers from inexecution of the principal obligation.
He may not claim at the same time both the principal obligation and
the penalty unless it was stipulated for simple delay."
The exception of simple delay is of importance for building contracts, but if
the obligation to which the clause penale attaches includes other obligations
then the question arises as to an employer's ability to recover more than the
penalty. Prior to the Code Civil, on the prevailing opinion that such clauses
were a means of assessing damage, they were subject to judicial interference
where the penalty exceeded the damage, but the final terms of the Code
accepted the proposition of assessment, but rejected intervention. Whether
the object be genuinely to assess damages, or to compel an economically
weaker party to perform an obligation, the same consequences follow, for in
practice clauses penales are predominantly applied as providing for what
common law terms liquidated damages. Articles 1229 and 1152 laid down the
premise adopted by French law, with Article 1229 in its first section
reproducing practically word for word Pothier's statement of the nature of a
penalty.64
If the penalty is solely an assessment of damages payable on default then no
more than the penalty could be recovered on a claim for monetary
compensation. This was the effect of Article 1152 which remained unaltered
from the inception of the Code until 1975:
"When an agreement provides that one who shall fail to execute it
shall pay a certain sum by way of damages, there shall be no award
made of a greater or a lesser sum to the other party."5
The Article contained the rejection of the doctrine of the dmit commun as to
62 Planiol and Ripert, Traité pratique de dreit civil français. German law apparently gives the choice in
that ti 340 par. I prevides that the creditor can sue for the penalty instead of performance.
' Article 1229: "La dause pénale est La compensation des donimages et inté,ts que le créander
souffle de !'inexécution de !'obII8ation pzincipal. line peut demander en méme temps le pnncipal
et La peine, a moms qu'elIe nait été stipulée pourle sJmple retard."
Setoutatnote55above.
• Article 1152: "Lorsque le convention porte que celui que man quera de I'exécuter payeza une
certaine somme a titre de darnmages-intézts, ii ne peut étre ailoué a rauue partie une so,nnie
plus forte, ni moindre."
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judicial intervention, 66
 for although the position represented by Articles 1229
and 1152 was that penal clauses are solely a means of assessing damages, it
was considered an unwarranted intervention with the parties' contract for a
court to modify in any way the damages agreed.
Where substitute performance is secured through an authonsation under
Article 1144 such a claim would result in a money judgment, but not for
damages in addition, and it was unclear whether Article 1152 would apply to
such a claim. 67
 In view of the Lol of 9th July 1991 enabling the court to order
payment in advance of the sum necessary to secure the substitute
performance the point becomes increasingly significant. The result will, it is
suspected, reflect the particular obligation for which the substitute
performance is authorised as against that secured by the clause penakl with
difficulty arising where it is the whole obligation.
The important aspect in relation to building contracts is the express exception
in Article 1229 from the prohibition on claiming compensation in addition
to enforcing the clause penale where the latter relates to simple delay. This
will obviate difficulty in the ordinary case. It is on its face, however, a narrow
exception to stipulate, both when contrasted with other Codes, 68
 and the
common law under which a clause liquidating damages for one breach will
not affect the damages recoverable on another breach. 69
 It would be applicable
as an exception where there was one obligation to do and another to do it
within a certain time, to which latter a clause penale was attached, but where
a penalty is stipulated for a particular breach of one obligation in an
agreement other than time it does seem that damages for breach of another
may be recovered70
When the Civil Code was drafted there were partisans of the hybrid nature of penal clauses, and the
legislative section of the Tnbunate in an unadopted portion went so far as to distinguish between
cases where the penal clause provided for the payment of liquidated damages arid no judicial
intervention was desirable, and cases where the penal clause provided for the payment of a penalty
which should be subject to judicial control.
'	 Treitel, op. cit.
° The Swiss and Austrian Codes follow the general rule disallowing a daim for both the principal
obligation and the penalty but the exception extends to where the penalty Is for failure to perform
either at the agreed time or at the agreed place; Swiss CO Art. 160 par. 2, Austrian CC ¶9J 1336 par.!
sent3. The German CC ¶ 341 par.1 extends the exception to where the penalty was provided for
failure to perform properly, in accordance with the contract, of which failure to perform to time is
give as an illustration.
An example is Akt. Reidarv Aitos (1927) 1 K.B. 532.
° Clause penale. Généralités, J
. 
Cl. Civ. art.1226 - 1233 no. 119.
144
That different results sometimes obtain from similar reasoning was true of
clauses pénales under French law. Having identified the result by Article
1229 as compensation in respect of damage suffered from non-performance,
it would have been logical to conclude that where the damage was less than
the penalty the amount stipulated should be reduced. 7' Instead French law
invoked sanctity of contract to prevent interference, much as English law
relies upon the freedom of contract to prevent interference by a court with
liquidated damages. The reason behind the attitude of French law would not
appear to have been based upon analysis of the nature of such clauses, but on
the premise that it was not in the interest of public policy to interfere with a
bargain freely entered into solely on the ground of the inadequate
appreciation by the parties of the amount of damage likely to follow from a
breach of contract. This public policy was irrespective of whether the
clause penale was designed to assess damages, secure performance of a
contractual obligation, or prevent its breach, whether the parties were equal
in economic power,73 or, whether or not the damage be greater than the sum
stipulated.
The French principle of literal enforcement left no power to reduce the
stipulated sum on the ground that it was excessive, and unlike the common
law, it may not be invalidated as extravagant and representing a "penalty" so
understood. Notwithstanding doctrinal criticism, the French courts
remained faithful to the rule in Article 1152 in their refusal to alter amounts
stipulated in clauses penales and consistently disregarded arguments
founded on natural justice and equite. To so interfere would contravene the
freedom to agree as parties might, and to effect a reduction in the amount
would destroy the beneficial and wholly justifiable end of obviating problems
of assessment of damages.
This position was reversed in 1975. The alteration gives effect to the droit
Being the solution favoured by dassical Roman law, canon la and in fact by PothieE
72 This policy element at the time of drafting the Code reflected distrust of judicial power; note 67
below.
' This was deplored by Carbonnier, Dmit Civil,, in the 1959 edition. 11, P. 543, who drew attention to the
fact that where the parties are not on the same footing of equality recourse must be had to legal
theories of a general nature such as abuse of rights, or 'Ira ude a Ia Ioi', if it is desired to protect the
weaker party.
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commun and its origins, and to the disappearance of the caution with which
judicial intervention was regarded at the time of drafting the Code. 74 A
second paragraph to Article 1152 was introduced in two stages so that a judge
may ureduce or increase the penalty agreed if it is manifestly excessive or
ridiculously low", and any stipulation to the contrary is void.Th The
manifestly excessive or derisory nature of the penalty is determined at the
time of the judge's decision.76
 Whilst the award is not required to be
regulated on the basis of the actual damage suffered it has the effect of setting
limits, for the reduction cannot be to less, nor an increase to more, than the
actual damage.
French law also permits a reduction in the stipulated penalty where the
contract had been performed in part, and the previously existing ability for
the parties to exclude this power of the court by contrary agreement has been
curtailed. This is achieved by Article 1231:
"When the agreement has been performed in part, the agreed penalty
may equally be reduced by the judge in proportion to the benefit which
the partial execution has given to the creditor, without prejucice to the
application of Article 1152. Any provision to the contrary shall have
no effect."77
The question whether or not a court of law should be empowered to modify a penal clause was the
subject of a heated discussion at the time, summed up l' Bigot-Preameneu before the Conseil
dEtat in the following terms: "On disait, dun côté, que les contrats devant étre exécutés de bonne
foi, it était juste de réduire Ia somme a laquelle les parties avaient fixé les dommages-interets; due le
débiteur na consenti a en élever Ia fixation beaucoup au delà de Ia juste proportion due parce quil
sest persuade quil pourrait remplir ses engagements, et quil ne serait pas exposé a Ia peine de
l'inexécution que sil eftt prevu les obstacles qui lont airété, il ne Se serait pas soumis a des
dommages-interets si considérables, quenfin les principes étaient ceux de La jurisprudence
actuelle.
On disait, dun autre cété, que les parties sent Les appréciateurs les plus sftrs du dommage qui pout
résulter de linexécution dun engagement; quainsi leur volonté doit étre respectée; que si Ion
accorde au juge le droit de dimineur les dommages-intérets queUes ont fixes, 11 faut donc aussi leur
donner le pouvoir de les augmenter Iorsque les circonstances portent La perte du créancier au delã
de ce qui avait été prévu
"Au milieu de ces difficultés, Ia section sest arreétée a une regle simple; elle a pensé que quand les
parties ont fixé elles-memes le taux des dommages-intéréts, leur prévoyance ne devait pas
demeurer sans effet, et quil lallait respecter leurs conventions, dautant plus que, dans dautres
contrats, on ne corrige pas les stipulations que les circonstances rendent enswte excessives ..."
Fenet, Recueil complet des Traveaux préparatoire du code civil, Paris, 1827-28, XIII, Procés verbal de
Ia seance du 11 brumaire.
Article 1152 as altered: "(Lo! no. 85-1 097 du 11 oct. 1985) < Néanmoins, le juge pout, méme d'office,
modérer ou augmenter Ia paine> (Lol no. 75-597du 9/whet 1975) < qui avait ete convenue, si elle est
manifestement excessive ou dérisoire. Toute stipulation contraire sera reputee non êcrire. >"
Cass. civ. 19th March 1980, Bull 1 n. 95, p. 76.
" Article 1231 as altered:" (Loino. 75-597du 9/uihIe 1975) Lorsque l'engagement a éte exécuté en
partie, La peine convenue pout (Lol no. 85- 1097 du 11 octobre 1985) ^. meme d'oflIce ^ étre
diminuée par le juge a proportion de L'intérét que l'exécution partielle a procure au créancier, sans
prejudice de l'application de l'article 1152. Toute stipulation contraire sera reputée non écrite.
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Notwithstanding the expressed Inability to exclude the power of reduction
for part performance there has been a decision that a judge may not apply
this Article where parties have themselves provided for a reduction in the
penalty in proportion to the benefit that part performance of the agreement
will give to the creditor.1°
The underlying structure of the original Article 1231 was a presumed intent
of the parties that their contractual assessment of damages be altered where
in fact the actual damage is reduced due to part performance, but this was a
dubious argument when the courts would not reduce the contracted
assessment where, independently of the doctrine of part performance, the
actual damage was less than the sum stipulated. Article 1231 had been of
limited application, for the courts refused to apply its provisions where the
object of the penalty was to prevent delay in performance as opposed to
performance itself, but in conjunction with the sea change in Article 1152
flexibility has been achieved, albeit at the expense of certainty.
An exception to the rule in Article 1152, deriving from judicial application,
remains extant 7 The French courts disregarded the sum stipulated in a
penal clause where the actual damage was greater in circumstances of do) or
faute lourde, gross negligence or deliberate fault, on the ground that it is
contrary to public policy to allow a debtor so to benefit. 8° The effect is that the
party in such default must compensate for the entirety of the damage.
Qauses penales are enforceable where damages can be awarded by a court so
that, unless the contract of which the provision forms part is void 81 or the
contract has been performed, 82
 it is for the plaintiff suing on a clause penale
to prove the existence of the contract containing the clause, that it has been
Corn. 21 July 1980, D.1981.335, note Chabas; J.C.P. 1982. II 197Th, note Boccara; Gaz. Pal. 1981.1. 207,
note Bey.
" There is another exception to the rule in Article 1152 in that the courts will inquire into the adequacy
of a sum stipulated in a penal clause where the law excludes the contractual avoidance of liability,
for the insertion of a veiy low figure as penalty would provide a means for drafting a clause of non-
responsibility in the form of a penal clause.
'° Artide 1150 is invoked which pmvides: Le debiteur nest tenu due des dommages et interets qui ont
ete prevus ou quon a pu prevoirlors du contrat, lorsque ce nest point par son dol que lobligation
nest point executee. I The debiteur is liable only for the damages which were foreseen or were
foreseeable at the time of the contract, pmvided that it is not by his do! that the obligation is not
performedi
' Article 1226.
$2 Article 1229 al. 2 and Article 1231.
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freely accepted, and that it has actually come into operation by reason of the
circumstances in which it is to apply83
The assimilation of clauses penales and damages is not carried to its ultimate
conclusion, for as recorded anew the object of clause pénales is not only to
provide redress for breaches of contract, but also to induce performance of
agreements so that the extent of the penalty will not necessarily equate to the
actual damage suffered on breach.84
6	 CcnnK1icenKnt, Completion arI Extensions of lime
The practical application of a provision for liquidated damages or a clause
penale will depend upon the ascertainment of the performance required as
to time in the relevant circumstances.
JCT 1980 provides that "On the Date of Possession, possession of the site shall
be given to the Contractor who shall therefore begin the Work, regularly and
diligently proceed with the same on or before the Completion Date." 85
 The
"Works" are represented by physical work notwithstanding the multitude of
other attendant obligations that may be provided for in the Contract Bills.86
The definition of "the Completion Date" is not simply "the Date for
Completion", as agreed prior to contract and stated in the Appendix, but
continues "or any date fixed under either Clause 25 or 33.1.3" so as to include
the effects of extensions of time.
Under AFNOR 1991 a characteristic of the CCAG, which apply unless
modifed, is the provision of a period of preparation. 87
 During this period the
contractor is required to draw up and transmit to the ma!tre d'oeuvre certain
of the documents that constitute contract particulars. 88
 These comprise
Subject to pmof as to formal notice to the debtor to comply with the obligation secured by the penal
clause, Article 1230.
" Corn. 29th Januaiy 1991, Bull. civ. IV, no. 43.
JCT 1980, clause 23.1.1. The Appendix to the Conditions should contain the parties' agreement of
the date of possession which will ordinarily be a fixed date for possession of the whole site.
U They are defined as: the Works briefly described in the first recital and shown and described in the
Contract Drawings and in the Contract Bills".
81 Afnor. Artide 13223.
88 Amnor: Articles 2.4 and 4.1 and 4.2.
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particular details for the carrying out of the work, a chart showing the
organisation of the contractor's business, the programme for carrying out the
work, specific survey and investigation plans, and any other documents that
are required to be prepared by the contractor by the contract. 89
 This
programme must fall within the overall timetable of the works
notwithstanding that it may bring about changes within it. 9° The period of
execution follows on immediately after the period of preparation but the
parties are able to provide in their contract particulars for the
commencement of the period of execution before the period of preparation
had ended.
The actual date for commencement of the work itself is fixed by instruction
from the maître d'oeuvre, countersigned by the employer. The date may not
be before the issue of the construction permit or other required
authonsation. 91 The instruction to commence has to be delivered between
the 30th and 15th day before the date fixed as the commencement of the
period of execution.92
The time for the work falls to be considered by reference to the 2 periods of
preparation and execution. 93 The period of preparation is that time necessary
for the drawing up of those documents in article 4.1 being the contractor's
responsibility94 It starts the day following the day upon which notification is
given to the contractor that the contract has been concluded and extends for
three months unless agreed otherwise by the parties in the CCAG. 95 The
period of execution may itself be divided into a period for the organisation of
the work and a period for the carrying out of the actual work itself.
Intermediate periods may be fixed for the execution of identified work91
The date of completion of the works is the date upon which they are in fact
Afnor: Articles 4.1.1, 4.12, 4.13, 4.1.4, and 4.1.5.
9° Afnor Article 4.13.
°' Afnor Article 73.1.
° Afnor Article 732.
° Afnor: Article 7.
° Afnor.Article7.1.1.
9° Afnon Article 7.12.
9° Afnor. Article 72.1.
° Alnor. Article 7.2.2.
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actually completed. The obligation to complete is to be found in the date
agreed as the date for completion, and in the obligation to pay penalties for
delay requiring consideration of the provisions for extending time.
The scheme for extensions of time 99 under JCT 1980 requires notice by the
contractor of the material circumstances when it becomes reasonably
apparent that the progress of the Works is being or is likely to be delayed.
The cause of delay and the any event "Relevant Event", being matters that
entitle the contractor to an extension of time, must be identified. The
ability to guage progress is less easy without the facility of a programme and
the absence of a clause requiring one is a notable distinction from AFNOR
In practice, provision may be made for a programme in general clauses in
Bills of Quantities.10 ' Particulars are required to be given by the contractor of
the expected effects of relevant events, either in the notices or as soon as
possible.
The architect has then first to form an opinion whether the causes of delay
are "Relevant Events", and whether by reason of them completion is likely
to be delayed, and if so, then he has to extend time by fixing such new
Completion Date as he estimates to be fair and reasonable.'° 2 Such date may
be made earlier to account for omissions.'° 3 This scheme is drafted so as to
operate during the work and before the Completion Date; but after it, and
within 12 weeks of the date of practical completion, the Completion Date
must be fixed by the Architect, whether later, earlier or the same as that fixed
during the Work.'°4
The catalogue of events in JCT 1980 clause 25.4 which have the potential
effect of relieving the Contractor from his obligation to complete by the
Completion Date and which would result in a later date is such as to render
frustration of the contract by an unforeseen supervening event highly
" Afnor Article 7.4
ja Clause 25.
'°o JCT: Clause 25.2.
'°' Reliance on such a provision as a ground for alleging breach in failing to adhere to a programme is
unlikely to be course in the face of the obligation only to complete by the Completion date.
102 JCT: Clause 25.3.
'° JCT: Clause 2532.
104 Jcr: Clause 2533.
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unlikely. The list Commences with force majeure, and exceptionally adverse
weather conditions, and Includes instructions issued by the architect. The
nature of those instructions that may give rise to extensions of time include:
those arising on finding any discrepancy or divergence between documents
or parts of documents, including drawings, bills and instructions;
instructions requiring a variation; those requiring postponement of any
work; and instructions in connection with nominated sub-contractors or
suppliers. The list continues at length.105
Under AFNOR 1991 article 7.5 governs extensions of the period of execution
and is divided into categories. The first is extensions for reasons not
attributable to the parties. The time is extended in respect of the duration of
inclement weather,'°6 which are those days when work is halted. 101
 Further
there are also to be taken into account those days during which it is not
practically possible to continue work
Other reasons for the duration of which the time is extended are the
impediments of force majeure; public holidays and special fête days; general
strikes in the trade, or in those bodies on which the work of the trade is
dependent, which affect the execution of the worlç, but to the exclusion of
'° Induding
t civil commotion, local combination of workmen, strike or lock-out affecting any of the trades
employed upon the Works or any of the trades engaged in the preparation, manufacture or
transportation of any of the goods or materials required for the Works;
& compliance with the Architect's instmctions:
6 the Contractor not having received in due time necessary instructions, drawings, details or levels
from the Architectfor which he specifically applied in writing provided that such application was
made on a date which having regard to the Completion Date was neither unreasonably distant from
nor unreasonably close to the date on which it was necessary for him to receive the same;
7. delay on the part of Nominated Sub-Contractors or Nominated Suppliers which the Contractor
has taken all practicable steps to avoid or reduce;
8.1 the execution of work not forming part of this Contract by the EmpLoyer himseLf or by persons
employed or otherwise engaged by the Employet
9. the exercise by the Government of any statutory power which directly affects the execution of the
Works by restricting the availability or use of labour which is essential to the proper carrying out of
the Works or preventing the Contractor from, or delaying the Contractor in, securing such goods or
materials or such fuel or energy as are essential to the proper carrying out of the Works;
10.1 the Contractor's inability for reasons beyond his control and which he could not reasonably have
foreseen to secure such labour as is essential to the proper carrying out of the Works; or
10.2 the Contractor's inability for reasons beyond his control and which he could not reasonably have
foreseen to secure such goods or materials as are essential to the proper carrying out of the Works;
11. the carrying out by a local authority or statutory undertaker of work in pursuance of its statutory
obligations, or the failure to carry out such wotic
12. failure of the Employer to give in due time ingress to or egress from the site of the Works,;
13. the deferment by the Employer of giving possession of the site.
'° AFNOR: Article 75.1.1.
'° In accordance with the provisions of Law 46-2299, 21 Oct. 1946, and subsequent revisions (Article L-
771-2 of the Code du Travail).
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periods of strike affecting only the particular project.'° 8 The category also
includes for the period to be adjusted in the event that variations to the work
are required by unforeseen work. Article 8.1, Modification aux liavaux,
provides for variations that may be required of the contractor and their
evaluation, and the formalities for instructing variations require written
instructions that particulanse the effect of such changes on the times for
execution. 109 The reference to unforeseen work is applicable to work of three
types: work ordered by the employer as a result of an administrative order or
a judicial or arbitral decision secured by a third party, emergency work
affecting stability, and work carried out as nominated expenditure. In respect
of each of these, time is extended upon justification for it by the contractor,
but not where there has been fault on the part of the contractor.11°
The second category is extension for the employer's delays. Within this is
Delay in payment" under which the contractor is prohibited in any
circumstances from suspending work on account of default in payment, but,
by the proviso, only if he has not given at least 15 days' notice in advance by
registered letter to the employer and the maître d'oeuvre. The time impact
is that the employer is then made liable for the consequences of all
interruption resulting from any failure to abide by his obligations, and in
particular any repercussions which it might have on the execution of works
of others. Other factors are delays in fulfilling administrative requirements,
delays arising from instructions or the lack of their provision after request.
The broad result sought to be achieved by these two standard forms is much
the same, but it is the interposition of the opinion of the architect in the
mechanism under the English form where the difference lies. Likewise in
the FIDIC conditions; while the qualifying events for an extension are simply
stated,t12 and must be such as fairly to entitle the contractor to an extension,
the determination of the extent is by the engineer, whose decisions and
opinions are expressed in the contract between employer and contractor to be
'° AFNOR: Article 7.5.1.2.
109 AFNOR: Article 8.1.4.2.
lb AFNOR: Article 75.1.3.
I " AFNOR:Article 7.5.2.1.
112 Clause 44. In short; extra work, any causes of delay referred to in the conditions, exceptionally
adverse climatic conditions, employer's delays or "other special cittumstances which may occur,
other than thmugh default of or breach of contract by the Contractor or for which he is responsible."
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required to be given impartially, yet whose own default under his contract
with the employer may have caused or contributed to delay, and much
consequent cost.3
An example within the actual terms of the FIDIC conditions is failure of the engineer to issue
drawings in time, clause 6.4. The extent of the intellectual athieticism required of an engineer to
satisfy the impartiality specified in the employer/contractor contract is seen from N.G.Bunni, The
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A party aggrieved at not obtaining the performance bargained for may wish,
in a general sense, to end further performance of a contract, and so far as
possible restore the position to that before performance on either side began.
The view that he is not receiving the performance bargained for may derive
from an actual breach of an identified obligation, or from the likely outcome
of the continued manner of performance as against an obligation of which
breach is determinable only subsequently, for example at completion. A
straightforward reason for termination is the hardship an employer may
suffer from having to accept or retain a lesser performance. As a remedy, it is
in both common law and civil law subject to a recogriisable permission,
whether prospective or retrospective, and may prove speedier than the
pursuit of performance or damages; but recognition of an ability to terminate
is balanced by protective features towards the defaulting party, reflecting the
degree of seriousness of default.
Assuming the existence of a breach the aggrieved party may wish first to
refuse to pay or render counter-performance; or second, he may refuse to
accept further performance; or third, he may already have performed his part
and wish for restitution of his own performance. The parties will generally
have provided for powers of termination in the express terms of their
contract where a standard form has been used, but the nature and
relationship of such to the law is material.
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At common law the terms rescission or repudiation are used, and it permits
the aggrieved party to rescind for non-performance merely by accepting the
defaulting party's conduct as producing that result. It is therefore a remedy in
the hands of the party asserting breach, subject to his action constituting a
proper application of the law. Conversely, it has been pointed out that there
is a greater reluctance in French law to allow such recourse to self-help in the
widest sense of allowing a remedy without court intervention.'
2	 RtsoMkwp and R&Iliatk,n
Prior judicial sanction is not a necessary element for the remedy of a
defensive withholding of performance, dmit de rétention, in French law for
a party may rely on the exceptio non adimpleti con tractus 2
The remedies of refusal to permit further performance and recovery of a
party's own performance are in French law referred to by the same name,
resolution, termination. This is where the aggrieved party wishes to secure a
finite release from his obligation as opposed to the temporary and
provisional result of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, but without loss
of the right to damages (as on a nullité). In civil law countries there is a
sharp distinction between contracts performed by single acts on each side,
instantaneous contracts, and successive contracts, including building
contracts, which require continuing acts of performance over a period of
time. In French law, the termination of the latter is referred to as résiliation,
cancellation, which operates for the future.3
While an aggrieved party may terminate a contract the particular legal
consequence on termination is moulded according to the circumstances of
the case. Just as at common law French law has regard to such factors as the
extent to which performance has gone and the loss caused by the default, and
The French maxim "Nul ne peut se faire justice a soi-méme, discussed in Béguin, Travaux de
l'Association I-I. Capitant, 18, 1966, 41.
2 Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract - A Comparative Account. Considered under Récep f/on
and Payment.
J . Carbonnie Dmit civil, IV, Les Obligations, 273, 280.
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the right to damages is not barred because the aggrieved party seeks to
recover the performance that he has rendered under the contract.
The notable distinction of the French approach to termination from that of
the common law is its judicial character. 4
 Further, whilst resolution is a
remedy for inexécution by virtue of a breach of contract that does not result
from a fortuitous event, it is also the term used when the inexécution is
brought about by force majeure. The histoiy of the remedy has given rise to
dispute as to its basis, but Article 1184 provides first, that a resolutive
condition6
 is implied in all synallagmatic contracts where one party fails to
perform his undertakin& second, that in such a case the contract does not
terminate by operation of law, and the aggrieved party may claim either
performance, or resolution and damages; and third, that resolution must be
sought in legal proceedings, en justice.
Article 1184 does not specify the grounds for resolution; it does not require
the aggrieved party to show total non-performance, nor does it say that any
non-performance will suffice. It prescribes how resolution must be sought,
not when it will be granted. 7
 That is a matter for the judicial process. In
determining whether to grant resolution the court will have regard to
various factors such as the defendant's degree of fault and the seriousness of
D. Hams and D. Tallon, Contract Law Today, Anglo French Comparisons. (1989).
Article 1184: La condition résolutoire est toujours sous-entendue dans los contrats
synallagmatiques, pour le cas o l'une des deux pazties ne satisfera point a son engagement. Dans
ce cas, le contrat n'est point résolu de plein dmit. La partie envem' laquelle l'engagement n'a point
ete exécut4 a le choix ou de fo,rerl'aut, a l'exécution de Ia convention Iorsqu'elle est possible, ou
d'en demander Ia resolution avec dommages et lntérêts. La resolution dolt étm demandee enjustice. et il pout étm accoidé au défendeur en déiai selon los ciwonstances.' LA resolutive
condition is always implied in synallagmatic contracts to provide for the case where one of the two
parties does not fulfil his undertaking. In such a case, the contract is not resolved by operation of
law. The party in whose favour the undertaking has not been performed has the choice either to
compel the other to perform the agreement, where that is possible, or of claiming resolution with
damages. Resolution must be claimed Lr action at la and the defendant may be granted further
time depending on the circumstances.l The Artide is in the section of the Code dealing with
conditional obligations.
' Article 1183 defines a resolutoiy condition: 'La condition résolutoiiu est celle qui, lorsqu'elle
s'accomplit, opére Ia revocation de l'obligation, et qui remet los choses au méme état que si
l'obligation n'avait pas eusté. Elle ne suspend point recotion de l'obligation, elle oblige
seulement le créancier a zestituer ce quila zeçz. dans le cas oCt lévénement prew par Ia condition
anive.' [A resolutive condition is one which,when conduded, effects the revocation of the
obligation, and which restores matters to the same position as if the obligation had never existed. It
does not suspend the execution of the obligatior it only obliges the creditor to restore what he has
received, in cirtumstances where the event provided for by the condition occurs.]
The lack of legislative text as to the required cirvumstances for the remedy reflects its judicial
character. An example of a specific application is from Artide 1654: 'Si lacheteur ne paye pas le
pn Jo vendeur pout demander Ia resolution deJa vente.' [If the buyer does not pay the price, the
seller may claim resolution of the sale.l
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the defect in performance. The formulation of the remedy as an implied
resolutive condition followed Pothier,8
 but the operation of such a condition
and the reasoning is hard to reconcile with the need for a court order. It has
also been seen as a sanction for bad faith and as a means of compensation,
but, while these may feature in decisions as to its grant, the generally accepted
basis is in the reciprocal obligations of a synallagmatic contract.9
The court considering a claim for termination may grant or reject the claim,
or grant the defendant a period of grace, delai de grace, within which to
perform his obligation. 10
 Where the inexecution is other than total, as an
abandonment, the matter is one for the discretion of the court within its
pouvoir souverain for there is no legal crtiterion for distinguishing breaches
sufficiently serious to justify the termination of the contract from those
insufficient. At any time before termination has been ordered the party in
default can prevent termination by offering to perform; indeed it seems he
can do this while an appeal against an order for termination is pending.'1
Conversely, the aggrieved party is not barred from claiming termination
merely because he has advanced a claim for performance. 12
 Termination is
not regarded as a usual remedy compared with damages.
The effect of the general requirement that a judgment for termination must
be obtained is both that until such a judgment has been pronounced, the
party in default is not deprived of his right to perform, and that the
aggrieved party is not justified in refusing to perform his part, or in putting it
out of his power to perform. On a judgment for resolution matters then
have to be restored as if the contract never existed, so the effect is a
Traité des Obligations. 1761 (English translation by W. D. Evans, 1806) s. 672. Pothier sought to show
a derivation from Roman law, but the supposed derivation is it seems not sound, A Weill and F.
Terre, Droit civil, Les Obligations, 4th Ed. 1986, s. 481.
J. Carbonniez Droit civil, IV, Les Obligations, 81, théone juridique.
'° Artide 1184 al. 3. A similai but more limited, provision as to period of grace in cases of sale is in
Article 1655 par. 2. ''Si ce danger n'existe pas. le juge peut acconier a l'acquéreur un délai plus ou
moms long suivant les dironstances.' [If this danger does not exist, the judge may accord the buyer
a delay of greater or lesser length according to the circumstances.l
J . Carbonnier, Droit civil. IV, Les Obligations, 272; the rele is criticised by G. Marty and P. Raynaud,
Droit civil, II no.301. The reason for the continuing ability of the defaulting party to offer to perform
whilst the proceedings are in train lies In the vezy powere of the court itself to adjudge that a further
period for performance should be granted if performance is still possible. Such control
12 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, p. 197 (pointing out that Italian law is
different in that under Italian Codice Civile Article 1453 par. 2 and 3 perfonnance can no longer be
claimed after an action for termination has been brought).
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retroactive annulment requiring restoration of benefits received, 13
 but with
this aspect inapplicable to building contracts, as continuing or instalment
contracts, the judge on résiliation fixes the date at which cancellation takes
place.
The general principle of French law is no doubt effective for the purpose of
protecting the defaulting party; but it can be seen as commercially
inconvenient.' 4
 The requirement of a judgment imposes delays and creates
uncertainty as to whether the court will grant or refuse termination, or adopt
an intermediate solution of giving extra time to perform.' 5
 To meet this,
French law developed exceptions to the rule that termination requires an
order of the court, but the inherent judicial character remains in the wariness
with which automatic terminating conditions are regarded.
The most important of these is where a contract contains express provision
for termination. The general validity of such provisions is undoubted.
Article 1184 is not considered to contain a mandatory principle of public
policy, so parties are, free to provide that in certain events the contract will be
terminated by operation of law, de plein dmit 16 Care is needed in drafting
such provisions as they are applied strictly, against parties relying on them.'7
A provision that in certain events the contract will be terminated may
operate simply as a reminder of Article 1184 and not dispense with the
requirement of a judgment.' 8 Nor is a mere provision requiring performance
within a fixed time (subject to Article 1657') sufficient for that purpose.2°
' There are numemus exceptions to such retroactive operation, for example purchases of chattels by
thiitl parties in good faith are protected.
'	 Zweigert and Kötz, 199.
IS The uncertainty of the reaction of the court is no less though than the uncertainty of litigation under
common law as to whether there was a repudiation.
" J
. 
Carbonnieç Dreit civil, IV, Les Obligations,, IV, 273-274, 277. The freedom is subject to statutoly
exceptions.
G. Marty and P. Raynaud. Droit civil, II no. 1105.
J . Carbonnie Droit civil, IV, Les Obligations, IV, 274.
'° Article 1657: "En matièm de vente de demes et effets mobilie,s, Ia zsoIution de La vente awa lieu
de plein div/f et sans sonunatioii. au pm/If du wjideur, aprés I'apiration du tenne con venu pour Ie
rethEntent." (In the matter of sale of previsions and movable effects, resolution of sale takes place
as a matter of law and without summons, to the benefit of the selle after the expiration of the time
agreed for the payment.1
20 On this point French law differs strikingly 1mm Gennan and common law This appears from the
contrast between failure to pay and failure to take delivety at the stipulated time, and from the
general provisions as to délai de grace (period of grace).
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If a contract provides that it is terminable by operation of law, the aggrieved
party need not obtain a judgment but he may yet have to give a formal notice
of default, sommation . For sales of land there is provision to this effect in
Article 1656.21 In other contracts the question is whether the provision for
termination by operation of law dispenses the aggrieved party from all
formalities, although it is common to insert a statement to this effect. 22 A
properly drafted provision of this kind may, literally, appear to permit
termination of a contract for some relatively minor default; 23 but an attempt
to use it in this way may fail on the ground that it is contrary to good faith.24
So qualified, such provision overcomes the inconvenience of the
requirement of a judgment, while providing safeguards against more serious
possible abuses of the right to terminate.25
Where a seller delays in delivery a judgment for termination must again be
sought in the absence of an express contrary provision in the contract. 26 It is
not easy to see why failure of the buyer to take delivery within the agreed
time has been singled out for special treatment; and in practice it appears that
sellers rarely exercise the right of peremptory termination confered by Article
1657 and notice of intention to terminate is usual. Certainly, unilateral
rescission, which the common lawyer would equate with acceptance of a
21 Art 1656: 'S'il a ete stipulé ior de La vente d'imrneubles, que, faute du payment du pii dans le
tenne convenu, La vente serait nso1ue de plein dmit l'acquereur pout néanmoins payer api-es
1'epiration du deJa,, tant qu'il n'a pas ete mis en demeure par une sommation; mais, apns cette
sommation, le /uge ne pout pas 1w accorder de delal. [If it was stipulated at the time of the sale of
realty that in default of payment of the price within the time agreed the sale would be cancelled as a
matter of Law, the buyer may nevertheless pay after the expiration of the time so long as he has not
been put on notice by a summons; but after such summons the judge may not grant an extension of
time.]
22 Mazeaud, Leçons HI no. 1011; Carbonieç IV 274.
23 Mazeaud, Leçons HI no. 947.
24 J Carbonnier, Droit civil, IV, Les Obligations, IV 277. An express provision will not entitle a seller to
terminate the contract after the buyer's bankruptcy so as to obtain the return of materials delivered
to the buyer and in effect secure a priority over other creditors; Law no. 67-563 of 13 July 1967 00 14
July p. 7059) article 61 par. I.
25 Article 1657 relates to contracts for the sale of commodities or other moveables of which delivery is
to be taken within a fixed time, and provides that at the end of the agreed time, if the buyer has not
taken deliveiy the contract may be regarded as terminated by operation of law at the option of the
seller. The purpose of this rule is to enable the seller to take prompt measures to safeguanl his
position in the event of the buyer's default. He can dispose of goods that may deteriorate at once
and so free his storage space and also protect himself against any fall in the market price of the
goods. He can do this only if the contract specifies a date by which the buyer must take delivery, and
such date is an essential condition of the sale. Without a term of this kind judgment is necessaly.
25 Article 1610: "Si le vendeur manque a faire Ia deliverance dans le temps convenu entre les parties,
L'acquereur pouna, a son choix, demander La resolution de La vente, ou sa mise en possession,, site
retani ne vient que du fait du vendeur." [If the seller fails to make delivery within the time agreed
between the parties, the buyer may, at his choice, demand rescission of the sale or his being put in
possession, if the delay occurred only from an act of the seller.l
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repudiation, is invoked at that party's risk and the courts exercise a
subsequent strict control on this aspect, which remains exceptional.27
The Appmach under AFNOR
The AFNOR provisions for termination are comprehensible to the common
lawyer only in the light of the underlying legal framework, but with that
understanding they provide a regime for termination to be effected in serious
circumstances so achieving the same object as the JCT conditions.
Termination de plein droit, without a prior judgment, and without a mise
en demeure covers such matters as liquidation of either party. 28
 Termination
without a prior judgment may be effected by the employer for default of the
contractor after formal notice in the event of abandonment of the site, but
without notice, in the event of identified deception in respect of quality of
materials, the performance of the works, or unauthonsed sub-contracting.29
Expulsion from the site would follow with judicial aid, and the employer
retains the site equipment and secures title to non-perishable materials.3°
Termination without a prior judgment may be effected by the contractor for
postponement or interruption due to the employer for more than 6 months,
27 Simle La Résiliation unilatérale anticipée du contrat a durée déterminee, J.C.P, 1971, 1, 2413;
Beguin, Rapport sur l'adage 'Nul ne pout se faire justice a sol-méme', Travaux de l'Association H.
Capitant, 18, 1966, 41.
2$ AFNOR 1991; article 20.1.1 Termination through defaults of one of the Parties. ["The contract may
be Immediately tenninated upon default of one of the parties and without any judicial order:
- after formal notice in all cases where the Articles of the cunent C.CAG. or the C.CAP. envisage
such termination.
- without formal notice In the case of 'collapse' duly recorded on the part of one of the parties.
'Collapse' is that which give rise to total or partial inability to manage one's affairs, whether final or
temporary and particularly by judicial order, liquidation of assets, Insolvency voluntazy winding-up
or cessation of trading.1
AFNOR 1991: article 20.1.2, Termination for Contractor's Default. ["20.1.2.1 The contract may be
immediately terminated without any judicial order, for default by the contracton
- after formal notice in the event of abandonment of the site,
- without notice, in the event of identified deception in respect of the quality of materials, the
quality of performance of the works, or in the event of sub-contracting or sub-letting of the works
contraly to the provisions of article 2.6.1
° AFNOR 1991: article 20.1.2.2, Consequence of Termination for Default of the Contractor. ["If the
termination is pronounced by the Employer on the grounds of default by the Contracto; under the
circumstances set out in articles 20.1.1 and 20.1.2:
- the Contractor subject to such termination, may be expelled from the site, and must then vacate
it of his workman and leave it dean and tidy, by order of the Tilbunal de Gmnde Instance , or the
Tnbunal de Commezre In the event that it has been so refened.
- the employer shall be entitled to retain any site equipment and installations and their value shall
be brought into account after deduction for depreciation. The employer shall also acquire
ownership of non-perishable materials purchased on payment by instalments, provided he pays the
balance of their price.1
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whether continuous or in shorter periods.31
The parties provide their own code, attributing the seriousness to the
circumstance and upon its occurrence excluding the necessity for prior
judicial sanction. Fault is the essence of this code including in it insolvency,
but under French law dissolution of the contract may take place where
failure of performance is not due to the defendant's fault. If performance of
one party's obligation becomes impossible through force majeure , the other
party's obligation may well be extinguished, but while this is not based on a
resolutive condition its effect is to operate prospectively, as on résiliation
applicable to building contracts and not retrospectively, as on resolution , and
it excludes a claim for damages. 32 It is possible for parties to include an
express resolutive condition providing for termination in the event of non-
performance irrespective of fault, and AFNOR 1991 reflects this in the ability
to terminate without court order and without obligation as to compensation
where force majeure renders continuation of the work impossible. 33 Except
in this respect, the financial consequences in damages of the default giving
rise to the termination are brought into the accounting between the parties
for the work completed.34
AFNOR 1991 still leaves scope for termination under the sanction of a court
order for by its article 20.3 "Where a party has failed to perform his
contractual obligations in circumstances other than provided for under
articles 20.1 and 20.2, the other party may seek termination under Article 1184
of the Code Civil". These circumstances would include delay. The
discretionary power of a French court to grant an extended period of time for
AFNOR 1991; article 20.1.3, Termination for Default of the Employer. ("Postponement or
interruption due to the Employer over more than 6 months, whether continuous or in shorter
periods, shall entitle the Contractor to terminate for default of the Employer."]
J . Carbonnier Droit civil, IV, Les Obligations, 271-272, 278.
Also on the death of the contractor. AFNOR 1991; article 202, Immediate Termination without
compensation. ("202.1 The contract may be immediately terminated without any judicial order in
the foHowing cirtumstances:
- death of the Contractor, save that, where applicable, the employer may accept any offers 1mm
his estate to continue the work.
- lotte majeure rendering continuation of the work impossible."]
AFNOR 1991; article 20.4. Consequences of Termination. 20.4.1 Ascertainment of the State of the
Work. (On termination under articles 20.1 and 20.2. the work completed at the date of termination
shall be ascertained. Payment for such work shall be made according to their degree of completion,
after deduction of any compensation due.1
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performance, the délal de grace, within which to perform when considering
a claim for termination, simply requires the court to have regard to the
circumstances in deciding whether to grant It. 3' It fulfils a similar function as
the nachfrist under German law where failure to perform does not without
more entitle the aggrieved party to refuse to accept late performance or to
terminate. While performance is possible a notice, nachfrist, requiring
performance within a stated time (being a reasonable time) must be given.
While the délai de grace can only be granted judicially, the naclifrist must
be set by the creditor and whereas the délal is discretionary the nachfrist is
a mandatory requirement. Both are comparable with the result of notice
makng time of the essence in respect of default by delay, and contrast with the
general principle in English law that termination of a contract on the ground
of default may be effected simply by a notice to that effect given by the
aggrieved to the defaulting party.
A right to cancel a contract except by mutual consent runs counter to broad
principles of French law, so in theory if a party purported to cancel, the other
could refuse to accept the cancellation, perform and claim the sum agreed. In
relation to the contrat d'entrepnse the important exception was introduced
by Article 1794, and it remains, namely that the person for whom the work
is being done can cancel it unilaterally on paying damages to the other party,
which include expenses incurred and loss of profit. AFNOR incorporates
particular reference to this.3'
" Article 1184 par 3: "La resolution dolt être demandée en justice, et U peut étre accordé au défendeur
un délai solon les circonstances." (Resolution must be requested at la and the defendant may be
granted an extension of time according to the circumstances.1
' In the case of sales of land one restriction is imposed by Article 1655: no deJa! can be granted on a
claim for termination if it puts the seller in danger of losing the subject-matter of the sale and the
price. Article 1655: "La réIution de Ia vente d'ammeubles est pmnoncée de suite, si le vendeur
est en danger de peidm Ia chose et le pnx. Si ce danger n'etiste pas, le juge peut acco,der a
l'acquéreur un délai plus ou moms long suivant les circonstances. Ce deja! passé sans que
l'acquézeura!t pay4 Ia resolution de Ia vente sera prononcée. [The cancellation of a sale of realty is
decreed at once if the seller is in danger of losing the thing and the price. If this danger does not
exist, the judge may accord the buyer agreater or lesser extension according to the cutumstances.
Such delay having expired without the buyer having paid, the cancellation of the sale is decreed.]
Article 1794: aLe malt,e peut ,esiiie par sa simple vIonté, le matrhé a fatfait quoique l'ouvrage
soit déjà commenc4 en dédommageant l'entmpreneur de toutes sos dépenses, de tout sos t,avau
et de tout ce qu'il aurait pu gagner dans cette entreprise.r [The employer may terminate the
contract, at his own instance, even though the woii. has begun, upon compensating the contractor
for all his expenses, all his works, and all that he would have pmfited out of the undertaking.1
3' AFNOR 1991, article 20.1.4, Termination by the Employer. ("Where the Employer terminates in
circumstances within Article 1794 of the Code Civil then the compensation to be paid to the
Contractor shall be calculated according to its provisions.1
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Requirement of fault
In French law fault is material for two purposes. First, the remedy of
termination available under Article 1184 depends on the presence of fault,"
which seems clear from the fact that Article 1184 provides for termination
and damages. Fault is a requirement for the latter and no distinction is
drawn between them as to the basis of liability. Second, termination is in
principle a judicial remedy, available at the discretion of the court. In
exercising that discretion, one of the principal factors which the court takes
into account will be the degree of the defendant's fault. For example, the
court may be influenced by the fact that the defendant acted in bad faith:
termination is more likely to be granted against one who knew of defects in
the subject-matter of the contract than against one who did not.4°
There is nothing in Article 1184 which indicates how the discretion is to be
exercised, and very little control is exerted by the reviewing courts. 4 ' The
juges du fond are subject to control if they apply wrong principles, but it
seems that even fewer principles control the exercise of discretion here than
in relation to damages. 42 Certainly some of the grounds which control the
remedy of termination at common law have been held not to be grounds for
controlling a decision to allow termination, and normally, the evaluation of
the seriousness of the default and the decision whether it is serious enough
to justify termination are not overridden. In civil law systems, the right to
terminate a contract on account of qualitative defects in the subject-matter is
not usually said to be restricted to cases in which the defect is of a serious
nature. It may in practice be so restricted in French law in the sense that
termination in principle requires a judgment; and if the defect is not of a
serious nature the court may refuse to order termination and instead order a
price reduction.
° Marty and Raynaud, II, no. 300.
° J
. 
Carbonnier Dmit civil, IV, Les Obligations, IV 272, 276.
' J . Carbonnie Droit dvii, IV, Les Obligations, IV 276.
42 Mazeaud, Leçons Ill no. 1101.
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3	 Repudiatkm and Detcrminalixi
At common law it is not fault that is material but contractual liability, albeit
that deliberateness and the character of the breach may influence the view as
to its seriousness. Common law draws no sharp distinction between delay
and other forms of contractual default in that upon failure to comply with
the terms of a contract as to time, the contractor is in breach and liable in
damages, and the employer may also have express remedies under the
contract. Whether the breach entitles the employer to accept that the contract
is at an end is determined in accordance with the principle of repudiation;
namely that the breach must be of the required degree of seriousness, of
which time being of the essence is one application.43
Time being of the essence means that one or more stipulations as to time are
conditions of which breach discharges the other party from the obligation to
continue performance of his own promises," and delay is treated as going to
the root whatever the magnitude of the breach so permitting termination
and recovery of damages. Where time is not of the essence of the contract,
or has ceased to be by waiver, the party aggrieved by delay can render it of the
essence by giving notice to the other party calling upon him to perform
within a specified period, which must be reasonable. 46
 Once such a notice has
been given he may terminate on failure to comply, and claim damages.47
Whilst time is generally of the essence in mercantile contracts, building
contracts do not fall into this category, and the normal rule is that time is not
United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v Bumley Council (1978) AC. 904 (H.L.) at 944.
" United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v Burnley Council (19Th) AC. 904 (H.L.) at 927, 945. In English law
there is no concept of time being of the essence of a contract as a whole: the question applies to the
particular term. Time will not be considered to be of the essence unless: the parties expressly
stipulate that conditions as to time must be stictly complied with; or, the nature of the subject matter
of the contract or the surrounding ciitumstances show that time should be considered to be of the
essence.
" Charles Rickards Ltd. v Oppenheim (1950) 1 K.B. 616 (CA.); Peak Construction v McKinney
Foundations (1971)1 B.LR. 111 at 120 (CA).
° Graham v Pitkin (1992) 2 All E.R. 235 (P.C.). The notice making time of the essence can be compared
with the German nachfnst, but there are important differences; first, the expuy of a notice making
time of the essence only has the effect of giving the party who fails to receive performance within
that time the option of tenninafin unlike a nachf,ist, the notice need not say that performance after
that time will be refused, nor does it deprive the aggrieved party of the right to claim performance of
the contract.
Where there has been a waiver of the right to accept a repudiation based on a time failure, notice is
then required making time of the essence in order to give rise to the ability to terminate; Charles
Rickards Ltd. v Oppenheim (1950) 1 K.B. 616 (CA).
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of the essence. 48 This is so where the contract includes provision for
extending time and liquidated damages for delay, 49 but this does not prevent
the parties by express term making time of the essence. 5° Extensions of time
granted would not amount to a waiver5'
Determination of the contract itself is not ordinarily a feature of provisions
in common law based standard forms, in that they confer rights to determine
the employment of the contractor under the contract and utilise the
continued existence of the contract for the regulation of the consequent rights
and liabilities of the parties. Termination at common law requires that there
be an expressed intention not to perform by the other party, which may be a
current breach. Although contract provisions for determination may
improve on this, and give grounds for determination that would not permit
the remedy at common law, where the ground is not one that would be
treated as repudiatoiy at common law the party relying on it is only entitled
to such remedy as the contract provides.52
The most important single principle used to control the remedy of
termination is that it is only available if the default attains a certain
minimum degree of seriousness. Similar expressions are used in both
common law and civil law to describe the seriousness of default or other
failure in performance required to justify termination. The failure must be
fundamental or essential; 53 it must go to the root of the contract;54 it must be
such that, had the aggrieved party known of it at the time of contracting he
Lucas v Godwin (1837) Bing. N.C. 737 at 744.
° Lamprell v Billericay Union (1849) 3 Ex. 283 at 308; Felton v Whame (1906) H.B.C. 4th Ed. Vol. 2. 398
(CA).
° Peak Construction v McKinney Foundations (1971) 69 L.G.R. 1 (CA), where of the term "time shall
be considered as of the essence of the contract on the patt of the contractor" it was said at p. 120 "no
doubt this gave the Corporation the right to determine the contract at the end of the 24 month
period as extended by the architect."
Nichemen v Gatoil (1987) 2 Uoyd's Rep. 46 (CA).
52 Thomas Feather & Co. (Bradford) Ltd. v Keighley Corpn. (1953) 53 L.G.R. 30; where the right to
determine for wmngful sub-letting carried the express remedies of absolute determination of the
contract itself or a sum by way of liquidated damages. The exercise of the right to determine
prevented success in the claim for damages for the extra cost of completing after the determination.
This expression occurs most commonly where time is said to be "of the essence" of the contract.
This phrase extends back in time at least to Glaholm v I-lays (1841)2 M & G. 257 at 268,
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would not have entered Into the contract; it must deprive him of the
substance of what he had bargained for,' it must frustrate his purpose In
entering into the contract, 51
 It must amount to a repudiation of the confract;
it must be such that further performance is of no interest to him; it must
constitute an important ground for termination.'0
Anticipatory Breach
Wrongful repudiation does not itself discharge the contract, it gives an
option to the affected party to terminate by his acceptance of the default as
having that result,'1 but the common law doctrine of anticipatory breach,
where the intent not to perform is shown before the due time for
performance, has no precise counterpart in civil law.' 2
 In French law
however a party may treat a contract as discharged without obtaining a prior
judgment for termination in cases of declared refusal by the other to
perform.' 3
 He runs the risk that his course of action may be treated as
wrongful if the court subsequently finds that it was unjustified, but it will not
be wrongful merely because he acted without first securing judgment. The
Code Civil Article 1636.: "Si I'acquéreur n'est évincé que d'une paz tie de Ia chose, et qu'eIie soft de
telle consequence, relativement au tout, que I'acquéreur n'e1t point acheté sans Ia partie dont il a
ete énc4 il peut faire résilierLa vente. [If the buyer is ousted from only part of the thing, and it is
of such consequence relative to the whole that the buyer would not have bought without the part
from which he was ousted, he may have the sale voided]
Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha,. Ltd., (1962) 2 Q.B. 41 at p. 70.
Universal Cargo Caniers Corp. v Cltati, (1927) 2 Q.B. 401.
Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v Naylor Benzon & Co. (1884) 9 AC. 434 (H.L.).
GennanyBGB ¶1280par.2,286par2,325par.1sent.2,326par.2.
00 Gennany BGB ¶1626.
" "If one party to a contract repudiates it ... the innocent party has an option. He may accept that
repudiation and sue for damages ... whether or not the time for performance has come; or he may if
he chooses disregard or refuse to accept it and the contract remains in full effect. - Lord Reid in
White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v McGregor (1962) AC. 413.
02 Civil law systems do not appear to recognise that anticipatoiy breach may render a defendant liable
in damages or to termination before the time at which performance under the contract was actually
due. But they nevertheless do give certain special effect to what a common lawyer calls anticipatoty
breach. Those special effects are apparent in relation to the machineiy of termination, as seen for
example in the AFNOR provisions identified above. An example from Italy is that there may be a
termination if it becomes apparent that work is not begun in time or its progress is unduly delayed,
albeit that such nght is exercisable only after the lapse of an additional period of time and a warning
of the likelihood of terminaton if the delay is not overcome. Codice Civile Artide 1662: "Inspection
of the work in progress. The customer has the right to check the progress of the work and to insoect
the condition thereof at his own expense. When, in the course of the work, it is ascertained that
performance is not preceding in accordance with the conditions established by the contract and
according to the standards of the trade, the customer can establish a suitable time limit within which
the contractor must conform to such conditions; if such time limit expires without results, the
contract is terminated without prejudice to the right of the customer to be compensated for
damages.", Trans. Beltramo. Longo, Menyman.
J . Cathonniei Droit civil, IV, Les Obligations, IV 272.
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effect of the doctrine is to enable an aggrieved party to claim damages even
before performance has actually become due. Similarly, an aggrieved party
who accepts an anticipatory breach is then generally entitled to terminate the
contract, and this is assumed in English discussion of the doctrine."
The option to pursue the contract and not to accept a wrongful repudiation
must have limits, comparable to those circumstances considered on
attempted enforcement of performance against an owner. Wrongful
repudiation by an employer would pose similar problems where an innocent
contractor sought to press ahead, 65 but the requirements of co-operation, and
a legitimate interest in performing the contract rather than claiming damages
would be absent, and in any event the risks inherent in such a course
renders the factual basis unlikely67
Seriousness of Breaches
Certainly in the building contract field the test of whether the breach goes to
the root is often the most useful. 68 Failure by an employer to give possession
is regarded as a repudiator>' act. 69 Interference with possession may not be
repudiatory,7° but, in general, wrongful acts which render completion
impossible will be. Failure to pay one out of a number of instalments is not
ordinarily sufficient but more may amount to a repudiation. 7t
 On the
contractor's side, although a breach consisting of negligent omissions or bad
workmanship where the work is substantially completed does not go to the
The argument in Hochster v De Ia Tour (1853). 2 E. & B. 678 makes no sense unless this assumption
is made.
Notwithstanding that in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v McGregor (1962) A.C. 413 per Lord Reid
"it is ... impossible to say that the appellants should be deprived of their right to claim the contract
price merely because the benefit to them as against claiming damages and re-letting ... might be
small in comparison with the loss to the respondent."
It was specifically recognised in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v McGregor that the appellants
could perform their part of fixing the advertising to the litter bins without the need for the
cooperation of the respondent.
it was doubted in London Borough of Hounslow v Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd. (19710
CU. 233, whether the option of insisting on performance, identified in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd.
v McGregoi was intended to apply where the contract is being performed by doing acts to the
property owned by the party seeking to determine it.
Repudiation is a drastic conclusion which should only be held to arise in clear cases of a refusal, in a
matter going to the root of the contract, to perform contractual obligations; Lord Wilberforce in
Woodar investments Ltd. v Wimpey Construction (U.K.) Ltd. (1980 1 W.L.R. 277 (H.L.) at 283.
° Roberts v Buly Improvement Commissioners (1870) L.R. 5 C.P. 310.
70 Earith & General Contractors Ltd. v Manchester Corporation (1958) 108 U. 655.
Payment of only £10,000 out of £24,000 then due was held to constitute a repudiation in Lop Air
Services Ltd. v Rolloswin Ltd. (1973) A.C. 331 (H.L) at 344 and 353.
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root of the contract in an ordinary lump sum contract, it is possible that
omisssions or bad work can be repudiatoly where their nature and gravity
shows an intent or inability substantially to perform his obligations?
Refusal to carry out the work, or abandonment without lawful excuse is
repudiatoiy,74 but unless it amounts to a refusal or inability to carry out the
contract, simple delay on the part of a contractor does not amount to a
repudiation.15
Performance on time as an obligation is measured against the date for
completion of the work, but more difficult is the measurement of
performance during the work If the sole obligation is to complete by a
certain date or such date as extended, no breach even would exist before that
date, albeit that the signs that there will be a breach may be apparent in
advance of the date.76
Where, under English law, parties have provided for a completion date then
a slow pace of work not resulting in a failure to complete in due time will be
unlikely to be a breach of contract at all 77
 The question as to an obligation on
a contractor to exercise due diligence will ordinarily be dealt with by express
terms, for without such a term there is likely to be difficulty in implying such
a term so as to give rise to damages for its breach prior to the date for
completion. It would find a place though in questions relating to an express
right to determine. Nevertheless a failure to exercise due diligence to such a
degree as amounted to refusal or abandonment or something going to the
root of the contract would ordinarily amount to a repudiatoly act. The point
was made in rejecting an attempt to imply a term of due diligence and
expedition into a contract where there were key dates for the contractor to
complete the manufacture of the gates for the Thames Barrier, where there
was also a variation in costs clause based on indices applicable to the dates of
72 Hoemg v Isaacs (1952) 2 All E.R. 176 (CA).
Sutcliffe v Chippendale and Edmondson (1971) 18 B.L.R. 157 at 161. This was the first instance
decision giving rise to Sutcliffe v Thackrah (1974) A.C. 727 (H.L).
Mersey Steel & Iron Co. Ltd. v Naylor Benzon & Co. (1984) 9 App. Cas. 434 (H.L).
Felton v Wharne (1906) 1-i B.C. 4th Ed. Vol.2, 398 (CA).
' lntennediate dates for parts of the works m' be expressly provided for under the schemes of both
the JO 1980 and the AFNOR 1989 foims. Under JCT 1980 use of the Sectional Completion
Supplement achieves this object, and AFNOR article 7.22 provides that intermediate periods for the
execution of the certain works may be fixed. By this means a senes of completion dates during the
whole work maybe achieved.
" Greater London Council v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd. (1984) 34 B.LR. 50 (CA).
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commencement of manufacture and a readiness for despatch:
what is due diligence and expedition depends, of course, on the
object which it is sought to be achieved. If one is obliged to achieve a
certain object within twelve weeks, it may be necessary to exercise
much more speed than if your only obligation is to produce it in
twenty four weeks or indeed in four years. The same applies to
diligence. You cannot have diligence in the abstract. It must be related
to the objective."78
Express provisions for determination
Determination clauses are viewed under English law as in the nature of
forfeiture provisions and construed strictly, particularly as to compliance
with procedural requirements/s
 and an invalid determination may amount
to a repudiation. 80
 Just as under AFNOR 1991 the JCT 80 conditions provide
for determination where the contractor is in financial difficulties, and on the
relevant event his employment is automatically determined. 8' The
categories of default by the contractor are suspension before completion;
failure to proceed regularly and diligently; refusal or neglect to comply with
written notice from the architect requiring removal of defective work or
materials;and, failure to comply with the provisions prohibiting assignment,
or sub-letting without consent, but there are inserted elements that
emphasise seriousness. The requisite default is "if without reasonable cause
he wholly suspends ...", and the refusal or neglect has to be such that "the
Works are materially affected".82
Such default does not lead immediately to the right to determine for it is the
Parker U. in GLC v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd.... it is contended, however, that if a
manufacturer who has four years in which to complete a piece of equipment which could take as
little as ten months to complete, begins to do the job at the beginning of the period, he is obliged,
nevertheless, still to complete within the period in which it could have been completed. I ask myself
why...".
° Hill (J.M.) & Sons Ltd. v London Bomugh of Camden (1980) 18 B.L.R. 31 (CA.).
° Architectural installation Services Ltd. vjames Gibbons Windows Ltd. (1989) 46 B.LR. 91.
' JCT 80; clause 27.2. The events include bankruptcy and the appointment of an administrative
receiver. The employment may be reinstated and continued if the employer and contractor and his
trustee in bankruptcy, liquidatoi or receiver agree.
82 JCT 80; clause 27.1.
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architect who has then to give notice specifying the default, and if the
contractor continues the default for fourteen days after the notice or at any
time repeats it then the employer may give notice determining the
employment.84
The architect is not interposed in a determination by the contractor where
the events that may lead to it are employer defaults of non-payment within
fourteen days of issue of a certificate, and interference with or obstruction of
the issue of a certificate; and suspension of the whole or substantially the
whole of the uncompleted work for a period, by reason of certain events.
These may well involve default by the architect, and features that impose
seriousness have the seeds of tripartite dispute in them. The events are:
architects instructions relating to documentary discrepancies, variations and
postponement, unless "caused by reason of some negligence or default of the
contractor ..."; the contractor not having received necessary instructions,
drawings and the like from the architect in due time for which he specifically
applied neither too early or too late; delay in work by the employer opening
up to inspect and testing unless the result shows non-compliant worlç and
failure by the employer to give the requisite access. On a determination the
scheme provides for the rights and liabilities of the parties, mutual
accounting including loss and expense.
Whilst under French law the strict approach of the courts to termination
may render enforcement of express resolutive clauses subject to the
requirement of good faith, the JCT8O itself reflects a similar caution in
imposing a proviso on determination by both employer and contractor that
In English law, ordinarily a notice by which the right to terminate is exercised does not have to be in
any particular form. It need not even specify the ground on which the contract is terminated. If the
ground stated in the notice does not in law justify termination, the notice may nevertheless be valid
so long as a ground which does justify termination actually exists; Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice
Co., Ltd. v Ansell (1888) 39 Ch.D. 339 (CA) (employment); Taylor v Oakes, Roncoroni & Co. (1922) 38
T.LR. 349 (KB.) and 517 (CA) (sale of goods).
" JCT8O dause 27.1. The employer's notice has to be given within 10 days of the continuance or
repetition. In English la ordinarily a notice by which the right to terminate is exercised does not
have to be in any particular form. It need not even specify the ground on which the contract is
tenninated. If the ground stated in the notice does not in law justify tennination, the notice may
nevertheless be valid so long as a ground which does justify temiination actually exists; Panchaud
Fréres SA. v Etablissement General Grain Co. (1970) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 53 (CA).
' JCI80, clause 28.1. The form suggests one month, but careful advance consideration of the period is
required, for this may be wholly inadequate where a technical difficulty arises which requires
suspension.
JCT8O, clauses 27.4 and 28.2.
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their notices "shall not be given unreasonably or vexatiously".87
Determination by both employer and contractor under JCT8O is not exclusive
in the sense that the scheme is "without prejudice to any other rights or
remedies which the ... may possess" so leaving open the application of
acceptance of a common law remedy 88
The JCT forms also provide for the ability of the employer to postpone any
work to be executed under the contract and for the financial effects to be
assessed and certified as loss and expense, together with a right for the
contractor to determine his employment after due notice where the cariying
out of the whole or substantially the whole of the uncompleted works is
suspended by reason of such a postponement for a continuous period the
length of which is open to prior agreement by the parties (with a suggested
period of one month). 89
 A right of termination is equally provided to the
contractor in AFNOR.9° If the duration is postponed for 3 months on more.
However neither the German BGB nor the VOB standard form 91
 provide any
rule for unilateral variations of the duration of the works.
The achievement of proper, contractually complying work by remedial work
during the currency of the contract period poses problems without the
assistance of particular standard conditions of contract, with the owner in
England ordinarily left to a remedy in damages. In Italy the Carte di
Cassatione, while recognising that a suspension of work by the employer
stops the contract time for completion running against the contractor and
entitles him to a postponement of the completion date, concluded that the
duration of a suspension ordered by an employer did not have this effect
where it was to allow other contractors to execute work which ought to have
been done by the contractor but which he had failed to implementY
This relates the reaction of determination to the event relied on for it in the context of a reaonable
employer or contractor in the instant situation; John Jarvis Ltd. v Rockdale Housing Association Ltd.
(1986)36 B.L.R. 52 (CA.).
' In the case of an employer 's repudiation the "well settled" rule that a contractor may opt to recover
on a quantum meruit may be invoked; Chandler Bres. v Boswell (1936) 3 All E.R. 179, and Lodder v
Slowey (1904) A.C. 442, and although doubt is cast on this in Keating on Building Contracts, 5th ed.
the point was applied1
 without argument, in Lusty v Pinsbury Securities Ltd. (1991) 58 B.L.R. 66 (CA.).
JCT 1980, clauses 23.2 and 28.1
9° AFNOR 1989, artide 7.
Verdingungsoednung fuer Bauleistungen,. the Contractual Procedure for Building Works.
92 Florio v Region Sicily. Court of Cassation, 7th May 1987, No. 4216 (1987) Fom It. Mass. 1987.
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FJDIC
While each of English and French laws and the standard forms examined
shows an aim towards a similar end, the means of achieving it requires
more than a transposition of terms. Under FIDIC, comparable financial
difficulty may be achieved by the contractor being "deemed by law unable to
pay his debts as they fall due", but, apart from the dependency on the
engineer's opinion as the requisite event for termination (and that including
an opinion that the contractor has repudiated the contract) the effect is to
"terminate the employment of the Contractor without thereby releasing the
Contractor from any of his obligations or liabilities under the Contract, or
affecting the rights and authorities conferred on the Employer or the
Engineer by the Contract."93
This potentially qualifies the French concept of résiliation under which the
parties are released from their future obligations, but even so the parties are
not excluded from recourse to Article 1184 and the view of the court as to the
circumstances, whether or not the engineer opined as to repudiation. The
result of the use of such conditions under French law would be the creation
of the veiy uncertainty which a unified from of contract may be desired to
achieve. A further example is the importation of the concepts of unforeseen
reasons and impossibility as employer defaults, 94
 so invoking the spirit of
force majeure but with the result of compensation to the contractor, contraiy
to its ordinary legal effect.95
FIDIC, 4th, clause 63.1 Default of the Contractor. "If the Contractor is deemed by law unable to pay
his debts as they fall due, or ... ... or if the Engineer certifies to the Employer ... that,. in his opinion,
the Contracton (a) has repudiated the Contract, or (b) without reasonable excuse has failed (i) to
commence the Works in accordance with Sub-Clause 41.1, or (ii) to proceed with the Works, or aiy
Section thereof, within 28 days after receiving notice ..., or (c) has failed to comply with a notice ... or
an instruction ... within 28 days after having received it, or (d) despite previous warning from the
Engineer, in writin& is otherwise persistently or flagrantly neglecting to comply with any of his
obligations under the Contract, or (e) has contravened (the prohibitions on sub-contracting), then
the Employer may, after giving 14 days' notice to the Contractoi enter upon the Site and the Works
and terminate the employment of the Contractor without thereby releasing the Contractor.?.
FIDIC, 4th, clause 69.1. Default of Employer. 1n the event of the Employen ... (d) giving notice to
the Contractor that for unforeseen reasons, due to economic dislocation, it is impossible for him to
continue to meet his contractual obligations -. the Contractor shall be entitled to terminate his
employment under the Contract by giving notice to the Employer ...".
' FIDIC 4th, clause 693. Payment on Termination. "... in addition to the payments specified in Sub-
aause 65.8, the Employer shall pay to the Contractor the amount of any loss or damage to the
Contractor arising out of or in connection with or by consequence of such teimination.
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I	 Ik!gaEki
The delegation of performance by subcontracting is an inevitable facet of
construction and applicable rules derive from whether a workman is
precluded from engaging others or is obliged to perform work personally. A
contract conditional on personal execution is not expressly characterised in
civil law systems, 1 although it appears implicit from provisions for
termination upon death or supervening incapacity of the workman that
personal execution was a condition, 2 for a contract is then extinguished if
personal aptitude was decisive.3
The ability to employ others to execute work differs from an entitlement to
delegate the work whether in whole or in part by sub-contracting,' and the
The ability of a workman to employ servants for executing work does not give rise to any special niles
in the codified systems relating to work and labour. It appears that the nature of the work permits
the conclusion that a workman is allowed to let another do the work even where a code starts out with
a proposition to the contraly for example in the Austrian CM1 Code Artide 1165.
2 As in the French Code Civil Article 1795 and the Italian Codice Civile Article 1674.
In Italy the Corte di Cassassione determined that employment of third persons is implicit in the
nature of a contract for work and labour appaito, whenever those persons are rendered part of the
organisation of the enterprise, Cas. 11th Apr. 1972 no. 1125, rep. Porn 1972 v Appalto no. 2. In reality
the considerations as to whether thini persons may be employed arise in cases concerning vicarious
liability for negligent acts or omissions of servants or agents committed in the course of their
engagement, Italian Codice CMI Artides 1228, 2049.
There is provision in the Italian Codice Civile, Article 1656, whereby the workmen must not engage a
subcontractor, sub appaltatom , unless authorised,. so creating a premise that without such
authorisation the work has to be camed out by the enterpnse organised by the contractor. Behind
this rule is the notion that the workman, even though owing an obligation to have the work done, far
fare, nevertheless has to execute that work in an enterprise organised by himself. It appears,
however, by reference to agency sub-contracting is regarded as having been deemed to have been
authorised if the contract or nature of the legal relationship so permits.
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approach of civil law jurisdictions equates with English law.5
 This approach
Is:
"There is a well known division of Contracts for work and labour
One class is where the work and labour can, on the true construction
of the Contract, only be performed by the contracting party himself or
by some staff that he employs. The other class is where . it is to be
inferred that it is a matter of indifference whether the work should be
performed by the contracting party or by some sub-contractor whom he
employs."6
Ability to secure performance of a contract by another does not relieve from
liability for the default of the sub-contractor,7
 and no question of assignment
arises which would create a direct contractual relationship between the
employer and the sub-contractor.
2	 Faztiajlar Aspects
The growth of specialised subcontractors and the consequent necessity for
extensive sub-contracting in the construction industry has led to the
development of numerous special rules in standard conditions. This
legitimate reason for sub-contracting finds effect in France where the AFNOR
conditions disentitle the contractor from sub-letting all of the work
entrusted to him, Ia totalité des travau but prohibit sub-letting of part only
without the employer's authorisation.8
The comparable term in JCT 80 is that "The Contractor shall not without the
written consent of the Architect (which consent shall not be unreasonably
As applied in British Wagon Company v Lea & Co. (1880) 5 Q.B. 149. The plaintiffs agreed to let
railway wagons to the defendant, and agreed to keep them in repait After the winding-up of the
plaintiffs, and in answer to the claim for rent, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs were
consequently incapacitated from performing the contract; but "...where a person contracts with
another to do work or perform service, and it can be inferred that the person employed had been
selected with reference to his individual skill, competency, or other personal qualification ... Personal
performance is in such a case of the essence of the contract ... But this principle appears
inapplicable in the presence instance ... as we cannot suppose that in stipulating for the repair ... the
Defendants attached any importance to whether the repairs were done by the company, or by any
one with whom the company might enter into a subsidiary contract to do the work, Cockbum Cj. at
p. 153.
Davies v Collins (1945) 1 All E.R. 247, per Lord Greene at 249; but Some obligations may be personal,
whilst others arising out of the same contract may be performed vicariously, Southway Group Ltd. v
Wolff (1991) 57 B.L.R. 33 (CA).
As emphasised in Moresk Cleaners Ltd. v Hicks (1966) 2 Lloyd's. Rep. 338.
' AFNOR 91, article 2.6.1.1: ("The contractor awarded the contract shall not be entitled to sub-contract
all of the works entrusted to him. Article 2.6.1.2: The contractor shall be entitled to sub-contract the
performance of certain parts of his contract, provided he has previously obtained the employer's
acceptance of each subcontractor and approval of the terms of payment for each subcontractor"J
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withheld) sub-let any portion of the Works ...".' Unreasonable withholding
would doubtless reflect the circumstances, size and nature of the particular
works within the contract, and whilst sub-contracting the entirety is not
expressly prohibited, assignment without consent is.1°
The requirement for employer's consent barely restricts the scope of sub-
contracting in real terms, but in England problems have derived not so much
from an unauthorised subcontract rather from the nomination of sub-
contractors by employers.0 The difficulties to which nomination has given
rise are a reflection on the employer's desire to identify the work of the sub-
contractor, ascertain and control the price of the sub-contracted work as well
as to exercise control over the personality of the subcontractor and the terms
on which his work is to be done, all of which are then set against the
background of no contract between the employer and the sub-contractor.
Indeed, the provisions for nomination in JCT 80 extend to prohibit the main
contractor from executing the work of the nominated subcontractor. That
this attempt at control, without contract, of the nominated subcontractor by
the employer has given rise to difficulty is in no doubt,' 2
 even to the extent of
leaving the employer without a remedy in the case of defective materials
where the suppliers' subcontract limited his liability to the main contractor.'3
This has led to yet another body of rules in the shape of direct
JCT 80, dause 19.2.
1 JCT 80, clause 19.1 "Neither the Employer nor the Contractor shall, without the written consent ot the
othet assign this Contract." A distinction was drawn between the right to have the contract
performed, which was pmscnbed by the dause, and, the fruits of performance, which were not;, in
Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v Lenesta Sludge Dispoals Ltd. (1992) 57 B.L.R. 57 (CA), but this was not
the effect of the clause as decided by the House of Lords at (1993) 3 W.L.R. 408.
H A view of this, and of the position in Swiss law, is seen in P. Gauch andJ. Sweet, Selected Problems of
Construction Law: An International Approach.
12 Especially the requirement on the employer to re-nominate, and bear the financial consequences
where the first nominated sub-contractor "drops our even by repudiation; Bickerton v N. W.
Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board (1970) 1 W.L.R. 607 (I-iL), cndsed in Hudson's Building
Contracts, 10th ed. Post Bickerton development in Percy Bilton Ltd. v GLC (1982) 1 W.LR. 794
limited its potential impact by allowing the employer to recover liquidated damages for delay from
the main contractor where the delay resulted from the need to re-nominate, but the effect of the
concession as to the non-applicability of an extension of time provision and the dictum as to the
ability of the main contractor to refuse to accept a re-nomination where the period for such work
went beyond the original period, have left scpoe for exploration. The subject is discussed In I.N.
Duncan Wallace, Construction Contracts - Principles and Policies, ch. 21.
Gloucestershire County Council v Richardson (1%9) 1 A.C. 480; and also Fairclough Building v
Rhuddlan Borough Council (1985) 30 B.L.R. 26 (CA.).
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subcontractor/employer warranties.14
A constant complaint of sub-contractors is difficulty in obtaining payment,
whether with or without the impact of "pay when paid clauses which place
sub-contractors in an unattractive position. 5 Urging sub-contractors as to
terms which they should not accept carries hope beyond reality;' 6
 equally,
devising a scheme to curb the worst excesses,' 1 and achieving legislation to
implement it is an unlikely prospect in England.
3	 'h French Law ol 1975
The attempt to improve the position has been in France, where a distinctive
and important feature is the regulation of sub-contracting by legislation
introduced in 1975,18 to the intent of ensuring that subcontractors would be
paid notwithstanding bankruptcy or insolvency of the main contractor. The
Loi sought to accomplish this through rights for subcontractors to be paid
directly by the employer in public works contracts, and, for private works, for
subcontractors to have a right of direct action against the employer. This
intervention which overrides the essence of the contractual chain adopted
for the organisation of the construction process deserves analysis.
In France sub-contracting remains a topical subject in the spheres of further
legislation, and the application and development of existing legislation in
the courts. The regulation by the 16 articles of the Lol of 31st December 1975
as amended where one finds the attempt to organise and better the lot of
subcontractors has created its own dificulties. The attempt is nonetheless
valiant even though the subcontractor's position carries problems also
'4 Even without the standard forms of direct warranty between employer and sub-contractor the law
provides a direct warranty upon which a subcontractor or supplier may be liable in cimumstances
where an assertion or premise is made which might be regarded as made with an intention to result
in legal relations, but which in fact results in the employer engaging the sub-ontractor or supplier
through the medium of a main contractor Shanklin Pier Ltd. v Detel Products Ltd. (1952) 1 K.B. 854,
and Wells (Merstham) Ltd.v Buckland Sand and Silica Ltd. (1965)2 Q.B. 170.
G.N. Prentice, Remedies of Bulding Sub-Contractors against Employers, 1983, 46 M.L.R. 409.
' Sensible suggestions as to unacceptable conditions in 1.N. Duncan Wallace, Construction Contracts
- Piinciples and Policies, are prefaced by If their bargaining power pelmits.
' JA. Fisher, The Solution to Sub-Contractors Payment Preblems. (1990) 6 Constr. L.J. 287. The scheme
for adjudication on witholdings by main contractors, for example in the JCI Nominated Sub-
Contract form adds a layer for argument.
18 Loi No. 75-1334 of 31st December 1975, as amended.
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reflected in England.'9
The building world may not readily resort to written agreements and this
reticence frequently leads to general principles being eroded by tacit
understandings, even in the case of express terms, instanced by the
preservation in French law of implied reception despite the formal wording
of Article 17926.20 In the private house-building sector over 60% of work is
sub-contracted,21
 and some 76% of the subcontractors do not have written
contrads. This renders regulation difficult, and subcontractors are the first
victims of a main contractor's failure. The subcontractor's liability is not
touched by the legislation of 1985, nor by the Lol of 4 January 1978. As he is
excluded from the guarantee system and building insurance, the
subcontractor is subject to general principles of law vis-à-vis contractors up
the chain whilst the main contractor is subject to a different legal regime as
against the employer.23
The French legislation suggests a policy standpoint, regarding subcontractors
as in an intrinsically weak position, requiring them to be protected in society
against the economic might and legal power of dominant contractors. Such
vision is encouraged by the economic weight of the subcontracting sector,24
and whose interests are adopted by politicians of all hues. 25
 The legislation
has been bedevilled by practical difficulties in application, and also subject to
'° G.N. Prentice, Remedies of Bulding Sub-Contractors against Employers, 1983, 46 M.L.R. 409.
20 Although the text states that acceptance is a legal acr, pre-supposing the existence of a written
document, decisions of the Cow de Cassation allow the valid existence of an implied acceptance;
(Cass. Civ. 3,16th July1987 Bull. Civ.!!!. no. 143 p. 84,. Cass. civ. 3, 12 Ocober. 1988 Bull. III no. 137 p. 75)
which can be deduced for example from payment of the price and entry into the property Cass. civ.
3, 12 October 1988, above, and, 7th December 1988 Rev. Dr. trim. 1989213).21 Pethaps even 100%, as the private house "builder" is sometimes content to sign the contract and
then subcontract the entirety of the works,. B. Sablier and I.E. Cam, Guide to subcontracting in
constructior edition du Moniteur 26.
In spite of the protection which the legislation endeavours to afford by procedures for direct
payment and direct action, eveiy year more than 10,000 workmen find themselves in a delicate
position as a result of being unable to recover debts estimated at 800 million francs. 38% of
subcontractors say that they have had to face up to unpaid debts during recent years; according to
the remarks of J P Lapadu, President of the National Council of Subcontracting in the Building
Industry Mon T. P,. 20 April 1990, 79.
23 The terms of Article 1793, providing the domain of the fixed price lump sum contract, have been
held not to apply to a sub-contract agreement between two enterprises. Civ. 3, 15th February 1983,
Bull. civ. III, 44.
24 Representing 13% of the turnover of building and public works in 1989; according to an inquiry L)' the
board of economic and international affairs of the Ministry of Supply (Mon. T. P. 9th Maith 1990 P.
11) which confirms previous identical figures.
25 In recent years the number of written questions set down by parliamentary members about
subcontracting has never been less than seven per member on average.
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the forces of development through the courts and a desire for modification.
Consequently the rules for liability for and payment of subcontractors, and
sub-subcontractors, are at the heart of developments which render any
exposition "rather fragile".26
The Loi is divided into four sections: (1) provisions of general application,
articles I to 3; (2) provisions establishing the right to be paid directly by the
employer in public works contracts, articles 4 to 10; (3) provisions establishing
the right of direct action against the employer in private sector contracts,
articles 11 to 14; and, (4) miscellaneous provisions, articles 15 and 16.
Provisions of general application
Sub-contracting is defined by article I as "the activity by which a contractor
entrusts by a sub-contract, and under his responsibility, to another person
called a subcontractor, all or part of the performance of a construction
contract, contract d'entreprise, or public works contract, contrat du marché
public , entered into with an employer". Whilst including the sub-
contracting of "all or part" of a public or private works contract, a contractor
may only sub-contract part of works 27 to which the Code de Marches Publics
applies.
Before subcontractors can claim direct payment from or bring a direct action
against an employer, public or private, the employer must first have been
informed of the price and conditions of payment that were agreed between
the main and subcontractor, and article 3 provides that "the contractor who
intends to perform a (construction) contract or public works contract by
resorting to one or several subcontractors shall, at the time he enters into,
and during the entire duration of such contract or public works contract,
cause each subcontractor to be accepted and the conditions of payment of each
subcontractor to be approved, by the employer; the main contractor is
required to communicate the subcontract or subcontracts to the employer
26 H. Pennet-Marquet,. Subcontracting in French Law, (1991) 1.C.L.R. 315.
27 Article 2, and Circular of 7th October 1976.
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when the latter requests them".28
The sanction for default on either condition is that the contractor remains
bound to the subcontractor, but he may not invoke the subcontract against
the subcontractor. From this it might seem that the contractor would be
bound to pay the subcontractor for his work on the basis of the subcontract
but may not claim under it against the subcontractor for breach, and this
approach was adopted by some courts in the early 198O's. The Cour de
Cassation refuted this, concluding that whilst article 3 only permits a
non-authorised subcontractor to rescind the contract he must accept liability
for his work when he requires payment for his seMces; he may not "at the
same time take advantage of the subcontract to obtain payment for his works
and reject it to escape from his contractual obligations".
This aspect is all-embracing in the chain for by article 2 a subcontractor is
constituted the main contractor vis-a-vis his subcontractors, so a
subcontractor's election to subcontract requires obtaining acceptance of the
sub-subcontractor as well as approval of the conditions for payment.
Contracting out is prohibited by article 7, for any waiver of the right of direct
payment is void, and such rights subsist even though the contractor is in
bankruptcy or reorganisation. Article 12 is in like terms for the right of direct
action. Additionally article 15 forcefully adds that "clauses, stipulations and
arrangements, whatever their form, the effect of which would be to frustrate
the provisions of this Law, are null and void". The effect of this must be that
any "pay when paid" clause making payment to the subcontractor
conditional on receipt of payment by the main contractor from the employer
would be void.
2 Reflected in AFNOR 91, artide 2.6.12. In discussion of the legislation a preposal for a requirement
that the subcontract itself be ratified by the employer was rejected in favour of a duty on the
contractor to cause each subcontractor to be accepted and the conditions for paying him to be
appmved by the employei Flecheux, La loi no. 75-1334 de 31 deecembre 1975 relative a Ia sous-
traitance, JCP, 1976 I 2791, para. 10.
Tnb. de grande Instance, Toulouse, 16th Januaty 1980 D, 1981 114; Dongi 20th December 1983 Gaz.
PaL 1984. As if artide 3 provided that where the subcontractor has not been accepted nor the
conditions of payment agreed by the employer, the main contractor shall nevertheless be bound as
regards the subcontractor, but cannot invoke the subcontract against the subcontractor's interest.
Cass. cw III 13 April 1988 Bull. III no.72 & 73 p.41 &42. 01988521 note Dubois.
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The right to direct payment
The direct payment provisions, only applicable to public works contracts,3'
require contractors at the time of tender to inform employers of the nature
and amount of all services which they intend to subcontract. 32
 This is
independent of the requirement in article 3 to cause each subcontractor to be
accepted by the employer.
Under such contract the accepted subcontractor whose conditions of payment
have been approved has the right to be paid directly for the execution of that
part of the contract for which he is responsible. The payment procedure is
that the documents intended to support a direct payment by the employer
must be delivered to the contractor who has 15 days from receipt either to
endorse on them his acceptance, or to give notice to the subcontractor of his
refusal, with reasons. After this period, the contractor is deemed to have
accepted those of the documents which he has either not expressly accepted
or refused, 34 enabling direct payment to be made by the employer. Sub-
subcontractors engaged on public works projects are it seems limited to a
right of direct action against the main contractor.
The two principal conditions, acceptance and consent, which have to be
obtained concurrently,3' may be secured by the contractor indicating at the
time of the tender the nature and total cost of each undertaking he envisages
sub-contracting31 and proposing subcontractors. The provisions of the Lol as
to acceptance and consent apply only at the time of conclusion of the main
Whether with the state, a regional organisation, collectivité locale, or a public establishment or
enterprise.
Article 5. The right to direct payment is limited to subcontractors of the contractor having contract




This is not cleat and has been the subject of debate.
Acceptance without consent is not valid; CE, 13th June 1986,Pas de Calais D1986 obs. Terneyre.
The requirements of article 5 are repeated in artides 47 and 257 of the Code des Marches Publics.
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contract, and may be fulfilled implicitly by the acceptance of the tender. 39
 The
third condition, the documentation, was the subject of subsequent decrees. If
there is no response within the 15 days the subcontractor must then refer to
the employer who must then give notice to the main contractor to supply
proof that his rejection is justified within 15 days.4°
The direct payment has two quantum limitations; first, subcontractors can
only recover the amount in the subcontract as fixed in the main contract.
This though is subject to its revision and being brought up to date, 4' and
payment for additional work not foreseen by the subcontract but which was,
in practice, absolutely necessary can be required. 42
 Second, the employer
cannot be forced to pay more than the amount contained in the main
contract, constituting his contractual liability43
The risk of subcontractors rights to direct payment being prejudiced by claims
of contractor's creditors is limited by article 9 stipulating that contractors are
only entitled to pledge as security such part of public works contracts
undertaken which they perform personally. Accordingly, subcontracting
reduces available security up to the limit proportionate to the part intended
to be sub-contracted. 44 Non-observance of this aspect has its problems in that
the Conseil d'Etat decided that security for a part of the contract which was
over the proportionate limit nullified acceptance and prevented direct
CE, 24th October 1986 Mon T. P. 12 Dec. 1986 p. 52.
" Article 2 of the Code des Marches Publics, specifies that if a request for acceptance and consent was
made at the same time as the offer or tende; the granting of the contract includes acceptance; in
other cases, where no response is made within 21 days from receipt of the request the subcontractor
Is deemed to be accepted and qualified. Where however an employer invites the main contractor to
proceed to a fonnal dedaration of subcontractors and requires the contract to be split up lot by lot
he cannot be regarded as having impliedly accepted the subcontractors. (CE,. 2nd June 1989 Vii de
Boissy Saint Léger D.1990 228, note Benabent, AJDA 1990 p. 720, note Sablier and Cam Mon. T.P. 2
Mat 1990 p. 55, GaL Pal. 1-2 June 1990 p. 17).
4° Article 8, as affected by the decrees of 29th August 1977 and 27th November 1979. The Court of
Cassation has acknowledged that the main contractor can be validly forced, in equit4 to hand over
the detailed accounts supplied by the subcontractor Cass. civ. 8 Mar 1989 Mon. T. P.30th June 1989
p. 50.
' This revision and bringing up to date must have been provided for in the document containing the
agreement; CE, 28th Januaiy 1987, Communes de Vayres Gaz. Pal. 87, Mon. T. P.30th April l987p. 51.42 CE,. 13th Februaiy 1987 Societe Ponticelli Freres Mon.T.P. 12th June l987p. 59; B. Sablier and J .E. Cam
uMdiflonal works canied out by subcontractor without a service orde?, AJDA 1988 p. 15.
A decision the Conseil dEtat suggests a further point: that the holder of the contract has not already
paid the subcontractor a sum equal to the subcontract even if the basis for the payment was outside
the contract,, CE, 3rd November 1989 SA Jean Michel Dr. Mm 90 46, Mon. 1. P 13 April 1990, D. 1990
Som. comment 244, obs. Temeyre. Otherwise expressed, the payment made on whatever basis to
the subcontractor by the main contractor extinguishes to that extent the right to direct payment
belonging to the said subcontractor. Such a stipulation does not appear anywhere in the Act.
" Also article 1351 of CCAG.
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payment because one of the preconditions was absent. 45
 The subcontractor
was consequently penalised for the contractor's default. 46
 In the Cour de
Cassation a banker in funds unsuccessfully opposed direct payment in
similar circumstances with the court simply treating the excess security as not
available.47
Direct payment is far from a certainty for a subcontractor, but it is a useful
potential protection available, and to expedite matters subcontractors may
have recourse to a juge des référés 48 Apart from the direct payment
provisions, there is it seems a possibility of rendering the employer liable to
the subcontractor.49
 It is not an easy route. It presupposes fault on the part of
the employer, who, being sufficiently aware of the subcontractor's part in the
works, did not insist on the requirements for subcontractors being imposed
on the contractor5° Proof that the employer had actual knowledge of the
nature of the subcontractor's part in the works and his relationship with the
contractor is essential, 51
 and relief is likely to afford only a partial remedy to a
subcontractor who will undoubtedly be himself at fault for having accepted
work without verifying his position.
The right of direct action
For private works to which the right to direct payment is inapplicable, article
12 provides those subcontractors accepted by and whose conditions of
payment have been approved by the employer, with the right of direct action
against the employer, if the contractor does not pay sums due under the
subcontract within one month after having received from the subcontractor
Namely compliance with the Loi; CE, 2nd June 1989 SA Phinelec D. 1990, 229 obs. Benabent. AJ DA
1989 720 obs. Sablier and Cam, Gaz. Pal. 1-2 June 1990, Paris P. 17.
Quite paradoxical'; H. Perinet-Manuet, Subcontracting in French Law, (1991) I.C.L.R. 315.
Cass. corn. 20th June 1989 JCP 1989 IV, 318; a decision on transfer of debt, being an similar solution to
that which follows on a direct action.
48 C. Mm. dappel Bonleaux 19th December 1989 M Cousseron JCP 90 IV, 125 which allows payment in
advance of the whole of the debt. It is a form of summary judgment.
H Pennet-Marquet, Subcontracting in French Law, (1991) I.C.LR. 315.
° Article 2 of the Code des Marché Publics and Artide 2.1.49 of CCAG forbid secret subcontracting.
' It has been held suffIcient that the subcontractor was accepted without agreeing his conditions of
payment,CE 13th June 1986, Pas de Calais D. 1986 lR 424, obs. Terneyre; and that a subcontractor
featured on the list supplied by the contractor to the employer, CE, 6th May 1988 Vile de Derain Dr.
Mm. 1988 no. 376. Attendance at site meetings may give rise to the degree of knowledge, CE 23M
April 1986 Ste 1-lelias Paysage Gaz. Pal. 25th Dec. 1986 p. 13, and 6th November 1985 Commune de
Checy, AJDA 1986 p. 42, note Sablier and Caro.
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a formal notice to pay.52
Every subcontractor, regardless of tier has the benefit of the right of direct
action against the employer depending on that vital point of acceptance and
approval by the employer of his conditions of payment In this respect, the
right of direct action differs from the right to direct payment where the
benefit is restricted to subcontractors of the main contractor. Where the right
of direct action is invoked, the obligations of the employer are limited to
those which he still owed to the contractor on the date of his receipt of a copy
of the formal notice to pay sent to the contractor"
As under the right to direct payment, the risk of subcontractors' rights being
prejudiced by contractor's creditors is addresed by article 13-1 prohibiting
contractors from transfering or pledging amounts receivable under the
contract with the employer except for amounts due for work which executed
personally.
Direct action against a private entity would not afford such protection as
direct rights against public bodies, but the risk of reduced protection in
private works is substantially ameliorated by article 14. This requires that
payment of subcontractors be secured by a joint and several, solidaire
guarantee obtained by the contractor from approved establishments
following conditions fixed by decree. 54
 Alternatively, if it is not secured by
guarantee, then by the contractor's delegation to the employer of
performance of the contractor's payment obligation towards subcontractors
under Article 1275 of Code Civil extending to the value of services to be
rendered by subcontractors. The guarantee is preferable for subcontractors
with its protection against bankruptcy of both employer and contractor, but
cost renders contractors disinclined to procure them.
Contractors, reportedly, frequently failed to implement the requirements of
article 3 to enable subcontractors to enjoy the right of direct action or to
52 A copy of such notice is required to be sent at the same time to the employer
Article 13.
These are ordinarily banks. As a transitional measure the guarantee could be obtained from one of
the organisations on the list pmmulgated by Loi no.71-584 of 16th July 1971 in connection with
retention guarantees ( retenues de guaranhie).
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provide the necessary security, and an attempted remedy was an addition in
1986 of article 14-1 requiring the employer to intervene. If employers detect
the presence on site of subcontractors who are not the subject of the article 3
obligations, notice must be given to the contractor to fulfil them; and if
accepted subcontractors whose conditions of payment have been approved
are not recipients of the delegation of performance of the contractor's
payment obligation, then employers must require the contractor to verify the
provision of the guarantee.
There have been and remain difficulties in operating these provisions which
are being worked out in practice and which give rise to debate. 55
 The
straightforward premise, that subcontractors have the benefit of article 14 and
that sums due from contractors will be guaranteed by bond unless payments
due to subcontractors are assigned, is, on many views, little more than pious
hope, in spite of the penalty of annulment of the subcontract.
It is difficult to envisage contractors, who may have become reluctant to
commit matters to paper, readily or easily adopting the strict formality of an
assignment of payments or the cost of guarantees within article The
mechanism of direct action under articles 12 and 13 only benefits those
subcontractors with approved contracts and conditions of payment, for
although this condition does not appear in the section on direct action but in
article 3, courts have upheld employers' defences 58
 to subcontractor actions
upon absence of acceptance or approval.
Forms of acceptance and approval have loomed large, with courts not
necessarily assisting subcontractors. Nevertheless acceptance of
subcontractors after the start of work, and just prior to institution of direct
H Perinet-Marquet, Subcontracting in French Law, 1991, ICLR, 315.
56 There is rio hesitation in the courts in stating a subcontract is void when there is no guarantee as laid
down by the Act, duly signed. Cass. civ. 3, 11th October 1989, Bull, Ill No. 189 p. 103, JCP 1989 IV 396,
Gaz, Pal. 8-9th August 1990 annotated summanes p. 13.
Artide 14 has, it appears, only benefitted, at most, 20% of subcontractors; B. Sablier and J
.
 E. Caiv,
Guide to Subcontracting in Construction, p. 109 et seq., and Mon. T. p. 11th August 1989, p.33.
The main contractor and his creditors may not raise the absence of acceptance and agreement of
the subcontractor to prevent the employ&s desire to pay the subcontractor directIy Cass. civ. 31st
June 1988 Bull, Civ. Ill, no. 101, P. 57. This condusion is not universal, CE, 2nd January 1989, VilIe de
Boissy St. Leger, D. 1990, 229, note Benabent.
Cass. Mixte 13 March 1981 D 1981 509 note Benabent, JCP 1981 1118568 concl. Toubas, note
Flecheux, Re Dr. trim. 1981 225 obs. Malinvaud and Boubli.
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action, has been recognised.' 0
 Implied acceptance of subcontractors by actions
clearly showing the employer's will has also been acknowledged as
compliance," but not readily,' 2
 and implied acceptance is unlikely to attract
the benefit of a summaiy result.'3
By article 12 direct action is only available where the contractor fails to pay
sums due under the subcontract within a month of receiving notice, and, to
show this, it seems that it is necessary to commence action against the
contractor," but this is sufficient and further steps in pursuit are not
required.65
 Even when all conditions are met and direct action is available,
subcontractors' tribulations are not ended for that assured by article 13 IS:
"the payment corresponding to the services provided for by the
subcontract of which the employer is effectively the beneficiary. The
obligations of the employer are limited to those he still owes to the
main contractor on the date of receipt of acopy of the notice provided
for in the preceding article."
Application of this has allowed direct action for amounts due to the main
60 Cass. civ. 3, 16th December 1987 Bull. II, no. 206, P. 122 Gaz. Pal. 26-27th February 1988 P. 13, Mon, T
P. 8th April 1988 p. 57; Pans 25th May 1990 D. 1990 IR 163. Previously a stricter test required
acceptance and agreement prior to the execution of the works, Cass. civ. 3, 18th May 1982 D. 1982 IR
515.
61 Cass. civ. 3, 18th July 1984 Rev. Dr. trim. 1985, 59, obs. Malinvaud & Boubli, Cass Corn. 27th February
1990, JCP, 1990, IV, 165.
62 It has been considered insufficient on the greunds of a purely "passive" attitude of the employer in
situatons: where subcontractors came on to the work site, Cass civ. 3, 18th Januaty 1986, Mon. T P
12th September 1986; Paris 5th November 1986 Rev. Dr. trim. 1987 p. 57 obs. Malinvaud & Boubli; Aix
26th Februaiy 1988 D. IR 1989, 358; where representatives were sent to site meetings, Cass civ. 3, 3rd
October 1985 Rev. Dr. trim. 1986, 206; and, where there was tacit acceptance of work camed out by
the subcontractors factory, Cass corn. 14th June 1988, JCP 1988 IV 297, Rev. Dr. trim. 1988, 461 abs.
Malinvaud & Boubli, 27th Februaiy 1990 JCP 90 IV 165.The appreach seems to be that any dispute as
to agreement to the subcontractor constitutes a serious dispute which does not come within the
power of the juge des référes, Cass. corn. 4th July 1989 Bull. IV no. 212 p. 142 (a decision on another
aspect of agreement in an action between main and subcontractor). The nature of the point appears
comparable with a serious issue to be tried under RSC Order 14.
63 Trial judges have recognised tacit acceptance and agreement in situations: where works canied out
for seven years were not contested by the employer, Agen 6th February 1984 JCP 1985 IV 85, Rev. Dr.
trim. 1985 p. 59; where the employer spoke to the subcontractor to obtain details of his qualifications,
Paris 6th February 1984 Rev. Dr. trim. 1985 p. 59; and where the subcontractor had taken part in site
meetings and was included on the list of subcontractors authonsed to take part in the works Paris
25th May1990 D9OIR 163.
64 Cass. civ. 3, 29th Febniaiy. 1984 Rev. Dr. trim. 1984 313. Presentation of a bill of exchange upon
maturity for payment in respect of works done cannot be considered as constituting a valid notice,
Cass. corn. 3rd July 1990, JCP 90 IV 336, D 90 IR 218.
65 A judicial summons against the main contractor is not required, Cass. civ. 3,29th February 1984, Rev.
Dr. trim. 1984 313, nor is the joinder of the subcontractor in any bankruptcy proceeding against such
contractor, Cass. civ. 3, 29th February 1984 Bull. III no. 56.
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contractor from the employer, 66
 even if they are not directly linked to the
subcontract,61 but subcontractors' claims will be fully satisfied only if the total
amounts claimed by all the subcontractors do not exceed the amounts due to
the main contractor from the employer If they do, then the amounts
remaining due to the main contractor are divided among subcontractors
joined in the direct action in proportion to that due to each.68
Direct action can be a significant weapon, particularly where utilised
summarily, en référé , although the conditions of approval and acceptance
are practical hurdles which produced amendments to articles 13-1 and 14-1.
The effect of article 13-1 is to encourage contractors to provide the guarantee,
cautionnement personnel et solidaire , required by article 14. It enables
contractors to use as security the entirety of the monies due under the
contract when first providing the guarantee, for otherwise the availability of
monies for security is limited. In practice its application has rendered direct
action more effective by penalising contractors' bankers.
The limiting of employers' obligations to those owed to the contractor on the
date of receipt of the copy of the formal notice led to the point that the
employer must be the main debtor at the time of the notice. If any
assignment of debts or factoring had arisen before formal notice then the
rights of the subcontractor would have been assumed by the assignee, 69
 or
factor7° The basis mirrors the English position of an assignee taking subject
to equities.71
This position was modified by Article 13.1, introduced in 1981, and its
application. The Cour de Cassation determined that whatever the date of
the notice, any assignment of debts or factoring exceeding the amount due to
the contractor could not be raised in defence against the subcontractor when
66 Even if the works ordered by the employer were carried out after the main contractors bankruptcy,
on instructions from the syndicate, Cass. corn. 20th June 1989, JCP 1989 1V 318, Gaz. Pal. 25-26 May
1990, annotated summary p. 12.
67 Cass. mixte 18th June 1982 D. 1983 221 note Benabent, Rev. Dr. trim. 1982 P. 515 obs. Malinvaud &
Boubli.
69 Cass. civ. 3, 11th Februaiy 1987 Bull. Ill no. 26, p. 16.
69 Versailles 1st July 1987, IR 219, Re Dr. trim. 1988, p. 101 obs.. Malinvaud & Boubli.
70 Cass. civ. 3,25th March 1987; Mon. T.P. 3rd July 1987, p.57.
This being subject to all rights of set-off and other defences which were available against the
assignor' per james U. in Roxburghe v Cox (1881) 17 Ch. D. 520 (CA) at 526.
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the required guarantee had not been supplied 72
 A gap remains in the desired
protection of subcontractors, for despite article 13.1 direct action by
subcontractors can only succeed if it precedes the discounting of a security
issued by the main contractor,73
 because the transfer to the discounting bank
renders the employer owing nothing further to the main contractor when
subcontractors appear. This applies also on the bankruptcy of contractors
where amounts due from the employer are sequestrated to benefit creditors.74
The legislation did not rest with limiting rights of main contractors.
Employers' liabilities were reinforced. By article 14.1 employers must put
main contractors in the position to comply with their liabilities immediately
they aware of subcontractors on site who have not been accepted or without
approved conditions of payment. Where a subcontractor is accepted and
approved, but without the benefit of a transfer of payment, the main
contractor must satisfy the employer that he has supplied a guarantee. There
is a heavy onus on employers, for whilst this obligation is not reinforced by
penalty the result of failure may mean either that an employer is liable to the
subcontractor for damages, or the subcontractor is able to take direct action
where the conditions of acceptance and approval are not met. 76
 Article 14.1
excluded from its ambit the construction of a private dwelling by an
individual with a view to himself or his spouse or their immediate relations
occupying it, but in this area subcontractors were particularly vulnerable, and
in 1990 protection was introduced?
72 Cass. corn. 22nd November 1988 Bull. IV no.317 & 318 p. 213, D. 1989 P. 212 obs. Benabent, Gaz. Pal.
23-25 April 1989 p. 8 obs Sablier & Cam; also, N. Peisse, Direct Action of Subcontractors in
Competition with the law on Assignment of debts, Daily Gaz. Pal. 29th Maith 1989 p.2.
Cass corn. 4th July 1989 Bull. IV no.212 p. 142, JCP 1990 ed. N II p.80 note Dubois. A Benabent, The
conflict between banker and subcontractor, Rev. Dr. trim. 1990 p. 149; A. M. Rornan Protection of
subcontractors in private contracts entitled to direct action in a dispute against bankers holding
transfers of debts, D 1990 Chr. p. 179; H. Synvet, New variations on disputes concerning bankers and
subcontractors, JCP 1990 IV, 3425.
' Cass. civ. 3, 17th October 1990, D.1990 1K 254.
TGI Paris 16th September1988 Re Dr. trim. 1989 358 obs. Malinvaud.
' Cass. civ. 3, 13th June 1990 D. 1990 J465, note Dubois. This case also decided that the 1986 decree,
having added Article 14.1 to the 1975 Act, applied to contracts cunent at the time.
' The Loi of 19th December 1990. This was not brought fonvani as a general reform, even regarding
payment, but limited to subcontractors under contracts for private houses.
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The Amendment of 1990
The 1990 Lol begins at base, importing a required condition that subcontracts
are subject to a written agreement made at the commencement of work The
document should consist of five statements: a description of the building
work; the identities of the employer and guarantor; a description of the work
covered by the subcontracting agreement; the agreed price and means of
payment, particularly the time limit which should not exceed 45 days; and
the amount of any penalties due from the builder if payment is delayed.79
This new measure is criticised 80 on grounds that, apart from being restricted
to the construction of private houses, its penalty is the criminal sanction of
imprisonment for between two months and two years, or a fine of F.F 8,000
to 125,000 for anyone engaged in building private houses 81 who does not
make a written subcontracting agreement, 82 and further, that the requirement
to send a copy of the subcontract agreement to the guarantee body, an
essential condition to ensure that the guarantee recognises the existence of
the subcontractor, does not extend to subject this body to penalty. The 1990
Lol is not thought to be the last word as it cannot resolve problems of
payment of subcontractors in private housing or overcome difficulties
relating to subcontractors' liability.
In wider terms there appears to be consensus that the whole legislative
activitiy has been successful in public works contracts, and the direct payment
procedure has it seems been widely accepted and applied. 83 This is not
regarded as so in private works for, despite the 1986 amendment, concealed
or disguised subcontracting is reportedly still widespread, and subcontractors
This period was reduced to 30 days by the Senate, despite reluctance on the part of the government.
Copies of the subcontract agreements should be sent by the builder to the body obliged to supply
the external guarantee of completion requirements by the Loi. In the Law of 1972 the builder
needed only pmduce an "internal guarantee relating to his own financial condition. This it seems is
frequently used.
H Perinet-Marquet. Subcontracting in French Law,. (1991)8 I.C.L.R. 315.
' Whether built 1mm plans supplied by the builder (Article L.231-1) or not (Article L.232-1).
82 Artide L.241-9. The legislators are themselves sceptical as to the effectiveness of such recourse to
the criminal la for this was the governments opinion accortling to a ministerial reply of 9th
November 1987, Mon. T. P. 11th December 1987 p. 15.
Sous-traitance: de Ia Theorie a Ia Pratique, Moniteur 1P 17th April 1987.
That is, non-compliance with article 3; Réponse Ministenelle No. 6775; J.O. deb. Ass. nat. 16th
October 1989 p.4588, cited in Jurisclasseur,. Construction, Sous-traitance, fascicule 206, para..23 if.
C.R. Seppala, French Law on Subcontractin& (1991) I.C.L.R. 78.
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continue without the right of direct action and the security provided for. The
sanction for failure to cause subcontractors to be accepted and the conditions
of payment approved, that the main contractor cannot invoke the
subcontract against the subcontractor, has proved Ineffective, partly because
some courts held open the route for contractors to pursue claims for defects
in tort where they can establish fault of the subcontractor.85
4	 Particular Liabilities under Frendi law
A subcontractor entitled to the benefit of a building contract incurs as against
the contractor a contractual liability, 86
 without the necessity of proof of fault,
and subject to the intervention of force majeure •87 Nevertheless a
subcontractor is not a guarantor subject to Articles 1792 et seq. of the Code
Civil. 88 The 1978 Lol excludes subcontractors from the 10 year warranty
period, and so liability for 30 years remains. 89
 Article 1788 applies to
subcontractors, as to any hirer of work, and the risks of the work remain with
him for so long as he has not handed it over to the main contractor or
another subcontractor9°
As between subcontractor and employer French law has been open to doubt,
in much the same way as English law, 91
 in that conflicting decisions in the
Cour de Cassation leave the subcontractor's position uncertain. There is no
doubt that the subcontractor, not coming within Article 1792-1, is not bound
u Commentators have also urged that contractors' obligations under article 3 should be reinforced
with penal sanctions, or that the direct payment procedure be extended to apply to pnvate
employers. While prospective changes continue to be studied, which itself indicates a
determination to succeed, no amendment has been inthxluced.
66 Cass. civ. 3,3rd October 1985 JCP 1986, 20601, note B M Blocl 13th June 1990 D, 1990 IR 179.87 Where the Cour de Cassation refuses to take into account fault raised by a subcontractor, Cass. civ.
3,29th October 1986 Mon 1. P.21 November 1986.
U Considered under Liability for Defects.
Cass. civ. 3,25th June 1985 Bull. III no.102, 18th June 1990 0 1990 IR 179.
° Cass. civ. 3,2nd November 1983, Rev. Dr. trim. 1984, 186 obs. Malinvaud & Boubli. Article 1788: 'Si,
dans Ie cas ol I'ouvner lb unit Ja matière, La chose vient & peria de qudque man!ère que ce soit,
avant d'éter livrée, Iaperte en est pour I'ouvne, a moms que La matt,e ne lOt en demeure de
mcevoirla chose.' [If, where the worker supplies the materials, the thing should perish, for whatever
reason, before it is delivered, the worker bears the loss, unless the employer was in delay in
accepting it.]
Junior Books Ltd. v Veitchi Co. Ltd (1983) 1 AC. 520, was classified as "unique"by the House of Lords
in D. & P. Estates Ltd. v Church Commissioners for England (1989) AC. 202 at 215, is no longer citable
as authority for a general duty of care in tort in such circumstances, and is not followed even at first
instance, Nitngin Eireann Teoranta v Inco Alloys Ltd. (1992) 1 WLR. 498.
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by the 10 year period of liability to the employet92
 The question has become
one of eliciting whether the subcontractor has a liability in tort, as to which
there was little doubt 93
 until within the last five years when the Commercial
Court94 and the First Civil Court 95
 adopted the chain of contract as a premise
in this area, concluding that when someone under a contractual obligation
passes on to someone else the task of carlying out the obligation, the
beneficialy only has the right to "an action, of necessity contractual, which he
can exercise within the limit of his rights and the extent of the debt of the
substituted debtor". Conversely, in the same year (1988) the third Civil Court
of the Cour de Cassation acknowledged that there was a liability in tort for
proven fault,° 6 as has the Conseil d'Etat with regard to public works.97
The consequences of these two opposing conclusions are that whilst the
subcontractor subject to liability in tort can only be proceeded against for
actual fault his liability is not restricted in time to the 10 year limitation
period; whereas under the chain of contracts principle the subcontractor is
subject to a liability based on his contractual obligation, and although he is
not subject to the 10 year period as between himself and the main contractor,
because he is not within Article 1792, he does have the benefit of the
limitation of liability to the period of 10 years after reception by virtue of that
being the period of the guarantee to which the main contractor remains
liable to the employer. Further he will have the benefit of any clauses
restricting liability contained in both the main and the sub-contract.98
5	 Aplication of the FrerKth law
The scope of application of French law of subcontracting depends both on the
definition of subcontracting in the 1975 Lol and on the concept of public
92 Cass. civ. 3, 20th June 1989, Bull. 1989 III no. 146, p. 80.
' Cass. ci 3, 22ndJanuaiy 1982. Bull. 82 III no. 164, p. 120.
Corn. 17th Feb. 1987 JCP 1987, II 20892 note Dubois, D. 1987, 543, note Jourdain.
' Cass. civ. 1,8th March 1988, Bull. 1988 1 no.69 p.46 conflmied by Cass. civ. 1, 21st June 1988 Bull. I no.
202, p. 141.
96 Cass. civ. 3,22nd June 1988 Bull. Ill no. 115 p. 63.
CE,. Nancy 16th Jan. 1990, Jurisdata no. 040430; CE. Grenoble 10th January 1990 Jurisdata no. 040159;
15th March 1989 Jurisdata no. 04105; CE, Angers lothJanuazy 1989 Rev. Dr. trim. 1989 467.
CE, Nancy 16th January 1990 referred to above.
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order. Subcontracting by article I is "the operation by which a contractor
entrusts, by means of a subcontract, and under his liability to another person
called a subcontractor, all or part of the completion of a building contract or
public works contract agreed with the employer", and the Lol presumes no
direct contractual link between the one who carries out work and the
ultimate beneficiary of it. By any reasoning subcontracting presumes the
existence of a main contract and is incompatible with employment or sale,
and the essence is the entrusting of part of the performance of that contract.
A link of direct subordination between someone working on site and the
main contractor would not give rise to the relationship of a subcontractor,
even if wages are not paid directly by the latter. By contrast an agency making
available temporary teams of workmen under the supervision of one
employee and paid a lump sum is subject to the Lol of 1975. The distinction
between contracts of supply and subcontracting is less easy. Simply to supply
building material or equipment does not come within the 1975 legislation,
and will be regulated as appropriate either by the normal conditions of sale,
guarantee in respect of hidden faults or possible application of clause 17924b00,
or by its treatment as a hiring of goods as in a crane hire.
There is less clarity when the supply is specific to a particular project or has to
be installed on site by the supplier. The point was avoided in rendering the
existence of a subcontract conditional on a direct assumption of liability by
the subcontractor in carrying out the works, 101
 or on the completion of acts of
production or service connected to the completion of the work being carried
out on site.'°2
 The position has been reached it seems where the definition of
a subcontractor is applied to anyone who carries out, even in a factory a
particular element of work for a specified site following special instructions
under which there can be no substitution of any other product for that which
has been ordered.103
Reims 7th March 1977 JCP 1978 IV, 325, Rev. Dr. trim. 1979 208 obs. Malinvaud and Boubli; but not if
the workforce in question was not involved in the building contract.
°o The criteria for applying this text are met and in particular the existence of an EPERS (element
which can give rise to joint liability); on this point, H. Permet - Marquet refened to above.
'°' Cass. cw 3 17 Feb. 1982 Gas. Pal. 1982-2 p.221, Rev. Dr. trim. 1982 515 obs. Malinvauci and Boubli.
IZ Cass. civ 3 18 Jan. 1983 Gas. Pal. 1983-1 p.136, Rev. Dr. trim. 1983 obs. Malinvaud and Boubli, Rev.
trim. DE Civ. 1983 552 obs. Remy.
103 Cass. civ. 3 5 Feb. 1985 Bull. 1985 Ill no. 23, Gaz. Pal. 1985 2 p. 248 obs. Jestaz, Re Dr. trim.1985 256
obs. Malinvaud and Boubli, Rev, trim. Dr. Civ. 1985 737 obs. Remy, 0.1986 J 499 note Huet.
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The scope of the definition of a subcontractor has been extended considerably
and encompasses the supply of specific frameworlç'° 4 the manufacture of
locks in accordance with a special schedule of conditions, 105
 the manufacture
of pipes adapted to the requirements of contours and site 106
 and even kitchen
units built in accordance with precise instructions given by the employer.'07
The assembly of a travelling crane was even considered sufficient by one
juge du fond,' 06	 not the supply of units taken from existing stock.'°9
Accordingly the traditional characteristic element of a building contract in
distinguishing a contract of sale, namely the predominance of work over
supply does not apply to subcontracts. This criterion, well adapted to
craftsmanship and small business, gives way to the demand for special
orders, better suited to modern production processes. Changing the frontier
of a subcontract in this way increases the protection of the manufacturing
subcontractor, but has the disadvantage of limiting the guarantees available
to the employer in respect of products. The legislature intended to make the
manufacturer of a specific article liable under the 10 year guarantee applying
to builders by virtue of Article 1797.4, but the producer, by becoming a
subcontractor as against the employer, escaped not only the strict 10 year
guarantee and the duty to insure, which is its corollaiy, but also any
contractual liability. From this point of view, the extension of the scope of
subcontracting upsets, at least in part, the balance sought by the 1978
legislation.
As an example of political will to grapple with the position of the
subcontractor the French experience must be rated successful, and the
determination evidenced by amending legislation is praiseworthy. The
necessity though of forming a view as to where the balance of interests
should lie renders a similar attempt in England unlikely, although the EC
104 Cass. civ. 3,5th Februaty 1985 above, and 10th Januazy 1986 Rev. Dr. trim. 1986 p. 363.
105 Versailles 14. Jan 1988 D 1988 I R 41, Rev. Dr. trim. 1988 p. 209 obs. Malinvaud and Boubli.
'° Cass. corn. 20th June 1989 D 90 246 note Virossamy. The degree of exactness of installation or order
tends to become one of the criteria to distinguish a building contract and a sale contract (Cass. Corn.
4th July 1989 D 90 246 note Virvssamy).
'° Pans 25th May 1990 0. 1990 IR 163; and implied, Cass. civ. 3, 8th March 1989 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr. 1989
620 obs. Bigot.
TGI Bressuire 4th August 1987 Gaz. Pal. 5-6 April i989p. 11.
'	 VersailLes 19th May 1988 0. 1988 IR 221.
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Discussion Paper of June 1993 places problems of subcontractors firmly on the
agenda.'1°
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1	 Basis f liability
Whether concerned with an individual item of material or an aspect of
workmanship or the totality of the project the starting point is the broad
principle of the obligation to conform with the contract, whatever the nature
of the defect or the other qualities of the completed work'
The range of potential remedies for failure to conform may extend to seeking
the performance of new work, the removal of the defective work, with or
without replacement, termination of the contract, reduction of the price, and
damages. The merits of each reflect the multitude of fact situations, but the
stringency of the measures determine the criteria for availability and,
possibly, a balancing of interests. Termination of the contract as opposed to
reduction of the price depends on the nature or seriousness of the defect and
may be weighed against the ability to achieve specific performance, which
depends on the adequacy of damages. Equally the need or desire to pursue
damages will be a reflection of the ease with which other remedies can be
secured.2
French law regards the contract for services as ordinarily giving rise to
In this there is a generic comparison with the law of sales for, as in the Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods, the seller's obligation is to deliver goods "which conform with the
contract".Article 19.
2 In Germany damages or compensation for non-fulfilment, schadensersatz wegen nichtezfullung,
may be claimed if the defect in the work was caused by the workmans fault, but this is an alternative
to the remedy of reduction in price or cancellation of the contract. They are true alternatives in that
cancellation of the contract is reganied as extinguishing the contractual obligations and thus the
ability to claim damages. The daim for reduction in price permits the contractual obligations to
remain intact albeit that they are fulfilled on new terms.
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obligations de moyen where fault is a requirement for liability3 This
imposes a duty to engage in the promised activity to the required standard,
but not so as to bring about the contemplated result. Fault is not an essential
factor for liability where the obligation is to achieve a promised state of
affairs, described as an obligation de résultat, or déterminé , as in the
building contract.
Some contracts for services may impose both obligations. In this way the
obligation to produce a result under a strict liability finds a boundary in
respect of contracts for work and labour at a line created by the first obligation
to deliver the work and the second, to preserve it, in particular as to goods of
the employer upon which work is to be carried out. The obligation to deliver
or redeliver, is usually regarded as part of the obligation to produce a
specified result, but it is the second obligation that is classified as one of a
promise of a diligent effort such that liability for transgression of such
obligation requires fault. 4
 The essence of the obligation is a promise to
exercise all possible care, although the degree of care within the obligation
de moyens may be extended or contracted having regard to the nature of the
contractual obligation.
In England the distinction is made between the warranty whether express or
implied, breach of which does not require proof of fault, and the obligation to
exercise reasonable skill and care. The point arose in Greaves & Co. v
Bayrtham Meikie & Partners where under a package deal contract the
plaintiff contractors had undertaken the construction of a warehouse and
engaged the defendant structural engineers to design the floor which cracked
as a result of having insufficient strength to withstand particular vibration
from stacker trucks. Whilst the trial judge had expressed himself in terms of
a higher than ordinary duty as a result of the purpose for which the
warehouse was to be used being made known to the engineers, the Court of
Appeal re-emphasised that in the employment of architects and engineers, as
with all professional men, the law does not usually imply a warrranty that he
will achieve the desired result, only that he will use reasonable care and
J. Carbonnie Dmit Civil, Les Obligations Vol. IV, 257; and Article 1302.
Articles ll37and 1245.
Greaves & Co. v Baynham Meikle & Partners (19Th) 1 W.L.R. 1095 (CA.)
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skill;6
 but on the facts the common Intention to design a warehouse fit for its
purpose resulted in a warranty to that effect.
The performance required under the contract itself will generally have a
separate existence from the standard to be imposed in cariying it out, when
the latter will not be exhaustive of the extent of the obligations:
"A contract gives rise to a complex of rights and duties of which the
duty to exercise reasonable skill and care is but one. If I employ a
carpenter to supply and put up a good quality oak shelf for me, the
acceptance by him of that employment involves the assumption of a
number of contractual duties. He must supply wood of an adequate
quality and it must be oak He must fix the shelf. And he must carry
out the fashioning and fixing with the reasonable care and skill which
I am entitled to expect of a skilled craftsman. If he fixes the brackets but
fails to supply the shelf or if he supplies and fixes a shelf of unseaoned
pine, my complaint agaist him is not that he has failed to exercise
reasonable care and skill in carrying out the work but that he has failed
to supply what was contracted for. He may fix the brackets and then go
away for six months, but unless and until I accept that conduct as as
repudiation, his obligation to complete the work remains."7
The basis of the isolated rules relating to defects of quality in building
contracts found in the Code Civil was described by Pothier. The obligations
du conducteur were seen to arise out of the very nature of the contract for
work and labour and were to execute the promised work, to carry it out in
due time, to perform it well, and, to make good use of the thing supplied by
the employer and to preserve them carefully. The third obligation,
i'obligation de faire bien I'ouvrage, rendered anyone undertaking to do
work bound to do it in compliance with the lex artis, and the actio ex locato
could be brought if the work was defective, as well as if the workmen had
failed to execute it.
From the outset the implied promise to possess and exercise the skill of his
profession was attributed to every workman. Additionally, incompetence was
• Approving the extent of the duty as set out in Bolam v Friem Hospital Management Committee
(1957) 1 W.L.R. 582 at 586: 'The test is the standard of the ordinaiy skilled man exercising and
professing to have that special skiil. A man need not possess the highest expert skill,, it is well
established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinaty skill of an ordinaiy competent man
exercising that particular ait
Midland bank Trust Co. Ltd. v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp (1979) 1 Cli. 384. OliverJ.
• Oeuvres de Pothier IV, Part 7 (Du Louage dOuvrage).
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to be regarded as the workman's own fault. This liability of the conductor
opens had been stated in such absolute terms that prior to the Revolution
Domat had revived the concept in the context of the law of sales, 9
 which
nurtured the strict liability of the vendeur professionnel under Article
1645.10 By this a seller whose course of business is the selling of a certain
product is deemed to be aware of its defect, being treated as a seller acting in
bad faith.
Pothier concluded that in the first instance the workman had to remove the
defect of quality which a court found to exist, and if he failed to do so within
a period of time fixed by the court the employer was authonsed to have the
defect removed at the expense of the workman.' 1
 Further, the workman had
to compensate the hirer for the damage caused by the defective worlç and
this was applicable both to the employer's goods upon which the work was
being carried out as well as to other goods affected by the bad performance.
The example included was of a badly constructed house which collapsed
with the result that the contractor had to pay damages additionally for the
loss of furniture that could not be saved.
Development of French law included this obligation to carry out the work
lege artis implied into the primary obligation to execute the work by which
the contractor promises a distinct result. It is the enterprise that carries with
it I'obligation de resultat . Whilst the enterprise includes the status
attributed to contractors promising to do work in conformity with the
contract and corresponding to the standards of the trade, the obligation is not
limited to the performance to that standard whatever the outcome and is
greater than a mere promise of diligent effort in the enterprise.
The consequence of inferior quality in the case of defects, is that the promised
result has not been achieved and the primary obligation not fulfilled, and
Domat, Les Loix Civiles dans leur Ordre Naturel, 1770.
'° Article 1645: 'Si le vendeur connaissait les vices de Li chose. ii est tenu, outie la zestitution du pnx
quil en a reck. de tousles dama8es et inté,ts enve:s !'acheteui" [If a vendor knew of defects in the
article he is liable not only for the repayment of the price which he has received therefor, but also for
all damages suffered by the purchaserl.
" in his Treatise on the Law of Obligations, 1826.
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that liability flows from such breach of contract irrespective of fault. 12
 The
only mode of escape Is extraneous circumstance comprising force majeure,
contributory negligence, faute de Ia victime, or intervention of a third party
intervention d'un tires, carrying the burden of proof.
This principle is applicable where reception, acceptance, of the work has not
yet taken place, so leaving scope for a wider remedy than damages by the
removal of the defect or the production of new work. This is the
discretionary remedy of the juges du fond of execution en nature where
the decision turns on feasibility on the individual facts. Where a defect
cannot be entirely removed damages are available additionally, so the effect is
a reduction of the price payable by the employer. The mechanism of
deduction corresponding to the diminished value of the work may be
regarded as available in circumstances where the repair of the defect is
overwhelmingly costly or might cause damage to the work14
The Code Civil contained few rules on defects in building contracts, so
providing both the necessity and the opening for their development and
subsequent amendment that is unsurprising in view of the march of time
and complexity of the construction process. 15 The Code though, at its
inception, instituted a decennial liability for defects which has remained
ingrained in French law, around which amendments have been built, and,
against which French reaction to the most recent proposals for
harmonisation of liability in the construction industry is measured.'6
2 In Germany the emphasis is on the primaiy obligation of the wodcnien to produce work which has
the promised qualities and is free from defects, BGB i 633. Delivezy of work not meeting these
requirements Is not regarded as the proper fulfilment of the main obligation.
Referred to under Performance and damages, Specific Performance.
In Germany the practical need to deal with defects apparent in the work prior to completion found
recognition in the right granted to the employer to fix an adequate time limit for the removal of such
defects; BGB ¶ 634, also the Swiss Code of Obligations Article 366. The BGB enables employers to
warn that upon inaction in removing defects the employer will cancel the contract or demand
reduction of the price. The fixing of a period for the removal of defects is not required if removal is
impossible or the contractor refuses, and the ability to require removal is affected L' the question of
economic reasonableness.
In contrast with the original French codification, Germany had more explicit legislation. The former
German Commercial Code (1861) and the Dresdner Entwurf (1865) provided a common basis in the
law of obligations in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Switzerland and in Austria. In turn, Greece
was much influenced by the German model, and Turkey adopted the Swiss Code of Obligations in
1926.
" Considered in relation to the Giupec Report, of December 1992, on proposals in the E.C. for liability
in the construction industry under Hamionisation.
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French law is distinguished in its concern for the protection of the owner. He
is presumed, it seems, to be ignorant of construction matters, whilst
contractors and the professionals are presumed to have knowledge of the
defects in the works they have constructed. After completion all those
involved in the construction work in contract with the employer are treated
by status with regard to their responsibility to the owner for substantial
building defects that may appear in the works over the ten-year period.
The scheme for liability in the original text of the Code was the provision
within the Obligations of the Sellers' 1
 as to the guarantee against defects in
articles sold in Articles 1641 to 1649; a specific liability by Article 1792 on the
architect and contractor for a period of ten years if a building constructed for a
lump sum, a pnx farfait, failed whether in whole or in part due to a defect in
construction even though there was a defect in the sub-soil;' 8
 and a discharge
by limitation from liability in respect of substantial works, gros ouvrages, by
Article 2270.
2	 The French legislation of 1%7
Amendment was introduced in 1967' to extend and adapt the liability in
respect of the sale of property to be constructed, 2° vente d'un immeuble a
construire, and notably as to the liability of architects, contractors and other
persons connected with the construction under Article 1792, and then again
that year,2 ' to clarify the provisions with regard to the class of persons
responsible for defects and counteract judicial interpretation. The provisions
affecting liability of the seller of property to be constructed became Articles
'	 Book 3, Title VI - Sales. Article 1603:11 a deux obligations pnndpales, cello do déliwer et ce/le de
ganuztirla chose qu'il vend. [The seller has two principal obligations, that of delivering and that of
guaranteeing the thing sold].
Article 1792, original text: "Si l'edifice constnzit a pti. fail, péiit en tout ou en partie perle vice de Ia
construdio: rnéme par le vice du sot los azrhitectse, et entrepreneurs en sont responsa b/es
pendant dix ans." [If a building is destroyed in whole or in part because of a defect in construction,
including a defect in the gmund, architects, contractors and other persons bound to the employer by
a contract of works are liable for them for ten years .1
'	 Loi no.67-3, 3rd Januaiy 1%7.
This applies equally to renovated property: Civ. 3, 2nd May 1978, J.C.P. ed. N. 1979. Il. 13, note
Meysson.
Li no. 67-547, 7th July 1%7.
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1642-1, and 16461.22
The obligation under the Code of guarantee owed by the seller was by Article
1625 given two objectives: first of peaceful possesession, and second, to
cover hidden defects, vices caches, or defects of a serious character. 24
 The
guarantee against hidden defects, applicable to all sales, by Article 1641
comprehends those rendering the item sold unsuitable for its intended use
or which so diminish such use that the purchaser, had he known of the
defect, would either not have purchased or would only have given a lesser
price. By Article 164226 there was no liability for patent defects, vices
apparents, or those which the purchaser could discover for himself. The
effect of introducing Article 1642127 was to prevent any discharge for patent
defects whether before reception of the works or before one month after the
purchaser took possession, and to provide that an agreement by the vendor
to repair the defects prevents rescission, resolution, or reduction in price.28
The nature of claims under the seller's guarantee in respect of defects that
might give rise to resolution , was recognised by the imposition by Article
22 The Loi also introduced other rules affecting the sale of property to be constructed. Articles 1601-1
to 1601-4.
23 Article 1625: "La garantie que le vendeur dolt a l'acquéreu a deu objets: le premier est Ia
possession paisable de Ia chose vendue; le second los defauts caches de cette chose ou los ices
,dhibitoires." [The guarantee owed by the seller to the purchaser has two objectives: the first is
peaceful possession; and the second, in respect of hidden defects or defects of an annulling
character]
24 Those that would enable resolution to be achieved. Considered under Termination. In Germany
cancellation of the contract requires a senous defect and the remedy of is barred "If the defect
diminishes only insignificantly the value or fitness of the work", BGB ¶ 634-3.
25 Article 1641: "Le vendeur est tenu de Ia garantie a ,aLcon des défauts caches de La chose vendue qul
la rendent impreple a I'usage auque! on Ia destine, ou qw diminuent teliememt cot usage, que
l'aceteur ne I await pas acqwse, ou nen await donné qu'en moindie pth. s'il los avait connus.#
[The seller is liable on the guarantee for hidden defects In the thing sold which render it unfit for the
use for which it was intended, or which so diminish such use that the puithaser would either not
have purchased it or would only have paid a lesser price had he known of that defect.)
26 Article 1642: "Le vendeur n'est pas tonu des vices apparents et dont I'acheteur a pu so convaincre
lui-méme." [The vendor is not responsible for defects which are either patent or in or respect of
which the purchaser can satis' himself.)
27 Artide 1642-1: "I.e wndeurdun imnieuble .4 construi,e ne peut étre décha,4 ni avant Ia reception
des tiavawç ni avant lexpiiation d'un délai dun inois apies Ia pnse de possession par Iacquézeur,
des vices de construction a!ois apparent. II n)' aura pas lieu.4 resolution du contret ou A
diminution du pim si le vendeur s'oblige a réparer Jo vice.' [The vendor of property to be
constructed is not released from liability in respect of defects in construction that are then apparent
whether before acceptance (Ia reception) of the works or before the expiration of a period of one
month after occupation. Termination (resolution) of the contract or diminution in the price will not
be required if the vendor undertakes to remedy the defed.J
In Germany in consequence of restriction on cancellation by reference to the nature of the defect
the remedy of reduction in pnce became more important and used with flexibility even to the extent
of courts permitting the reduction in price to ml where the entire work proved worthless, BGH, 29th
October 1967, BGI-IZ 42.232.
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1648 of a limitation period 29
 by which action must be brought within a short
period, un bref delai, unspecified in time and to be derived from the nature
and manifestation of the defects and the norms of the trade or locality. 30
 The
determination of the period is for the juge du fond, taking into account the
facts and circumstances. 3' Providing a measure of uniformity for actions
under Article 1641-1, a period of one year from the time when the vendor's
hability for patent defects expired was imposed by amendment to Article
1648.32
The extent and nature of the liability of the vendor of property to be
constructed was then by Article 1646-1 linked to that of architects,
contractors and others connected with the employer by a contrat de louage
d'ouvrage by making the vendor liable for ten years from reception for
hidden defects for which such persons are liable on the application of Articles
1792 and 2270. Further. a guarantee of minor works, menus ouvrage, was
imposed for two years from reception; the guarantees benefit successive
owners of the building and the ability of the vendor to avoid resolution or a
reduction in price by his agreement to repair the defects was provided. It
20 Artide 1648: AL 'action nsultant des vices ,dhibitoires dolt étze intentée par l'acquereu dans un
brefdélai suivant Ia natum des vices zédhibitoirns, of I'usage du lieu o6 Ia vente a ete faite." [An
action resulting from defects of an annulling character must be brought by the purchaser within a
short period,, according to the nature of the defects and custom applicable to the sale.l
X. de Mello gives an average of 2 months; An International Comparison of Limitation Periods in
relation to Construction Projects, I.BA papers presented at the 21st Biennial Conference, New York,
1986.
' Civ. 1, 10th January 1968,D. 1968 282. The German BGB provides short periods of limitation, six
months in respect of work on goods unless there had been fraudulent concealment; one year in the
case of work on land and five years in the case of work on buildings, with the period beginning to run
from acceptance, abnahme, of the work; 8GB 1 638.
Article 1648, addition by Loi no. 67-547 of 7th July 1967: A'Dans le cas prevu par l'article 1642-1,
laction dolt étre introduite, a peine de foredusion. dans l'année qul suit Ia date a Laquelle Jo
vendeurpeut êtm décha,-é des vices apparents. (In respect of Article 1641-1, the action must be
brought, to avoid it being barred, within one year of the date when the vendor's liability for patent
defects is discharged]
Article 1646-1 introduced by Loi no. 67-3 of 3rd January 1967 and Loi no. 67-547 of 7th July 1967 and
subsequently replaced: Le vendeur dun inimeuble a constivire est tenu, pendant drc ans a
compter de la reception des t,avau., des vices caclés dont los architectes, entrnpieneuis et autres
peznnes liées au mattre de l'ouvzage par un contzat de louage douvrage sont eux-n,ênies tenus
en application des articles 1792 ef 2270 du pnisent code. Le vendeur est teiiu de garantir los menus
ouvrages pendant deux airs a cornpier de Ia niception des tjavauv. Los 8a,antie benéfIcient aur
pmpn'étaires successifs de fimnieuble. ii n'y aura pas lieu a resolution du contrat ou a diminution
dupzivsile vendeurs'oblige a iiparerle vice."
[The vendor of property to be constructed is liable for a period of 10 years following the acceptance
of the works for those hidden defects for which architects, contractors and other persons connected
with the employer in respect of works am themselves liable by the application of articles 1792 and
2270 of the current code. The vendor is liable by wananty for minor works for 2 years following the
acceptance of the works. These wananties are for the benefit of all successors in title to the property.
Termination (resolution) of the contract or diminution in the price will not be required if the vendor
undertakes to remedy the defect.l
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seems that substantial argument had been advanced that Article 1792 was to
be regarded as a special law derogating from a principle of non-liability after
reception , particularly in the case of work on goods, although the Cour de
Cassation had held in 1958 that for menus ouvrages contractors remained
liable for hidden defects notwithstanding prior acceptance of the work by the
employer.34
The 1967 amendment counteracted the effect of the refusal by the Cour de
Cassation to apply the presumption of liability under Article 1792 to an
architect on the ground that such profession did not conclude applicable
contracts. It deleted the restriction to contracts, prix fait, and extended the
range of those responsible to all persons linked to the employer beyond
architects and contractors. The original text of article 1792 provided: "If a
building is destroyed in whole or in part because of a defect in construction,
including a defect in the ground, architects, contractors and other persons
bound to the employer by a contract for the hire of worl and skill are liable
for them for ten years." 31 The original Article 2270 constituted a discharge of
the architect and contractor from the guarantee after ten years in respect of
gros ouvrages constructed or directed by them, with no legislative limitation
for hidden defects in menus ouvrages but subject to action within a bref
délai. Article 2270 as introduced in 1 967 added a two year period for the
liability of those involved in respect of such ordinaly or menus ouvrages.
' Cass. Civ. 4th Januaty 1958 and Cass. Civ. 19th May, 1958, JCP, 1958 11108.
In Belgium there was not the same change in 1%7 and the wording of Articles 1792 and 2270
remains.
In Italy there was development beyond the pattern of the French codification, but the Italian
Codice Civile Article 1669, whose ongin was the French Article 1792, was not subject to the lump sum
provision, pn.-.. (alt The Liability operatd in favour of the empLoyers successors in title and appears
regarded as an extra-contractual liability deriving from the ordine publico. As a result, claimants
needed to prove no direct contractual relationship with the person liable and in consequence their
position was not be weakened by disclaimers or limitations of liability.
Article 1792. original text; 'Si I'edifice con stiult a piix fal'. petit en tout ou en partie pane vice de Ia
construdion. rnême par le vice du so les azrhitectes, et enfrepreneuz5 en sont responsables
pendant db ans. -
Artide 2270 as introduced by Loi no.67-3, 3rd Januaiy 1%7: i..es awhitectes, entzepreneuz et autm
pezsonnes Iiées au maître de Iuge par un cont,t de iouage d'ouvrage ont dêcha,és de La
garantie des ouvIges quiIs ont faits ou thnés apres dLc ans si1 sgit de givs ouvIges aprés deux
ans pour Ies menus ouw-ages. (Architects, contractors and others connected with the employer in
respect of a contract for the hire of work and skili are dischaied from their guarantee of the works
they have carried out or supervised after ten years for substantial works , and after two years for
minor works.J
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3	 •fl Ld Sjinetta
The 1978 legislation has been described as revolutionaiy, in the sense of
breaking with the traditional rules based on the Code Civil, but it is an
organised and practical approach retaining as its base the ten year period for
liability, and increasing the significance of reception. In conjunction with
the legislation substantial measures were introduced into the Code de Ia
Construction et de L'Habitation ,'° particularly the innovative regime of
compulsoiy insurance of the liabilities to which Articles 1792 and following
give rise. 41 Article 1792 as introduced in 1978 provides:
uEvely person who takes on construction work (tout constucteur) is
liable in law to the employer or the purchaser of the resulting work in
respect of any damage, including the effects of any deficiency in the
ground, which jeopardises the soundness of the work or, by affecting
constituent parts, components or equipment, renders it unfit for its
purpose.
Such liability may only be avoided if the person taking on the work
proves that the damage was caused by cause etrangere 1'42
Article 1792-1' identifies tout constructeur under Article 1792 as including
three groups. First, every architect, contractor, technician or other person
connected44 with the employer by a con trat de Iouage d'ouvrage in respect of
works, from the 1967 amendment. Second, every person who sells, after
completion, works that he has constructed or caused to be constructed. The
vendor of a completely finished building would not have been subject to the
same liability as under a contrat de Iouage d'ouvrage, but only for hidden
defects. By this addition to the ranks of tout constructeur such vendor
carries the same liability. This also applies to the vendor of a building yet to
' Loi no. 78-12 of 4th January, 1978 with effect from 1st January 1979, named after the engineer M.
Spinetta who was the force behind the legislation.
40 Decree no. 78-621 of 31st May 1978.
Code de Ia Construction et de L'Habitation, Section VIII Assurance des travaux de bátiment,
Articles L. 111-27 to L.111-39, and paricularly at L. 111-28.
42 Artide 1792: ut constn.icteur d'un ouage est iesponsable de p/em d,vi( enveis le nzaftre ou
l'acquereur de d'ouvrage, des dornages, niême resultant d'un 'dice du sol, qui compmnettant Ia
solidité de Iouvnrge ou qul, l'affectant dans l'un de sec éiénients constitutIs ou l'un de sos élérnents
d'equipement, le rendent irnpnpm a sa destination. Une telle resposabilité n'a point lieu si le
constzucteurpmu%e que les donunages provennent d'une cause étiangèrn.'
1. Every architect, contractor, technician or other person connected with the employer by a
contmt de louage d'ouwage in respect of works. 2. Eveiy person who sells, after completion, works
that he has constructed or caused to be constructed. 3. Every person who, while acting in the
capacity of "mandataire" carnes out a function similar to that of an owner. employer?'
" This includes any contrOler tecimique or bus eaux de con trOle.
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be constructed by virtue of amendment to incorporate the width of Articles
1792, 1792-1, 1792-2 , and 1792-3 into Article 1646-1. The Code extends the
liabilities of the constructeur to the first vendor of the building to be built,
and to the vendor of a building built for himself.
The third inclusion is everyone who while acting in the capacity of
mandataire implements a function similar to an owner/employer, locateur
d'ouvrage. The contrat de Iouage d'ouvrage is distinct from an agency, and
the constructeur under such engagement, including any architect, is not by
that an agent of the maître d'ouvrage , although an employer may give
power to an architect to act as agent. The project manager is seen as an agent
of the maître d'ouvrage, and whilst in principle the agent would have no
liability for defects this amendment assimilates him as described into the role
and responsibility of constructeur.
Article 1792246 referring to the presomption de responsabilité imposed by
Article 1792 extends the responsibility to damage affecting the reliability of
the component parts or equipment fitted into a building but only when they
form an integral part of the services, foundations or framework of it,
whether by enclosure or cladding. The equipment element is taken as an
integral part when its removal, dismantling or replacement cannot be
carried out without deterioration to or loss of function of the structure.
Other items of equipment in the building are, by Article 1792-3, subject to a
guarantee of proper performance, garan tie de bon fonctionnement but with
Article 1646-1 as introduced by Law no. 78-12 of 4th Januaty 1978 with effect from 1st Januaiy 1979:
"Le vendeur dun immeuble I canstniire est tenu. a conipter de Ia reception des travawç des
obligations dont les ardiitectes, entrepreneuis et autres personnes liées au n1aftre de I'ouvrage par
un contrat de Iouage d'ouviage sont eux-niêrnes tenus en application des articles 1792; 1792-1,
1792-2 et 1792-3 du present code. Les gazanfies bénéficient aw. pmpnétaires successifs de
linrmeuble.lI ny ama pas lieu a resolution de 1 vente ou a diminution du prn si le vendeur
sob!ige a réparer les dommages définis aux articles 1792, 1792-1 et 1792-2 du present code et a
assumer Ia gazantie prevue a Particle 1792-3."
[The vendor of property in the course of construction is liable, with effect from the acceptance of the
works, in respect of those obligations for which arvhitects, contractors and others in contract with an
employer in respect of works are themselves liable under articles 1792, 1792-1, 1792-2 and 1792-3 of
the current code. Neither resolution of the sale nor a diminution in price can take the place of this
obligation if the vendor agrees to repair the damage referred to in artides 1792,1792-1 and 1792-2 of
the cunent code and adopts the guarantee provided for in article 1792-3.)
Article 1792-2: "La presomption de iesponsabilite établie par l'arfide 1792 s'etend également aux
doinnrages qui affectant La solidité des éléments d'équipement d'un bAilment, mais seulement
lorsque ceux-d font indissociablement cozps avec les ouwages de viabilité, de fondation,
d'ossature, de cbs ou couveit. Un élément d'équipement est considéré conune fonnant
indissociablernent cozps avec l'un des ouvrages mentionnés a l'alinéa précédent kue sa depose
ou enlévenient de matièi de cet ouviage.
Article 1792-3: Les autres éléments d'equipement du bAtinient font l'objet d'une garantie de bonfonctionnenient d'une duthe nuniinaie de deux ans a compter de la thception de I'ouvzage'.
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a limitation period of two years from reception.
The manufacturer of components in the building or parts, or an item of
equipment purpose-built for the works is, by Article 17924,48 jointly liable
under Articles 1792, 1792 2 and 1792-3 where the component is incorporated
unmodified and in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Where
the item is imported, the importer bears the responsibility of the
manufacturer.
The vital distinction between mandatory, droit imperitif or d'ordre publiq
and non-mandatory droit suppletif , rules in the Code was not left to
subsequent decision for Article 1792-5 stipulates that any attempt to exclude
or limit the responsibilies imposed by Articles 1792, 1792-1 and 1792-2 or to
exclude the guarantee under Article 1792-3 or to limit the range of Article
1792-4 is void and of no effect.
Whilst Articles '1792 and 2270 are rules of the ordre public and cannot be the
subject of total disclaimer, limitations on the extent of recovery or limitation
of liability may impinge where both parties are building professionals.
Nevertheless where such person knew of a defect or was grossly negligent in
not knowing of it then he would be prohibited from relying on an exclusion
or limitation clause, following from Article 1134 al. 3,49 requiring that
agreements be executed in good faith. The distinction in contractual
relations between commercial men and domestic consumers as to the
validity of exclusions or limitations of liability was recognised by Article
1646-1, and with regard to the, building developer, pmmoteur immobilier,
by Article 1831-1 to -5.
Artide 1792-4: "Le fabricant d'un ouvzage, d'une partie d'ouvrage ou d'un élément d'équipement
conçu et produit pour satisfaire,. en état de sen4ce, a des exigences precises et détennjnées a
!'avance, est solidairement w.sponsable des obligations mises par les articles 179.Z 1792-2 et 1792-3 a
La chae du locateur d'ouwige gui a mis en muvze, sans modification et confonvément aux regles
édictées par le fabncant,. 1"ouvnge. Ia partie d'ouvzge ou élément d"equipement considéth. Sont
assimilés a des ía b:icants po url'application du present article: Ceiw gui a iniporte un ouvrage, une
parite d'ouvrage ou un élément d'equipement fabtique a I'etzangei Celu! gui la presente comme
son ceu en faisant figure sur Iui son nom,. sa snanjue de fabnque ou tout autre signe distinct!! -
Artide 1134 "Les conventions legalernent fonnees tiennent lieu de Jo! a ceux gui les ont faitee.
Files re peuvent et:e zevoquees que de leur consentement neutraL ou pour les cau que La lol
autonse. Files doivent eti executees de bonne foi"' ["Agreements when legally made are binding
under law between those between whom they are made. They may only be rescinded by mutual
consent or on grounds provided by law. They must be executed in good faith.1
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The regime provides for defects arising after completion, but an obligation to
complete works carries with it the obligation to complete them properly on
their face without apparent defects and is that of achieving completion.
Practical realities of building weighed against reluctance to impose acceptance
on an owner utilising uncompleted or defective works constructed on his
land, and led to a balancing of interests. Completion is achieved by
acceptance of the works, but the obligation and right of contractors to remedy
defects continues, as opposed to the obligation to pay damages. Article 1792-6
approaches this by reference to reception and the imposition of a one year
defects liability period, garantie de parfait achèvement
For the duration of the warranty under Article 1792, Article 2270 provides
that every person, natural or legal, who may be liable by virtue of Articles
1792-4 is released from the liability and guarantees imposed by the
application of Articles 1792 to 1792-2 ten years after acceptance of the works
or, by the application of Article 1792-3, on the expiration of the period
prescribed by that Article, namely two years.
4	 Eng'and
Implication of terms
The primary obligation is to perform the contract in accordance with its
terms. A useful expression is in Aldersiade v Hendon Laundry Ltd.:51
". what I may call the hard core of the contract, the real thing to which
the contract is directed, is the obligation of the Defendants to launder.
That is the primary obligation. It is the contractual obligation which
must be performed according to its terms, and no question of taking
due care enters into it. The Defendants undertake, not to exercise due
care in laundering the customers' goods, but to launder them, and if
they fail to launder them it is no use their saying 11we did our best, we
exercised due care and took reasonable precautions, and we are very
sorry if as a result the linen is not properly laundered." That is the
essence of the contract ...".
Implied terms may be required and the obligation on contractors to perform
° Considered under Completion and Acceptance of Work, La Reception.
' Aldersiade v Hendon Laundty Ltd. (1945) 1K.B. 189 (CA) per Lord Greene M.R. a case on the ability
to rely on the terms of a clause limiting liability.
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work with all proper skill and care, expressed as in a good and workmanlike
manner, is a usual term implied where no express terms make similar or
other provision. The degree of skill will involve a court in considering the
circumstances of the contract and such degree of skill as expressly was or
impliedly ought to be within the professed function of the contractor. Where
materials are involved the usual implied term is that they shall be of good
quality. The third usual implied term is one of fitness for purpose of the
work as completed, but this involves the employer making known to the
contractor the particular purpose for which the work is to be done and the
circumstances showing that the employer relied on the contractor's skill and
judgment in the matter52
In respect of the first of the usual implied terms, the degree of skill implied
derives from the lex artis and it was same guiding civil law maxim to which
recourse was made in the case of Harmer v Cornelius 53 where the nature of
the obligation incumbent on a skilled labourer, artisan or artist was identified
as the implied warranty that such persons "possess and exercise reasonable
skill in their several arts". The profession of an art amounted to a
representation "to all the world that the professor possesses the requisite
ability and skill". In this sense considerations of negligence enter into the
question of breach of contract.
The effect of the implied term as to quality renders the contractor liable for
latent defects even though the employer may have chosen the materials and
even though there may have been no lack of care or skill on the part of the
contractor, Young &Marten Ltd v McManus Childs Ltd.54 Certainly, the
express terms and surrounding circumstances of the contract are paramount
as to whether and the extent to which terms are to be implied, but, once
implied that the completed work is to be fit for its purpose, unanticipated
difficulty, or even impossibility in achieving the result desired, will not avail
the contractor in escaping from liability55
52 Such reliance need not be total or exclusive, as where certain matters are specified in great detail
and others left to the skill of a contractor, Cammell Laird & Co. v The Manganese Bmnze and Brass
Company (1934) AC 402.
1-larmer v Cornelius (1858) 5 CB (NS) 236, adopting the maxim: 'spondet pentiam artis - Imperitia
culpae adnumeratur".
Young and Marten Limited v McManus Childs Limited (1969) 1 AC 454.
" Thom v London Corporation (1876) 1 App. Cas. 120.
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The facility with which discussion of implied terms in English building
contracts takes place must be tempered by reference to the necessity for
implication. Where comprehensive general conditions are incorporated as
terms of the contract together with specifications and bills of quantities with
detailed preliminaries, there is very little scope for implication. 56
 In the case
of sales of uncompleted houses the implication of the three usual terms as to
workmanship, materials and fitness for habitation has become tantamount
to a rule of law where such terms are not expressly excluded. The practice,
dependent upon economic circumstances, of leaving dwellings without the
completion of final matters such as decorations or sanitary or kitchen fittings
so as to permit a choice by the purchaser does not mean that the implications
of the terms is restricted only to those matters uncompleted at the time of
contract but they extend to the whole construction already carried out.57
In terms of remedies for defective work, subject always to express terms the
medium of damages will impinge on the ability of the contractor to recover
payment, when the question whether entire performance is a condition
precedent becomes material with the application of the principle of
substantial completion.
The basis of liability for defects in English law so far as implied terms extend
is not dependent upon fault but on an objectively viewed standard derived
from the deemed possession of the requisite ability and skill on the part of
the contractor. On the continent, however, the duty to warn becomes
important and reflects the support for the strict liability of the contractor,
particularly where the employer is not a building professional.
A Duty to Warn
This aspect highlights the different development of civil law and English
law. From Roman law the nature of a contractor's task was seen as an
Nevertheless the law will imply such usual terms as have been refermd to above unless the parties
have indicated an intention to exclude or modify them Liverpool City Council v Irwin (1977) AC 239.
Perryv Shamn Development Co. Ltd (1937)4 All ER. 390; Hancock v Brazier (Anerley) Limited (1966)
2A11 E.R.901.
Considered under Reception and Payment.
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obligation to achieve the result, and this was carried into civil law to produce
a liability of the contractor for non-achievement of the end. English legal
analysis of the promise and degree of reliance upon the contractor may
achieve the same result through the mechanism of a term of fitness for
purpose, even where compliance with terms as to workmanship and
matenals is achieved. Essentially the difference in approach derives from the
status of the contract or obligation to build afforded by the civil law and the
view of the particular contractual obligation in English law.
Whilst undoubtedly changes in the works necessitated by defective plans or
specifications may be made upon the intervention or advice of the contractor,
the question arises whether and to what extent a contractor owes a duty
under English law to examine the plans and specifications that he receives
for omissions or defects and to warn the employer if he concludes that
performance by him in accordance with those plans and specification will
result in an unsatisfactory job.
Stated in this way, the question is whether there is an overriding duty to say
that what is required by contract to be performed will or may not achieve
what is or might or should be perceived as the end result of the bargain.
Assuming a contract to build to a certain specification or plan the answer to
the question would have to lie in the contract by express or implied terms,
and such a duty might conflict with that central contract obligation. Equally
the scope for a duty at common law in tort would be limited or negated in
this way. The crucial aspect is the extent to which the contractor is relied on
for his skill and judgment, and the nature of that reliance.
English courts have considered the question in various contexts. Duncan v
BIundeiI 59 concerned an instruction to install a stove, which the defendant
implemented, unsuccessfully, by laying a tube under the floor to vent the
smoke. The principle applied was:
"Where a person is employed in a work of skill, the employer buys
both his labour and his judgment; he ought not to undertake the work
if he cannot succeed, and he should know whether it will or not; of
course it is otherwise if the party employing him should supersede the
workman's judgment by using his own."
Duncan v Blundell (1820) 3 Stark. 6.
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Although authority that in circumstances of a contract for labour and
materials a contractor may have obligations covering design and the ultimate
achievement of the employer's scheme in terms of fitness for purpose, the
qualification to the general statement of principle operates when translating
such obligation into the context of substantial building contracts.
In Lynch v Thorne 6° the contractor complied exactly with the drawings and
specifications forming part of the contract, and was not liable for an obvious
defect in the house. The central argument was on an implication of a
warranty that the house would be fit for habitation, for the purposes of which
it was admitted that the employer relied on the contractor. Both the
implication and a duty to warn were rejected:
". there was an express contract as to the way in which the house was
to be completed. The express provisions were exactly complied with,
and any variation from them which would have rendered this wall
waterproof would have been a deviation from the express language of
the contract."
The result was criticised substantially on the point of implication, not directly
on the refusal to impose a duty to warn, but the result was to negate a liability
on contractor who had performed precisely his contractual obligation where
that result was defective otherwise than through breach of his obligation.
The distinction between the implication of the term and the imposition of
such a duty, contractual or otherwise, is not semantic. Compliance with an
implied term of suitability necessarily involves contractors examining the
drawings and specifications. An obligation to provide a building that is fit for
habitation or suitable may well override bare compliance with plans
depending on the skill and judgment required to be exercised to achieve the
object. Where such an obligation is imposed, the liability for any errors that
may generically be design effectively becomes joint and several in the absence
of any contrary provision between the designer and builder. Under such
responsibility, contractors would be bound to warn employers of any defects
or omissions in the drawings and specifications for them to be remedied and
for them to escape liability. This would minor an obligation under a duty to
° Lynch v Thome (1956) 1 W.L.R. 303 (CA), per Loiti Evershed,. M.R.; the facts concerned a wall which,
though constructed in accordance ith the plan, could not keep out driving rain.
210
warn.
Within the last decade first instance decisions in EDAC v Moss 61 and
Manchester University v Wilson & Womersley 62 involved finding a duty to
warn the employer through his agent the architect. In EDA c the
conclusion was to imply a term into the main contract to give business
efficacy and to implement the intentions of the parties that the contractor
should warn the employer of any design defects that became known during
the work.64 In the Manchester University case the judge followed his
decision in EDAC and found an implied term for the contractors to warn of
defects "which they believed to exist" which was circumscribed and "did not
require them to make a critical survey of the drawings, bills and
specifications, looking meticulously for mistakes ... the ... obligation to warn
arose when, in the light of their general knowledge and practical experience,
they came to believe than an aspect of the design was wrong." 65
 This stops
short of a policing exercise, beyond the traditional division of function
between architect and contractor. The justification for the duty in EDAC was
that if a contractor knew of design defects it would be absurd not to inform
Equitable Debenture Assets Corporation Limited v William Moss (1984) 2 Constrruction Law
Reports 1; a case involving defective curtain walling, where the defects were as a result of both poor
design by the specialist curtain-walling sub-contractor and the bad workmanship of the main
contractor.
62 Victoria University of Manchester v. Wilson and Womersley and Pochin (Contractors) Limited
(1984) 2 Construction Law Reports 43.
The reasoning was" ... if on examining the drawings or as a result of experience on site Moss formed
the opinion that in some respect the design would not work, or would not work satisfactorily, it would
have been absurd for them to have camed on implementing it just the same. ... if the directors of
EDAC and of Moss had been asked at the time when the contract was made what Moss should do in
those circumstances, they would have agreed at once that Moss should communicate their opinion
to Morgan. ... therefore, ... in order to give efficay to the contract, the term requiring Moss to warn of
design defects as soon as they came to believe that they existed was to be implied in the contract."
The judge also considered that the duty to warn should also be imposed on the main contractor as
part of his duty of care in tort. As the content and extent of such a duty was co-existent with that
under the contract, the issue did not form a material part of the judgment and was not analysed.
64 To support the conclusion, reliance was placed on the Canadian case of Brunswick Construction Ltd.
v Nowlan (1974) 21 B.L.R. 27, Supreme Court of Canada. Contractors agreed to build a dwelling
based on drawings and a specification prepared by an independent architect. As a result of design
defects there was leakage but the contractors were held liable on the basis that they, as experienced
contractors, should have known of the defects in design and were consequently under a duty to warn
the employer of the danger inherent in executing the plans previded. This was a majority decision;
per Ritchie, J. "In my opinion a contractor of this experience should have recognised the defects in
the plans which were obvious to the architect subsequently employed by the (owner) and knowing of
the reliance which was being placed upon it. I think that the (contractor) was under a duty to warn
the (owner) of the danger inherent in executing the plans ...".
° Victoria University of Manchester v. Wilson and Womersley and Pochin (Contractors) Limited
(1984) 2 Construction Law Reports 43; "Belief that there were defects required more than mere
doubt as to the correctness of the design, but less than actual knowledge of errers." The case
concerned cladding, although cladding to a relatively new design which had, in due course, fallen
away in certain areas. The contractor was again employed on the JCT Standard Form of Contract
(1963 edition), and again the employer employed an architect.
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the employer, but, equally, a contractor knows that he must abide by his
contract and comply with the plans and specifications to avoid being in
breach. Such approach could ovemde the promise to perform in accordance
with the contract; and to resort to the description of absurdity may be a
disguise for a decision to relieve the employer from the consequences of a
contract to build to a deficient specification.
This point was revisited in Glasgow University v Whitfield & Laing
Construction ,66 after Muirhead v Industrial Tanks 67 and Simaan v
Pilkington •68 The contractor was a third party, and the claim of a duty to
warn was made by the defendant architect.' 9
 The judgment rejected the duty
either in contract or in tort/° and, based on Tai Hing Cotton 11 and Lynch v
Thrn it concluded that U there was no room for the implication in the
contract of an implied duty to warn the building owner of defects in the
architect's design .J'.
An obligation to warn is appropriate in circumstances where the employer
expressly or by necessary implication makes known to the contractor reliance
on him to exercise the skill and judgment of a contractor,74
 and within that
The University of Glasgow v William Whitfield & John Laing (Construction) Ltd (Thini Party). (1988)
42 B.L.R. 66. The University employed Whitfield as architect, and Laing as contractor, on the JCT
1963 Standanl Fonn. The design defect in this case led to leaks of water and condensation.
' Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities (1986) Q.B. 507 (CA.).
° Simaan General Contracting Company v Pilkington Glass Ltd (1987) 1 WL.R. 516 (CA).
The architects' claim under the Qvil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. The difficulty the architect
faced was that under transitional provisions there was no entitlement to recover contribution by
reference to any liability based on breach of an obligation assumed before the date when the Act
came into force. The contractors' obligations were assumed well before that, and the architects were
unable to daim any contribution based on any alleged breach of the contract between contractor
and employer.
° No duty to warn existed in tort as the duty of care was only where a risk of damage to persons or
other property was concerned; in this case any loss suffered was purely economic and irrecoverable
In any event. Where a detailed contract existed between the parties, there could be no room for the
Implication of a duty to warn about possible defects in design.
Tel Fling Cotton Mill v Liu Chong Fling Bank (1986) AC. 80 (P.C.). The finding on contractual liability
was crucial because of the conclusion that there should be no wider duty in tort than there was in
contract, following Tal Hing where it was, at p. 107, not accepted - ... that the parties' mutual
obligations in tort can be any greater than those to be found expressly or by necessaly implication in
their contract.
72 (1956) 1 WL.R. 303 (CA.). The passage relied on was "...where there is a written contract expressly
setting forth the bargain between the parties, it is, as a general rule, also well established that you
only imply terms under the necessity of some compulsion., at p. 306.
EDAC and Manchester University were distinguished on the ground that there the judge had in
mind the situation where the contractor knew that the owner placed reliance on him in the matter of
design. (1988) 42 B.LR. 66. They - ... can stand with more recent decisions if they are read as cases
where there was a special relationship between the parties, but not otherwise ....
When a tem as to fitness for purpose would onlinarily be implied, IBA v EMI Electronics Ltd. and
BICC Construction Ltd (1980)14 B.L.R. 1 (H.L).
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standard design defects are apparent. tm
 Where such a duty imposes
obligations on the contractor, 16
 those obligations should be restricted so that if
in the course of the performance of his basic duties under the contract to
follow the design as received, the contractor discovers by reason of his
knowledge and experience that the design is incomplete or patently deficient
in any way, he should not cariy on and build in accordance with that design
without drawing attention to the matter so that it might be remedied by
variation."
There is no such term in JCT 8O, nor in the ICE Conditions, 5th or 6th
Editions, nor in FIDIC. On the contraly the ICE based forms contain an
express statement which ordinarily would override implication of a term as
to warning. The ICE 5th edition provides in clause 8 (2):
"The Contractor shall take full responsibility for the adequacy, stability
and safety of all site operations and methods of construction, provided
that the Contractor shall not be responsible for the design or
specification of the Permanent Works (except as may be expressly
provided in the Contract) or of any Temporary Works designed by the
Engineer."
This would not, however, mean that if, for example, the contractor sees that
the engineer's design of a temporary cofferdam is bound to fail, he is obliged
to go ahead with the works and has no obligation to warn the client or the
engineer as his agent, of the dangers involved.79
Even where a concurrent duty in tort exists a claim in tort cannot be used to
escape the effect of contract provisions. 80
 Although a time barred contract
claim does not itself debar an action in tort during the potentially longer
Lindenberg v Canning (1992) 29 Construction L.R. 70 at 81.
Why this does not arise as a matter of course in building work is because of the role of the architect;
the captain of the ship, as it is sometimes descibed.
The point arose in the Abbeystead disaster case, Eckersley v Binnie & Partners (1988) 18 Con. LR. 1,
and the nature of the obligation of the contractor there led to the conclusion per Bingham U. at p.
147: They were simply employed to build the tunnel, and while they were bound to do that in a
competent, professional and safe way, they were not bound to do more than that.
Save for giving notice if divergence between statutozy requirements andthe contract documents is
found.
As postulated in Eckersley v Binnie & Partners by Russell U. at p. 68, and in relationship to the
workforce.
William I-fill Organisation Ltd. v Bernard Sunley Ltd. (1983) 22 B.L.R. I (CA.), where the plaintiff
could not rely on a claim in tort to escape the effect of a final certificate.
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limitation period, Pirelli V Oscar Faber 81 is unlikely to provide guidance for
the future, and the approach is like;y to be as applied In Nitrigin Eirann v
Inco Alloys Ltd 82 Under a building contract where the architect designs and
the contractor constructs it will not be often that there will be found the
necessary degree of reliance by the employer on the contractor in matters of
design for liability in tort to arise.
Whilst Murphy v Brentwood has restricted recoverability of economic loss,
the decision did not affect such recoverability where there is a sufficient
relationship of proximity to allow operation of the Hedley Byrne principle.84
If it applies between sub-contractor and employer, then it may equally apply
between main contractor and employer, and whilst it may have been thought
that Hedley Byrne liability was restricted to professionals, there is no good
ground for distinguising or excluding contractors, for the requirement is
that the person making the representation professes some special knowledge
or expertise.
If the contractor's liability to his employer in tort for pure economic loss
comes only within the Hedley Byrne category then this may impede a duty
to warn, it being a positive requirement of providing advice. Whilst it has
been suggested that "professional advice may be too narrow a definition in
this context. Negligent professional acts or omissions, if advisory in nature,
may be regarded as breaches of duty leading to recoverable pure economic
loss ... This could always prove a Trojan Horse for duties to warn and other
II Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd. v Oscar Faber & Partners (1983) 2 A.C. 1, where the existence of a
cause of action in tort was assumed on the then state of the law from the fact of damage to the
chimney itself. In L.ancashire and Cheshire Associaciation of Baptist Churches Inc. v Howard &
Seddon Partnership (1993) 3 All E.R. 467, It was held that a duty of care actionable in tort could exist
where the parties were in a contractual professional relationship, to provide a right of action where
the daim for breach of contract was statute barred.
82 Nitrigin Eirann v Inco Alloys Ltd. (1992)1 W.L.R 498, where Pirelli was distinguished and a defect in
quality not causing physical damage was found not to have started time running.
83 Murphy v Brentwood District Counci (1990) 1 AC. 398. This is considered further under Fault, Tort
and Economic loss.
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller & Partners (1964) A.C. 465. In Murphy it was affIrmed that the
relationship between a sub-contractor and his employer could still give rise to a Hedley Byrne
liability, (1990) 1A.C. 398; per Lord Keith: lt would seem that in a case such as Pirelli, where the
tortious liability arose out of a contractual relationship with professional people, the duty extended
to take reasonable care not to cause economic loss to the client by the advice given ... I regard Junior
Books .. as being an application of that pnndple."
Morgan Crucible Co. v Hill Samuel Bank (1991) 1 All ER. 148.
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generic liabilities ••,s86 It may be a Trojan Horse for holding that a contractor
is in breach of a professional duty if he fails to warn of a defect in a design,
but if physical loss resulted from a defect in design of which the contractor
failed to warn, then where there is reliance the contractor will still be liable
in tort to the employer, not under Hedley Byrne, but under a Donoghue v
Stephenson duty including one to take reasonable care to avoid omissions,
as well as acts, which can reasonably be foreseen as likely to injure.
The ability of an employer to show reliance will depend on the extent to
which he engages professionals and the decision in Pacific Associates Inc. v
Baxter confirms the long held view that "the engineer has no duty to the
contractor as such to detect or prevent faults in temporary works (or the
permanent works). The engineer is appointed to protect the employer, not
the contractor." 9° However, the position of the employer is markedly clearer
in civil law jurisdictions. In France the Cour de Cassation has consistently
held that a contractor who fails to caution against risks involved in the
execution of the plans may incur liability for damages, although an exception
is made in respect of the employer who himself is competent in construction
work.
Contractors are perceived as having responsibilities to the owner that
overlap those of the maitre d'oeuvre , and there is not a demarcation as
From Professor P. Capper's paper at the 3rd Annual Construction Conference, Kings College,
London. September 1990, Legal Obligations in Construction. Professor P. Capper's point was by
reference to Ross v Caunters (1980) 1 Ch. 297, which has been approved in White v Jones (1993) 3 All
E.R. 481.
Donoghue v Stephenson (1934) A.C. 562.
In Lancashire and Cheshire Associaciation of Baptist Churches Inc. v Howard & Seddon
Partnership (1993) 3 All E.R. 467, the submission of designs was found not to be for the purpose of a
statement as to their technical qualities, and as the loss was purely economic no duty to prevent
such existed.
Pacific Associates Inc. v Baxter (1990)1 Q.B. 993; "The argument often put forwaed in practice that it
is somehow an excuse for faults in workmanship or materials that they were not objected to by the
engineer or resident, is to imply that the employer is in a worse position if he engages engineers to
supervise the contractor than if he does not.
M.W. Abrahamson,. Engineering Law and the ICE Contracts, from the 4th Edition, 1979, at p. 53.
Cass. civ. 13th May 1971; Bull. civ. 1971 Ill 212 No. 297.
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referred to in Clayton v Woodman •92 The contracto?s function is not seen
as an instrument for cariying out the orders and following the design
decisions of the architect, rather his is a professional function to make
himself aware of potential problems including basic errors in design and
construction and call attention to them. This is seen in AFNOR 91 by the
provision which formally requires the contractor both before the works begin
and during construction to bring to the attention of the maitre d'oeuvre any
defects or problems resulting from errors or omissions that he finds in
documents or in orders he receives. 93
 The consequence of the obligation of
this nature is a sharing of responsibility for the successful outcome of the
work and for problems of design as well as construction.
The function of the contractor is in France also taken as an incident of his
status and with this status comes the duty to advise the employer. This is
provided for by Article 1135 of the Code Civil which creates an affirmative
duty to advise and provide information about the difficulties or risks that
may be encountered in the execution of the works, 94
 even to the extent of
matters falling outside the confines of the contract, for instance risks to
neighbouring land, potential disadvantages of the construction processes
being used, or difficulties with soil conditions.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that English law is deficient in
terms of obligations imposed on a contractor compared with civil law
jurisdictions. Obligations imposed on the contractor in English law show
that the ultimate responsibility for matters of design may fall on the
contractor in ways unconnected with a duty to warn in the sense that the
question posed at the outset suggests.
92 Clayton v. Woodrnan & Son (Builders) Ltd. (1%2) 1 W.LR. 585; Pearson, L.J. at 593: it is important
that the responsibility of the builder should not be overlaid or confused by any doubt as to where his
province begins or some other persons province ends in that respect. The architect, on the other
hand, is engaged as the agent of the owner for whom the building is being erected, and his function
Is to make sure that in the end, when the woi4 has been completed, the owner will have a building
properly constructed in accordance with the contract, plans, specifications and drawings, and any
supplementaiy instructions which the architect may have given ... It is the function and right of the
builder to cany out his own building operations as he thinks fit...".
° AFNOR 91, Article 5.4.
Artide 1135: "'Los conventions obligent non seulement a ce quly est expilme, mais encore a toutes
los suites que equit4 lusage ou lo bA donnet a lobligation d'apres sa nature."' [Agreements are
binding not only as to what is expressed, but also as to the consequences which equit4 usage or law
imposes on the obligation, according to its nature.1
216
The existence of an obligation to build fit for the purpose will necessarily
involve the contractor in the detailed examination of the design which he is
obliged to follow. Likewise, the obligations to build in a workmanlike
manner and use proper materials might well be breached in the event of the
building ultimately being unfit, albeit by reason of matters which may in one
sense be problems of design.95 Further, if the contractor takes on an obligation
to achieve a particular purpose or function, he will not be relieved of the
duty to achieve that particular purpose or function by the deficiency of
designs which he is also under a contractual duty to follow. 96
 In the context
of the purpose of a building contract, an express obligation to achieve the end
may override, and failure will result in liability notwithstanding that the
secondary obligation has been complied with, 91
 so where the contractor is
under such an obligation he becomes involved in similar activities in
relation to the examination of design documents as he would be obliged to
carry out in pursuance of a duty to warn under the law as it appears in civil
law jurisdictions.
This proposition as to English law must be found in a warranty that the work
will be fit for its purpose. A warranty may be implied from facts showing
that the employer made known the particular purpose to the contractor or
that the work was of a kind which the contractor held himself out as skilled
in performing and that the employer relied on the contractor's skill and
judgment. 98 To meet such warranty the contractor may well have to do more
physically than the contract on its face expressly requires of him. Whilst an
obligation to conform with detailed plans and specifications not of his own
responsibility will reduce the scope for the operation of such an implied
warranty it may apply to parts of the worlç 99
 or further; the duty to comply
D. Comes, Design Liability in the Construction lndusti 4th ed., 1994.
This view is supported in Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts, 10th Edition p.29l: "So a
contractor will sometimes expressly undertake to cariy out work which will perform a certain duty or
function, in conformity with plans and specifications, and it turns out that the works constructed in
accordance with the plans and specifications wi1i not perform that duty or function. It would appear
that generally the express obligation to construct a work capable of cariying out the duty in question
overrides the obligation to comply with the plans and specifications, and the contractor will be liable
for the failure of the work notwithstanding that it is camed out in accordance with the plans and
spedfications.
Hence, the use of the performance specification.
" Cammell-Laird & Co Ltd. v Manganese Bmnze & Brass Co. Ltd. (1934) A.C. 402 (H.L.); partial
reliance suffices.
Greaves & Co. Ltd. v Baynham Meikle (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1098; where engineers engaged by a
contractor to design a floor to enable the contractors to fulfil their contract were in the facts taken to
have rmpliedly warranted the suitability of their design for the particular purpose.
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with detailed plans or specifications may be subsumed in an express
warranty.'°°
Defective Premises Act
Of underrated significance is the Defective Premises Act 1972,101 which has an
important bearing although its ambit is dwellings.' 02
 A duty is created:
'4... to see that the work which he takes on is done in a workmanlike
or, as the case may be, professional manner, with proper materials and
so that as regards that work the dwelling will be fit for habitation when
completed."°3
It is owed by "A person taking on work for or in connection with the
provision of a dwelling" whether by erection, conversion or enlargement
and the manner of compliance with that duty is defined:
"A person who takes on any such work for another on terms that he is
to do it in accordance with those instructions given by or on behalf of
that other shall be the extent to, which he does it properly in
accordance with those instructions, be treated for the purposes of this
section as discharging the duty imposed on him by sub-section (1)
above except where he owes a duty to that other to warn him of any
defects in the instructions and fails to discharge that duty"°4
It covers all those who might equally come within Article 1792 - I of the Code
Civil, whether architects, builders or others.105
The exception to the fulfilment of the duty by compliance with instructions
does not impose any duty to warn, nor does it identify a universally
Steel Co. of Canada Ltd. v Willand Management Ltd (1966) S.C.R. 746.
'°' In force from 1st January 1974. Introduced as "An Act to impose duties in connection with the
provision of dwellings ..7.
102 The buildings in the duty to warn cases referred to above were not dwellings, but the Act was not
referred in any of them in relation to the alleged duty to warn.
'° Section 1 (1). This imposes liability for non-feasance as well as misfeasance, as where necessazy
work has not been done, as well as done badly; and unfitness may exist from that failure even




''Joseph, her husband, by profession a carpenter". There is no bar to contractors or subcontractors
having to see that the work taken on is done in a professional manner in circumstances where it
might be appropriate in place of "workmanlike". The obligation, to see that the work is done with
proper materials and as reganis that work the dwelling is fit for habitation when completed, is
applicable to builder and architect alike and conversely prevides no basis for detracting from the
architects duty to see that the work is done in a workmanlike manner.
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applicable duty to warn of defects in instructions; where those instructions
certainly will, probably will, possibly will, might or might possibly, in
circumstances that certainly will, etc., occur; give rise to some deficiency in
the dwelling. It leads to the search for circumstances where a duty exists on
the part of a person who takes on work in connection with the provision of a
dwelling and who receives instructions, to warn against defects in them.106
The compliance with instructions is applicable to "A person who takes on
any such work on terms that he is to do it in accordance with instructions
given by or on behalf of that other ..." but:
"A person shall not be treated ... as having given instructions for the
doing of work merely because he has agreed to the work being done in
a specified manner; with specified materials or to a specified design."
The taker-on of work cannot rely on the fact of agreement by the giver of
instructions for doing the work or design in a specified manner and with
specified materials, as securing the first bastion towards compliance, namely
"instructions given". This provides for both the layman position of an
owner equivalent to the view taken of him in French law, and an attempt to
negate the effect of a contractual obligation to carry out and complete works
in accordance with plans, drawings and specifications as found in Lynch v
Thorne.
If this aspect is correct then the effect, without reference to the statutory
acknowledgement of a duty to warn, is that the traditionally conceived but
statutorily imposed obligations as to workmanlike manner, proper materials
and fitness for habitation override, and give rise to liability despite
contractual obligations that would result in a defective dwelling. On this
basis the mechanism available to the builder as in Lynch v Thome , 107
avoidance of liability for transgression of his statutory duty would in truth be
"a deviation from the express language of the contract", and a breach of
contract.
Contractual provisions specifying the manner; materials and design would be
'° The search may be helped by reference to instructions but, it is suggested that, unless it results in
the existence of the duty depending upon the provision of a dwelling and fitness for habitation, the
duty to warn of defects in instructions is of general application and not limited to dwellings.
107 With "an express contract as to the way in which the house was to be completed" and where any
variation from the expi-ess provision would have rendered this wall waterproof". Expressions from
Lotti Evershed M.R. (1956) 1 W.L.R. 303.
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regarded as "instructions" albeit that "merely agreed" connotes passivity as
distinct from required with knowledge, but, as agreement to have works
done in a specified manner, materials or design is not to be taken as "having
given" instructions, then the scope for recourse to compliance with
instructions as an escape and thus to a duty to warn is likely to be minimal.
The same would apply to instructions by way of variation.
Within the JCT forms were provisions which may have been in mind. In
the 1963 edition if the contractor found any discrepancy in or divergence
between the contract drawings, Bills of Quantities, instructions issued by the
architect or further drawings or documents issued he was obliged to give
notice of it.' Additionally, under an obligation to comply with Acts of
Parliament, regulations or bylaws, if the contractor found any divergence
between the statutory requirements and any of the documents so mentioned
or a variation instruction he was again obliged to give notice.'°9
 These reflect
an obligation only in circumstances where his particular knowledge and skill
actually alerts him to deficiencies in what is being required.
The duty to see that the work taken on is done in a workmanlike manner,
with proper materials and so as to be fit for habitation cannot by virtue of
Section 6(3) be excluded by any contractual term, and any such term which
purports to or has the effect of excluding or restricting the operation of the
provisions of the Act or any liability arising by virtue of them is void." 0
 It is
unlikely that any different duty applies where there is an obligation to build
so as to achieve fitness for purpose in works other than dwellings, albeit
reliance is the touchstone. Total and exclusive reliance is not necessary but
rather reliance on the taker on of work to some substantial extent as regards
his skill and experience." This is entirely consistent with the proposition in
Duncan v Blundell, and reflects the status and obligations of such persons
under civil law.
The Law Commission report recommending legislation categorised premises
'°' 
.JCT Clause 1(2): now clause 2.3 of the JCT 1980 edition.
'°° JCT Clause 4(1); now clause 6.1 of JCT 1980 edition.
° So in essence a duty to warn exists as part of the obligation to achieve fitness for habitation.
" Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. v Manganese Bmnze & Brass Co. Ltd. (1934) AC. 492 per Lord Wnght p.
425 to 429. So that he is not a mere ciphet, or as Roman law described it a nudus minister
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as defective in the contractual sense where their condition falls short of the
standard of quality which the purchaser was entitled to expect,' 12
 and properly
contrasted defective premises from the point of view of tort liability as those
which constitute a source of danger to the person or property of those likely
to be in or near them."3
The Commission concluded that caveat emptor should continue to apply to
the sales of dwellings previously occupied, but not for newly built
dwellings,' 14
 for:
"There is no reason why a person who acquires a dwelling from the
builder should have to examine it in detail to see whether it is in a
sound condition. He should be entitled to rely on the diligence and
skill of those whose work has gone into the provision of the dwelling
and he should have a remedy if the dwelling proves to be defective",
so reflecting the French position after 1978. The Commission's proposal was
to avoid the implication of a term of the contract and to impose "an
obligation of more than strictly contractual force since the benefit will pass to
subsequent owners". The result is of major significance in that the duty is
owed to a class far beyond those to whose orders the dwelling is provided,
namely to "every person who acquires an interest (whether legal or
equitable) in the dwelling, so that difficulties associated with assignment of
the building or design contracts do not arise."
The Commission did not think that the escape of showing compliance with
the duty by following instructions should be available "in such cases as
112 Notwithstanding that the required standanl of the duty was seen by the Commission as equating
with the usual trilogy of implied tenns, the Act has been constnied as requiring defects rendering
the dwelling unfit for habitation to be proved, not merely improper workmanship or materials;
Thompson v Clive Alexander & Partners (1992) 59 B.L.R. 77.
" Civil Liability of Vendors and Lessors for Defective Premises, Law Commission No 40 16th
November 1970. This was prophetic as to pmblems relating to the distinction.Because it appears
to have contributed to the existence of some of the deficiencies in the present Law The proper
development of the tortious liability for the nanower range of dangemus defects may have been
inhibited by the envneous belief that this would necessarily entail an extension of the contractual
liability for defects of quality. In fact, while the same premises may be defective in both senses, the
basis of liability is different and independent7
" The Law Commission restricted itself to dwellings on the basis that it was not aware of any
substantial criticism of the then present law as it applied to commercial or industrial premises, and
that whilst the justification for the principal of caveat emptor existed for those premises by the
ability of a purchaser to satisfy himself by survey to ascertain its condition, shortage of living
accommodation had weakened the bargaining position of purchasers of dwellings.
As argued in St Martin's Proprty Coiporation Ltd. v Sir Robert McAlpirie Ltd., heard together and
reported with Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd (1993) 3 W.LR. 408.
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Lynch v Thome P 116 and it was dependent upon whether the employer had
submitted plans and specifications for the builder to comply with, unlike in
Lynch v Thome where the builder provided plans to which the employer
agreed."7 MInstructionshls clearly includes plans and specifications,"9
 but the
extent of the discharge by compliance will depend on the scope attributed to
not treating a person as having given instructions "merely because he has
agreed to the work being done in a specified manner, with specified materials
or to specified design". Restriction derive from mere agreement would
though widen the ability of the builder to show compliance with architect's
plans to achieve discharge; and it widens the scope of inquiry into a duty to
warn.'20
The Commission justified imposing the obligations on professional men,'2'
adding
those who, like specialist sub-contractors, hold themselves out as
possessing skill in designing dwellings and their components have
almost certainly a responsibility under the existing law to warn those
who employ them if the plans or schemes which they prepare for the
The justification for the exemption, or ability to show compliance with the duty by following
instructions was" ... when a builder takes on work under a contract which obliges him to build to a
given design provided by or on behalf of the other party to the contract or in accordance with plans
and specifications provided to him, then his obligation will be discharged if he builds in a
workmanlike manner and with proper materials as specified. It is, of course, not uncommon in
"tailor made" building or conversion for the "building owner" or his architect or surveyor to provide
plans and specifications or to nominate the sub-contractor and specify the materials required for
the performance of the builder's contract. The builder Will not be liable if he adheres to instructions
of these kinds which become terms of his contract provided that so far as his own wozk is concerned
it is done in accordance with his instructions and is done properly.", Law Cctmmission No. 14 para.
29.
The principle of Lynch v Thorne that there was no room for the implication of an implied term as to
fitness for purpose was, as it appears, only sought by the Commission to be overndden where the
employer had agreed on the basis of the builder's plans and specifications and not those of his own
or his agent. "We therefore propose that a "mere agreement" to accept plans, specifications or
other instructions prepared by on or behalf of the other party to the contract should not enable the
latter to escape the rigour of the statutoty obligations. Where, however, the person accepting such
specifications has done so after obtaining independent advice or in reliance upon his own judgment
then to that extent there will be an easing of the statutoly obligation."
Ill The draft Bill recommended by the Law Commission included: "(4) In subsections (2) and (3) above
"Instructions" includes plans and specifications and references to the giving of "instructions" shall
be construed accordingly". This was not included in the legislation.
119 There is express reference to them being given "on behalf or the employer. In these circumstances
the exception from discharge by compliance with such instructions where the builder owes a duty
"to that other to warn him of any defects in the instructions" suggests a limitation of the duty
extending only to warning the employer/owner and not arty architect acting on the owner's behalf.
The narrower perception of a duty to warn dependent on reliance by the employer directly on the
contractor as perceived in the University of Glasgew case is, it is suggested, consistent with this and
more probably correct.
120 Conversely if an owner is taken to have "merely agreed to his architects design then the ability of
the builder to rely on compliance with instructions at all is narrowed.
121 
"The imposition upon such persons of the proposed statutoiy obligation will recognise this
responsibility."
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purpose of use in house-building may result in unfitness for
habitation."
The identified context of the duty to warn, however, had been on the part of
designers whose designs would become or form part of the instructions; but
this perception was not given this limit in the legislation by virtue of the
compendious term "a person taking on work".
The guarantee scheme under the auspices of the National House-Building
Council gave an exemption from of the 1972 Act, as it was until 1979 an
approved scheme, since when this restriction on the operation of the
measure ended. The impact and potential of this short and relatively simple
legislation has not been appreciated to the full. The duty under it is
additional to any duty otherwise owed. Its force will advance as standards of
fitness for habitation advance. Its application cuts swathes through the
murky depths of assignment of contracts and warranties, and rights of action
or suits for the benefit of others, and tort.' 22 The guarantee obligation
subsequent to Ia reception represents the mechanism for recovery in France;
in England there is the action for damages, and for dwellings the perception
that the consumer is poorly served and subject to unnecessary complexity is
unjustifiable. The feature of exemption by compliance with instructions
certainly reflects the influence of the role of the architect, but the
development of the duty to warn may produce a counter-balance. The future
lies in the assimilation into the scheme of all premises and not solely
dwellings.
122 G. Robertson, Defective Premises and Subsequent Purchasers, (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 559; J
.
 Cartwright,
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1	 Retentkxis
The obligation to make interim payments will ordinarily arise either
expressly by the terms of the particular form of contract, and in England by
implication, 1
 but the express terms may provide for retention money to be
deducted and held until completion. 2
 This is a common but not a necessaiy
feature, reflecting a security for due performance in the hands of the
employer and a, hopefully, temporary price reduction for the contractor.
The express provisions of any contract as to the retention money determine
however the point of release by reference to the state of the work
Under the JCT 1980 scheme the retention deductible is five per cent unless
a lower rate is agreed by the parties and specified. 3
 Its deduction is in
permissive terms from the total value of work materials and goods which
falls to be included in any certificate where "practical completion" has not
been achieved.4
 Where "practical completion" has been achieved the effect
is to release one half of the Retention, and the remaining half is then
retainable until the Certificate of Completion of Making Good Defects at
the end of the Defects Uability period.5
Under most building contracts retention is seen as a security held by the
Employer against final completion, and where the term "practical
The Tergeste (1903) P. 26. Considered under Reception and Payment.
2 
"Then entire performance is usually a condition precedent to payment of the retention money
but not, of course, to the progress payments. The contractor is entitled to payment pro rata as the
work proceeds, less a deduction for retention money. But he is not entitled to the retention money
until the rk is entirely finished, without defects or omissions., Denning U. in Hoemg v Isaacs
(1952) 2 All ER. 176 at 181.
' Clause 30.4.1.1. Three per cent is usual for contracts whose value is over £500,000.
Clauses 301 and 30.4.11.
Clauses 17.4 and Clauses 30.4.13. Earlier forms had made release of the retention dependent on
ceitification for that purpose.
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completion" is used then it is to be taken as complete in every sense and
without patent defects.' Final completion depends on the nature and
extent of the contractor's responsibilities under the contract after practical
completion. This state of practical completion derives from the JCT
scheme where it is only in respect of defects appearing after that time that
there is an obligation during and at the conclusion of the Defects Liability
Period to remedy them. Hence the reduction in retention under JCT 1980,
but to allow a contractor to recover retentions when there are patent defects
would defeat their purpose.
The condition of release of the second half of a retention at the end of a
defects liability or maintenance period is a sensible and practical benefit to
an Employer, for the use and occupation of works for a period after
"practical completion" provides the opportunity for the works to be truly
tested and defects that may not have been apparent to come to light. The
formal aspect of a Certificate of Making Good Defects in the JCT 1980
scheme recognises a stricter approach to the release of retention on final
completion of all contract obligations. 7 The point identifies the basis of
sanction against failure of the contractor to perform completely as within
the concept of entire contracts.
Where retained by an employer questions arise as to the basis upon which
it is held and the rights of others in respect of it. This is particularly
important both in the case of sub-contractors whose work and materials
have been the subject of such retention, and in circumstances of
insolvency. The mechanism of the trust has been deployed, and the
forerunner was the F.AS.S. form of sub-contract 8
 of which Clause 11(h)
provided that to the extent that an amount retained by the employer under
the main contract included retentions under the sub-contract then the
main contractor's interest in it was fiduciary as trustee for the sub-
Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v Westminster City Corporation (1970) 1 W.L.R. 637 at 646, per Viscount
Dithome. P & M Kay Ltd. v 1-losier & Dickinson Ltd. (1972) 1 W.L.R. 146 at 164,. per Lord Diplock.
Applied in I-LW. Nevill (Sunblest) Ltd. v William Press Ltd (1981) 20 B.L.R. 78.
The effect was summarised in Hoenigv Isaacs: "In the present case the contract provided for 'net
cash as the work proceeds, and balance on completion.' If the balance could be regarded as
retention money then it might well be that the contractor ought to have done all the work
correctly without defects or omissions in order to be entitled to the balance.'', (1952) 2 All E.R. 176
at 181, per Denning U..
Issued under the auspices of the National Federation of Building Trades Employers and the
Federation of Associations of Specialist Subcontractors.
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contractor.
This provision was considered in 1954 in Re: Tout and Finch' where it was
held to have made a valid equitable assignment of the right to the material
part of the retention to the sub-contractor who was entitled to the amount,
whether in the hands of the employer or the liquidator who had been
appointed on the voluntaly liquidation of the main contractor prior to the
end of the defects liability period.
For main contractors merely to have a contractual right to be paid
retentions would be of little value on the employer's insolvency, and
similar wording followed in the JCT 1963 editions of contracts 1 °
 in respect
of retentions from the main contractor so as to create a trust n favour of the
main contractor binding on the employer. The wording was "Fiduciaiy as
trustee for the Contractor" (but without obligation to invest) 11
 and the
interest of the Contractor was expressed as a beneficial interest.
One aspect arising on this attempt to give an identifiable interest in the
retention that would be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator
appointed on the employer's insolvency, was the securing or appropriation
of the fund for the trust in order to identify the monies held, and for it not
to fail for inability to trace the monies.
Notwithstanding no express obligation on the employer to appropriate and
set aside as a separate trust fund the sums withheld as retentions or their
equivalent, injunctions were granted to secure this result. The conclusions
were that without that obligation the term as to the trust could not have
any practical application, and that the beneficial interest of the contractor
' Re: Tout and Finch (1954) 1 W.LR. 178. It constituted the contractor a trustee of his contractual
rights against the employer to receive the monies retained after the end of the defects liability
period a trust of the dose in action. Clause 11(h) also gave the contractor the right to free his
contractual right to monies retained by the employer from the trust in favour of the sub-
contractor by setting aside other monies as a substituted trust fund. It was followed in Rayack
Construction Ltd. v Lampeter Meat Co. Ltd (1979) 12 B.L.R. 30, and Re: Axthur Sanders Ltd.(1981)
17 B.L.R. 125.
'° The 1939 Editions of the R.I.BA fomi had provided an optior that amounts retained should
constitute a Retention Fund which had to be placed in a bank account in the joint names of the
employer and contractor. Particular problems ansing on insolvency in the construction industiy
are addressed in R. Davis, Construction Insolvency
" This remains in the JCT 1980 scheme where Oause 3011 provides: "the Employer's interest in the
Retention is fiduciaiy as trustee for the Contractor and for any Nominated Sub-Contractor (but
without obligation to invest)."
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could only subsist in a fund so appropriated and set aside. 12
 Equally, the
trust fund provides protection to the employer to the extent of the fund
against the risk that his claims for breaches by the contractor would rank as
unsecured debts, as well as to the contractor.
Another aspect is the ability to uphold retention money provisions in the
face of insolvency if it is argued that there can be similar difficulties as
attach to provisions for direct payment of sub-contractors, namely the
creation of a preferential debt offending against the pan passu rule
applicable on liquidation.' 3
 Where retentions are the subject of a trust the
judicial view expressed' 4
 was that such provisions were unaffected by the
decision in British Eagle.' 5 Indeed on the operation of the scheme, once the
retention is set aside as a trust fund with the contractor having a beneficial
equitable interest in it then the retention monies would not be part of the
property of the company at the time of a liquidation of an employer.
In the case of Re: Arthur Sanders Ltd 16 where an employer had entered
into two building contracts with a contractor who went into liquidation
and the end result was that it owed retentions to the liquidator on one
contract but was owed a greater sum by the liquidator on the other, it was
held that there could be no mutual set-off applied under the then
applicable Bankruptcy Act 1914 in respect of that part of the retentions
referable to the nominated sub-contractor's work which the liquidator was
entitled to receive as trustee for the sub-contractors. Under the main
contract, although the employer was not required to set aside a retention
fund, the court applied to the solvent employer the equitable maxim of
looking on that which ought to be done as having been done and not
allowing him to take any advantage from his failure. This fund then
12 Rayack Construction Ltd. v Lampeter Meat Co. Ltd (1979) 12 B.L.R. 34. An express obligation on
the employer to place the Retention in a separate bank account incoiporated in the JCT 1980
foim, but not in the Local Authorities' Edition, only the Private Edition.
' l.N. Duncan Wallace: HudsonNs Building and Engineering Contracts, 10th Edition and
Supplement, by reference to British Eagle International Airlines Ltd. v Cie. National Air France
(1975) 1 W.LR. 758 (H.L.) The pail passu rule is now in the Insolvency Act section 127.
'	 Re: Arthur Sanders Ltd (1981)17 B.LR. 125.
British Eagle International Airlines v Cie. Nationale Air France(1975) 1 W.L.R. 758 (H.L.). The
I.A.TA. clearing house for monthly settlement of debts and credits between members was
considered and the conclusion was that the rules for liquidation should prevail over the
arrangements as a matter of public policy It was, per Lord Cress, N•••• irrelevant that the parties of
the 'clearing house' arrangement had good business reasons for entering into them."
'	 (1981)17 B.LR. 125.
227
attracted the trust of the contractor to the extent of the retention applicable
to the sub-contractors' works under the provision of the forms of sub-
contract which had been considered in Re: Tout and Finch. Neither the
determination of the employment of the main contractor nor the
provision for final accounting between employer and main contractor
could Interfere:
".... once the sums notionally set aside under that provision [in the
main contract] have become impressed with whatever is the trust
upon which they are held they remain subject to that trust whatever
the fate of the contractor's employment or of contract itself."11
The sub-contracts had taken effect as assignments to the sub-contractors of
their due proportion of the main contractor's beneficial interest in the
retention monies following Re: Tout and Finch, and the employer was
holding the proportions in trust for the main contractor as trustee for the
sub-contractors,' 8 so overcoming the clause in the main contract providing
that nothing in it should render the employer in any way liable to any
nominated sub-contractor. Thus the main contractor no longer had a
beneficial interest in the sub-contractors' due proportion of the retentions,
and having no such interest it was not due to him in such a way as to
permit the employer to raise a set-off against it.
The importance of the effective assignment and the framing of the
mechanism in respect of retentions was emphasised by the decision in Re:
Jartay Developments Ltd 19 where the development agreement provided
for the employer to retain sums from payments to be made to Jartay which
were to be sums certified by Jartay's architects. Jartay contracted with
builders on a JCT form of main contract but they had not appropriated the
retained sums under it for the trust contemplated. On Jartay's liquidation
the builders sought a declaration that the sums still retained under the
development agreement by Jartay's employer were held in trust for them
and were not to pass to the liquidator. The conclusion was that an order
against Jartay to establish the fund was not available after liquidation, and
as none of the retention held by Fortay had been set aside the builder could
" Re: Arthur Sanders Ltd (1981) 17 B.LR. 125, per Nourse J. at 137.
The point of the assignment had arisen because the JC 1%3 form had made no provision in
relation to the retention for nominated ub-contractors and the JCT 1980 expressly makes the
employer trustee for the nominated sub-contractors.
Re: Jartay Developments Ltd. (1982) 22 B.L.R. 134.
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not claim to be treated as if it had. As against Jartay's employer, whilst
there was nothing in the development agreement to have prevented Jartay
assigning its rights against the retention under it, the contract between
Jartay and the builders did not contain any assignment to the builders of
such right. The provisions of the two contracts as to certificates, payments
and retentions were different and no implied assignment of intention for
such could have arisen. An employer's informal solvency at the time of
the application may however affect the enforceability of a contractor's right
to a fund, for in Macjordan Construction Ltd. v Brookmount Emstin Ltd 20
administrative receivers had been appointed, and the court was unwilling
to take an action that might prefer the contractor to other unsecured
creditors21
The express requirement to appropriate and set aside a retention fund
incorporated in the case of an employer utilising the JCT 1980 Private
Edition is quite unnecessary because of the reference to the position of the
employer as fiduciary. This was the result in Wates Construction
(London) Ltd. v Frantham Property Ltd. 22 where even the actual deletion of
the clause containing the obligation did not negate it, on the basis that the
deletion could not have attributed to it other than speculative reasons and
therefore was not to be used in the construction:23
".... clause 30.5.1 creates a clear trust in favour of the contractor and
sub-contractors of the retention money of which the employer is the
trustee. The employer would be in breach of his task if he hazarded
the fund by using it in his business and it is his first duty to
20 MacJoitlan Construction Ltd. v Brookmount Erestin Ltd. (1991) 56 B.LR. 1 (CA.), "in a case where
the employer is insolvent when the application for a mandatory order is made, ... (it) ... would,
assuming it were complied with, give preference to the contractor as against other secured
creditors. I do not see any reason why the Court should do such a thing. If the directors of an
insolvent company were, pursuant to a clause such as clause 30.42.1, to set aside a retention fund
for the benefit of a building contractor, questions of preference might wefl anse (see section 239,
Insolvency Act 1986). So far as preference is concerned, the appmpriation of assets to constitute
the retention fund would be no different, in my opinion, fmm the payment of any other contract
debt.", per Scott U. at p. 16 in the judgment of the Court.
21 Insolvency principles identified in Roberts Petmleuni Ltd. v Bernard Kenny Ltd. (1983) 2 AC. 192
(H.L.) have given nse to debate as to whether this appmach is correct, G. Moss "Retention Trusts",
Insolvency Intelligence, vol. 5, April 1992.
22 Wates Construction (London) Ltd. v Frantham Pruperty Ltd(1991) 53 B.L.R. 23 (CA).
23 The Court of Appeal preferred the general rule of Viscount Summer in MA. Sassoon & Sons v
International Banking Corporation (1927) A.C. 711 (H.L.) at 721, that the effect is as if the deleted
words had never formed part of the point at alL rather than the use of the deletion "as part of the
surmunding circumstances in the light of which one must construe what they have chosen to
leave in" per Lord Cruss in Mottram Consultants Ltd. v Bernard Sinley & Sons Ltd. (1974) 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 197, which use was taken as applicable "exceptionally".
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safeguard the fund in the Interests of the beneficiaries."24
The contention that the interest of the beneficiaries was sufficiently
protected without a separate bank account, provided the sum was
identifiable, because they would have a right in equity to trace, was
rejected. That right depended on the ability to identify a fund into which
the money had been placed, and it was of no value if, for example, the
money had been paid out to general creditors who had given value and
without notice.25
For the employer, the benefit of a retention is to that extent to secure him
against the risk of breach by the contractor in relation to the obligation to
achieve performance by completing satisfactorily. Where by the contract
the trust in respect of the fund is created it is to that contract the employer
must look for recourse, and it is here that the trust and the contractual
right divide. That benefit to the employer is not, under the JCT 1980
scheme, such as to enable him to be a beneficiary of the trust. Clause
30.1.12 of JCT 1980 provides:
"Notwithstanding the fiduciary interest of the Employer in the
Retention ... the Employer is entitled to exercise any right under this
Contract of deduction from monies due or to become due to the
Contractor against any amount due under an Interim Certificate
whether or not any Retention is included in that Interim Certificate
and the argument that the employer was a beneficiary under the trust,
having an immediate or contingent interest in the retention because of his
entitlement to make deductions from it under the contract, was rejected by
virtue of those terms rendering the employer solely a trustee for the main
contractor and nominated sub-contractors and not simultaneously a
beneficiary26
Not being a beneficiary but with his rights governed by the express
24 Beldam U. at page 37.
25 Beldam L.J. at page 31-32.
26 Wates Construction (London) Ltd. v Frantham Pmperty Ltd. (1991) 53 B.LR. 23, per Beldam U. at
30. Furthen "... the nature of the retention fund confirms this view of the trust which was created.
It was a fund which was made up of sums which had been measured and was due, subject to the
performance subsequently of conditions, to be paid to the contractor and the sub-contractors. It
was payable, unless the contractor or sub-contractors failed to fulfil their obligations under the
contract,, and subject only to the deductions which the employer was by the terms of the contract
entitled to make fmm the fund.", per Beldam U. at page 31.
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provision permitting deduction the fund could become a yo-yo in the
hands of the employer/trustee, governed by his evidence as to the
contractor's performance. The potential, but unevidenced, claim for
liquidated damages for delay referred to in Rayack v Lampeter 27 was
insufficient to prevent the injunction to establish the fund,
notwithstanding the acknowledgement that such a maintainable claim
would entitle the employer "to withdraw the equivalent from the trust
account." A mere contention as an entitlement to deduct is insufficient
and even, where an arguable case existed in respect of a right to deduct by
reason of defects, that did not defeat an application requiring the setting
aside of a fund. 28 Although the employer had already raised its claims for
defects, failure to achieve practical completion and liquidated damages, the
conclusion was that these were "speculative, in the sense that it is a matter
for speculation whether the employer will ultimately succeed in proving
its contentions," and that such an arguable right to deduct did not hold
sway.29
The point at which an employer's entitlement to deduct arises is important
for where the employer had such a right to deduct based on a certificate
under the contract no order requiring the fund was made. 3° Conversely, an
order was made where an employer's claim was not based on a certificate as
would bind the parties immediately 31 The entitlement to deduct will
depend on the terms of the contract and the strength of the employer's case
at the time of the application for establishing the fund. Whilst a contractor
v Rayack Construction Ltd. v Lampeter Meat Co. Ltd. (1979) 12 B.L.R. 30 at 39.
Concon1e Construction Co. Ltd. v Colgan Co. Ltd (1984) 29 B.L.R. 120 (High Court of Hong Kong).
The provision was that the beneficial interest of the main contractor in the retention was
subject only to the right of the Employer to have recourse thereto from time to time for payment
of any amount which he is entitled under the provisions of this contract to deduct from any sum
due or to become due to the Main Contractor."
"1 do not think an employer is entitled to have recourse on the trust fund of retention monies
simply on the strength of his own belief that he has a good claim which entitles him to such
monies. The Court cannot countenance a situation where the employer would, in effect, be the
judge in his own cause and able to say when he would make deduction from the retention monies.
Allowing the employer to free the retention monies from the trust whenever the employer
claimed entitlement to a set-off would drive a coach and horses through the whole system of
protection ..., Rhuidj. at page 133.
3° Henty Boot Building Ltd. v The Croydon Hotel & Leisure Co. Ltd (1985) 36 B.L.R. 41, [CAl. In that
case a certificate of the architect's opinion that the works ought to have been completed by a date,
that gave nse to an entitlement to liquidated damages.
J . Finnegan Ltd. v Ford Sellar Moms Developments Ltd 11991153 B.L.R. 38, where unlike in Henty
Boot, under the form of jcr Contract with Contractor's Design, 1981 edition the employer's notice
of intention claim liquidated damages for delay did not have a binding effect on the parties unless
and until set aside by an arbitratot
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under the JCT form does not have to make a request for the set aside of the
fund on each occasion when retention is deducted from interim payments32
delay In an application for an injunction to secure that result may be fatal
both In respect of the decision on an equitable remedy, and because the later
the application the greater time is given for events to occur that may give
rise to claims to deduct by employers. So that where such claims, including
equitable set-off, were extant and evidenced it was concluded that there was
no subsisting obligation to appropriate and set aside a fund.33
Notwithstanding the obligation to establish a trust fund of monies retained,
the nature of retention as a security for the employer against breach by the
contractor of his obligations enables the central feature of even establishing
the separate fund to be defeated. Thus whilst the trust itself exists, in
respect of retentions that which is within the trust is and remains available
to the trustees to satisfy his security and to defeat the interest of the
beneficiary. The cases to date concerned with defeating the obligation to set
aside the fund have concentrated on the ability to deduct by reference to the
strength of the evidence as to the potential of employer's claims, and it
seems that little attention has been paid to the duties of the employer as
trustee and their incompatibility with his contractual right which is
effectively to remove the fund from its trust to satisfy his own financial
interests. In short the nature of a retention renders the position of the
employer as a trustee incompatible. No employer could reconcile his
ability to look to the fund for his claims to deduct with the duties of
trustees, and the scheme clearly offends the principle that a ufr.ijstee must
not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may
conflict."34
The function of the retentions and their monetary importance as a
percentage close to the extent of profit of many contractors, points to the
need to establish an independent third party as the trustee, if the use of the
32 J Finnegan Ltd. v Ford Sellars Developments Ltd. (1991) 53 B.LR. 38.
" GVI Reahsations Ltd.v Panatom Ltd. (1992) C.1.LL 788.
Lord Upjohn in Boaniman v Phipps (1967) 2 AC. 46 at 123. Although it is n authorised conflict
232
trust is to persist 35 and current awareness in the field of pension funds of
the need for independent trustees may assist in bringing such a change
about. Alternatively the use of guarantees and retention bonds, extensively
used in civil law countries, may become more prevalent in England. The
limitations of the time for retention do not give it a greater efficacy than
the performance guarantee.
In England the development of the forms of building contract imported the
trust in an attempt to balance the securing of the retention for the benefit of
contractors and sub-contractors against its purpose as an amount available
to the employer to satisfy his ability to recover for liabilities of the
contractor. This is distinct from engineering forms where the ICE
conditions avoid provision for the employer as fiduciary, or setting aside
funds. 36 This is equally so under the FIDIC conditions, where the engineer
certifies the amount of payment due to the contractor subject to the
retention,37 so that how the retention under the FIDIC conditions would be
viewed in France is to be compared with the lack of
safeguard under English law without an expressed fiduciary capacity of the
employer.
French legislation
In France there has been direct legislative action illustrating the concern of
the State for the regulation of retentions and protection for contractors, so
as to import a balance and not leave the matter to contract and the
economic strength of individual parties. The legislation introduced in
1971 provided simple and general rules limited to private works, and
It will persist in the sense that the fiduciary position of the employer is embodied in the JCT
standard forms. This would also point to the problem if the work were practically complete and
the employer is placed in administrative receivership and will not release the retention, The
contractor would have to look to the determination of his employment, or to specific performance.
" The reference in the 5th Edition to a "reserve ... accumulated in the hand of the Employer ..."
disappeared in the 6th Edition.
Clause 60.2 (a)
' Loi No 71-584 of 16th July1971. The 1967 legislative changes included the alteration of Artide 1779
so as to identil as one of the three principle types of such contract, "Celul des airhifects,
entzepzneuis d'ouages et fechnictens par suite d'etudes, devis ou manthés -, and affect those
connected with building works in a wider sense than just the employer and contractor under a
building contract. It was Ey reference to this wider relationship that the law of 1971 was
intmduced.
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Article I commences 39 with an effective permission to deduct retention,
with an overall limit of five per cent of the total value. Its nature is
identified as a retention and contractual guarantee to satisfy the remedying
of those matters made the subject of reservation at the time of Ia reception.
For this reason the formulation of the reservation at Ia reception is of
importance, but, dealing as they will, only with the visible, the contractor's
obligations as to the hidden remain.
The next step is that the employer has actually to deposit a sum equal to the
retention into the hands of a depository who has to be agreed by the
parties.4° The obligation on the employer continues in respect of retentions
made subsequent to the initial deposit, by the requirement to increase the
deposit where sums are retained in excess of it. 4 ' Article I concludes by
enabling the contractor who would by contract be obliged to suffer the
deductions to avoid them by providing a guarantee.42
Article 1: 'Les paiements des accomptes sur ía valeur de finitive des marches de tmvaux pilvés
visés a l'artide 1719-3 du Code Civil peuvent étre ampates d'une retenue égale au plus a 5p.JX
de leur moufant et garantissant centractuellement l'exécution des travauc pour satisfaire, le cas
echéaut aux reserves faites a la reception par le maItre de I'ouvrage.'
[Payments by instalments against the final value of those works under private agreements
refened to in Article 1779-3 of the Code Civil may be made the subject of a retention as a
contractual guarantee of the execution of the works in order to satis1' those matters reserved by
the Employer upon Ia reception in the event of failure to remedy them.]
40 In default of such agreement it is the courts by the President of a Tribunal of Grande Instance or
of Commerce who decide on the depositoty. "Le maitre de l'ouwage doit consigner entre les
mains d'un consignataire, accepte par les deux piufies ou a défaut designé par le president du
tribunal de grande instance ou de tribunal de commerce, une somme égale a Ia retenue
effectuée." [The Employer must deposit into the possession of a depositoiy agreed by the parties
or,in default deter by the President of a Tribunal de Grande Instance or Tribunal de Commerce a
sum equal to the retention deducted.]
41 Article 2: "Dans le cas oil les sonunes ac/ant fail l'ob/et de Ia retenue de guarantie depassent Li
consignatlon 4sée a l'aiinéa preceden le maitre de l'ouviage dewa completer cell-cl jusqu'au
montant des sommes acàsi retenues.
IWhere sums have been made the subject of a retention in excess of the deposit provided for
above the employer must increase the deposit up to the amount of the retention in the like
manner]
42 Artide 1 conclusion: "Toutefis, Ia retenue de garantie stipulée contractueliement n'est pas
pratiqueée si l'entrepzeneur foumit pour un montant egal une caution persanelle et solidaire
êmanant d'un établissement financier eant sur une Lisle uIxée par decree."
[Notwithstanding the above the retention provided for by contract shall not be made if the
contractor furnishes a joint and several bond secured from a finandal institution whose name
appears on a schedule given by decreee.]
The decree is No. 71-1058 of 24th December 1971.
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Article 2 provides for the release of the sums which have been deposited
on the release of the guarantee at the end of a year after la reception
whether concluded with or without reservations as to defects or
incomplete work The release takes effect unless the employer has given
notice to the depositoiy or surety of objection on the grounds of the
contractors failure to discharge his obligations. Liability in damages is
imposed for objection made without proper reason.
The law is part of l'ordre public for any agreement or provision which
seeks to exclude or contravene Articles I and 2 is void, 44 and with this
legislative scheme in place the AFNOR conditions provide for the
deduction of retentions of 5% from payments by instalment, unless
particular provision is made specifying a lower percentage, and that this is
governed by the legislation in force.45 By amendment introduced in 1972 46
the law was made applicable to sub-contract works, and the scheme
impinges on retentions made by main contractors as well as by employers
in respect of sub-contractors' works. The identification of such retentions
from sub-contractors' works is assisted by the AFNOR 1991 conditions
which require the value of work performed by sub-contractors to be
distinguished.47
The FIDIC conditions 48 do not provide any upper limit on the retention
Article 2: " A l'epization du deJa! d'une année a compter de Ia date de reception, faite avec
sans résewe, des travai& visés a I'article precedent, La caution est libérée ou les semmes
consignees sont versées a l'entrepmneur, méme en l'absence de mainleree, Si Je ma lime de
!'ouge n'a pas notiflé a Ia ution ou au consignataire.. par Jettm recommendée, san opposition
motivée par !'uiexécution des obligations de l'entrepreneur L'opposition abusive entratne Ia
condemnation de I'opposanf .1 des dommages - inté,ts.'
[Upon the expuy of one year 1mm the date of ía reception of works referred to in the above article,
whether made with or without reservation, the bond shall be released or the sums deposited paid
to the contracto; even in the absence of delive8y up if the has not given notice to the surety or
depository, by recorded deliveiy, of objection on the gmunds of failure by the contractor to comply
with his obligations. Objection without proper justification gives rise to liability on the objector for
damages.]
" Article 3: Sont neuls et de nul effet queue qu'en sont Ia famine, le clauses, stipulations et
arrangements, qul auraient pour effet de faire edec au dispositions des articles ler et 2 de ía
présente Jo!."
[Terms, stipulations and arrangements which have an effect converse to Articles 1 and 2 of this
Law are void and of no effect.]
AFNOR 1991, Article 18.5
48 Law No 72-1166 of 23rd December 1972 inserted Article 4 in Law No 71-584: "La présente Jo! est
applicable aui. conventions de sous - traitance." [This Law is applicable to contracts for sub-
contracting.]
APNOR 1991, Article 17.1.1.
FIDIC 4th Ed. Clauses 60.1(c), and 602: Dr.N.G. nni, The FIDIC Fonn of Contract, 1991, p.232.
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leaving it to be specified in the Appendix so that provision for more than
5% would be struck down. It has been noted however that the extent of the
retention percentage has been reducing over time, 49
 and this must be seen
in relation to the increasing usage of performance guarantees. The
retention is not simply a security against defects but against any
contravention of the contractor's obligations. The English approach of
reducing the retention at the point of practical completion detracts from the
employer's security at the very stage when he may need it most, both
because of potential loss from latent defects and as a means of inducing the
contractor to perform his obligations arising during and at the end of the
defects liability period.50
 The French scheme avoids this aspect, but both
would require a formulated and quantified claim on the retention by
reference to breach by the contractor at the conclusion of the stipulated
period after practical completion or Ia reception51
The inclusion of the retention money bond in the French legislation
reflects the perception of the retention as one aspect of protection as well as
the greater use made of guarantees in civil law jurisdiction. Under English
contracts it is suggested that difficult questions arise as to the ability to make
a call on such bonds, namely whether it is intended as a means whereby the
employer may unilaterally at any stage in effect revert to withholding of
retention by calling the whole fund, or, whether its purpose provides only
a "draw down" of such sums up to the limit reflecting the quantified
consequence of a particular default. 52
 The answers depend on the terms,
but equally critical is the unlikely ability of any employer satisfactorily to
determine his loss at a stage when in England the first half of the retention
ordinarily becomes payable. Deficiencies during the work will not usually
give rise to the employer suffering damage where the payment obligation
° M. Abthamson: Engineering Law and the 1.C.E. Contracts, 4th Ed. p. 265.
5° The jC' form includes a period of 6 months, unless some other penod is specifically previded by
the parties. The ICE form includes for 12 months.
The one year period in Law No. 71-584 of 16th Jul. 1971, and that save for the defects liability
period in AFNOR 1991.
52 J . Uff & E. Jones (eds.), International and ICC Arbitration, 1990, Conference Papers, Professor P.
Cappec Bonds and Guarantees: Their Various Types and Problems.
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extends only to such work as has been "properly executed". 53
 Similarly
under AFNOR the valuation by the employer's agent and payments
depend on the due discharge by the contractor of his obligations.TM
The existence of patent defects negates practical completion and the
obligation to release of the first half of the retention, but deemed practical
completion under JCT 1980 occurs on the employer taking possession. 55
 At
that point the employer must have identified and quantified his loss
consequent on extant defects to have recourse to the retention. If the
contractor is in delay in achieving practical completion and the architect
has already so certified then the ability to deduct is extant, but otherwise
the obligation to pay over the retention on that date gives rise in practise to
a scramble.57
 It is against this background that the performance guarantee
or bond in relation to the whole works becomes a more desirable vehicle as
security for the employer.
The code for public works in France utilises the performance guarantee 58
 as
security for due performance, 59
 and although nothing in the CCAG excludes
a retention its only provision concerning this is to enable a bond to be
substituted for any contract requirement for a retention, either at the outset
or at any later stage.'° The object of the retention money bond is to enable
payment of the retention sums to be made to the contractor without
waiting for the expiry of the defects period, and in the hands of the issuing
bank it represents those sums that would otherwise fall due for deduction
JCT 1980 Clause 30.21.1. Further the argument may be depked that such are there "temporaly
disconformities" per Lord Diplock's dissent in Kaye (P & M) Ltd. v 1-losier & Dickinson Ltd. (1972)
1 W.L.R. 146 at 165.. giving rise to neither breach or damage during the work given the contractor's
obligation to complete properly; but this argument did not succeeed in Nene Housing Society
Ltd. v National Westminster Bank (1980) 16 B.L.R. 22.
AFNOR 1991 Articles 17.4, (17.4.1.1 and 17.4.1.5) and 18.1.
JCT 1980 Clause 18.
UnderJCT 1980 Clause 24.2.1.
Particularly where the architect has to consider and re-consider questions of delay and extensions
of time in the six week period alter practical completion,, under JCI 1980 Clauses 2422 and 253.1.
CCAG 1991/2, Article 4.1, 4.11.
Again up to five per cent, CCAG 1991/2, Article 4.13.
CCAG, Article 4.2:" Retenue de gazantie: Lonque les dispositions réglementaires le pemiittent,
si le mairhé comporte, au lieu d'un cautionnement, une retenue de gamntie, le ren1placement
de cette ztenue de garantie par une caution peionelle et solidaire, dans los conditions prewes
par los règlernents, pout infe,wnir, soit a l'ongine, soit a tout moment. La retenue de gazande est
alors testituée."
[When the regulating provisions allow, if the contract provides for a retention, instead of a
guarantee, thenstitution of a joint and several bond on the conditions provided may be made
either at the outset, or at any stage. The retention is then released.l
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from the retention." The facility for the translation of the sums retained
Into a bank guarantee at any time and prior to Ia reception shows the
perceived equivalence of the retention to the performance guarantee.'2
The EEC Conditions'2 adopted by the Council decision of 16th December
1991 incorporate a retention sum to be "retained from interim payments by
way of guarantee to meet the contractor's obligations during the
maintenance period" with the limit imposed of 10% of the contract price.TM
The substitution of a retention guarantee is expressly permitted,'5
 and
release is within 90 days of final acceptance. Doubtless this reflects the
economic strength deriving from EEC funding and the greater risk in
overseas territories; but, apart, from continuation of retentions simply
because that is what has been done before the way forward in civil law
jurisdictions is likely to be the amalgation with, or replacement of
retentions by performance security for the entire works, as in the
Netherlands UAV conditions.66
2	 Bords and Guarantees
One aspect of bonds and guarantees is to offer assurance of payment or
compensation from a solvent paymaster in the event of defaults by a
contractor during the construction process, and also during tendering.
From a recognised mechanism in international trade they have become an
important part of construction contracts and the applicable rules and
problems posed are similar in France and England.
In addition to performance and retention money bonds, Ia garantie de
' Dictionaire Joly, Pratique des Contrats Intrerrationaux, 2nd Ed. 1989 Livre VII.
62 Dictionaire Joly, Pratique des Contrats Intrenationaux, 2nd Ed. 1989 Livre VII.
Official Journal of the European Communities, Issue 0378-6978, L40, Volume 35, 15th Feb. 1992.
These general regulations general conditions and pmcedural rules on conciliation and arbitration
for works, supply and service contracts are for those financed by the European Development
Fund (E.D.F.) for qppcation in the association of the overseas countries and territones (OCT) with
the EEC. Council Decision 92/97/EEC.
64 EEC 1992 Article 47.1.
65 EEC 1992 Articles 47and 153.
' Unifoim Mministrative Conditions for the Execution of Works, 1989, UAV 1989, Clause 43.
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dispense de retenue, tender,67
 and advance payment bonds, are common.
The performance bond may not be tied to any particular default within the
range of the contractor's obligations. Rather it may be required simply to
cover a given percentage of the tender total, throughout the period of
construction and without regard to the increasing value of performance
received. It is an incentive to performance without particular regard to the
nature or extent of any particular default.
Inevitably the first question for determination is upon what terms may the
bond be called. 69
 The conditional bond is the more prudent form, from the
contractor's viewpoint, for the obligation to pay will be conditional upon
proof by the beneficiary of the requisite default, 7° and the nature of the
condition is critical, as is the event which triggers the obligation of
payment. The major distinctions within all types of bonds and guarantees
are as to the degree of ease with which payment can be called for
Problems arise because of the preference for different reasons of both
employers and banks for guarantees in "first demand" form. 71
 The bank's
undertaking will be to pay on demand without proof or conditions. 72
 As
between the bank and the employer such a bond is tantamount to cash in
The tender bond, la guarantie de souniission, will accompany the contractor's tender to give
assurance of the contractor's earnest to contract if the tender is accepted and provide a
mechanism for compensation if the contract has to be re-awarded. It exists without any
underlying contract between the employer and contractor where the invitation and submission of
a tender give rise to obligations readily appreciated by the civil law the obligation of good faith in
negotiations. See Section B, and also for potential development, the Canadian case of Northern
Construction v Gloge (1986) 2 W.W. R. 649, and D.R.Perc Radical Developments in the Law of
Tenders: A Canadian Reformation (1988)4, Construction Law Journal 171.
The advance payment bond, or repayment guarantee, là garantie de restitution d'accompte,
safeguards the client employer in regard to re-payment of large sums advanced early in the
construction process. Depending on its terms it may have a purpose of redress to a dient upon
contractual default by the contractor, as does the ICC Model Form of Repayment Guarantee, or
be restricted to the unapplied balance of the advance, as in Mercers v New Hampshire Insurance
Co. (1992) 2 lloyd's Rep. 365.
This raises the point as to the applicability of the principle of co-extensiveness between
obligations in the bond or guarantee and the underlying contract, G. Andrews & R. Millett Law of
Guarantees, 1992.
° Such an instrument is less attractive to the banking community. It may draw the bank into
complex contractual disputes as between the employer and the contractor. It does offer valuable
utility, fo upon proof of default, the employer is assured of a solvent paymaster for the sunis by
way of compensation found to be payable.
' These have been introduced relatively recently in the histoiy of building contracts having evolved
from commercial sale contracts with the guarantee of an automatic consequence, of payment,
upon a particular event.
72 Such a performance bond or guarantee was described as 'a new business transaction" in the
Edward Owen case, and, equally, In Dictionnaire Joly Practique des Contrats Internationaux
(1989)2nd Ed. Livre VI, as a new form of guarantee.
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the hand of the employer,73
 deriving from agreement to pay without
reference to or limiting effect of proof of default under the underlying
contract.74
In France the first demand guarantee, Ia garan tie a premiere demande is
equally treated as an agreement to pay a fixed sum made in connection
with an underlying contract guaranteeing its execution, but constituting an
independent guarantee obligation and characterised by the inability to
oppose its call save in exceptional circumstances. It has given nse to much
litigation and was judicially defined as an agreement where the guarantor
has contracted not to dispute payment nor to raise any objection to it for
any reason. 75
 Two important principles were ascribed. First that of
irrevocability of the demand save in cases of fraud or manifest abuse. The
provision of the guarantee prevents the interference with the basis of the
trigger of the event. 76
 Second, the independence of the first demand
guarantee from the underlying contract, such that the operation of the
guarantee is only subordinated to observation of those conditions that are
expressly building on it. 77
 The nullity of the underlying contract or its
termination does not affect the guarantee which remains unaffected to be
fulfilled; and the duration of the guarantee is fixed independently of the
Distinctly recognised in France by the Cour de Cassation, Cass. Corn, 20th Dec. 1982: D, 1983.
365, note M. Vasseur. Also as seen in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v Barclays Bank
International Ltd. and Umma Bank (1978) Q.B. 159 (CA); where English suppliers contracted
with Libyan customers to erect greenhouses there on tenns that the customer was to pay by
instalments by a confirmed letter of credit. Before that contract had been made the suppliers
were required to arrange for a guarantee for 10% of the contract price. This was procured through
Barclays with the sum payable to Umma "on demand without proof or conditions", with Umma
then issueing a guarantee to the customer. The suppliers gave a counter-guarantee to Barclays
irrevocably authorising them to comply with any demands under the guarantee, with payment
being conclusive evidence of the Banks' liability so to comply The customer did not open the
correct confirmed letter of credit, and the suppliers maintained that their guarantee had no
effect. The suppliers were not in default. The customer claimed payment on Umma on its
guarantee; Iimma claimed payment from Barclays, who in turn claimed from the suppliers on
the counter-guarantee. The suppliers sought to injunct Barclays and Umma from paying on the
guarantees. The court referred to the similarities with letters of credit, where the only exception
to the rule of no interference would be if the bank knew that the request for payment was made
fraudulently, or on forged documents. The same applied to the performance bond: "... these
performance guarantees are virtually promissoty notes payable on demand".
On demand bonds may expose the solvent contractor innocent of any default to heavy loss at the
hands of an irresponsible employec but where appreciated they conceal an inevitable and
substantial adnal expense for employers; l.N. Duncan Wallace, Construction Contracts:
Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract, 1986, Ch. 19, Guarantees and Bonds in Construction
Contracts.
Cass. Corn. 2nd Feb. 1988.
Cass. Toulouse 26th Oct. 1988.
Cass. Corn, 10th June. 1986.
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documents requiring it. 78
 This principle gives nse to the refusal to give any
effect to the terms of the underlying contract where they would interfere
with the obligations under the guarantee. However it does appear possible
to prove that the underlying contract has been completely carried out in
order to prevent recovery on the guarantee.79
At common law a guarantee is a promise to answer for the debt or default
of another, and is ancillary to the underlying obligation so that discharge of
the principal obligation discharges the guarantee obligation. In France
Article 2071 defines the nature of a surety as one who binds himself to the
creditor for the satisfaction of the obligation if the principal debtor does not
do so.' By Article 2028 recourse against the principal debtor is given where
the surety has made payment, and Article 2029 provides that the surety is
subrogated to all rights of the creditor against the principal debtor.
At common law, both conduct to the prejudice of a surety and a material
alteration in the obligation guaranteed would release a surety from
liability. As to conduct: "A surety is undoubtedly and not unjustly the
object of some favour both at law and in equity, and ... is not to be
prejudiced by any dealings without his consent between the secured
creditor and the principal debtor." 8 ' As to a material alteration an
extension of time would release a surety, 82
 but not if there was an express
provision in the contract under which the contractor was entitled to such,
as in the standard terms. To prevent the operation of the common law
rule protecting the surety precautionary words are often included, as in the
"Example" provided by FIDIC
Whether the terms constitute a guarantee at law or not depends on the
wording which can cause confusion, because the description "guarantee"
in a document does not determine that it bears the legal effects of
Corn. 24th Apr. 1990, D. 1991, 177, note Morvan.
° Cass. Corn. 21st May 1985.
Suretyship, di, cautionnenient, is the subject of Title XIV of the Code CMI. Artide 2011: "Ce/ui
qul se rend caution d'une obli8atiott. se sonn,et enve, le créancier a satisfane a cette obIigatiozi.
si le débiteur n'y satisfait pas lui-ménie..
01 Lord Selborne in Re: Sheny (1884) 25 Ch. 0.692 at 703 (CA)
82 Rees v Berringtori (1795) 2 Ves. Jun. 539; Greenwood v Francis (1899) 1 Q.B. 312 (CA).
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suretyship.83 Whatever the description attached the better course is to
regard this area as one of looking at an obligation to pay that arises on
certain events. The important feature will be whether the undertaking to
pay Is related to a failure to perform under some other agreement or not.
Where the production of a document is provided for as the event that
triggers the obligation to pay the nature of the document may give a
certainty that is a fair balance between the parties, TM but whether the
document complies with the requirement has to be tested. This was done
i n LE Contractors Ltd. v Lloyds Bank plc. and Rafidian Bank 86 where one
counter-guarantee between the banks was for a... any amount you state you
are obliged to pay' but the demand was UAt beneficiaries demand please
credit full amount ... due to shortages not finished yet". This was held not
sufficient because, with or without the doctrine of strict compliance, it was
not a statement of an obligation to pay. 81 The call on the guarantee has
been examined under civil law, and in Belgium it has been decided that it
must be the clear manifestation of the will manifestation claire de volonté
by which the guarantor is required to meet his obligations, and it must be a
definite call,U and in France the sending of a letter in terms of "progogez
• The Edward Owen case, in which the terms performance guarantee and performance bond were
both used, illustrates this. One of the suppliers' arguments had been that because the document
had been expressed as a guarantee, the bank was under no liability unless there was a principal
debtor and some default in his obligations, and that because there was no default on the part of
the suppliers the guarantee did not come into effect. This was rejected on the ground that
"Although this agreement is expressed to be a guarantee, it is not in truth such a contract. It has
much more of the characteristics of a premissoty note than the characteristics of a guarantee.',
per Geoffrey Lane U. at page 172 The full force derived from the words "We confirm our
guarantee ... payable on demand without preof or conditions," and there was no dependence on
the underlying contract requiring any default before demand.
" The ICC Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees have sought to deal with the preblem by
requiring the production of a judgment or arbitral award as a condition of the right to payment,
ICC Publication No. 325, 1978.
With performance bonds there may be less need for the doctrine of strict compliance as it
applies to letters of credit where the documents are required to be in precisely the terms
previded for and "... there is no mom for documents which are almost the same or which will do
just as well.", Equitable Trust Co. of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd. (1927)27 Lloyds L.Rep. 49
at 52 per Lord Sumner.
e I.E. Contractors Ltd. v Lloyds Bank plc. and Rafidian Bank (1990) 2 Lloyds L Rep. 4%.
• In the same case however, the undertaking was to pay ... unconditionally the said amount on
demand, being your claim for damages breught about by ... (the contractor) ...". This required
more than a mere demand. It had to state that it was a claim for damages breught about by the
contractors. The actual demands made had requested withdrawal of the guarantees "In view of
the non-discharge by ... of its contractual obligations in making good the deficiencies ...", and,
rejecting the requirement of strict compliance, they were regarded as sufficient because in
substance even if not expressly they said that what was claimed was damages for breach of
contract.
" Pres. Tnb. comm. Burssels 17th November 1988. Where it was also held that payment was only
due on an effective call made before the date of expixy of the guarantee.
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ou payez ", extend time or pay, was held not to constitute a firm and
unequivocal call bringing the guarantee obligation into play only a request
to keep the guarantee in force.
Whilst the 2nd and 3rd Editions of the FIDIC form made provision for the
terms of a bond or guarantee to be as approved by the Employer, no form
was proposed. 9° The FIDIC 4th Edition 91
 refers to "Performance Security"
and requires it to be in the form provided, or otherwise as agreed. Part II of
the Conditions of Particular Application provides two Example forms. The
language of the performance guarantee put forward by FIDIC in its first
Example is virtually the same as the model bond put forward in the 4th
Edition of the ICE Conditions, and has been the subject of judicial
consideration under the common law as to its nature, and there is no
doubt that to recover the employer has to prove both the breach of contract
and the damages that he has suffered in consequence."
The extent of time for which the surety is to remain liable is critical. At
common law, completion or release of the promise guaranteed discharges
the surety from further obligations, 94
 and on this form, only when it could
be said that the contractor had no further obligation either under the
contract or for damages for breach of it could the surety's liability come to
an end. Defective work from a failure to "... duly perform and observe all
the terms ..." might come to light long after completion.
However, while the time for the liability of the surety is co-extensive with
that of the contractor under this FIDIC Example the terms of the
underlying contract itself identify the extent in time of the validity of the
Cass. Corn. 24th Jan. 1989, Article 2039 of the Code Civil recognises the ability to extend the time
under a guarantee and provides that such does not discharge the surety.
°° This was unlike the English ICE conditions which since their inception in 1945 have included a
form of bond that reflected standard, archaic, tenninoloy.
°' Published in 1987.
92 Tins Industrial v Kono Insurance (1987) 42 B.L.R. 110, Hong Kong Court of Appeal.
Workington Harbour & Dock Board v Trade Indemnity Co. Ltd. (No. 2) (1937) 3 All E. R. 139
(CA) and (1938) 2 All E. R. 101 (H.L.).
Lewis v Hoare (1881) 44 L.T. 66 (H.L.).
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guarantee.95
 The duration is critical and by virtue of clause 102 of the
FIDIC conditions the protection of the employer ends just when he needs it
most, as with the retention. The vital area seldom catered for is the
potential liability for undetected defects that appear subsequent to defects
liability period and within the permitted limitation periods.
This provides a restraint in time on a claim, and in this way prevents
claims in respect of subsequently emerging defects. The physical return of
the security is an important feature for the contractor to secure, but as seen
under the French law relating to retentions the release is imposed even in
the absence of the return of that bond.9'
The proviso in the form is an equally important restraint on a call. 91
 Not
only has there to be default and damages but the employer must have
successfully pursued the contractor to an award or agreement before the
surety's obligation to meet the damages arose. The terms of the FIDIC
contract itself merely provide for notification to the contractor before a
claim is made.99
The call on the bond is as between employer and the bank. It is a separate
contract. The contractor is not party to it. The bank has its interest secured
by a counter-indemnity. The sum finds its way into the hands of the
employer. The building contract between the employer and the contractor
FIDIC 4th Ed. Clause 10.2:
	 "Period of Validity of Performance Security
The performance security shall be valid until the Contractor has executed and completed the
Works and remedied any defects therein in accordance with the Contract. No daim shall be
made against such security after the Issue of the Defects Liability Certificate in accordance
with Sub-Clause 62.1 and such security shall be returned to the Contractor within 14 days of the
issue of the said Defects Liability CertifIcate."
°' Law No. 71-584 of 16th Jul. 1971, Article 2.
FIDIC, first Example form. "Provided always that the above obligation of Guarantor to satisfy
and discharge the damages sustained by the Employer shall arise only (a) on written notice
from both the Employer and the Contractor that the Employer and the Contractor have
mutually agreed that the amount of damages concerned is payable to the Employer or (b) on
receipt by the Guarantor of a legally certified copy of an award issued in arbitration proceeding
carried out in conformity with the terms of the said Contract that the amount of the damages is
payable to the Employer."
" The FIDIC Conditions for Mechanical and Electrical Works, 3rd Edition, 1988, extended clause
10.3 to prohibit a claim unless one of four conditions is satisfied: (a) breach by the contractor not
remedied within 42 days after notice to do so, with the notice required to state the intention to
claim. the amount and the breach relied on, or (b) agreement in iting that the amount
demanded is payable, or (c) an award in arbitration unpaid within 42 days, or (d) the
contractor's liquidation.
FIDIC, clause 10.3: Claims under Performance Security Prior to making a claim under the
performance security the Employer shall, in evely case, notify the Contractor stating the nature
of the default in respect of which the claim is to be made.
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will doubtless have an arbitration clause limiting the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator to disputes under that building contract. The arbitrator has no
jurisdiction under the bond contract. Within any such arbitration on claim
and counterclaim the contractor will with broad merit say that the
employer has already received the bond money and he wants it back or
credit for it. Such circumstances are not fanciful.10°
References to discounts may not necessarily mean there can be no account
for the bond monies between the parties to the principal transaction, but
English authority does not deal with any implied contractual obligations to
bring the bond monies into account. 101
 If the contention that no account is
required is correct it might mean for instance that in the event of delay in
completing a building carefully thought out provisions for liquidated
damages subject limits would in effect be pointless.'02
Such problems have two main sources: independence of the bond or
guarantee from the underlying contract and the refusal to interfere with
the independent obligation to pay.'°3
 Only established fraud on the part of
the beneficiary known to the issuing bank under a typical unconditional
°° Dr. N.G. Bunni, The FIDIC Form of Contract (1991), refers to an analysis of 40 construction
arbitration awards under the I.C.C. rules between 1988 and 1990, which showed conflict over
bank guarantees and performance bands in 25% of the cases. In Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v
National Westminster Bank Ltd. (1978) Q.B. 146, first demand guarantees were characterised
as in effect representing a discount in favour of the buyers" This view of the discount was
echoed in the Edward Owen case in similar terms. Treating it as a discount presupposes no
obligation on the employer to bring the sum into account under the building contract. There
would be no question of subregation. Put shortl> the bond monies simply pass into the general
assets of an employer in a case where payment has been made. There are strung reasons for
objecting to such a result since in effect it represents a windfall. Albeit that with the judicial
pronouncements made it may be said that contractors who make such anangements have
themselves given the discount.
Although the Edward Owen decision does contemplate that when an on demand bond is called,
for example, by a buyer and paid by a bank the seller may have some tights against the buyer.
The contractor may be relieved by the terms of the underlying contract, which, if governed by
English la may be susceptible to an implied term or collateral agreement that the preceeds of
the guarantee should be breught into account between himself and the employer. These
mechanisms may more readily be arguable where the contract itself has previded for the bond
to be ananged and as a security for the performance of that contract as under the FIDIC
conditions. Where the opportunity exists the true answer is for the parties not to leave it to the
uncertainties of implication, but to make express prevision. The FIDIC form previsions as the
period of validity of the perfomiance security and notification of default to the contractor make
no mention of accounting for the preceeds of a call within the contract.
102 
j Uff & E. Jones (eds.), International and ICC Arbitration, 1990, Conference Papers, D. Marks,
Bonds and Guarantees: Powers of the Tribunal.
'° Save in the vezy nanow exceptional cases of established fraud, illegality, and, perhaps, unusual
ancillary circumstances such as allegations of misrepresentation by the beneficiaiy or rights of
set-off against the beneficiaty. Under English law the courts have referred interchangeably to
cases on letters of credit in order to articulate the independence principle and the limiting of
injunctions to cases of established fraud.
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bond will be regarded as sufficient in English law to justify refusal of
payment by a guarantor,'° 4
 and while the plaintiff argued In the Edward
Owen case that the known lack of default established fraud, the fact of a
dispute as to the letter of credit did not render the only event on which the
obligation to pay arose, namely the demand, fraudulent. In France the
inability to challenge on the basis of reliance on the underlying contract
ceases with "frauds ou d'abus manifestes ", fraud or manifest abuse.'°5
Here though reference may be made to the applicable terms of the
underlying contract in order to show such manifest abuse or fraud, since it
is precisely to secure the proper execution of that contract for which the
guarantee comes into existence. The Cour de Cassation was however clear
that "only the existence of fraud or manifest abuse gives rise to an obstacle
to the carlying into effect of the agreement under first demand guarantees.
It is not sufficient that there is a chance that fraud exists".'° 6 Without such
fraud or manifest abuse the demand must be met, and this without any
ability in the juge des référés to postpone payment by reference to the new
Code of Procedure permitting the ordering of protective measures to
prevent imminent loss.107
The same principles extend to the counter guarantee, which is not only
independent of the underlying contract but equally of the first demand
guarantee. There is no connection seen between the counter guarantee to
the bank and the liability to the beneficiary. This means that unless there is
a provision to the contrary the call on the counter guarantee is not subject
to proof that the first guarantee has been properly called by the
beneficiaiy'° 8 Nevertheless it does not prevent the court form interpreting
the counter guarantee in the light of the first guarantee. 109 However the
mechanism of guarantee and counter-guarantee in respect of a first
demand guarantee places the obligation to verify the beneficiary's claim in
104 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v Royal Bank of Canada. (1983) A.C. 168.
'° Pans 19th May 1988, Pans 15th Feb. 1989.
"Seule l'a-ostence d'une fraude ou dun abus manifestes est susceptible de faire obstade a
!'exécution des engagements a piemière demande. II ne suffit pas qu'en nue de fraude
existes"
Article 873: "... des mesuzes conseivatoiis pour prevenir un dominage imminent [pmtective
measures to prevent imminent lossl.
Paris, 8th November 1988: 0. 1990, somm. 206, obs. Vasseur Paris 2nd November 1990: D 1990,
somm. 209 obs. Vasseur.
'°° Cass. comm,.3rdApnl 1990: 0. 1990, IR III.
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respect of the underlying contract on the guarantor of first demand, and
the counter guarantors have to satisfy themselves that such verification
has been properly carried out.11°
The English courts have begun to indicate some limited recognition, still
fully to be explored, that some legal protection could be given against
unjustified calls in wider contexts than just the limited exceptions of fraud
and illegality. The bank's obligation under the bond is independent and
absolute and must be seen to be freely enforceable and, equally in the civil
law whilst it is necessary for the bank to verify carefully that the terms of
the guarantee as to a call are met, the civil law does not require the bank to
be satisfied that the beneficiary has a justified call beyond the terms of the
guarantee itself. 11 ' The focus of attention moves to injuncting the
"abusing" beneficiary either from calling upon the bond in the first place or
from being able improperly to deal with the proceeds once the call has
taken place. 1t2 In France the independence of the first demand guarantee
from the underlying contract has been overcome where that contract has
stipulated for a guarantee that falls to be reduced as the value of the work
that has been executed increases, garanties glissantes, sliding guarantees.
The underlying contract has to be examined for thhe purpose of valuation
although it seems that the courts nevertheless do not regard such
provision as removing the independence attaching to the guarantee rather
as transforming it into a secondary security."3
"° Cass. corn. 10th November 1981, 0. 1982 417, note Agnostini. The banker's obligation of
checking does not extend to investigation to uncover possible fruad or abuse, but the bank is
liable if the fraud or abuse is apparent to an o!thnarily prudent and diligent banker.
" Pres. Tnb. Corn. Brussels 26th May1988.
112 Clues to this potential approach in England arise from two cases: Intraco Ltd. v Notis Shipping
Corp. ahe Bhoja Trader) (1981) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 256, and Potton Homes Ltd. v Coleman
Contractors (Overseas) Ltd. (1984) 28 B.L.R. 19. The Bhoja Trader recognises that so long as the
actual payment by the bank to the beneficiaty is not interfered with, then even in the absence
of fraud a Mareva injunction may be granted to prevent the proceeds of the bond in the hands
of the beneficiaiy being removed from the English jurisdiction, it is the natural corollary of the
proposition that a letter of credit or bank guarantee is to be treated as cash but that when the
bank pays and cash is received by the beneficiary, it should be subject to the same restraints as
any other of his cash assets per Donaldson U.. The significance of the Potton Homes case is
in dicta of Eveleigh L.J.: "As between buyer and seller the underlying contract cannot be
disregarded ... If the seller has lawfully avoided the contract prima fade it seems to me he
should be entitled to restrain the buyer from making use of the performance bond. Moreover,
in principle I do not think it possible to say that in no circumstances whatsoever, apart from
fraud, will the court restrain the buyer. The facts of each case must be considered. Eveleigh
U. went on to point out that the Edward Owen case was not concerned with the position as
between the buyer and the seller, nor did it address the question as to whether there would have
been a subsequent obligation on the employer to account to the supplier.
" Paris, 14th March 1988: D 1989, somm 152 obs. Vasseur. Cass. comm., 27th February 1990: D,,
1990, somm. 213,. obs. Vasseur
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If by reference to its terms a bond is viewed as a means of payment on
account of damages for contractual default then in any subsequent claim or
dispute the proceeds of the call should have to be taken Into account in
diminution of the loss claimed by way of damages as monies already
provided. As between the employer/beneficiary and the contractor there
might well be arguments justifying the re-payment to the contractor of
(some of) the proceeds of a call under a bond even in the absence of fraud.
This is relevant not only to a court or arbitrator assessing an award of
damages after such a call. The right to re-payment if the proceeds were to
be paid over may of itself be arguably sufficient to justify injunctive relief
to prevent disposal of the proceeds in the hands of the beneficiaiy once the
bank has paid.
Whilst French courts have looked restrictively at the question of fraud or
abuse by the beneficiary when raised in opposition to a call, there have
nevertheless been decisions which assist in showing the approach to the
question.' 14 It is treated as fraud if a beneficiary makes a call for delay in
delivery manifestly contrary to the truth and where the call has in reality
no other purpose than to secure a reduction of the agreed price." A call
was regarded as abusive, if not fraudulent, where made by a purchaser
under a supply contract who had decided that he did not want the contract
performed and who was regarded as having treated the guarantee as
unwarranted when he had done nothing for four years."6 Similarly it was
held to be an abusive call by a building owner who had ceased to give
possession of the site without explanation and without advancing any
ground of complaint as to the state or quality of the works, and who
himself had prevented any provisional reception The French courts
require the fraud or abuse to be manifest and so will not appoint an expert
to investigate whether calls were fraudulent in nature on the basis that if
such investigation is necessary then there exists a doubt, and with that
"4 Dictionnaire JoI op. cit. Muse a jour 1990-2.
" Paris, 18th November 1986 0. 1988 somm. 247, cbs. Vasseu, "Manifesement contraiie Ia
yéreité "
Paris, 27th June 1988 D. 1989 somm. 151; Cass. comm. 6th Februaty 1990: 0. 1990, somm. 213,
obs. Vasseur
" Versalilles, 1st December 1988 0. 1989, somm. 155, obs. Vasseur.
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doubt the abuse cannot be manifest.u8
The established position of the guarantee, however, assures its increasing
use, and in France the prospective legislation as to Ia lid ucire is unlikely to
impinge on the continued use whether in respect of retentions or
otherwise.
A procedural matter which is capable of being dealt with in the underlying
contract, is the jurisdiction of arbitrators appointed to deal with disputes
which may be the same as or a least connected with those which gave rise
to the caB on the bond. Ordinarily, such arbitrators will have no
jurisdiction over the bond itself since, although given under a
requirement contained in the underlying contract, the bond involves
contracts between other persons. It is frequently the case, where a bond has
been called and paid, that the contractor will ask the arbitral tribunal to
consider the validity of the call and to make protective interlocutoty
orders." 9 The parties may agree in the underlying contract to give the
tribunal jurisdiction in relation to the bond monies, for example, by giving
power to direct that part or all of the funds should be brought into a
designated account.
That these matters require careful advance consideration is clear and
without resolution prior to tendering difficulties arise.' 20 The FIDIC form
does not assist,' 2 ' because the appropriate resolution of the terms of the
bond is not satisfactorily left until after the letter of acceptance.' The ICC
Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees have the overall intention to
Pans, 13th October 1988 0. 1990 somm. 211, oL,s. Vasseur.
" Craig Park & Paulsson,. ICC Arbitration, para. 26.05.
In England, in Arbiter (Investments) Ltd. v Wiltshier (London) Ltd. (1987) where no terms had
been agreed the court was willing to infer that the parties had not contemplated an on-demand
bond, reported on this point as a note at 14 Construction L.R. 16.
121 PIDIC, Clause 10.1 Performance Security
"If the Contract requires the Contractor to obtain security for his proper performance of the
Contract, he shall obtain and provide to the Employer such security within 28 days after the
receipt of the Letter of Acceptance, in the sum stated in the Appendix to Tender. When
providing such security to the Employer, the Contractor shall notify the Engineer of so doing.
Such security shall be in the form annexed to these Conditions or in such other form as may be
agreed between the Employer and the Contractor. The institution providing such security shall
be subject to the approval of the Employer. The cost of complying with the requirements of this
Clause shall be borne by the Contracto; unless the Contract otherwise pmvides.
122 The Notes to the FIDIC Conditions for Electrical and Mechanical Works,3rd Edition, sensibly
make it dear that the precise nature of the performance security should be stated in the tender
documents.
249
attempt to recognise the different interests of the parties involved in a
guarantee transaction.' The introduction identifies their intent to apply to
the use of demand guarantees, namely guarantees, bonds, and other
payment undertakings under which the duty of the guarantor or issuer to
make payment arises on presentation of a written demand and any other
documents specified in the guarantee and is not conditional on actual
default in the underlying transaction.
123 cc Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees, ICC Publication No. 458, published in April 1992.
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1	 The Role of Fault
The existence and scope of the requirement of fault in civil law and under
common law give rise to substantial difference in their theoretical approach,
but less so, it seems, in practical application.' The question arises as to the
function of fault in a scheme of contractual remedies, and the impact of
liabilities that depend on it. At common law the nature of the breach or the
action may be categorised by reference to the degree of fault involved, 2
 but
fault is not necessarily, depending on the category of the tort, a substantive
requirement for any liability. 3
 Under civil law fault may be discussed in
respect of the legal effects of non-performance, particularly as to termination.4
A link also exists between fault and damages and is found in Article 1147 of
the French Code Civil.
At common law the general presumption in an action for breach of contract
is that it is "immaterial why the defendant failed to fulfil his obligations and
certainly no defence that he had done his best". 5
 This should not obscure the
analysis of the nature of the obligation under the contract, and whether it is
one where the performance required is that of meeting a standard measured
against norms of reasonable effort in the particular field. This analysis may
be determinative of the nature of the performance required and whether the
absence of fault is a necessary part of it, as in an obligation to exercise due care
' G. H. TreiteL. Remedies for Breath of Contract, A Comparative Account.
2 For example an actionable misrepresentation may be innocent or negligent.
Mere interference with a right is sufficient to constitute a tort..
Considered under Termination.
Rainen v Miles (1981) A.C. 1050 at 1086 (H.L.).
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and skill.6
In France the scope of the requirement for fault in contractual relations
depends on the important distinction already seen between the obligation de
moyens and the obligation de résultat where the former, ordinarily
affecting professions, is associated with the due exercise of the skill and care
of the calling and the latter with bringing about the promised state of affairs.
Whilst in respect of building projects the scheme of guarantee
responsibilities under the 1978 legislation applies to all those involved in the
construction process and overrides the necessity for such analysis as against
the employer, the point remains as to the impact of fault between those so
involved and third parties. Further, the obligation under the guarantee in
respect of latent defects gives rise to liability even in circumstances otherwise
amounting to cause etrangere because that is where the risk lies under the
policy behind the legislation for this categoly of contract.
The impact of fault in contract is seen from Articles 1137 and 1147. The first
provides that the obligation on a party with regard to the preservation of the
subject matter of the contract is to take the degree of care expected of a
reasonable person, d'un ban père de famille 7 The second, Article 1147,
provides for liability for damages for the failure to perform or for delay in
performance in all cases save for the intervention of cause etrangêr but
there is no necessary, or any, coincidence between a failure to take the care of
un ban pete de famille and a cause étrangère. A failure to perform to the
requisite standard is a failure regardless of whether the defendant was
actually capable of attaining that standard, and so is an imposition of an
It has also to be recognised that the language of fault is frequently and specifically incorporated in
contract obligations. For example in JCT 1980 liability under the indemnity in dause 20.2 is in
respect of "any negligence, breach of statutory duty, omission or default"; determination of
employment by the Contractor under clause 28.lmay be for suspension of the works for the
specified period by reson of architect's instructions unless caused by some negligence or default of
the Contractor". Under ICE 1991 the indemnity by the Contractor under clause 22 (2) is ... except
for damage resulting frem any act or neglect .. done or committed by the Employei his servants or
agents."
' Article 1137: "L'obligation de wilier a Ia conseivation de Ia those, soi que La con vention n'ait pour
objet que I'utilité de l'une des parties, soit qu'eiIe alt pour objet leur utilité commune, soumet ce/ui
qui en est chaie a y appolfer tousles soins d'un hon pete de famille. Cette obligation est plus ou
moms étendue reiativement a certains contrats, dont les effets, a cet eganj sont aqliques sous les
titzs qw Las concemant.' [The obligation to take care for the preservation of the subject- matter,
whether the agreement has as its object the benefit of one of the parties only, or whether it has as its
object their mutual benefit, requires the person who is responsible for it to exercise all the care of
un hon pete de famille. The obligation is more or less extensive in relation to certain contracts,
whose effects are explained under the titles which concern them. I
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objective standard in a contractual performance. Fault will be irrelevant to
the action where the defendant is liable on the principle of a vicarious
liability or non-delegable duty.
In English law the impact of fault on an analysis of the nature of the
obligation can be seen in the context of building contracts from the
distinction between the supply of materials under a building contract and the
supply of services. In Young & Marten v McManus Childs the sub-
contractor who supplied roofing tiles that contained a latent defect from their
faulty manufacture was liable under an implied term as to merchantable
quality which was not excluded by the specifying of those tiles by name by the
contractor. The rejected arguments of the sub-contractor were that where a
choice is required then it must be exercised with due skill and care with the
lack of choice negating the warranty and that a contract for work and
materials differed from a contract of sale, having the quality of a contract for
services where the major component is the skill and judgment of the person
undertaking it.
The reasoning behind the rejection included that the warranty against
defective quality of materials did not depend on whether care or skill could
have prevented the trouble or whether there was knowledge of the existence
of the defect. Unless the contract terms excluded the warranty of quality the
warranty applied, with the chain of contracts assuming importance in order
to provide the vehicle for recovety from the manufacturer with whom the
ultimate blame lay.'° Such a supply under a building contract was regarded as
'	 Mazeaud, Leçons de droit civil, II, 1 no. 485.
Young & Marten Ltd. v McM anus Childs Ltd. (l%9) 1 A.C. 454. (H.L.). On the point of implication it
is to be noted that the selection was only of the type of tile and there was in fact nothing expressed as
to the quality. This may be contrasted with the pmvisions in JCT 1980 where by clause 2.1 the
contractor's obligation as to compliance with the Contract Documents indudes the Bills of
Quantities and continues: "using materials and workmanship of the quality and standards therein
specified", and by dause 222.1 the Contract Bills are to have been prepared in accordance with the
6th Edition of the Standard Method of Measurement published by the Royal institution of
Chartered Suiveyors and the Building Employers Federation, which requires them to describe the
quality of the matenals. These express terms as to quality are beyond the obligation in clause 8.1.1 to
provide materials "of the kinds and standards described in the Contract Bills".
'° Lord Peatte at 470. A tortious liablity of the manufacturer was regarded as an unsatisfactoiy
alternative, but the justification for this argument is weakened by the introduction of product
liability pursuant to the EC Directive, O.J. 1985 L 210 p. 7, and referred to under Harmonisation. The
chain of liability argument also suffers from the ability for it to be broken by a valid exemption
clause, or the effects of nomination, as in Gloucestershire County Council v Richardson (1969) A. C.
480.
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without distinction from the circumstances of a sale of goods.'1
Where the supply of services is involved there is specific imposition of the
implied term that the supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care
and skill.' 2
 Whether such standard is met involves fault in the sense that the
test is against reasonable human endeavour, but the facility to find an
obligation to succeed in the successful production of the result exists
depending on the nature of the obligation undertaken.'3
Under civil law the necessity for fault depends not only on the distinction
between obligations de moyen and de résultat but also on the category of
contract into which the transaction falls. In French law, a seller of specific
goods is not in breach because they suffer from latent defects, but by reason of
them he is subject to the guarantee liability, and price reduction." These are
available regardless of fault but they do not provide full relief to the injured
party in the sense that they do not compensate his consequential loss or loss
of bargain. Such compensation is available if the supplier is at fault, for
example if he knew of the defect, and in the case of sales by professional
sellers to non-professional buyers there is the presumption of such
knowledge, whereby the obligation to guard the buyer against loss due to
defects, the obligation de securité , becomes in reality an obligation de
résultat .js With the regime of the guarantee liability in respect of defects in
buildings such limit on the scope of recovery does not exist.
2	 The Rn of Tort
The limits on the claims for compensation that the law of contract imposes
have led to the development of tort to determine when the perpetrator of the
" Lord Upjohn at p. 474. This is recognised by the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, and,
applying to building contracts as it does; the same terms as to quality and fitness are implied by
section 4.
12 Section 13 of the 1982 Act. It was recognised in Young & Marten Ltd. v McManus Childs Ltd., at p.
465, that the fitting of the tiles would be distinct and involve only the obligation to exercise due skill
and care.
As in Greaves & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. v Baynhem Meilde & Partners (1975) 1 WL.R. 1095, (CA). in
the case of engineers.
' Articles 1641 and 1644; considereded under Reception and Payment. Price Reduction.
15 Mazeaud, Leçons 111,2 no. 993. Duny P. La nature contractuelle ou délictuelle de Ia responsabilite.
(1972) 7 Rev. Trim. Dt civ. 779.
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harm ought to bear the loss suffered by the victim, but it is important to
recall that the guarantee liability In France has the impact of benefitting those
subsequent purchasers whose search for a remedy in England was one of the
features of the expansion of the scope of claims in tort.'6
The development of Roman law moved away from the requirement of a
deliberate act and a consciousness of doing harm to mere culpa , and
extended the scope for recoveiy to damage to persons or property as an
indirect consequence of the act, but there was no general principle that
everyone is responsible for the harm for which they are to blame for causing
Whether the law of tort under common law consisted of a general principle
that it is wrong to cause harm to others, or of specific rules prohibiting
certain kinds of harmful activity,' 7
 the problems of the boundaries remain.'8
Negligence as a tort under common law embodied the omission to fulfil the
requisite duty of care which concept was a necessary introduction for
expansion of the scope for recovery in a system without a principle that fault
carries a liability. The duty of care may be independent of any proven fault,
simply representing a factual situation where society wishes to impose a
liability, or it may be seen as those circumstances that are taken to represent
fault, and coupled with the facets of breach and damage it then became an
available mechanism for limiting the scope of the action.' 9 Those limits have
reflected diverse attitudes towards the allocation of risk for personal injury
and damage to property, and without a principle of exclusion of liability for
economic harm the duty aspect has been used to keep liability for negligence
in check2°
The circumstances of the duty of care of a person in business who gives
information advice or opinion, apparently based on special skill or
knowledge to those who as he knows or should reasonably foresee will act in
BS. Markesinis, An Expanding Tort Law- The Price of a Rigid Contract Law. (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 354.
" The debate found in earlier works, as in Pollodç. 12th ed (1923), and Salmond, 2nd ed., (1910).
" "ACtS or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as
to give a right to eveiy person injured by them to demand relief", Lord Atkin in Donoghue v
Stevenson (1932) A.C. 562 at 580. In this way the law of tort is as much about non- liability as liability,
Williams and 1-lepple, The Foundations of the Law of Tort.




reliance on its soundness, 2' would be well recognised in civil law. While the
wrongful issue of a false statement would be taken as contra bonos mores,
liability is more likely seen as arising under the law of contract on the basis of
the relationship created with the third party. The relationship which is
regarded as within the scope of the law of contract derives from factors akin
to those found in Hedley Byrne to gve rise to the duty of care.
3	 The Frenth Experkice
There are five articles in the Code CiviL which have remained virtually
unchanged, on which rest almost the whole of the French law of delict. The
wide general principle is in Article 1382 "Any act whatsoever of a person
which causes damage to another, obliges the person, by whose fault the
damage is caused, to make it good", 22 which is ampIified in Article 1383
"Eveiyone is responsible not only for the damage which he has caused by his
own act but also for that which he causes by his negligence or imprudence."24
A close link is created between fault and tortious liability: any fault
committed gives rise to this responsibility if damage results. The
formulation of a single fundamental principle, instead of an approach based
on specific torts derived from the natural lawyers of the seventeenth
centuly25 and the work of Domat was influential on the basis of the Code
and its exposition of Roman law, 26 as adapted to the thoughts of the time.2'
21 As in 1-ledley Byrne & Co. v 1-leller & Partners (1964) A. C. 465.
Article 1382: "Tout (ait que icon que de l'hontrne, qul cause a autw sin dornmage, obige celui par lafaute duquel il est amv4 ale répamr"
23 It is a qualification on any limitation of fault which would otherwise arise by reference to a
requirement for malice, R. David, English law and French Law.
24 Article 1383: "Chacun est tesponsable du doniniage qu'il a cause non seulernent par son fall, trials
encore par sa negligence ou par son imprudence.
25 As in Grotius, De Jure belli ac paws libri tres (1685); "Let us come now to what is due by the law of
nature in consequence of a wrong. By a wrong we here mean eveiy fault, whether of commission or
of omission, which is in conflict with what men ought to do, either from their common interrest or by
reason of a special quality. From such a fault, if damage has been caused, by the law of nature an
obligation arises, namely, that the damage should be made good." (trans. Kelsey).
26 Domat,, Las Loix civiles dam leur ordre naturel (1689). In this Domat used the idea of fault and
derived the principle that compensation must be made for want of care as well as for harm
intentionally caused.
21 Pothier had identified délits where the conduct comprised do! ou maiignité as distinct from quasi-
délits where the harm was caused without a malign motive but by an imprudence that was not to be
excused, sans maligité, trials par une imprudence qui n'est pas excusable, and from this the Code
placed the law of delict in a chapter Des délits et des quasi- délits into which parcels the subject is
approached.
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From such general principle It has been for the courts to develop the
substance and limits of claims in torL 2
 The French concept of fault requires
comparison with negligence in English law" Faute is treated as a failure to
observe a behaviour which the defendant should have respected, with faute
délictuelle characterised by an intent to cause harm and faute quasi-
délictuelle constituted "by criticisable conduct which a responsible person
similarly circumstanced would not have committed". 3° The reasonable man
of ordinary prudence is the homme avisé, and of particular interest is the
control exercised by the facility to find that such person would not have
exercised his rights in an unreasonable manner, an abus d'un dmit, so as to
cause even unintended harm. This includes contractual rights as where
premature termination prejudices the other party, where it is suggested the
application of the express prohibition on the Employer against giving notice
of determination "not unreasonably or vexatiously" in JCT 198O' provides a
comparable English circumstance. It also extends to the breaking off from a
relationship short of contract, as in the abandonment of pre-contract
negotiations,32 an abus du dmit de mmpre Ia negociation.
This view of fault as an abuse of rights illustrates that tortious liability is by
reference to the single principle of fault without the need for, or constrictions
of, particulansed torts. 33
 While the doctrine of consideration in English law
is a prerequisite to a binding contract and the existence of a duty of care is a
prerequisite for tortious liability, French law regards all agreements seriously
entered into as legally binding, and all faults as potential sources of tortious
liability without the need to resort to either concept. Without that need or a
limitation by reference to a duty of care in the circumstances that may result
in liability the facility to reflect moral feelings in tortious liability is the
greater.
28 Illustrated by Professor André Tunc in his graphically titled essay "It is wise not to take the Civil
Codes too seriously', m Essays in Memoiy of Professor F.H. Lawson.1986.
29 Lawson and Markesinis, Tortious Liability for Unintentional Hami in the Common Law and the Civil
Law, 1982.
3° Mazeaud, Tunc, Traité de droit civile, 380.
' jcr 1980, dause 28.1.3.5: "... provided that such notice shall not be given unreasonably or
vexatiously.
32 Considered under Contract and Pre-Contract.
Just as it is a fault to break off negotiations after a reasonable expectation that a contract would be
entered into, so it is a fault to build a wall to depnve a neighbour of light. Fault can also be found in
the procedural field, as where an action or step in an action is taken for the extraneous purpose of
the burden of costs on a party.
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There are circumstances where the existence of fault is presumed, and these
are exceptions to the requirement for a plaintiff to prove the fault.34
Vicarious liability is one, 35
 as is the liability of a building owner for its
dilapidated condition. The industrial, social and economic developments of
the late nineteenth century led to the introduction and of development in
French law of an independent meaning to the opening words of Article 1384
whereby a person is liable "not only for damage caused by one's own act, but
also for that caused by the act of persons for whom one is responsible, or for
things under one's care", and not only must no fault be proved to escape
liability but positively that the damage was due to force majeure Y
Damage is an essential element for the court's decision is to make good,
reparer, the damage suffered. The distinction between kinds of damage,
whether physical or economic has not posed the problems faced in English
law, and debate has centred on the extent to which moral damage prejudice
moral is compensated, but importantly, after dommage and faute the third
element for liability is a causal link between the faulty behaviour and the
harm suffered, a chain of causation lien de causalité. Here the French view
is that there is no such link if the harm is traceable to a cause etrangere
rather than the defendant's conduct. Force majeure , fault of the victim and
unforeseeable behaviour of a third party may constitute cause etrangere, but
even if not sufficient for that purpose they may give rise to a reduction of
damages. The boundary of the harm is limited to that which is a direct and
immediate consequence, une suite immediate et directe, which follows the
These are to be found in the provisions of Articles 1384 to 1386.
Artide 1384: "On est responsable non seulenient du dornniage que !.on cause par son pmpre (alt,
mals encore de celui qw est cause pane fait des pezonnes dont on dolt npcdre, ou des choses que
I'on a sous as gaizie.
Article 1386: 'Le proprietaire d'un bátirnent est respnsable du donuna,ge cause par sa ilne.
iozsqu'eiIe est anivée par une suite du défaut d'entretlen ou par le .ice de sa constivctlon."
' A clear statement is in the Judgment of the Cow de Cassation in Chemin de fer l'Ouest v Martault:
"The presumption of fault established by Article 1384 al. 1, on the part of the person who has under
his care the inanimate object causing the damage, can be rebutted only by proof of cas fozfuit , a
!i,,re majeure or a casue étrangêne that cannot be imputed to him; it is not sufficient to prove that
he did not commit any fault or that the cause of this damage has not been detennined".
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test applicable to the law of contract in Article 1151. Within this there is no
fixed criterion for remoteness, and the matter rests with the decisions of the
juges du fond.
The problems arising out of the modern economic and social order in the
balancing of interests and risk appear in both jurisdictions, particularly in the
area of economic harm. Where for example a builder has negligently
damaged a conduit and interrupted the supply of services the English courts
might have utilised the scope of the duty, 39 or the boundaty of remoteness,4°
to prevent compensation for economic loss.
The re-establishment in England of the distinction between damage to
property and pure economic loss may be a less uncertain line as a
formulation of policy, but it is a policy expedient and is unlikely to stem the
extent of literature on the subject. 4' The Code Civil however makes no
distinction between pure economic loss and the harm, physical or otherwise
to property or other things to which the claimant has a right, for under
Articles 1382 and 1384 whoever causes dommage must make compensation
where the manner in which the harm was caused gives rise to liability. The
scope for variety in its judicial application is immense. The sovereign
power of the juges du fond renders intervention to develop a cohesive
approach difficult to achieve, and even where there is intervention by the
Cour de Cassation the nature of the judgments delivered leaves the true
grounds for the upholding or rejection of appeals on damages obscure.
Article 1151: "Dans le cas niéme oz I'inexécution de La convention résulte du do! du débiteur, les
dommages et intéréts ne doivent comprendi a !'égaztf de Ia porte epmuvee par le cnander et du
gain dont II etpnvé.. que ce qui est une suite immediate et directe de l'ina'cécution de Ia
convention."
[Even where the non performance of the agreement results fmm the wilful behaviour of the
debiteur , damages are to extend only to that which is a direct and immediate consequence of the
non-performance, with regain to the loss incumed by the injured party and to the gain of which he
has been deprived.]
Weller & Co. v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute (1966) 1 Q.B. 569.
4° S.C.M. Ltd. v Whittall & Son Ltd. (1971) 1 Q.B. 337; Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v Martin & Co. (1973)
Q.B. 27.
The German appmach represents a vezy different starting point, contmsting with the French Code,
and utilising the fonnula of damge to pmperty. In simple terms, the BGB does not permit recoveiy
for pure economic loss. On the example the courts in Germany would pmvide compensation only if
property is damaged or destroye in that BGB U 823-1 pmtects ownership against negligent
damage and pure economic loss requires the identification of a pretective statute or a right to an
established and operative business for its recovely. Lawson and Markesinis, Tortious Liability for
Unintentional Harm in the Common Law and the Civil Law.
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The formula, however, under which the harm may be compensated (apart
from the necessity for it to be an immediate and direct consequence of the
defendant's conduct) is that it must be certain and not hypothétique or
éventuel. As a particular result, the plaintiff who suffered pure economic
loss as a result of a builder's negligence in interrupting the supply of energy
was allowed recovery by the (Jour de Cassation as a consequence directe du
fait de I'entrepreneur without reference to any difficulties in the decision or
wider debate.42
The potential for difficulty is when the damage results from competing
causes, or where the damage has been increased by circumstances that could
not reasonably be anticipated. As to the latter, French law has a distinction
between tort where all damage that is a direct consequence of it must be
compensated, and the law of contract where a test of foreseeability exists, but
may be discarded where the breach is due to deliberate intent, dol. Whether
the case can be seen as a contractual or tortious liability is thus of potential
importance. A breach of contract is not regarded as a tort in relations
governed by contract, but the same event may constitute a tort vis a vis
others.43
The decennial liability in French law benefits the owner and his successors,
so that liability of the contractor in tort as against others will require fault to
be shown by way of negligent or intentional act or omission, and
responsibility may exist not just because of personal fault but because of
vicarious responsibility for another's fault or because the damage was caused
by something in one's care. This liability, by Article 2262, extends for a period
of 30 years from the date when the cause of action arose and the victim
became aware of the damage.
Questions involving fault are not uncommonly raised in claims between
contractors and professionals, and particularly where one or other is sued or
has been found liable to the owner under the decennial liability. In this field
the French courts have it seems developed a feature for the purposes of
enabling negligence to be established to which resort is had in construction
42 Cass. civ. 8th May 1970 Bull 1970 II. 122.
PH. Lawson, Fault and Contract - a few comparisons. (1979) 49 Tul. L.Res 295.
260
cases. This has been to invoke a breach of a contractual obligation to another
as the relevant fault under Article 1382, and it constitutes an exception to the
general principle in French law that agreements have effect only between
contracting parties and neither damage nor benefit third parties, except third
party beneficiaries. 44
 The contractor then may assert a breach of the architect's
contracted design obligation to the employer as a tortious act towards him. It
is not for the contractor to show any intention by the contract between the
architect and employer to confer third party beneficiaiy rights on him, but he
must show that the act comprising the particular breach caused him damage,
which damage may be a liability under the decennial guarantee.
In this respect fault becomes aligned with breach of contractual obligation.45
The nature of French judicial decisions does not make it possible to ascertain
matters such as the exact terms of the contracts, but the operation of this
feature seems clear, and particular results indicate a justifiable comparison
with the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.46 For example, by the Act, a
contractor liable to the employer in respect of damage for breach of his
contract has a right to claim contribution where the architect would be liable
to the employer under his contract or otherwise. No question arises here as
to intent to benefit the contractor under the employer -architect contract, or
as to the existence of duties owed between the parties to the contribution
proceedings. The party claiming contribution does not have to show that he
has suffered damage resulting from the breach, but that the party from whom
contribution is claimed could be shown on the same factual basis to have
" Article 1165: "Les conventions n 'ont d'effet qu'entre Los parties contractantes; elles lie nuisent point
au tiers, et a/los tie Jul pm!Itent que clans le cas prevu par l'artide 1121." [Agreements have effect
only between the contracting parties; they do not give rise to detriment to third parties, nor benefit
them save as provided in Article 11211.
V.V. Palmer, Contractual Negligence in the Civil Law. (1975) Tul. L Rev. 49.
' By section 1 (1): "... any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by another person may
recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same damage (whether jointly
liable with him or otherwiser.
Section 6(1): "A person is liable in respect of any damage for the purposes of this Act if the person
who suffered if (or anyone representing his estate on dependents) is entitled to recover
compensation from him in respect of that damage (whatever the legal basis of his liability, whether
tort, breach of contract. breach of tort or otherwise)."
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been liable if an action had been brought against him in England 47 by the
person who suffered the damage.' The extent of contribution recoverable is
such as the court may find just and equitable having regard to the extent of
the person's responsibility for the damage in question, and may amount to a
complete indemnity.'9
The similarity of result in France is illustrated by the case where an owner
claimed against the contractor after large cracks and splits appeared in a
building constructed to plans of the owner's architect. The contractor sought
to join the architect as third party but was challenged on grounds, including,
that as he had no contract with the contractor, he could only be liable to the
contractor in tort and then only for an act or omission independent of his
contract with the owner, and that none had been alleged. The Cour de
Cassation affirmed the lower court's decision, which had rejected this
argument, in terms which described the nature of a contractor's tort action
against an architect:
"Whereas the decision (of the juge du fond) correctly declares that the
architect and the contractor, third parties to one another, can, in the
carlying out of activities which are separate, but dependent in their
final goal, commit torts against the other; equally a claim by the owner
for breach of contract against the architect, or against the contractor,
can, quite apart from any contractual viewpoint, be characterised as a
tort in the relations between the architect and the contractor"9°
A breach by the architect of his obligation to the owner as to proper design
may thus constitute the fault vis a vis the contractor if he suffers damage as
the result of the design defect. The basis for this is that the activities of both
The potential impact of the rights to claim contribution under the 1978 Act may in a European
context be considerable, first, by reason of section 6(1) by which references in section 1 to a persons
liability in respect of any damages are references to any such liability which has been or could be
established in an action brought against him England by an or on behalf of the person who suffered
damages, and which continues: "but it is immaterial whether any issue arising in any such action was
or would be determined (in accordance with the rules of private international law) by reference to
the law of a country outside England and Wales"; and second by reason of the jurisdiction provisions
of Articles 2 to 5 of the 1968 Brussels Convention, as incorporated into English law by the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982..
" Section 1 (6). By section 1 (2) the entitlement to claim contribution exists even where the claimaints
liability has ceased since the damage occurred (provided he was liable before he made or was
ordered or agreed to make the payment in respect of which contribution is sought); or where the
payment is made in bona fide settlement or compromise regardless whether he is a or even was
liable in respect of the damage (provided the factual basis of the daim against him could be
established).
Section 2 (1) and (2). The principles for assessing this are causation and relative blameworthiness;
Baker v Willoughby (1970) A.C. 467 (H.L) at 490.
Cass. Civ. 1, 24th May 1%7.
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architect and contractor have a common objective (the achievement of the
work) with the performance of their activities being interdependent.
In a further example a contractor, having been held liable in damages to the
owner for constructing a residential building without a ventilated space
under the floor resulting in excessive humidity, claimed indemnification by
the architect to whose plans he had built. The conclusion of the juge du
fond that the architect was liable in tort to the contractor for the damages
was challenged on the ground that the contractor could not base his action on
negligence committed by the architect in the performance of his contractual
obligations to the owner as this negligence was not separable from that
contract. The Cour de Cassation rejected the point, holding that the fact that
the design error could render the architect liable to the owner in contract did
not preclude the contractor from alleging that this breach constituted a fault
towards him, and permitted the contractor to recover from the architect the
damages he had suffered, representing the damages for which he was liable
to the owner. Thus if an architect is entrusted with the duty of supervising
and managing work and is specially remunerated for this task then if after
the owner claims against the contractor for a building defect, the contractor
seeks to join the architect as a third party for having negligently managed
and supervised the works, the court will not reject the impact of tortious
liability by virtue of the contractor being a third party to the employer-
architect contract.51
That one builder could recover from another in tort in respect of a breach of a
contract with the owner by that other builder appears consistent with this,
and offers a means of allowing the one builder, who has previously been
held liable to the owner for the whole damage, to recover whether in whole
or part from the negligent builder.
The French courts it seems reject the argument that it is improper for a
contractor who has produced faulty workmanship to seek contribution for
some portion of the damage caused by it from architect or engineer. Upon
finding that the woodwork of the buildings which the contractor had built
was infested with beetles, an owner sued the contractor, who then joined the
Cass. Civ. 1, 13th July 1961.
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architect responsible for the design and supervision of the work The juge
dii fond , while finding that the architect had not inspected the woodwork
prior to installation as he should have done, dismissed the claim against the
architect on the grounds that the contractor could not be considered a simple
executor of work; that he could not justifiably complain of lack of
supervision by the architect, who was not his guardian, and that the architect
had not contracted as to any obligation to the contractor. The Cour de
Cassation annulled this, concluding that, notwithstanding the absence of
contractual relations between them, the architect and contractor could be
liable to each other in tort even when the tortious event constitutes at the
same time the breach of a contractual obligation towards the owner, and that
thejuge dii fond should have determined: "whether the architect's default
(in neglecting to inspect the woodwork prior to installation) of itself and
quite apart from any contractual viewpoint did not constitute a fault towards
the contractor entitling him to recover damage ••'t52
In such cases it is however insufficient to assert merely a general failure by
the architect of his contract to supervise. A balcony of a building under
construction by a contractor supervised by two architects collapsed with fatal
consequences. The collapse occurred because only half the quantity of the
steel reinforcement required had been used. The contractor and responsible
personnel were held liable for the accident and, at first, successfully sought
recovery of half of those damages, with the juge du fond holding that the
architects had insufficiently supervised the work. The Cour de Cassation
noted that whilst the accident was due to negligent work by the contractor
(not faulty design), the architects had the ability "to exercise over him
effective, direct and daily control", but annulled the decision as without legal
justification because it had been based merely on the architect's obligation to
supervise, without determining in what respect the architects had committed
a tortious act towards the contractor. 53 The Cour d'Appel dismissed the
contractor's claim, affirming it difficult to accept that the persons who had
caused the accident could transfer a share of the responsibility resulting from
its own fault to the architects simply by invoking a general failure of
supervision; and further, even if the architects had committed a fault against
52 Cass. Civ 3, 4th June 1973.
" Cass. Civ. 7th November 1%2.
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the contractor, it could not be considered the direct or proximate cause of the
damage. For there to be liability each must have contributed to the entire
damage but lack of supervision could not itself have caused collapse of the
balcony and the damages suffered, whereas the negligence of the contractor
was sufficient.54
The Cour de Cassation, likewise, where an architect and contractors had
been held liable in solidum to the owner for the repair of defects to a central
heating system considered that the architect's duty of supervision "does not
oblige him constantly to be on the site nor does it substitute for supervision
by the contractor of his own personnel", and as the juge du fond had not
sought to determine "if the architect's obligation of supervision ... would
have been of a kind to prevent the defect", the decision was annulled.55
Where negligent construction appears to have been flagrant, it seems that the
contractor is relieved of having to prove that the damage it suffered was
caused by a specific breach of the architect's contractual obligation to
supervise. 56
 When only two years after completion of a building a large
portion of the ceiling of an apartment in the building collapsed, the Cour de
Cassation held that fault in carrying out the supervisory and managerial
functions could be attributed to the architect. 57
 Likewise a contractor sued for
having failed to treat timber used in house construction with insecticide, as
required by the contract (and the absence of which would have threatened
the stability of the building), joined the architect responsible for supervising
the work as a third party. The architect challenged the joinder. After
determining that the architect was obliged to supervise the work and to
verify that the materials employed had been treated and after finding that the
architect had "purely and simply turned this matter over" to the contractor,
the Cour de Cassation rejected the challenge to the joinder. This case is also
" Cour dAppel de Dijon, 22nd December 1964.
Cour de Cass. 3,25th May 1976.
0i in practical tenns, the circumstances are taken as proof in themselves.
' Cass. Civ. 1. 31st July 1961. Similarly, where an architect had totally neglected his obligation of
supervision, and senous defects existed, the Courde Cassation affiimed liability without requiring
that the damage be shown to result from a specific negligent act, and refused to annul the decision
that the architect was responsible for half the damages caused by the contractor after noting that
the damages consisted, among other things, in cracks in facade and internal bearing walls and
infiltrations of rainwater through the walls and after noting that the architect failed to appear on the
site until after the construction work was completed; Cass. Civ 3eme 22nd May 1973.
Cass. Cw 3,31st Januaiy 1969.
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of interest as, under his contract with the owner, the contractor had expressly
assumed "sole responsibility" for the supply and installation of building
materials and sole responsibility for defects" which could result therefrom.
These obligations on the contractor were not found by the court to limit the
architect's obligation towards the owner (consistent with Antcle 1165) or to
prevent the contractor's tort action against the architect based on an alleged
breach of it.
4	 Liabthty in solidum
Faced with the frequent difficulty of accurately apportioning damage in
construction cases and concerned to ensure compensation of the victim
(whether the owner or third parties), the French courts often render
judgments holding two or more of the participants in a project liable in
solidurn, that is jointly and severally, to the victim for the damage. Such
judgments are ordinarily pronounced in cases where fault of several
participants is believed to have contributed to the damage.
For example, a subcontractor of the contractor (who was in liquidation), the
architect and the engineer were held liable in solidum for 75% of the costs of
repair of a defective heating and hot water system (the remaining 25% of the
costs being imposed on the owner). The defective heating and hot water
system resulted from the absence of a water treatment system. The judgment
in solid urn was said by the court to be justified against each party on the
ground that each had committed an act of negligence contributing to the
damage: the specialist engineer was found in breach of contract for not
warning the owner of the risks of omission of the water treatment system;
the architect was found in breach for not having verified that provision for a
treatment system was made; and the subcontractor was found liable to the
owner in tort for undertaking the installation without warning the owner of
the absence of a water treatment system.59
In cases where construction defects are held to result, in part, from faulty
supervision by an engineer or architect, such engineer or architect may be
° Cass. Civ. 3,25th March 1980.
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held liable in solidum with those responsible for the faulty execution of the
work'° Apart from reliance on breach of contract to establish a tortious
liability there Is an action available directly comparable to English
contribution proceedings where one party is made liable in solidum with
other participants in the project and pays the whole amount of the judgment.
5	 Tort dams aid wigii
What though of the owner? Is it consistent with the invoction of the
architect's contract with the owner, when considering claims by the
contractor for contribition, that the owner should not be precluded by the fact
of the contract between contractor and sub-contractor from claiming in tort
directly against the latter, and further that he might rely on the sub-
contractor's breaches as constituting fault causing damage?
The traditional principle of French law has been that where parties have a
contractual relationship then their remedies lie in contract not tort.
Significant litigation took place in France in respect of "contractual" actions
between sub-contractors and employers. Debate arose in about 1979 as to
whether in circumstances of a chain of contracts particularly in sales of goods
the ultimate consumer's action agaisnt a sub-vendor was in contract or tort.
The essential divide was between the undesirability of different regimes
governing the responsibility of the many parties involved so that the remedy
in contract was advocated; and the traditional line that without a contractual
relationship the remedy was in tort.
Separate chambers of the Cour de Cassation adopted different approaches.
Contradictoiy decisions resulted, creating "open crisis". 61
 In full assembly the
° Cour dAppel de Paris, 1,30th March 1973; Cass. Civ. 3,29th April 1974.
The point derives from decisions in 1984 on similar facts, namely direct claims by the employer
against the manufacturer, for defective roof tiles. The First Chamber on 29th May 1984 adopted the
premise that the action was "contractual", while the Third Chamber, on 19th June 1984. resolved that
the mute had to be in tort. These were the subject of the note of Professor Bénabent in Recueil
Dalloz Sires 1985, 17, Cahier, 213, who used the phrase "open crisis" but supported the contract
mute: ... it was justifiable to conclude that the presence of a contractual group (more so if it is a
group of simultaneous or successive contracts relating to the same object) justifies unity of actions
which are brought within its domain and condemns the use of an action of a delictual nature. Even
between the extremes of the chain, it is therefore exclusively in the domain of contract that one
assesses the elements of responsibility in the same sense"]
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Cour de Cassation in 1986 determined that an employer as sub-purchaser of
building materials enjoyed all the rights and actions that belonged to the
original purchaser and that his action was contractual and not tortious in
respect of non-conformity.' The impact of this was apparent in 1988 where
the plaintiff had given slides for enlargement into photographs to a company
who sub-contracted the job to another who lost them. The plaintiff sued the
sub-contractor, and the result, firmly adoping the contractual route and
rejecting delictual responsibility, was that the sub-contractor was entitled to
the benefit of an exclusion clause in the plaintiff's contract, and certainly the
plaintiff's rights would have had additional limitations depending on the
sub-contractor's contract. 63
 This provides a useful display of the role of
contract as to, first, its extent, reflecting the French law approach to contract as
a perceived relationship; second, its use as a mechanism that curtails tort
actions; and third, its emphasis on those contractual obligations attaching to
the parties that may determine or limit responsibility without reference to
proof of fault.
One might have thought that such result in 1988 would have ended the
ability of the employer to bring proceedings against a sub-contractor in tort.
A decision later that year to the contraiy was described as an "island of
resistance to the phenomenon of contractualisation'? The debate continued
but may have been laid to rest by the decision of the full assembly of the
Cour de Cassation delivered in July 1991.65 The conclusion rested on the
provision in Article 1165 that agreements have effect only between the
parties to them, and was that "the sub-contractor has no contractual
relationship with the employer.", so that it re-established the pre-1979
doctrine of liability in tort. The social impetus that undoubtedly led to the
02 Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 1986, 24, Cahiei 293. The facts concerned the purchase of material for
insulating pipework which caused conosion. The Cour de Cassation sits in full assembly to resolve
conflicts between Chambers and where important questions of principle are involved.
° Cass. civ. 1, 8th March 1988; La Semaine Juridique, No. 40, 21070. An earlier decision of the
Commercial Chamber of the Cour de Cassation which had derived from the partial sub-contracting
of the construction of a ship had resulted in a conclusion that no delictual remedy was available
between the owner and the sub-contractoi but without reference to a contractual remedy either
existing or providing the grounds for the decision; Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 1987, 36 Cahiei 543. This was
adversely noted by Pmfessorjourdain at 545.
04 Cass. civ. 3,22nd June 1988, La Semaine Juridique, No. 40, 21125; where the court refused to follow
what by then was the orthodox line. The main contrsctor was in liquidation and the plaintiff building
owners claimed against a sub-contractor carpenter in respect of defects. The action was held to be
appropriately in tort, but the plaintiff failed for want of proof of fault. The comment is in the note,
again of Professor Jourdain.
05 Cass. civ. 12th July 1991; the case of Besse.
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desire to provide a remedy without the necessity for proof of fault has found
its mark in the development of the schemes of product liability and is
unlikely to re-emerge in the near future as a force influencing the balance
between contractual and tortious actions.
6	 Droit administratif
Different rules are applicable where the matter falls within the jurisdiction of
the administrative court; 6' and where there is a connection between the fault
and public service, faute de service, liability of the State is substituted.'7
While tortious liability under the droit civil is based on fault the droit
administratif is seen as taking a wider view with compensation provided in
certain circumstances without a wrong having been committed, as where
harm is caused resulting from something done for the public benefit,' 8
 for
example accidents resulting from public building works. Fault does however
play a part and there is a material distinction between fault that reflects
malfunctioning of the public service, faute de service, and personal fault,
faute personnelle , committed by an officer but not linked to his public
service which broadly resembles the English distinction between a servant's
acts in or beyond the scope of his employment.'9
From a Law of 1799 a duty to compensate anyone injured as a consequence of
public works was imposed on the administation, and in this century the
Conseil d'Etat has evolved a principle of liability without fault, 7° and based on
68 The principle which highlights the difference and which is applicable whether in respect of torts or of
contract was expressed in the judgment of the Tribunal de Conflits in the case of Blanco in 1873:
Considering that the liability which may fall upon the state for damage caused to individuals by the
act of persons which it employs in the public service cannot be governed by the principles which are
laid down in the Civil Code for relations between one individual and another: that this liability is
neither general nor absolute: that it has its own special rules which vazy according to the needs of the
service and the necessity to reconcile the rights of the state withprivate rights ...", T.C. 8th Februaiy
1873.
The general liability attributed to the State by the case of Blanco was applied no less to public
authorities as fmm the case of Feutiy, IC. 29th Februaty 1908.
68 Brown and Bell, French Administrative La 4th ed. 1992. Deriving fn,m the principle of "egalite
devant les charges publiques", (equality before public burdensi in Article 13 of the Dedaration of
the Rights of Man of 1789; R. En-era, The Scope and Meaning of No-fault liability in French
Mministrative La 1986, C.LP., 171.
'8 The distinction leads to a liability of the authority within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts
and to a liability of the officer in the ordinaiy courts. A combination, cumul, has led to the authority
being liable to bear the whole damages but with rights to secure appmpnate contribution, now
through the administrative courts.
Initial steps towards this were in a willingness to presume fault.
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risk deriving from the activities of the state which should carry an indemnity
if creating loss. 7' This aspect contrasts with the common law approach
whereby the fact of the works being done, for example on a highway, merely
imposes a duty of care on the authority which if broken results in liability,
but if not leaves the burden where it falls.72
7	 11Kb English Experience
The development and construction of a building is complex, involving
many separate entities with their own functions and duties. A plethora of
relationships is created although in basic form, the contractual chain runs
from the employer to the main contractor, to sub-contractors, suppliers, and
separately to contracts with the professionals engaged. There are inherent
difficulties in this contractual framework, with loss frequently caused by
actions of those beyond its reach. Vicarious liability and indemnity
provisions are ordinarily incorporated into building contracts, but for
whatever reason a contractual chain is broken the prospect of non-recovery
from a party who has caused loss remains, with tort as a possible route to
recovery.
The elements of a duty of care, proximity and foreseeability, are inescapably
present as between the majority of the legal entities involved in a
construction project, but restrictions are placed on the types and extent of
loss in respect of which a duty of care may be owed and recovery made.14
Duties are limited at common law, but they are also limited by contractual
arrangements that exist.tm
 just as in respect of the sub-contractor in France.
Where, because of the main contractor's liquidation, an employer seeks
As expressed by Dugwt in his Traité de dmit constitutionnel, 3rd. ed., 1927-9, 469: "... the activity of
the state is carried on in the interest of the entire community the burdens that it entails should not
weigh more heavily on some than on others. If then state action results in individual damage to
particular citizens, the state should make redress, whether there be a fault committed by the public
officers concerned. The state is, in some ways an insurer of what is often called social risk,. sisque
social ..P.
72 The example is illustrated by Holiday v National Telephone Company (1899) 2 Q.B. 392.
Murphyv Brentwood District Council (1991) 1 AC. 398 (l-I.L.) at 462-3.
Murphy at p. 471-2.
Simaan General Contracting Co. v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No2) (1988) Q.B. 758 (CA).
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recovery from a sub-contractor for the latter's defaults which have caused
loss,7' proximity and foreseeabflity are present for a prima fade duty of care
to arise, but the hurdle is the ability to recover economic loss." The current
law relating to the recovery of economic loss in negligence has been
developed entirely by the judiciaiy. This has laid its basis open to constant
revision to reflect perceived changing social and economic conditions and
varying policy considerations, and such propensity has been particularly
apparent in recent times during which the courts have followed caution,
restricting negligence outside contract and emphasising the pre-eminence of
parties' own contractual framework in risk allocation. 78
 As a result, many of
the expansions in the law manifest in the previous decades have been
overturned.
The foundation for the development of negligence was the duty of care, but it
did not derive from or portray a principle in the sense of Article 1382 of the
Code Civil, for it canied the seeds of lack of one. Lord Atkin in Donoghue v
Stevenson relied on the consideration in Le Lievre v Gould that it had
been established that:
"under certain circumstances, one man may owe a duty to another,
even though there is no contract between them. If one man is near to
another or is near to the property of another, a duty lies upon him not
to do that which may cause a personal injury to that other or may
injure his property"8'
° As was done in Junior Books Ltd. v Veitchi Co. Ltd. (1983) 1 A.C. 520 (H.L.), but there was nothing to
indicate in that case that the main contractor was in liquidation or that the contractual chain was not
available.
" The cost of repair or replacement, diminution in value, and loss of profit.
' B.S. Markesinis, The Random Element of their Loidships' Infallible Judgment: A Economic and
Comparative Analysis of the Tort of Negligence from Anns to Murphy. (1992) 55 M.L.R. 619.
(1932) AC 562 at 580: "At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be,
and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular
cases found in the books are but instances. ... The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes
in law, you must not injure your neighbour and the layers question, Who is my neighbour?
receives a restrictive reply You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour?
The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the
acts or omissions which are called in question."
Le Lievre v Gould (1893)1 Q.B. 491. In the same case, perA.L Smith U.: "The decision of Heaven v
Pender [(1882-3) 11 Q.B.D. 5031 was founded upon the principle, that a duty to take care did arise
when the person or property of one was in such proximity to the person or property of another that, if
due care was not taken, damage might be done by the one to the other."
" This, by Loid Atkin, "Sufficiently states the truth if proximity be not confined to mere physical
proximity, but be used, as I think was intended, to extend to such close and direct relations that the
act complained of directly affects a person whom the person alleged to be bound to take care would
know would be directly affected by his careless act. ... I confine myself to articles of common
household use, where every one, including the manufacturer, knows that the articles will be used by
other persons than the actual ultimate purchaser ... (1932) AC 562 at 583.
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but lack of a principle is illustrated in the dissent in Donoghue v Stevenson
82 which was prophetic of later difficulties.0 Despite this Lord Atkin's general
conception of relations which give rise to a duty of care was taken as a
"principle of proximity" 84 and to be regarded as a statement of principle
although requiring qualification.85
Notwithstanding debate over the extent of a principle, recovery in
Donoghue v Stevenson extended only to the injuly caused to a person, a
separate entity, by the offending article. The cost of or damage to the
offending article itself was not recovered and the liability of the
manufacturer depended largely on the absence of opportunity for
intermediate inspection by the user. It was seen as a short step from it to
conclude that a negligent misrepresentation may give rise to an action for
damages for financial loss, since the law will imply a duty of care when a
party seeking information from a party possessed of special skill trusts him to
exercise due care, and that party knew or ought to have known that reliance
was being placed on his skill and judgment.86
The conclusions in Hedley 87 were that there must be something more
than mere misstatement, the most natural requirement being that expressly
or by implication from the circumstances the speaker or writer has
undertaken some responsibility. If a person assumes a responsibility to
tender deliberate advice, liability would attach if given negligently, and it was
"If one step, why not fifty. Yet if a house be, as it sometimes is, negligently built, and in consequence
of that negligence the ceiling falls and injures the occupier or anyone else, no action against the
builder exists according to English la although I believe such a right did exist according to the la
of Babylon.", (1932) AC 562 at 577. Lord Buckrnaster thought that Heaven v Pender should be buried
so securely that their perturbed spirits should no longer vex the law. He continued "... it would seem
little short of outrageous to make them responsible to members of the public for the condition of the
contents of evely bottle which issues frem their works. It is obvious that,. if such responsibility
attached to the defenders, they might be called on to meet claims of damages which they could not
possibly investigate or answer."
In D.& F. EstatesvChurchCommissioners(1989)A.C. 177(H.L).
Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd. (1964) A.C. 465 at 524.
U will require qualification in new ciitumstances. But ... It ought to apply unless there is some
justification or valid explanation for its exclusion. For example, causing economic loss is a different
mattei for one thing it is often caused by deliberate actIon." Lord Reid in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v
Home Office (1970) AC. 1004 (H.L.) at 1026.
80 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller and Partners Ltd. (1964) A.C. 465 (H.L.).
" The facts should not be ovexiooked. Advertising agents placed orders for which they were liable to
pay. They asked their bankers to inquire into the financial stability of their client company. The
bankers made inquiries of the Respondents, who gave favourable references "without
responsibility". In reliance on the references, the Appellants placed orders which resulted in loss.
The disclaimer negated the duty.
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postulated that situations might exist where "... one person voluntarily and
gratuitously undertakes to do something for another and becomes under a
duty to exercise reasonable care."" Such assumption of responsibility has
emerged as the kernel of the case," but Lord Devlin was content "with the
proposition that wherever there is a relationship equivalent to contract there
is a duty of care."'° This provided a basis for holding that if there is an actual
contract, there is no duty of care." The elements in Donoghue v Stevenson
of physical injury to person or property and the exclusion of economic loss
enunciated in the Dorset Yacht case were omitted,' 2
 but Hedley Byrne has
constituted a special and limited exception which in turn has been built on in
relation to liability of advisers.'3
 It has survived the counter-revolution and
is used as a platform for explanation and justification.
Since 1970 a spate of cases in this area have substantially derived from
building works.' 4 Dutton v Bognor Regis U.D.C. imposed liability for
damages not limited to physical injury but extending to damage to the house
and an indication, deriving from Hedley Byrne, that such might include
economic loss.'6
 In reaching this conclusion the premise was that a builder
Lord Moms at page 497.
Emphasis was also placed on reliance, and on foreseeability of loss. Per Lord Moms at page 4%: "In
logic I can see no essential reasons for distinguishing injury which is caused by a reliance upon
words from injury which is caused by a reliance upon the safety of the staging of a ship ..IHeaven v
Pender] or by reliance upon the safety for use of the contents of a bottle of hair wash [George v
Skivington (1869) L.R. 5 Ex.1J or a bottle of some consumable liquid [Donoghue v Stevenson." Per
Lord Devlin at page 517: "That is why the distinction is now said to depend on whether financial loss
is caused through physical injury or whether it is caused directly. The interposition of the physical
injury is said to make a difference of principle. I can find neither logic nor common sense in this."
° At page 530.
Greater Nottingham Co-operative Society Ltd. v Cementation Piling and Foundations Ltd. (1988) 3
W.LR. 3% (CA).
The telescoping of the neighbour principle of reasonable foresight with economic loss recoverability
under Hedley Byrne was identified as giving rise to an unacceptable expansion of liability and a
requirement for some other test for economic loss claims, PP. Craig (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 213.
° Caparo Industries Plc. v Dickman (1990) 2 AC. 605.
" Reviewed Initially by l.N.Duncan Wallace (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 16, and also by reference to
Commonwealth developments (1978) 94 LQ.R. 60, and 331.
Dutton v Bognor Regis U.D.C. (1972) 1 Q.B. 373 (CA). A claim by a subsequent purchaser against a
Local Authority for negligence in inspecting foundations built on the site of a rubbish tip. The
builder was not an active party as it was thought that as the law then stood a claim against the
builder could not succeed. The Court of Appeal held that the power of inspection under the Public
Health Act 1936 canied with a duty at common law to take reasonable care to see that the byelaws
were complied with and that negligent approval of foundations, which resulted in a hidden defect
likely to cause injury to a future purchaser, was a breath of that duty The plaintiff came within the
dass of persons described In Donoghue v Stevenson. There was sufficient proximity and, with
buildings there was no need to show reliance.
Stamp U. at page 415: "... one goes back to consider what was the character of the duty, if any, owed
to the plaintiff, and one finds on authority that the injury which is one of the essential elements of
the tort of negligence is not confined to physical damage to personal property but may embrace
economic damage which the plaintiff suffers buying a worthless thin& as is shown by Il-ledley
Byrnel."
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could be liable for negligence in constructing a house, and this proved the
start of a pendulum swing from the then prevailing view to the position in
Junior Books v Veitch,, 91 and back, when Murphy overruled Duttan.98
Also overruled in Murphy, was Anns v Merton which was a further, and
ultimate, extension of Lord Atkin's neighbour principle. Prior to the
decision, economic loss in tort was recoverable, resulting from negligent acts
or omissions, so far as it was immediately consequent on physical damage,'°°
or from negligent misstatements, so far as the Hedley Byrne special
relationship and assumption of responsibility tests were satisfied. Following
the decision in Anns both the test for determining the existence of a duty of
care (for acts and omissions as well as statements) and for recovery of
economic loss was taken as Lord WIlberforce's two stage test: firstly whether
"as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered
damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or
neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the
former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the
latter - in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the
first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider
whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to
reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of persons to whom it
is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise....[e.g.1
cases about "economic loss" where, a duty having been held to exist,
the nature of the recoverable damages was limited."0'
Lord Wilberforce agreed generally with the conclusions in Dutton as to the
position of the builder stating that the "nature of the damages recoverable
may also include damage to the dwelling house itself .".'°
Junior Books Ltd. v Veitchi Co. Ltd. (1983) 1 AC. 520.
08 D.& F Estates cast doubt on Dutton, and it was expressly ovenu1ed by the House of Lords in Murphy
v Brentwood District Council.
° Anns v Merton London Borough Council (1978) A.C. 728 (H.L.).
'°° Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v Martin & Co. Contractors Ltd. (1973) 1 Q.B. 373, (CAL although Dutton
v Bognor Regis had made some inroads into this.
'°' At p. 751. Anns was a claim by lessees of flats against a Local Authority for negligence in relation to
their powers of inspection under Building Byelaws in allowing builders to construct insufficient
foundations causing structural movement resulting in cracks and sloping floors. Applying this test, it
was held on assumed facts that the Local Authority were liable.
102 There was discussion as to the nature and purpose of parts of the Public Health Acts from which it
was conduded that a Building Inspector owed a duty of care of occupiers, being persons whose
health or safety might suffer injuly if the foundations were inadequate, and arising from this it was
held that the cause of action only arose when there was present or imminent danger to the health or
safety of persons occupying the building. The relevant damage was a...
 in my opinion material,
physical damage and what is recoverable is the amount of expenditure necessaly to restore the
dwelling to a condition in which it is no longer a danger to the health or safety of persons occupying
.J' at page 759.
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Anns gave rise to notable features. First, the two stage test was said to be of
general application and to be derived from Donoginie v Stevenson. Second,
Dutton was affirmed, including the proposition that a builder may be liable
for negligence in constructing a house. Third, an emphasis was placed on the
present or imminent danger to health or public safety, although injuly need
not have been suffered, (this derived from the purpose of the Public Health
Acts, but it is very closely allied to the principle of physical damage). Fourth,
the nature of the damage recoverable was said to encompass reasonable
expenses of necessary alternative accommodation as well as repair costs,
namely economic loss.
Anns enjoyed prominence but even before its demise in Murphy, it attracted
increasing criticism and doubt. 103
 It was to be treated with reservation,' 04
 and a
preference was expressed that the law should develop new categories of
negligence incrementally rather than by a massive extension restrained only
by the Anns second stage.'° 5
 The second stage of the Anns test would rarely
have to be applied, and Hedley Byrne and Junior Books "turned on the
voluntary assumption of responsibility towards a particular party, giving rise
to a special relationship."°6
Prior to this, the freedom given by the Anns test had been illustrated in
103 Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney-General of Hong Kong (1987) 3 W.L.R. 776 (P.C.). This case concerned a
daim against the Hong Kong Commissioner of Deposit 1king companies for negligence in the
registration of a company whose affairs, it was said, he should have known were being conducted
fraudulently, speculatively and to the detriment of its customers. The Privy Council held that there
was no cause of action since the relationship between the Commissioner and the plaintiffs was
insufficiently dose and direct for him to owe then as members of an unascertained dass of
potential depositors, a duty to take reasonable care. In reaching this conclusion it was said, at page
785, that: "For the future it should be recognised that the two-stage test in (Anns) is not to be
regarded in all circumstances as a suitable guide to the existence of duty of care."
104 Lord Keith at page 783: "Their Lordships venture to think that the two stage test formulated by Lord
Wilberforce ... has been elevated to a degree of importance greater than its ments. Further, the
expression of the first stage of the test carnes with it a risk of misinterpretation. ... The first view _. is
that he meant to test the sufficiency of piwdmity simply by the reasonable contemplation of likely
harm. The second view ... is that Lord Wilberforce meant the expression "pmximity or
neighbourhood" to be a composite one, importing the whole concept of necessaty relationship
between plaintiff and defendant described by Lord Atkin in (Donoghue v Stevenson). In their
Lordships opinion the second view is the correct one."
'° From Brennan J
. 
in the Australian case of Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman (1985) 59
ALJR 564. The case offered sensible guidelines for the future, l.N Duncan Wallace, I.C.L.R.,. vol.3,
•1986.
101 Lord Keith at pages 785 and 787.
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junior Books 107 where: there was no danger to life or limb or other property;
limiting Donoghue v Stevenson to physical damage to person or property
was regarded as long since ceased; there was".., almost as close a commercial
relationship with the respondents as it is possible to envisage short of pnvity
of contract"; there was no physical damage to the flooring in the sense in
which that phrase was used in Dutton; the question was whether the duty
extended to avoid defects in the work itself, sometimes it had been
overlooked that virtually all damage including physical damage is in one
sense financial or economic for it is compensated by an award of damages.'°8
Exclusion clauses in the main contract were pointed to as possible facts
limiting the duty of care, but there was a duty to take reasonable care to avoid
not only physical damage to person or property but also pure economic loss.109
Dissent pointed out that Donoghue v Stevenson was based on danger of
physical injury to persons or property other than the very property which
gave rise to the danger, 11 ° but it appeared that there was nothing more to
hold back economic loss claims and that contract was an unnecessary
'° Junior Books Ltd. v Veitchi Co. Ltd (1983) 1 A.C. 520 (H.L.). Specialist flooring sub-contractors laid a
floor at the pursuers factoty within the pursuers alleged was negligently defective. They claimed the
cost of relaying the floor and various items of economic and financial loss consequential on
replacement. They did not allege that there was any danger of injuly to people or property. It was
held that where the relationship was sufficiently close a duty in tort extended to avoid causing pure
economic loss consequential on defects in the wot.
Lord Roskill between pages 538 and 545.
'° Lord Keith at page 535; "It has also been established that where a duty of care exists through the
presence of such reasonable anticipation (of physical injuiy to person or property), and it is
breached, then even though no such injuly has actually been caused because the person to whom
the duty is owed has incurred expenditure in averting the danger, that person in entitled to damages
measured by the amount of that expenditure7 The deterioration of the flooring was not damage to
the respondents property such as to give rise to a liability falling directly within Donoghue v
Stevenson. The flooring had an inherent defect. The appellants did not damage the respondents
property they supplied them with a defective floor.
"° The apparent effect of Junior Books as an unwan'anted intrusion of tort into what should be the field
of contract was seriously doubted by observers who found support in Lord Brandon's dissent,
including Professor J
. 
Fleming (1984) Oxfonl Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 4, No.2.
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impediment to recovery1
The scope of the duty of care was used to herald a retreat from tort in the
Pea&idy case,"2 but it was Simaan v fllkington " which tackled the problem
of economic loss. Main contractors sued glass suppliers in negligence for
supplying glass units which were not of the colour specified and claimed
economic loss because money which otherwise they would have been paid
was withheld. It was held that a claim for pure economic loss,
unaccompanied by physical damage to property of which the plaintiff was
owner or to which he could show possessory title, lay only where there was a
special relationship which amounted to reliance by the plaintiff on the
defendant. The plaintiffs had no proprietary interest. It was doubted
whether there was any damage. Nor had the defendants assumed
responsibility to the plaintiffs for the quality of the units.
The conclusions included an acceptance without reservation that a claim
may lie in negligence for economic loss alone (Hedley Byrne ); that the
defendants owed the plaintiffs a conventional duty of care to avoid physical
damage to persons or property; that there was no meaningful sense in which
the plaintiffs could be said to have relied on the defendants; that it might be
"Plainly this decision contained the seeds of a major development of the law of negligence.....It
remained to be seen whether those seeds would be encouraged or pennitted to germinate.", per
Bingham U. in Simaan General Contracting Co. v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No.2) (1988) Q.B. Th8 at 768.
Junior Books was analysed to great effect in Muithead v Industrial Tank Specialists Ltd. (1986) Q.B.
507, to show that it contained no principle at aI per Goff L.J. at 523f, ... the only principle
consistent with (1) the relevance of "the veiy dose pmximity between the parties"; (2) the relevance
of reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant; and (3) the fact that the defendant may be able to rely
on contractual terms with a third party in order to defeat the Plaintiffs claim against hin is that, on
the facts ... it was considered by the majority - that the nominated subcontractor had assumed a
direct responsibility to the building owner.. However ... the parties had deliberately structured their
contractual relationship in order to achieve the results that (apart from any special arrangements)
there should be no direct liability inter Se." It was regarded as an "exception to the general principle
that economic loss is not recoverable in the absence of actual or apprehended physical damage",
per Woolf U. in Greater Nottingham at page 419, and uncitable, per Dillon U. in Simaan v
Pillcington at page 778: a "controversial decision .... [whichl cannot now be regarded as a useful
pointer to any development of the law ... . In Murphy, the House of Lords said that Junior Books
could be regarded as an application of Hedley Byrne.
112 Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund vSir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. (1985) 1 A.C. 210 (H.L.).
Plans submitted to the local authority for approval showed flexible drainage. The drains in fact
constructed were, on the instructions of the Plaintiffs arthitect, rigid. This was known to the local
authority drainage inspectoi When the drains were tested two years later they were unsatisfactory
and had to be reconstructed. The House of Lords held that the Plaintiffs claim in negligence
against the local authority failed because (i) it was not lust and reasonable to impose liability and
(ii) the local authority owed no duty to activate their statutory powers in relation to drainage. The
issue really came to be whether the local authority owed a duty to Peabody to warn then that they
were heading for financial disaster. Considered as refreshingiy clear" in l.N. Duncan Wallace, The
New Peabody Principle. (1985) 1 Constr. U. 176.
Simaan General Contracting Co. v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No.2) (1988) Q.B. 758.
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possible to say that a nominated subcontractor has assumed responsibility to
the building owner, but not to the main contractor, that Junior Books had
been interpreted as a case of physical damage and that it was an abuse of
language to describe the glass units as damaged; that Hedley Byrne did not
establish a general rule that claims in negligence may succeed on proof of
foreseeable economic loss caused by the defendant even where no damage to
property and no proprietaly or possessory interest are shown; and finally that
it was not just or reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendants
towards the plaintiffs of the scope contended for. The approach of the law to
awarding damages for economic loss was affected by pragmatic
considerations.
D. & F Estates 114 included a re-analysis of Arms. The case concerned
defective work by plastering subcontractors. The non-occupying corporate
owner claimed against the main contractor ceiling repair costs, future repair
costs of other plasterwork said to be defective and loss of rent. The Court of
Appeal had held that a building contractor does not owe a duty of care to an
owner or lessee not in occupation;) the contractor did not owe a duty of care
to supervise the subcontractor; and, even if there had been a duty, damages
would not include loss of rent being purely economic loss. The House of
Lords returned to the dissent in Junior Books, as expressing principles:
"... easy enough to comprehend and probably not difficult to
apply when the defect complained of is in a chattel supplied complete
by a single manufacturer. If the hidden defect in the chattel is the
cause of personal injuly or of damage to property other then the
chattel itself, the manufacturer is liable. But if the hidden defect is
discovered before any such damage is caused, there is no longer any
room for the application of the Donoghue v Stevenson principle. The
chattel is now defective in quality, but is no longer dangerous. It may
be valueless or it may be capable of economic repair. In either case the
economic loss is recoverable in contract by a buyer or hirer of the
chattel entitled to the benefit of a relevant warranty of quality, but is
not recoverable in tort by a remote buyer or hirer of the chattel.
If the same principle applies in the field of real property to the liability
of a builder of a permanent structure which is dangerously defective,
that liability can only arise if the defect remains hidden until the
defective structure causes personal injuly or damage to property other
than the structure itself. If the defect is discovered before any damage
is done, the loss sustained by the owner of the structure, who has to
D.& F. EstatesvChwth Commissioners (1989)A.C. 177 (I-IL).
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repair or demolish it to avoid a potential source of danger to third
parties, would seem to be purely economic.""5
It was not there necessary to decide how far Anns departed from this
principle, but the inference was that it was wrong," 6
 as confirmed in
Murphy. The notion of complex structures was introduced, where one
element of the structure should be treated for the purpose of the application
of the principles as distinct from another element, so that damage to one part
of the structure caused by a hidden defect in another part may qualify to be
treated as damage to other property." 7 Liability of the builder in negligence
for the cost of replacing the defect could not follow from Donoghue v
Stevenson or any legitimate development of it, and "would be to impose
upon him for the benefit of those with whom he had no contractual
relationship the obligation of one who warranted the quality of the plaster as
regards materials workmanship and fitness for purpose.""8
D. & F Estates was of profound significance, and put the law back to pre-
197O." It supported the following propositions: first that a claim in
negligence will not normally succeed unless there has been physical damage
to persons or property other than the property which is the product of the
negligence. Other claims are categonsed as claims for pure economic loss and
irrecoverable or warranty claims only recoverable in contract. Second, that
once a potentially dangerous hidden defect is discovered, it ceases to be
dangerous (since the means of averting the danger is available) and there is
" LordBndgeatpage206.
l.N. Duncan Wallace, Anns Beyond Repair. (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 107. J
. 
Stapleton, Duty of Care and
Economic loss. (1991 107 L.Q.R. 249.
" "The builder of a house or other structure is liable at common law for negligence only where actual
damage, either to person or to property, results [fromi carelessness on his part in the course of
construction. That the liability should embrace damage to the defective article itself is, of course, an
anomaly which distinguishes it from liability for the manufacture of a defective chattel but it can,. I
think, be accounted for on the basis ... that,, in the case of a complex structure such as building.
individual parts of the building fall to be treated as separate and distinct items of property On that
footing, damage caused to other parts of the building from, for instance, defective foundations or
defective steelwork would ground an action but not damage to the defective part itself except in so
far as that part caused other damage, when the damages would include the cost of repair to that part
so far as necessaiy to remedy damage caused to other parts.", Lord Oliver at page 214.
' Lord Bndge at page 207. This was just what Parliament had done in the Defective Premises Act 1972
in respect of dwellings, but not for commeitial premises, and this is the effect of the guarantee
obligation under French law. This was also the effect in the St. Martins case, reported with Linden
Gardens Trust v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd. (1993) 3 W.LR. 408 (l-l.L). lnteresting1 Keating on
Building Contracts, 5th ed, considers study of the Act more suitable to a work on torts.
" Sir Robin Cooke, An Impossible Distinction. (1991)107 L.Q.R. 46.
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no claim in negligence, but there may be recovety of the cost of averting a
danger to the health and safety of occupants or third parties, and, on one
view, liability depended on the chance of an accident occurring before the
defect is discovered. Third, that Junior Books was wrongly decided. Fourth,
where Anns departed from the principle above it was wrong and Dutton
might be wrong.12°
By what criteria were the courts to treat one part of the structure as distinct
from another? Possibilities might include functional interdependence,
structural dependence, or sourcing of the different elements from different
designers or suppliers. 121
 It was observed in Murphy that it would be
unrealistic to take the view that damage to one part caused by a hidden defect
in another part might qualify as damage to other property as regards a
building the whole of which had been erected and equipped by the same
contractot In that situation the whole package provided by the contractor
would fall to be regarded as one unit rendered unsound by a defect in a part;
but, where for example electric wiring had been installed by a subcontractor
and due to a careless defect a fire destroyed the building, "it might not be
stretching ordinary principles too far to hold the electrical sub-contractor
liable for the damage".
A distinction had to be drawn between some part of a complex structure
which was a danger only because it did not perform its proper function in
sustaining the other parts, and some distinct item incorporated in the
structure which malfunctioned so as to inflict positive damage on the
structure in which it was incorporated. So, if a defective central heating
boiler exploded and damaged a house or a defective electrical installation
malfunctioned and set the house on fire, there was no reason to doubt that
the owner, if he could prove that the damage was due to the negligence of the
boiler manufacturer or the electrical contractor, could recover damages in
tort. But the position was entirely different where, by reason of the
inadequacy of the foundations to support the superstructure, differential
120 Arms had introduced "an entirely novel Concept" and Lord Wilberforces observations in Anns were
"difficult to reconcile with any conventional analysis of the underlying basis of liability in tort for
negligence." Inevitably there was considerable uncertainty after D & F Estates which has been
removed by Murphy.
121 l.N. Duncan Wallace, Negligence and Defective Buildings: Confusion Confounded. (1989) 105
L.Q.R. 46.
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settlement and consequent cracking occurred. Here, once the first cracks
appeared, the structure as a whole was seen to be defective and the nature of
the defect was known.'
The open crisis (as the phrase had been applied to the debate in French law)
was laid to rest in Murphy where it was acknowledged that the complex
structure theory had been rightly criticised; it having been advanced as the
only logically possible explanation of the categorisation of the damage in
Antis as "material, physical damage". Its artificiality was demonstrated and
it was rejected as a viable explanation of the basis for decision in Anns. Prior
to Murphy uncertainties and dilemmas presented by D. & F Estates were
apparent In decisions at first instance.' The current position regarding the
recovery of losses at common law in the tort of negligence, appears to be that
to establish a claim in negligence, a plaintiff must show a duty of care owed,'24
and a breach of that duty causing actionable damage; the definition of the
circumstances in which a defendant owes a duty of care is critically related to
the definition of what is actionable damage; the damage necessary to sustain
a claim in negligence must be actual physical injury to person or property,
other than property which is the product of the negligence itself.'25
In the context of a building where a whole building is erected and equipped
by the same contractor, then the building is ordinarily to be regarded as one
unit. If in such a building defective foundations, for instance, damage the
superstructure, that will not be physical damage to other property sufficient
Even if. contraly to this vies the initial damage could be regarded as damage to other property
caused by a latent defect, once the defect was known the situation of the building owner was
analogous to that of the car owner who discovered that the car had faulty brakes. He might have a
house which, until repairs were effected, was unfit for habitation, but, subjed to the reservation
expressed above with respect to ruinous buildings at or near the boundaty of the owner's property,
the building no longer represented a source of danger and as it deteriorated would only damage
itself.
123 West Kent Cold Storage Co. Ltd. v C Hemmings & Co Ltd. (1990) C.I.L.L 547. Portsea Island
Mutual Co-Operative Society Ltd.v Michael Brashier Associates (1989) C.I.L.L. 520.
124 
"In most claims in respect of physical damage to property the question of the existence of a duty of
care does not give rise to any problem because it is self-evident that such a duty exists and the
contraiy view is unarguable", Lord Brandon in Mobil Oil Hong Kong v Hong Kong United
Dockyards (1991) 1 Uoyds Rep. 309 at 328 (P.C.).
125 A requirement for liability in negligence following Donoghue v Stevenson is no reasonable
opportunity for intermediate examination which would have enabled the plaintiff to be aware of the
potential for harm before it occurred. So, does discoveiy of a defect before it causes injuiy to person
or other property prevent recovely of the costs of making good the defect? On that basis the costs of
averting danger would be recoverable only in where recoverable because there is exceptional
liability for reliance on negligent advice or information (Hedley Byrne); oç where the costs are
Inevitable to prevent imminent harm to neighbouring property.
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to found a claim against the contractor in negligence. (In any event, once the
first cracks are detected, the loss is considered to be purely economic and
irrecoverable). However, if some distinct item incorporated in the structure
malfunctions so as to inflict damage on the structure in which it is
incorporated, there may be liability in tort. If defective electrical wiring
installed by a sub-contractor causes a fire which damages the building or if a
central heating boiler explodes, the electrical sub-contractor or the boiler
manufacturer may be liable for damages. There is thus an essential
difference between a defect which causes damage, externally, and a defect in
quality, and a contractor will ordinarily have no liability under the tort of
negligence on account of the mere fact of a defect, and this would apply
equally as between employer and sub-contractor.
As to recoverability, a plaintiff claiming in negligence normally cannot
recover economic loss (being "pure" if it is unrelated to physical injury to
person or other property), which is only recoverable where there is a special
relationship of proximity amounting to reliance by the plaintiff on the
defendant, or where truly consequential on actual physical injury to person
or property. The existence of a defect unrepaired because its cause is not
investigated would give rise to economic loss only and no cause of action,
until it did cause damage to other property, and the fact of prior knowledge
would not bar the action.126
Whether where the law stands is satisfactory or not it remains true that in
relation to construction the ultimate source of the facts that may create the
need for a remedy wil be a contract to build, or for work or materials. The
extent to which the rights and benefits that flow from such contracts can be
passed on or relied on by those beyond the immediate contracting parties is a
large factor in determining the need for a remedy beyond a contractual
remedy. It is in this sense that the English experience has been seen by
practising civil lawyers, namely as an extensive application to expand the
circle of beneficiaries to third parties in the building contract sense,
particularly subsequent purchasers.' 27
 Future direction will be linked to the
Although if the owner ought reasonably have diagnosed and repaired it contributoiy negligence
might be applicable, Nitrigin Eireann Teoranta v IncoAlloys Ltd. (1992) 1 W.L.R. 498.
127 V. van Houtte, Issues under civil law jurisdictions. (1993) School of Business and Industrial
Management, unpublished papers.
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debate addressed by the Law Commission,'28 and, under the auspices of the
E by GAIPEC,'29
 although the Building Act 1984 could have a potentially
wide impact.
'' Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 121, Privity of Contracts: Contracts for the Benefit of Thini
Parties. Considered under Future Directions.
La Groupe des Associations Industrielles Pmfessionailes Euivpéenes de Ia Construction. Referered
to under I-larmonistation and Future Directions.
'° Section 38 of the Act provides that, subjecy to the provisions of the section,. breach of a duty imposed
by building regulations shall be actionable, so far as it causes damage and except as regulations
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I	 An Initial Approadi
The construction industry has been identified by the EC as having an
important part to play in the creation of a single European market,' but the
objectives of an economically free and open market inevitably impact to
varying degrees on national rules and practices governing the relations of its
participants. An original view of didactic rule-making as a means of
harmonisation has given way in areas to a new approach reflecting greater
sensitivity to decentralising trends, 2
 and greater understanding that union
does not require the imposition of rigidity.3
The Single European Act required that the European Market be based on a
high level of protection for consumers with regard to health and safety, and
certainly in these areas the establishment of common rules of a rigid nature
continues; but the reception into national law of such technical requirements
is less likely to pose problems deriving from different approaches of legal
systems than matters affecting the structures and organisation of the
construction industries. There is inevitably no clear boundary between these
aspects, just as the features of an industry are not susceptible to the divisions
The Single Eumpean Act of 1986 has among its objectives the pwmotion of the free exercise of
economic activity within the EC, and by 1st July 1987 had been adopted by all Member States. A.
McGee and S Weatherill,. The Evolution of the Single Market : Harmonisation and Liberalisation.
(1990) 53 M.L.R. 578.
2 The concept of subsidianty truly reflects this, as seen within Article 3b of the Treaty of Maastricht:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers confened upon it ... In areas which do not
fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the preposed actio cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States.?.
Weiler, The Transformation of Eurepe. (1991) 100 'le U. 2403.
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of departmental responsibilities.4
The resolution of the European Parliament of October 1988 called for the
standardisation of contracts and controls in the construction industry, and,
whilst this may have been viewed initially as the means to achieve
harmonisation, there has been a rethinking and more refined approach,
although the formulation of rules affecting health and safety, and consumer
protection, has advanced.
In 1987 the EC requested the preparation of a study of rules affecting liabilities
in the EC countries, and this resulted in the Mathurin Report of 199O, being
an investigation into the question of responsibilities, guarantees and
insurance in the construction industry It identified numerous main
differences between Member States in the ways in which many issues in the
construction industry are dealt with concerning, for example, building
control regulations, the responsibilities of different disciplines in the
industry, controls during construction, quality assurance, subcontracting,
legislation, and approaches by courts to liability and damages, periods of
limitation, burdens of proof, apportionment of liability between different
parties, post construction liabilities, protection for private house purchases,
and professional liability insurance.6
The study recorded that "few countries have truly satisfactory legal systems
and that loopholes, uncertainties, complications and divergences abound".
This conclusion was not surprising, since in each Member State the legal
system has to do its best to provide means for resolution of disputes which
are, by the nature of the project itself, full of complexity, even within
national contexts. In a project which may from design concept to completion
The Directorates-General of the EC Commission of each of Industry, Competition, Consumer
Affairs, and Internal Market have significant responsibility for critical features affecting the
construction industry. The Commission has organised itself into 23 separate Directorates-General
or "DG's" in order to deal th the amount of work. Each is responsible for different sections of
work, and as different DC's are assigned pnmaty responsibility for different legislative measures
there are major difficulties created in co-ordination as a result.
Commission of the European Communities; C. Mathurin, Controls, contracts, liability and Insurance
in the Constructionlndustry in the Eurepean Communitt, 12th February 1990.
Resulting from this study of a ide variety of topics a working paper was drawn up, and examined at
a meeting of the GRIM (Groupe Réflexion, Information, Management) in October 1990, which
resulted in a decision to focus on the areas of liability, legal guarantees, and financial cover for such,
all to be based on a common terminology.
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of construction take several years, involving input from numerous
Interdependent disciplines, it would be unreasonable to expect otherwise.
The Report continued wisely:
"in view of. the size of the sector in question and interests at stake; the
number of people involved in the construction process and the
different industries and professions belonging to it; the fact that any
moves towards harmonisation would have a bearing on the laws,
traditions and legal principles on which the relevant national
legislations are based, caution is called for before embarking on the
harmonisation suggested by the study, whilst naturally not losing sight
of the objectives of the Treaty."
An acceptable and lasting model for dealing consistently throughout the EC
with questions such as when, in what circumstances, for how much, and
against whom liability for defective construction work should arise must be
viable. Histoiy suggests that a permanently acceptable model is far from easy
to find, but permanency in the sense of rigidity is not a desirable end. A
model must be able to contend, for example, with the pendulum of public
conviction at one extreme that the consumer must accept the risk of defects,
and at the other that there should be strict liability of the supplier to the
consumer regardless of fault for injuly caused by a defective product or
services. Arguments are provided at whatever point the pendulum may be
for continuing its momentum towards one extreme or the other until time
swings it in the other direction. The system for creating EC legislation and
implementation in Member States inevitably takes time and so decisions
must be sound in respect of principles. These principles ought to be wide
enough to enable such swings to take place within their spheres.
The formulation of them is not a mere drafting exercise. The Report
identified differences in rules affecting the ascertainment and attribution of
liability, and considered suggestions of which some were technical, and some
touched on the sphere that properly required a wider approach of the
comparative lawyer; particularly the suggestion for the preparation of model
contracts based on standardised terminology and definitions of the basic role
and functions of the primary participants in the construction process. It must
have been without surprise that difficulties were raised, not just because of
different legal cultures, but from sectional interests in the construction
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process.
Obstacles will always be presented, and undoubtedly they exist in
fundamental risks in contracting perceived as inherent in different Member
States,7 but the distance of the goal should not prevent the journey. Nor
should it be felt that the "great initial division"8
 between common and civil
law is the only hurdle. Civil law systems are by no means uniform, and their
kinship is more apparent to the common lawyer than to those subject to
them. Certainly it must be recognised, and applauded, that in significant
parts of Europe there has been an unmatched exercise in harmonisation of
private law; by the Code Napoleon, but expenence and development of a
theoretically complete code has been overlaid and adapted as society's needs
evolved. 9 The articles of the Code Civil were pegs on which to hang the
perceived requirements of developing societies, and the variety of private
law systems within Europe raises not for the first time to what they would be
an obstacle to union, and to what extent the variety would be reduced. 1° The
union of England and Scotland provides a yardsticic demonstrating that a
private law system of different root is no obstacle to harmonisation;" and,
equally, demonstrating that where harmonisation depends on legislation
that is to be common, a different system of private law will not be subsumed
or disappear.'2
2	 Safefy Produds, and Services
Technical aspects for harmonisation have proceeded. Since the publication
by the European Commission in 1985 of its White Paper on the
implementation of the internal market, reinforced by the Single European
'	 Professor P. Cappei Obstacles to Free Competition for Public Works Contractors - An English View,
a paper delivered at Birmingham Universit> 23rd April 1993.
8 Professor F. H. Lawson considered points, worthy of revisiting, in Private law Aspects of Western
Union, first published in 1949, Current Legal problems, and now in The Comparison. Selected
Essays, 1979.
Professor Lawson cited the stipulation pourautrui being borne 1mm a pelverse interpretation of the
Code CM!, and indeed it is contraly to a true analysis of Roman law roots, as considered under
Third Party Benefits.
Professor F. H. Lawson, Private law Aspects of Western Union. 1949, in The Companson, 1979.
" Other models are the union of Louisiana with the United States, andthat of Quebec with Canada.
12 Nor even when initial or apparent uniformity is created by the reception of a foreign law as with the
reception of Swiss law in Turkey, or as shown by the development of the Code Napoleon in Italy.
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Act, numerous proposals for legislative measures were made by the
Commission. A "new approach" to technical harmonisation and standards
relating to products adopted by the Council in its Resolution in May 1985,
determined that EC legislation through Directives should be limited to
matters concerned with "essential safety requirements (or other
requirements in the general interest)".
Since the 'freaty of Rome in 1957 there has been a strong movement that
affects the construction industry in relation to the importance of safety
requirements for the protection of the end user, and consumer interests have
grown in political importance.' 3
 Measures proposed or adopted by the
Commission concerning the safety of products and to a lesser extent services
have been along two routes. One has concentrated on encouraging safety by
obliging Member States to introduce laws creating liability to consumers or
end-users of manufacturers, producers of suppliers for damage caused by
defects in products marketed or by services inadequately provided. The other
has been to develop a common approach towards ensuring high standards of
design and manufacture whereby only safe products, and safe end-results of
services, may be placed on the market.
On the first route, a Product Liability Directive' 4
 had been adopted in July
1985. It was aimed at approximating in all Member States the liability of the
producer of industrial products made for private use, including products
used in the construction of buildings and other immoveables. The main
provisions are: liability without fault, subject to exonerating circumstances,'5
and liability without limit of all producers in the process chain, jointly and
' Two statements of policy are material, to which the Commission in consequence of those
developments is directed by the Single European Act: (a) By new Article 1O0A3) of the Treaty of
Rome: in adopting measures for the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the
Commission in any proposal to the Council "concerning health,. safety environmental protection
and consumer protection will take as a base a high level of protection"; (b) "The Conference wishes
by means of the provisions of Article 8A to express its flim political will to take, before 1 Januaiy 1993
the decisions necessaly to implement the Commissions programme described in the White Paper
on the Internal Marker, Article 13.
' Directive 85/374/EEC dated 25th July 1985. It was not required to be brought into force until 30th
July 1988. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 was passed in order to implement the Directive. Part 1
relating to product liability came into force on 1st March 1988.
' Exonerating circumstances indude proof that the state of scientific knowledge at the time when the
product was put on the market was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered
(unless a particular Member State provides otherwise), or that the defect was due to compliance
with mandatoty regulations of public authorities, or in the case of the manufacturer of a component,
that the defect was attributable to the design of the product in which the component was fitted, or to
the product manufadurers instructions.
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severally for the whole of the damage, for death or personal injury and for
damage to private property of a type intended for private use, excluding the
defective product itself. The onus of proof required of the consumer is only
proof of a defect and damage, and a causal relationship between the two,
although liability may be reduced or disallowed if the damage was caused by
negligence on the part of the injured person or a person for whom the
injured person was responsible.
Along the second route towards ensuring the safety of products throughout
the Community, there were measures or proposals directly relevant to the
construction industry,' 6 particularly; the Construction Products Directive;'7
various interpretative documents' explanatory of the "essential
requirements" of it; a Council Resolution adopted in December 1989 for a
global approach within the Community towards certification, testing and
other quality measures for industrial products; a Council Decision of
December 1990 (90/683/EED) defining modules for the various phases of the
conformity assessment procedures intended to be used in the Technical
Harmonisation Directives, of which the Construction Products Directive is
one; a proposal for a regulation laying down rules for affixing the 'CE' mark
of conformity in respect of the design, manufacture, marketing putting into
service and/or use of industrial products.
The Construction Products Directive establishes essential requirements
necessary to ensure that products for use in construction works will be fit for
their intended use.' 8 This appears wider than the Product Liability Directive,
not only in that it is a design brief for all construction products, but in its
reference to fitness for purpose, albeit limited, which is expressly excluded as
a factor in determining liability under the Product Liability Directive.' 9
 The
16 Rreviewed by P. Long, The Opening of the EC Construction Market: Harmonised Liability Rules for
Construction, a paper delivered to the 1BA September 1992.
' 89/106/EEC. Mopted by the Council on 21 December 1988 Member States were required to bring it
into forte by 27 June 1991. In England the Construction Product Regulations 1991 came into force in
December 1991, and while containing tensive powers of enforcement vested in authorities, they
do not expressly confer rights for the end-user.
e Article 2 of the Directive (para. 1) requires that products should be placed on the market "only if
they are fit for their intended use, that is to say that they have such characteristics that the works in
which they are to be incorporated ... can, if properly designed and built, satisfy the essential
requirements ...".
the defectiveness of the product should be determined by reference not to its fitness for use but
to the lack of safety which the public at large is entitled to expect .", Products Uability Directive,
sixth recital.
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essential requirements are set out in the Directive relating to six objectives,
namely mechanical resistance and stability; safety in case of fire; hygiene,
health and the environment; safety in use; protection against noise; and
energy economy and heat retention. The Directive is supplemented by
separate interpretative documents covering each of six areas.2° These are
intended as directions to EC and national standards authorities, or technical
approvals for particular types of construction products, which will link the
standards or technical approvals with the essential requirements and take
account of different levels of essential requirements for certain works, and
different conditions prevailing as between one Member State and another.
These standards or technical approvals are not mandatory under EC
legislation, but they provide the benefit that, through a system for
certification or attestation of conformity, the producer may market the
product in any Member State, overcoming any national barrier that might
otherwise apply.2 ' Without them, a product must be proved in other ways to
satisfy the essential requirements in order to ensure marketability in a
Member State. If products supplied enable works into which they are to be
incorporated to satisfy the essential requirements, subject to the works
themselves being properly designed and built, and if the products bear the CE
mark, indicating compliance with relevant standards) member states are
required by Article 4.2 of the Construction Products Directive to presume that
the products are fit for their intended use, and permit them to be marketed
across borders. This does not, however, mean that if a product is
subsequently found to be defective, the supplier will necessarily escape
liability under the Product Liability Directive.
Seivices Liability Directive
A proposed Services Liability Directive was published in early 1991,22
intended to promote the safety of services as part of the relaunching of the
consumer protection policy of the Council of Ministers and to require the
elimination of differences in protection provided by different Member States,
20 Drawn up by Technical Committees of the Commission in which the Member States paiticipate.
21 S. Chaney Eumpean Norms for the Construction lndustiy - How to Respond to Technical Barners in
the form of National Fonus, a paper delivered to the IBA. September 1992.
OJ, No. C 12/8, 18th January 1991.
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in order to remove bafflers to trade between them. The main proposals in
the directive were: a reversal of the burden of proof of fault by the supplier,
in favour of the consunier a broad definition of "services' so including
services in the construction industry; compensation for death, personal
injury, and serious physical damage to movable or immovable property;
liability without limit, with joint and several liability where "liability for a
given damage is shared between several persons"; short limitation periods
for bringing proceedings and termination of liability uexcept where services
relating to the design and construction of immovable property are
concerned".
Services relating to construction works had been excluded from earlier drafts
of the proposed directive, which emanated from DG XI, responsible for
consumer protection. Even if it is right that liabilities for services relating to
works of construction can properly be equated with and brought within a
general directive on services, the terms of the proposal appear inconsistent
when measured against the provider of other services, and the manufacturer
or supplier of products, and also to be inconsistent with the terms of the
Product Liability Directive. Certainly this proposal created controversy in the
construction industry
By way of example, 23 the proposed directive on liability for services applies to
services relating to all movable or immovable property where the service is
transacted on a commercial basis, and only when the question of damage is
considered that the directive is limited in effect to injury to persons and
private property. Damage to private dwellings caused by defective design or
construction, or inadequate supervision of construction would come within
the Directive, and the liabilities of architects, engineers, contractors and
others involved in the design or the construction or supervision of
construction of immoveables into which defective products are incorporated
will extend further under the Services Liability Directive than any liabilities
attributable to the supplier of the product, under the Product Liability
Directive.
23 M. Ludlow, Recent EC Measures affecting the Construction Industry in EC Member States. (1991)
IB.L 543.
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Further, the Product liability Directive requires rights of claim to be
extinguished ten years from the date when the product is put into
circulation. This is on the ground that products age in the course of time;
higher safety standards are developed, and the state of scientific knowledge
and technology advances, and so liability should expire after a reasonable
time. No similar approach appears in the proposed Services Liability
Directive. Different periods are there provided: five years from the supply of
the service except in relation to the design or construction of immovable
propertyc where the period is twenty years. 24
 In the case, for example, of a
contract for the rewiring of a private dwelling the service is unlikely to be
within the definition of "the design or construction of immovable property",
yet the expected useful life of the work done is likely to be well in excess of
five years. If the dwelling is burnt down six years after the provision of the
service because of defects in the wiring not known to the owner of the
dwelling It might be within the reasonable expectation of the consumer that
he should have a right to claim against the rewiring contractor for his
defective work, yet the terms of the proposed directive might debar him.
Evidence that the defect which caused the damage was a defect in a product,
the wiring itself for example, rather than merely in the supply of the service
of installation, would permit reliance on the longer ten year limitation
period of the Product liability Directive. There would also be the necessity to
trace the producer being the manufacturer of the finished product, the
wiring or of a component part of a larger defective product into which the
wiring was incorporated. If there were real doubt as to whether the damage
was caused by defective wiring or a defective fuse which caused the wiring to
be overloaded, or poor workmanship in the service of installation, liability
would then involve the suppliers of both the wiring and the fuse, and the
installation contractor. The complex structure argument raised in D & F
Estates would become a reality, even apart from differing chances of success
as between national courts.
24 Artide 9, "Extinction of Rights". The 20 year period of limitation proposed for services in the
constniction industiy conflicts with strong views expressed in some pails of the EEC involved in the
construction industiy that even a 15-year period is too long. The 15-year period adopted in the
Latent Damage Act 1986 was on the recommendation of the Law Reform Committee who in their
1984 report concluded that "a twenty year period might permit some vely stale claims and expose
many defendants to the risk of litigation for an unreasonable length of time".
292
The services involved in the design and the construction of building or civil
engineering projects are complex and so also are provisions to promote high
standards of safety which at the same time may inadvertently create barriers
to a right of establishment or freedom of movement of labour within the
single market. Construction services may be less obviously important in
relation to harmonisation of the "high level of protection" to the consumer
called for by Article IOOA(3) of the Revised Treaty of Rome than other
businesses such as vehicle repairs, package holidays, coach travel or the
design of standard medical products. 25
 Services in the construction industiy
tend to be individually tailored. Even in the design and construction of a
housing estate, each house requires separate considerations if for no other
reason than that the soils in which the foundations for a house are to be
designed and constructed can never be guaranteed to be the same as its
neighbour, and because the product can never be mass produced or produced
under factory conditions.
3	 Furthcr ThoughIs
Even from a view of France and England alone, it is apparent that the
systems for divisions of responsibilities in the process of designing and
erecting buildings or other structure, developed in different Member States
over centuries in different ways, must create dangers for instant
harmonisation. The systems largely work because those who have been
brought up in the industry have learned how they work from experience.
Harmonisation of experience can only be achieved through analysis of the
influences on that experience and understanding of the principles by which
the differing experiences have been guided.
There is also danger in framing particular directives without considering all
others whose effects may overlap, let alone considering the perception of the
differing systems within the Community of the words adopted as requiring
implementation. While differences in the implementing legislation in
Member States are to be avoided, differences Will be exascerbated by
assumption of a common result from an apparently straightforward
J. Steiner, Coming to Terms with EEC Directives. (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 144.
293
formula. 2' Member States are likely to find difficulty enough in their own
Implementing legislation in harnionising the effects of overlapping
Directives, but more difficult will it be to achieve harmonisation of the
effects of the required legislation without that understanding and feel for the
experience and attributes of the differing legal systems that comparative
study reveals. In both these aspects it appears that the means may
themselves defeat the end.
The controversy that ensued from the overlapping into the construction
industry world of the proposed directive on the liability of suppliers of
services, 2' prompted a proposal for a specific construction directive to the
intent that construction would be excluded from the liability of suppliers of
services directive, which led to the formation of the GAIPEC groups. 28
 This
group was charged with consideration of four aspects: acceptance of the
works, liability arising from the works, guarantees in respect of them, and
insurance cover, and its proposals of 1992 will influence the Commission,
although the text is a preliminary to any formal stage. 29
 There cannot be any
certainty that such a directive will be progressed because of the central issue
whether the degree of regulation would be regarded as compatible with the
principle of subsidiarity.
By virtue of the terms of reference, the results of GAIPEC's work do not take
into consideration aspects relating to the justification for Community action,
particularly the legal basis for it, the subsidiarity principle, or questions of
desirability or need. These were addressed in an interesting Discussion Paper,
which raises the questions in a manner requiring thought as to the
comparative function of existing rules and mechanisms of national systems
28 
"Federal" is an interesting example.
27 The draft directive on the liability of suppliers of services was announced by DG IX for Consumer
Affairs during the time that Claude Mathurin was compiling his report; "To say that this proposal
took construction industiy professionals and DG Ill by surprise is something of an understatement",
from Professor P. Cappei Developments in Liability under European Community Law, in Legal
Obligations in Construction, Uff and Layers (eds.) 1992. As to the histoty and the potential future of
the construction liability directive; J
. 
Huse and N. BLackab Harmonisation of Construction Liability
in the EC, a paper delivered to the Society of Construction La Febmaty 1993.
28 Le Group des Associations Industrielles Pmfessionelles Eumpéenes de Ia Construction. This group
was established in 1991 after consultation with the European Federation of Contractors, whose
Vienna Report of 1988 had addressed aspects that came to be studied by Mathurin.
The report has been described in the Commission as a coherent package with many suggestions on
the diverse themes in question. Developments concerning the general directive on the liability of
suppliers of services are also expected to have a direct bearing.
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with a view to debate as to the means of harmonisation, rather than by mere
identification of the fact of different rules. 3° The point that different systems
of liability create a hindrance to the aims of the Community is posed there in
terms of cost, leading to distortion of competition which might be mitigated
if each participant's obligations were identical. Sub-contracting, under
different legal regimes, is also identified as a problem area to be equally
mitigated by common principles. The existing regulation that has taken
place in the construction industry is there identified as likely to benefit from
co-ordination and supplementing particularly so in respect of Public Works,31
where, as postulated, the extant rules concerning competition would be more
effective after the harmonisation of liability and guarantee costs.
Pragmatically, the Discussion Paper recognises the attachment to national
systems with different procedures for acceptance of work, and the deep rooted
nature of construction in national law, and the idea is expressed that support
measures, mutual recognition, and framework directives may be more
appropriate, rather than regulation and detailed rules. For the common
lawyer, the attention given to acceptance of work, its relationship with the
right to payment and transfer of risk, and its detailed arrangements is
notable, as also is the emphasis on the guarantee as the means of redress.
Other areas where adaptation of aspects for incorporation into national
systems is to be considered are the transfer to successive owners of the ability
to bring proceedings, grounds for exclusion of liability deriving from force
majeure or acts of third parties (the professional when not acting as agent)
and questions of responsibility for choice of construction materials.
On the analysis of aspects in the thesis to this point it is thought that the
concerns and problems of French and English law in the operation of
construction contracts bear out that it is not necessarily legal structures
themselves that create barriers, especially when tested against the end results,
rather it is the embedded preference for procedures and characteristics simply
30 The Commission Staff Discussion Paper, Concerning Possible Community Action With Regard to
Liabilities And Guarantees In The Construction Sectoi June 1993.
The Public Works Contracts Directive 71/335 as amended by Directive 89/44Oand consolidated in
the pnposed Directive of 9th Januaiy 1992, on which the Council adopted acommon position on
18th June 1992. Directive 90/531 of September 1990 on procurement procedures in the wate; ener
transport and telecommunications sedors, and its amendment adopted in December 1992.
Directive 92/50 ofJune 1992 on coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts.
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representing the way things have always been done. Recognition beyond
acknowledgement is required to appreciate the features by which a harmony
of end result may be achieved, and where barriers exist This can be tested
further; in the contexts of required performance and changes to it,
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1	 The basicoNigiIici
The GAIPEC proposals assume that liability will be based on recognisable
concepts of fault and breach of contract, but the line of responsibility is critical
to its suggestion that liability be restricted to loss caused by the indMdual acts
or failures of the particular participant.' For example an employer will be less
interested in the respective contributions of the contractors and consultants
where relevant design responsibility reposes in the former. Impacting on
this however are regimes for the requirement of and restrictions on changes
in the work by the contractor
Prima facie, unauthonsed deviation from the plan or specification is
regarded as a breach of contract, but this general rule gives rise to exceptions.
The nature of construction work, particularly its relationship with the land,
will give rise to changes from original perceptions of it even without changes
of mind as to what work is required. A balance to be made is between the
width or narrowness of the definition of the work to be done so that changes
brought about by the requirement to do that work are within the price, and
the facility for the employer to secure that the contractor brings about a
successful construction which may necessitate the imposition of changes on
him by the employer.
The starting point is the scope of the contractor's obligation, and, given
detailed stipulations by way of plans and specifications, the obligation is to
comply. This may be part only of the obligation to produce the promised
result, which includes the obligation de bien faire l'ouvrage under French
J . Huse and N. Blackaby Harmonisation of Construction Liability in the EC, a paper delivered to the
Society of Construction l..aw, Februaiy 1993, suggest that a cost reduction might have been in mind
as the result of such individualisation of responsibility
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law, the obligation to execute the work well. In England the obligation to
cany out and complete canies implicitly the requirement within the price to
do all things indispensibly necessaly to achieve the described work, 2
 and
regarded as a question whether the contractor is excused from his obligation
to complete without additional payment, it may also be described as the
absolute obligation to complete.3
Common law contracts have not sought expressly to define this basic
obligation, or to address it application to the everyday situations of
construction work, and it has been left to the courts to work out the
implications. 4 The common law view is that the contractor, when he
undertakes to carry out and complete work to the design of the architect or
engineer of the employer warrants his ability to do so, though not its
suitability for its purpose once completed. If bringing the work to completion
to that design or in the physical conditions actually encountered is difficult,
or not practicable, without some change in the design itself or in the expected
temporary works or working methods, the contractor is nevertheless in
breach of contract, and will not be able to recover additional payment if he
finds himself obliged to change the design or temporary works or working
methods in order to carry out his primary obligation to bring them to
completion.5
Site conditions may either be more adverse at the time of entering into the
contract than available information may have suggested, or else subsequent
events may render them so. Under English law, in the absence of express
provision, this will be a contractor's risk to be surmounted without adding
to the inclusive prices of the contractor, or affecting the absolute obligation of
2 Williamsv FitzmauriceU858)3 FL& N.844.
Absolute in the sense of independent of fault.
The definition of work in wide terms in a lump sum contract makes easier the application of the
inference of an obligation to provide eveiything indispensibly necessaly, but the question of what is
included has to be answered as a matter of construction even where the description is by items in
bills of quantities.
The classic cases in England are the 19th century House of Lords decisions of Thom v L.ondon
Corporation (1876) 1 App. Cas. 120, and Tharsis Sulphur & Copper Co. Ltd. v McElroy (1878) 3 App.
Cas. 1040. The contractor need only, howevei valy the work sufficiently to achieve his obligation to
complete. and its subsequent failure will not be his responsibility.
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the contractor to complete.' Adjunct to this is the principle that an employer
does not impliedly warrant the accuracy or practicability of plans, drawings or
bills of quantities.'
in France the aflocation of ground risks under construction contracts is by a
presumption of a strict liability on the part of the contractor, both under the
principles of law applicable to private contracts, and administrative law for
public works. 9
 The employer does however have an obligation up to the
time of the issue of the construction permit to ensure in the preliminary
stages of the project that an appropriate programme is produced covering all
activities necessary for its execution.' 0
 For this he must adequately inform his
architect and contractor of the conditions for performance of the work, 1 ' and,
' As in Bottoms v York Corporation (1892) 1-ludsons Building Contracts. 4th ed Vol.2, 208 (CA) where
a claim was made for additional costs incuned during sewerage work, which had arisen due to the
fact that water pressure caused evety shovelful of mud removed from the excavation to be replaced.
Boring samples had not been taken prior to the start of the work and before the contract was signed,
the employer was aware that the price offered by the contractor would insufficient in view of the soil
to be expected. The contractor vainly requested an adjustment of the price, terminating the
contract when this was denied. The court held that since there had been no wananty by the
employer with regard to the type of soil, the contractor had not been entitled to tenninate the
contract and the claim failed.
' Thom v London Corporation (1876) 1 App. Cas. 120 (H.L); Lord Chelmsford at 133: "If the Plaintiff
had considered, as he was bound to do, the terms of the specification, he would either have
abstained from tenering for the works, or he would have asked the Defendant to protect him from
the loss he was likely to sustain if the plan of working described in the specification should turn out
to be an Improper one." Also as in Re: Nuttall and Lynton and Barnstaple Railway (1899) 1-ludsons
Building Contracts, 4th ed., Vol. 2, 279, invoMng excavation work, the employer made clear with
regard to the data on measurements contained in the specifications that they were not to be viewed
as absolutely conect, but rather served as information for the contractor. The contract documents
provided that the contractor was to satisfy himself as to the soil and all presumable measurements.
The excavated material transpired to be more than that indicated in the specifications and
drawings. The court rejected the contractor's claim for reimbursement for the additional costs.
Under lump-sum price contracts, Article 1793 compels the contractor to obtain a written supplement
to the contract for additional expenditure as a result of soil obstacles. Article 1793: "If an architect or
a contractor has undertaken to construct a building for a lump-sum price - in accordance with a plan
determined by theemployer and agreed upon with him - then he may neither demand any sort of
price increase - for instance, under the pretext of increased job costs or increased consumption of
material - nor assert changes or cost-increasing conditions in this plan, in so far as these changes or
added expenditures were not agreed upon with the employer in writing in the form of a fixed price."
Under measurement contracts, additional work beyond that for which lump-sum prices had been
originally agreed upon entitles the contractor to additional payment; J
. 
Catz, Les Constructeurs et le
Risque du Sol, Editions du Moniteui 1985, note 1, 63-64 (private construction contracts) and 104f.
(public construction contracts).
Liet-Veaux, Le Omit de Ia Construction, 9th ed,. 337. This is even more emphasised the more hghIy
specialised and qualified the contractor Cass. civ. 3, 17 October 1973, Bulletin des anêts de Ia Cour
de Cassation, p. 389.
10 Liet-Veaux, Le Droit de Ia Construction, 9th ed,246, 348. Under AFNOR 91, article 1.4.8, the
programme is the general schedule into the deadlines of which the contractor prepared work
schedule must be fitted.
The documents required for this are not binding; but a woddn gmup at the French Scientific-
Technical Centre for the Construction lndustiy has drafted a leaflet regarding soil data to be
supplied by the employer in apartment construction; DTU (Document Technique Uniflé),
Instructions pour Ia redaction dun contrat de reconnaissance des sols.
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through both the Cour de Cassation for private contractss,' 2
 and the Consell
d'Etat for public works, 13
 the employer is obliged to make known any soil
risks.'4
In the legal framework for public works recourse is available to the doctrine
of imprévison , as developed by the Conseil d'Etat, where some event
independent of the will of the parties transpires that was not foreseeable, is
attributable to unusual difficulties, and, in essence, leads to the negation of
the contractual basis for the transaction.' 5
 Analysis has shown that the
influence of this doctrine has been marked in the field of risk from unknown
soil conditions and that it does represent a considerable amelioration of the
risk ordinarily allocated to the contractor.'6
2	 Qianged CoiJi[kms
In English standard forms, particularly civil engineering contracts,
unfavourable physical conditions clauses have been commonly found for
more than half a century. Either expressly or impliedly, these clauses are
based upon a concept of reasonable expectation or foreseeability. The best
example is clause 12 (1) of ICE 91:
"If during the execution of the Works the Contractor shall encounter
physical conditions (other than weather conditions or conditions due
to weather conditions) or artificial obstructions which conditions or
obstructions could not in his opinion reasonably have been foreseen
by an experienced contractor the Contractor shall as early as practicable
give written notice thereof to the Engineer"
The clause then provides in detail how the engineer is to react to this notice
request that the contractor justify the added costs; issuance of instructions to
remove impediments; and, valuing for reimbursement additional costs to
the contractor.'7
t2 Cass. civ. 3, 20th Febr-uaiy 1970; Bull. civ. 1, 17th March 1969, D. 69, p.532.
Conseil d'Etat, 21st July 1970, Recueil Lebon, 533.
' Conesponding duties arise under the standard terms of contract of the professional organisations of
architects and engineers, J
. Catz, Les Constructeurs et le Risque du SoL, Editions du Moniteur, 1985,
note 1, at p. 37-38.
Considered under Relief from Performance.
J. Catz,, Les Constructeurs et le Risque du Sot, Editions du Moniteur, 1985.
Such clauses are not found in the building as opposed to engineering standard forms.
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The English approach has been described as Nuncompromising in its
enforcement" with regard to the contractor's strict liability for ground
conditions; it might have been impossible for the contractor to ascertain the
necessaiy information." Further the risk depends on the extent of available
information, and while clause 11 of the ICE conditions deemed that the
contractor had inspected and examined the site and to have satisfied himself
prior to tendering as to the nature of the ground and sub-soil, taking into
account all information which may have been provided by the employer,
there was no duty on the employer to provide information to the contractor.
Such an imbalance in the distribution of risk was not without its critics. It
was considered absurd that construction projects be undertaken on the fiction
that a contractor must tender on the basis of investigations either that might
be inadequately undertaken or that were deemed but could not be performed
in the time allowed for tendering and maintained that it should be a matter
for the employer to provide the contractor with such information on ground
conditions as might reasonably be expected of him.' 9 As some answer, ICE 91
introduced an obligation to provide all information as to ground conditions
obtained by or on behalf of the employer, by deeming him to have made it
available to the contractor, leaving the latter responsible for its interpretation
for the purposes of constructing the works. 2° This does not overcome
criticisms that it is the employer who, practically, decides the scope of
investigation and that the uncertainties as to the division of risk lead to
frequent disputes.2'
The aspect of an employer 's responsibility for the ground in which work is
'	 I. N. Duncan Wallace, Constmction Contracts, Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. 1986, 474
and 476.
M.W. Abrahamson, Engineering Law and the ICE Contracts, 5th ed., 1985, 4361. Since uncertainty
with regaiti to soil conditions is never able to be completely removed, Abrahamson recommends
that contracors be given the opportunity to calculate such risks dwing the competition phase on a
preliminaiy basis and then offer corresponding preliminaiy prices, including all costs to be expected
for delay and intemiption. M. Abrahamson, Risk Management - Mverse Ground Conditions [19841
I LC.LR 246, at 252.
20 ICE 91, clause 11(1). The deeming raises interesting possibililities in the event of non-disclosure,
through the mechanism of the Misrepresentation Act 1%7; Keating on Building Contracts, 5th ed.,
124 and 832f..
2* Keating on Building Contracts, 5th ed., 833..
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carried out is seen more in developments in Germany, 22 rather than in
France where the protective attitude towards the consumer-employer is
strong.23 Neither AFNOR nor the CCAG contain rules as to an obligation on
the employer to inspect the ground, or to provide information to the
contractor.2 ' In public contracts the contractual allocation of ground risk to
the contractor is typical of French construction practice as a whole and is seen
from the few applicable provisions in the CCAG whereby, there is reference
to the non-binding nature of notice given by the employer as to ground
conditions and an express exclusion of responsibility for information
provided to the contractor about them; reference only to those ground
impediments expressly identified in the contract; lump-sum price
agreements canying the ground risks; and an absence of contract provisions
for relief from the strict allocation of the soil risk to the contractor.25
In private contracts, the position is much the same: the contractor is often
met with additional work that becomes necessary as a result of ground
conditions, whether by lump-sum price agreements under Article 1793 or by
the exclusion of changes in lump-sum prices in measurement contracts. The
position of the contractor is significantly less favourable in France than in
Germany,21 Switzerland,28 or Austria, 29 for, although the owner is responsible
22 Prom the 1926 edition of the VOB the soil risk has in principle been allocated to the owner.
Described by Dr. C. Wiegand, Allocation of the Soil Risk in Construction Contracts. (1989) 6 I.C.L.R.
283.
23 The responsibility of tout constructeur under the guarantee in Article 1792 expressly includes
damage resulting 1mm ground deficiencies.
24 This situation has been termed astonishing with regard to the Cxie des Ma,rJ,és Public whose 237
artides regulate in detail the awarding and arrangement of public construction contracts; Cat?,, at 79.
25 Catz, at p. 139 (Nr. 508).
2$	 Catz, at p. 139 (l4r. 511).
27 The position in Germany can be summarised as follows: 1. Under both ii 645 of the BGB and article
9 of the VOB standard conditions, the presumption is that the owner is under an obligation to
describe the soil dearly and so exhaustively that all bidders will understand the description in the
same manner and be able to calculate their costs safely and without extensive preliminary work. 2.
The bidders must be able adequately to evaluate the soil and its effective support, as well as
groundwater conditions, on the basis of the description of the work to be performed. 3. Insufficient
data provided by the owner on the soil will be taken to result in an unreasonable risk for the
contractor, contrary to article 9(2) of the VOB conditions. 4. Nevertheless, the contractor is under a
duty to examine the soil conditions prior to making his bid; by resort to the duty to exercise care
customary In the trade the contractor remains obliged to inform the owner of any identifiable
shortcomings in the description of the work. 5. The higher the degree of expertise on the part of the
contractor and the greater the restriction on the owner over the soil (for example, construction on
property of a third party), the stricter the contractors duty to review 6. A clause restricting the
assumption of the soil risk to taking boring samples is viewed as an unreasonable detriment under
119 of 1976 legislation as to General Terms and Conditions of Trade and thus invalid.
2$ Dr. R. Meroni,. Subsurface Ground Conditions - Risks and Pitfalls for Project Participants: Civil Law
Projects - Legal and Contractual Approach in Switzerland (1990) 7 I.C.L.R. 198.
28 Dr. C. Wiegand, Allocation of the Soil Risk in Construction Contracts, A Legal Comparison (1989) 6
I.C.L.R. 283.
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for the ground within the framework of the programme that he establishes,
all contractual risks arising from theground are In principle allocated to the
contractor.
FIDIC goes further than ICE 91 in its clause 11 (1), commencing with the
statement that "The Employer shall have made available to the Contractor
such data on hydrological an sub-surface conditions as have been obtained by
or on behalf of the Employer ... " and again the interpretation is left to the
contractor, who is deemed to have inspected and examined the site and
information available "so far as is practicable, having regard to
considerations of cost and time". The extent of the investigations made on
behalf of employers will have a potential impact for, importantly, the
contractor is deemed to have based his tender on the data made available as
well as his own inspection; 38
 and the contractor is deemed to have satisfied
himself as to the correctness and sufficiency of the tender and of the rates and
prices in the bill of quantities which are to cover all his obligations uner the
contract "except insofar as it is otherwise provided in the Contract".31
The provisions of FIDIC clause 12.2 and ICE 91 clause 12 (1) are substantially
the same yet FIDIC adds a role for the employer in that the engineer is
required to consult with him before embarking on the determination of the
consequences of the contractor encountering unforeseen physical conditions
or artificial obstructions, and it utilises terms of acceptance rather than
approval in respect of measures that the contractor might take." Despite
criticisms of FIDIC that followed the nature of those aimed at the ICE
conditions,33 it is clear that French contractors would find it preferable,
certainly for private works, to be governed by FIDIC principles in this area of
3° FIDIC, dauses 11.1 and 12.1 utilise deeming in a variety of circumstances, commented on in E.C.
Corbett, FIDIC 4th, A Practical Legal Guide (1991).
Cause 12.1
32 N. G. Bunni,, The FIDIC Form of Contract (1991). The role required to be ptayed by the engineer can
pose real problems of practise In civil law jurisdictions; Dr.F. Niddisch, The Role of the Engineer as
Contract Administrator and Quasi-Arbitrator in International Constmction and Civil Engineering
Projects. (1990) 7 I.C.L.R. 322; H. André-Dumont, The FIDIC Conditions and Civil Law. (1988) 5
I.C.LR. 43.
3° I. N. Duncan Wallace, The International Civil Engineering Contract, A Commentaty on the FIDIC
Form (1974) and Supplements.
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sub-soil risks, rather than by the traditional French approach.34
3	 The Power to Vaiy
The definition of the work and the application of the obligation to complete
alone would without more give the contractor the right to carry out only that
descibed work, that is in the absence of a variation of the contract itself which
would require mutual agreement and consideration. 35
 Variation of the
contract works is invariably provided for in the express terms of the contract
for an architect or agent of the employer has no implied power to vaiy either
the contract itself, or the works under it, or to order as additions work
impliedly included within the contract for which the contract price is
payable.TM
The power to vary may only be exercised within the scope of the contract and
its terms as to the authority granted so that instructions beyond it do not
impose liability on the employer under the contract: "The architect is not the
employer's agent in that respect. He has no power to vary the contract.
Confronted with such acts, the parties may either acquiesce, in which case the
contract may be pro tanto varied and the acts cannot be complained of, or a
party may protest and ignore them. But he cannot saddle the employer with
M. Frilet,. How Certain Provisions of the FIDIC Contract Operate under French Laws (1992)9 I.C.LR.
121. J
.
 Catz,. Les Constructeurs et le Risque du Sol,. Editions du Moniteur, 1985, 249: "the FIDIC
certainly represents one of the best existing solutions in onler to take care of the consequences
deriving 1mm sub-soil impediments during the performance of the works. Specific legislative
reform in this area has been advocated by Catz,, with a clear solution to the problem of soil risk. A
new Article 1787 is advanced: in a first section an acknowledgement that the owner who himself
selects the site is to be obliged to bear any additional costs that result 1mm the geological nature of
the soil with risk-allocation clauses being prohibited; in a further section should establish the basic
responsibility of the owner to investigate thoroughly the soil prior to the start of the work and if
needed, to be a matter for the commissioned architects to undertake or on:Ier soil examinations and
to ensure that the construction project is prepared subject to the results of this investigation.
With regani to the lump-sum price rule in Article 1793 of the Civil Code, an express exception to the
lump-sum price principle is recommended with regard to additional expenditures related to the soil
risk in those cases in which conditions actually present deviate from those presumed in the contract.
For standard terms of contract of architects and engineers professional associations, for the code
for Marché Public de Travaux and for private and public general terms of contract, Catz considers
corresponding modifications to be necessay, hem at p.251 (Nr. 1045).
" The comllaiy that agreement to pay more for no additional work would fail for lack of consideration
was overcome In Williams v Roffey Bros. & Nicholl (Contractors) Ltd. (1990) 2 W.L.R. 1153 (CA) by
finding consideration in avoiding difficulties that would flow from not maintaining the relationship of
main and sub contractor; R. Halson, Sailors, Sub-contractors and Consideration. (1990) 106 L.Q.R.
183; K. Brownsword,. Contract, consideration and the critical path. (1990) 53 M.LR. 536.
Sharpe v San Paulo Railway (1873) L.R. 8(1. App. 597; Carlton Contractors Ltd. v Bexley Corporation
(1962) 60 L.G.R. 331.
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responsibility for them."37
Varied work done without request under a contract for specified works for a
price will constitute a failure to perform, but application of the concept of
substantial performance will considerably ameliorate the rigours of the
principle so as to permit recoveiy where changes, more usually omissions,
do not deprive the employer of substantially the whole of the work" If the
varied work is in the form of better or more work it will not attract
additional payment,° and consent by the employer to different work will
only enable the contractor to recover additional payment for the difference
where the employer knows or must be taken to know that it will cost more.41
Under JCT 80 "variation" is defined as the alteration or modification of the
design, quality or quantity of the Works as shown on the contract drawings
and described by or referred to in the contract bills. 42
 The contractor is obliged
to comply with architect's instructions in regard to any matter in respect of
which he is expressly empowered to issue instructions and the architect has
the power to require variations. 43
 He may also sanction in writing any
variation made by the contractor otherwise than pursuant to an instruction,
even it seems where there has been no request of any kind, and this power
Stockport M.B .C. v O'Reilly (1978) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 595 at 601.
In which case under an entire contract no payment would be due: Fonnan & Co. Proprietary Ltd. v
The Ship "Liddesdale" (1900) AC 190 (P.C.), Lord Hobhouse at 205 it seems hard that the plaintiffs
should not be paid for work which they have done; but such is the effect of contracting to work for a
lump sum and failing to do the work.
" Where there has been substantial performance a deduction for the liability of the contractor for
failing satisfactorily to complete, more often than not equating to the cost of completion, is the
result, Hoenig v lsaacs (1952) 2 All ER 176 (CA).
Tharsis Sulphur & Copper Co. Ltd. v M'Elmy & Sons (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1040; the contractor would
have to show an express or implied promise to pay. Under a lump sum contract the contractor was
obliged to construct specified girders. It was not practical to adopt the specification and the
contractor sought and was given pennission to make them thicker, from which "... there is nothing in
that to imply that there was to be a payment for that additional thickness", Lord Blackburn at 1053.
In principle save in those remote circumstances that fit in with Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. v
Commissioners of Works (1949) 2 K.B. 632 (CA), considered latei the contractor who without
authorisation does more than was originally provided for by the contract is not entifled to demand a
higher remuneration that the sum agreed upon.
42 JCT 80, clause 13.1 " induding .1.1, the addition, omission or substitution of any work; .1.2, the
alteration of the kind or standard of any of the materials or goods to be used in the Works; .1.3 the
removal from the site of any work ... other than work materials or goods which are not in accordance
with this Contract; 13.1.2: the imposition by the Employer of any obligation or restriction ... or the
addition to or alteration or omission of any such obligations or restrictions so Imposed or imposed by
the Employer in regard to: .2.1 access to the sie or use of any specific parts of the site .2. limitations of
working space; .23 limitations of working hours; .2.4 the execution or completion of the work in any
specificorder_."
JCI 80, clause 13.2. The contractor has a right of "reasonable objection" to any variation for those
particular matters in clause 13.11.
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extends to unauthorised work not otherwise invoMng additional cost.44
In France the straightforward terms of Article 1793 have been used to fashion
rules of practise. With its premise that for contracts on a lump sum basis the
price stipulated remains valid under all circumstances, the result is, as in
England, that unauthorised deviations from the plans and specification do
not entitle the contractor to a greater remuneration than agreed upon.
Unforeseeable circumstances in carrying out the contract work are in this way
firmly placed at the risk of the contractor
Article 1793 prohibits a price increase on the grounds of the effects of
increases in the labour and materials elements of the worl so that results
similar to the application of the English principle follow. Equally so as to the
implication in England of an obligation to provide everything indispensibly
necessary for Article 1793 extends the prohibition in lump sum contracts to
alterations or supplements made to the agreed plan, changements ou
augmentations faits sur ce plan, unless authorised in writing and a new
price agreed. That agreement has to be with the owner, and so the principles
applicable in England in the absence of express authority of an architect
would be well recognised. In France the maitre d'oeuvre equates to the
architect or engineer but he is not regarded as the agent of the employer, but
is considered to be an independent contractor bound by contract for the hire
of work The relationship between the employer and the maitre d' oeuvre is
not seen as one of engaging someone to act on one's behalf in connection
with a building contract but one of receiving advice.
Although Article 1793 is not mandatory as part of the d'ordre public,
AFNOR 91 makes available a special appendix of modifying provisions if the
works are to be treated as definitive, ne varietur, that is without any change
in the nature or scope of the work from their definition on the plans and
" 1-1. Fairweather& Co. Ltd. v L. B. Wandsworth (1987)39 B.L.R. 106.
Article 1793; "Lorsquun airiiitecte ou un entrepreneur s'est chaige de Ia constnwtion a foifait d'un
bJtimen. d'aps wi plan arrété et convenu avec le propnetaire du sol. ii ne peut emander aucune
augmentation de psi'.. ni sous le psétexte de I'augmentation de L main d'cauwe ou des maté4awc
ni sous celui de changements faits sur ce plan. si
 ces changenients ou augmentations n'ont pas eté
autorisés par écrit. at Ia pzu convenu avec le propriétaire." (When an architect or contractor is
responsible under a fixed price for the construction of a bulling, according to a plan settled and
agreed with the owner of the land, he may seek no increase in the pnce, whether on the basis of
increases in laboux or materials, or for changes or extensions to the plan if those changes or aditions
were not authonsed in writing and their price agreed with the owrter.l
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spedfication. The prohibition on either the employer or contractor from
unilaterally modifying the documents on which the agreement is based may
only be overcome by an expressly agreed additional provision which must
set out the effects on price and time. 47
 Without such modification it is the
employer who makes changes to the extent or nature of the works. They
must be made in writing with work orders countersigned by the employer,
and stating the price for the work involved or the mechanism for its
calculation and the effect on completion dates.
An employer or his architect may sometimes wish to use the contractual
powers to instruct a change in the work for the future benefit of the structure.
Where the need arises from a deficiency in the plans responsibility is not in
doubt, but not so where the contractor is in difficulties in complying with the
original design. Under AFNOR 91 the entitlement of the contractor to
additional payment due to changes in the nature of the work as ordered
requires also that they result from circumstances which are neither due to,
nor the fault of the contractor.49
In civil engineering contracts temporaly works do not usually form part of
the employer's design, their selection and any design being left to the
contractor, and again methods of working are almost invariably left to the
contractor, but specifications frequently identify the working processes likely
to be used and may also suggest a working method. These provisions,
coupled with terms providing for work to be carried out under the direction
and to the satisfaction of the employer's professional, have led to difficulties
of Interpretation. The contrasting views are, first, that the powers and
requirements of the professionals are concerned only to secure the quality
and integrity of the final work, and should be read in that restricted light, On
this view they do not detract from the contractor's overall right to decide
upon his preferred methods, and in particular they do not impose a duty on
the architect or engineer, whether to the contractor or to third persons, to
intervene and give instructions on these matters when difficulties arise or
AFNOR 91, article 1.2.
' AFNOR 91, Annex D, Modifying clause for fixed lump sum Contracts defined as Ne Varietur. Lack
of agreement on the new pmvisions leaves the contractor's obligation uner the contract extant, with
the employer able only to terminate the contract.
AENOR 91, article 8.1.4.1.
° AFNOR 91, article 8.13.1.
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are to be anticipated. 58 The second view is that the contract provisions when
viewed as a whole, particularly if not really explicit, do impose such a duty
on the adviser to take charge and give instructions. The English courts have
opted for the first view,5 ' unless the architect actively intervenes.52
The powers given to an architect or agent to issue instructions or to approve
may well therefore not of themselves require or involve a variation, but in
England there is danger in approving a proposal for alternative works. This
is illustrated by Simplex Concrete Piles v St. Pancras where the approval,
which was undoubtedly of a change, was held to be a variation entitling the
contractor to additional remuneration, notwithstanding that without it the
contractor would have been in breach. By virtue of amendments introduced
in JCT 80 the result in Simplex would probably not now be reached, for, if
any work, materials or goods are not in accordance with the contract
instructions may be given requiring a variation as are reasonably necessaiy as
a consequence without additional payment.54
Under AFNOR 91 unauthorised changes entitle the employer on the
proposal of the maître d'ceuvre to require demolition, correction or making
good to the exact contract requirements, and in addition deduct for the effects
of such on the final works or the work of other contractors. 55 The contractor
receives no aditional payment if such changes involve him in expense over
the contract price, and the employer is entitled to any saving if the cost of the
work as so altered is less than that originally envisaged. 56
 Despite not being
part of the d'ordre public the influence of the strict and protective nature of
the French Article 1793 is substantial and it can be contrasted with legislative
modifications applicable in Italy. The basic principle in the Codice Civile
Article 1659 is that there can be no change in the manner of execution of the
work unless authorised by the employer. Evidence of the authorisation is
50 The professional may simply leave the contractor to extricate himself from his difficulties as best he
can, subject to the employer's interests in the quality of the pentianent work or in avoiding costly
delays.
G>t v Woodman & Son (Builders) Ltd. (1962) 1 W.L.R. 585, and notwithstanding that the building
standard forms have not been altered to curtail the architect's supervisozy powers and
responsibilities.
52 Gay v Crump (1964)1 Q.B. 533.
Simplex Concrete Piles Ltd. v Borough of St. Pancras (1958) 14 B.L.R. 80.
jcr 80, clauses 8.4.1 and 8.4.3.
" AFNOR 91, article 8.2.1.
AFNOR 91, artcles 8.22 and 823.
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required in writing although the requirement as to the form of authorisation
does not go to the validity of the legal transaction, merely concerning the
proof of the result. 51
 changes need not necessarily be reduced to writing in
order to be given effect in that the Corte di Cassazione has decided that
unauthorised deviations from the plans are not regarded as breaches of
contract where the employer accepts the work without making any
reservation. In lump sum contracts authorised variations may give rise to
additional remuneration where agreed.59
The breadth of responsibility for a defective building raises the considerations
under the aspect of a duty to warn. Changes to the works brought about by
incomplete or defective plans or specifications may equally impose a duty on
the contractor to examine them and warn the employer if performance in
accordance with the plans and specifications will lead to defective work.
Where the contractor realises or ought to have realised that performance
according to them will result in a defective construction, then a duty on the
contractor to warn the employer, and culpable neglect of such duty rendering
the contractor liable in damages, 6° will diffuse a clear liability for the design.
This aspect reflects the difficulties presented in English law by Lynch v
Thome 161 and explicit contractual obligations which, where followed, will
result in a deficient building but from which deviation constitutes a breach.
Further, supervision of the contractor by an engineer may not eliminate but
may limit responsibility for a result in accordance with the employer's
expectations, but the contractor's position and consequent liabilities do
change if, under the contract, the contractor is bound to comply with the
engineer's design and variation instructions, without any initiative or
critical review, in which case he has indeed become a nudus minister, a
mere instrument in the hands of the engineer.62
Cass. 14th July 1972, No. 2431, rep. fom it. 1972 iv. Appalto no. 13.
" Cass. 15th July. 1966 no. 2055. mass giust. civ. 1966 1175.
Italian Codice Civile, Artide 1659. Where the Italian modifications are of particular interest is
where changes f mm the original plan or specification are necessaty by reason of a rule of art", or
the proper application and workmanship within the standards of the industry. In these
ciitumstances, by Artide 1660, in default of agreement by the parties the court is given has power to
establish or at least ratify the changes as vanation, and to fix new pnces if the parties cannot agree.
° As in lta Cass 22nd November, 1968 no. 3809, mass. giust. civ 1968,2000.
" (1956) 1 W.L.R. 303.
12 Oddo v Vassello, Cass. 31st Maxthl987, No. 3092 Mass. Vovo It. (1987) 528, directly and totally bound
by the instructions he received".
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English law undoubtedly does have something which can be used as a
comparison with the contractor's duty to warn as firmly established in civil
law countnes; where, for example, in France the Cour de Cassation has
consistently held that a contractor who negligently fails to caution against
risks involved in the execution of the plans may incur liability for damages,
but the exception exists in respect of the employer who himself is
experienced in construction work, 64
 and the extent of the powere to vary may
be limited.
4	 limits on the Powi
In English law the terms of the contract as to the power to order variations
may as a matter of construction provide a limit on the extent of the ability to
require more work, and where additional work has been done beyond it then
recovery may be upon a quantum meruit, as for work ordered outside the
contract.65 Some guidance may be gained from the Parkinson case, where
the parties to a contract for the construction of a munitions factory entered
into a deed of variation requiring exceptional working methods to overcome
existing delays; with the work to be required to be paid on the basis of the
rates and prices in the original contract, and with a maximum profit limit for
the contractor. The work ultimately ordered was found to have greatly
exceeded that contemplated by the deed of variation, including its profit
limit. The argument that there was an unlimited ability to order extra work
was rejected, and the contractor recovered on a quantum meruit for the
uncontemplated additions. 67 The terms of the original contract had given
wide powers to the Commissioners at their absolute discretion to modify the
Referred to under Liability for Defects.
Cass. civ. 13th May 1971, Bull. civ.. 1971 III 212 No.297.
For example, work requested after completion; Russell v Sa da Bandeira (1862) 13 C.B. (N.S.) 149.
Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. v Commissioners of Works (1949) 2 K.B. 632 (CA). This decision
has to be treated with caution with regard to any principle; first, because it relied on the discredited
case of Bush v Whitehaven Trustees (1888) Hudson's Building Contracts, 4th ed, Vol. 2, 122 [not
worth recording as an exposition of any principle of law Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors Ltd. v
Fareham U.D.C. (1956) A.C. 696 (H.L) at 7321 and second because of its special facts relating to the
Deed of Variation, as explained in McAlpine Humberoak Ltd. v McDennott International Inc.
(1992) 58 B.LR. 1 (CA).
• The prefit limit was £300,000. The contemplated amount under the deed for the work was about £5
million. The ultimate amount was £6.68 million.
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extent, character and quantities of the work ".. without vitiating or in any
way making void the contract ...", and while the court left open the question
whether the contractor would have succeeded in the same manner under its
terms it is thought that he would not
The scope of the power to vary under JCT 80 follows the same formula,
namely that "no variation . shall vitiate this Contract." which on its face
prevents the contractor from refusing to carry out the work under the
contract or unlimited variations, but some limit there must be as where the
power were used beyond anything that could conceivably represent a true
variation within the provision. Where that limit is depends on ascertaining
the intent of the parties on the construction of the contract, for where the
contract terms make detailed provision for the ordering and compensation
for the effect of variations there is no ability to set it aside on the grounds of
frustration or otherwise and seek reimbursement of a reasonable sum.69
The approach in France is different. For private works, the terms of AFNOR
91 set a limit on increases in the amount of the work in that the contractor's
obligation is to carry out additional work provided the addition, assessed on
the basis of the initial prices, does not exceed one quarter of the original
contract sum. 7° Further, whilst separate agreement is always possible, if the
increase exceeds the quarter the contractor is able to seek termination,
résiiation , of the contract under an order of the court. 7' A detailed scheme
also operates for public works under the CCAG whereby the facility of
résiliation is not available and the contractor is entitled to indemnification
where the additions amount to 5% under fixed price lump sum contracts;
25% under unit price contracts, and 50% under contracts based on cost?2
AFNOR 91 also sets a limit on decreases in the amount of the work that the
contractor must bear without entitlement to claim in consequence, and this
extends to a decrease in work, assessed on the basis of the initial prices, not
Keating on Buiding Contracts, 5th ed,, at p. 493, gives the example of an instruction to build a block
of flats under a contract for a single house.
' McAlpine Humbemak Ltd. v McDemiott International Inc. (1992) 58 B.LR. 1 (CA).
'° AFNOR 91, artide 8.1.1.1.
" AFNOR 91, article 8.1.1.3. Here resolution is, by the pmvisions of artide 203, under Article 1184 of
the Civil Code.
n CCAG, 1991 edition, articles 15.
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exceeding 20% of the original contract sum. 73 If the decrease exceeds this
then the contractor is entitled under the contract to claim compensation for
expenses and for lost profit. 74
 Where there is an increase or decrease in
quantities of more than 25% flowing from changes in the nature of the work
ordered by the employer and resulting from circumstances which are neither
due to the fault nor making of the contractor, then the contractor has an
entitlement to new prices for the work in question.75
In Italy the balance between employer and contractor in connection with the
ability to vary is within the Codice Civile. The point is one of relief for the
contractor. There are two qualifications in Article 1661 on the ability of the
employer to order variations in the plans; first, they are permissible only
within the general scope of the contract, and second they must not entail
considerable modifications to the nature of the work, notevoli
modificazioni della natura dell'opera , nor must the changes lead to
significant deviation from the extent of the works contemplated under the
original contract. Within these limits there is the additional bar against
variations in that the value must not exceed 20% of the remuneration
originally agreed and the contractor may seek adjustment of the contract
price even though the original was a lump sum. Where variations, not
being necessary variations within Article 1660, exceed the 20% limit the
contractor may refuse to carry out the order although he remains obliged to
execute the work according to the original plan and specification. 76
 Under
Article 1660 where in order to carry out the works acccording to the proper
standards necessary changes are required beyond 25% of the original price
then the contractor may withdraw from the contract and be indemnified for
his expense. Equally there is a right of the employer to terminate the contract
where the extent of changes necessary is considerable, di notevole entita
' AFNOR 91, article 8.12.1. For public works the figures for omissions are: 5% under fixed price lump
sum contracts; 20% under unit price contracts, and 33.3% under contracts based on cost, CCAG, 1991
edition, article 16.
AFNOR 91, article 8.1.22. Under common law the power to vaiy by omission does not extend to
enable an employer to omit work fron the contract to give it or similar work to a different contractor.
Two Australian authorities on this point of Carr v JA Berriman Pty. Ltd. (1953) 27 AJ.LR. 273 and
Commissioner of Main Roads v Reed & Stuart (1974) 12 B.L.R. 55 are regularly cited in England.
AFNOR 91, artide 8.1.3.2. This % is that applicable equally to public works, CCAG, 1991 edition,
article 17.
Attempts to oust this provision have been disapproved by the Corfe di Cassaj.ione, whereby general
provisions, dausola g-enerale , inserted with the intent of negating the contractor's right to claim
additional remuneration under Article 1661 are void on the ground of illegality, Cass. 24th April 1968,
no. 1331, mass. giust. civ. 1968,670.
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upon which cancellation the employer is liable for the indemnity7'
The civil law approach to limitation on the extent of variations is adopted in
part in FIDIC namely In terms of compensation. Whilst the engineer is
given wide authority to instruct variations their valuation, and that of the
originally defined and measured works, is at the rates and prices in the
contract,tm
 unless all varied work and measurement adjustments taken
together,79
 are in excess of 15% of the original contract price. In this event an
addition or deduction of such further sum as is agreed by the parties, or in
default determined by the engineer, falls to be made, which sum is based on
the difference over the 15%. In the third edition of FIDIC in 1977 the
percentage had been reduced to 10% leading to its greater application before
reversion to the current 15%.
Such clause has no counterpart in the English ICE Conditions, and, whilst
criticised,8' it does adopt a mechanism familiar in civil law jurisdictions. The
calculation is provided to be done on the issue of the Taking-Over Certificate,
and the 15% is a hurdle for adjustment of the remuneration. It is not a
prohibition on variations beyond it. This points to the true balance in respect
of variations being between the facility to require changes and a satisfactory
" This ability to terminate and indemnify against expenses for considerable necessary variations is
contrasted with the unilateral right of an employer to terminate under Article 1671, when the
compensation is for expenses and loss of the contractor's profit.
76 PIDIC, clauses 51.1 and 52.1. Instructions are not required for increases or decreases in quantities
the result simply of the fact of them exceeding or being less than those in the bills of quantities,
dause 51.2.
' The inclusion in the PIDIC 15% computation of measurement alterations is an important
clarification. The point highlights the significance of the analysis of the essential features of lump
sum, measurement and value and schedule contracts for determining what is a variation. This is
also illustrated by Arcos Industries Pty. Ltd. v Electricity Commision of New South Wales (1973) 12
B.L.R. 63 (Supreme Court of NS.W.). Declared as a Schedule of Rates contract, payment was to be
made for the actual quantities measure and quantities given were "approximately conect" with no
guarantees as to the quantities or responsibility for them. The works were subject to "extras,
additions, deductions, enlargements, deviations, alterations, substitutions and omissions", but
without the approval of the contractor the total value of omissions to the works was not to exceed 10%
of the contract price, which was defined as the total value of the work exclusive of the value of "extras
etc.". The quantities of earth and concrete works fell short of the estimated quantities by in excess
of 10%, and the contractor claimed that such was an omission made without his approval. The
condusion was that although the nature of the work was certain its extent was not, and that as
variations in levels and dimensions were integral to a schedule of rates contract the total value of the
work, being the contract price, was not the estimated value derived from the approximate quantities
but the true value of the work of the nature agreed to be done. The provision for variations and their
restrictions were thus concerned with changes in the nature not in the quantities of the work.
FIDIC, clause 523. Expenditure under provisional sums and dayworks, and cost resulting from the
application of price adjustment formulae or the impact of subsequent legislation are exduded from
the computation.
' I. N. Duncan-Wallace, The International Civil Engineering Contract, p. 105.
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means of compensating the contractor, whose business and aim after all is
the execution of works for proper remuneration. This is upset only where
the ability to vaiy represents a perceived unreasonable economic imposition
on the contractor. The restriction of variations to percentages of the contract
price may in reality be more heavy handed than an unrestricted approach,
particularly where termination is an option, provided always that
appropriate measures exist for achieving proper remuneration. Such
potential imposition as would derive from the lack of restriction in England
is substantially ameliorated under JCT 80 by the application of the rules for
revaluation not just to the varied work, but, by amendment from the 1963
edition, to other work beyond that varied where the variation has
substantially changed the conditions under which that other work is
executed,82
 and also by provision for payment of "direct loss and/or expense"
incurred by the contractor for disturbance to the regular progress of the works
by instructions requiring a variation where he would not be reimbursed by
payment under any other clause. 83
 Movement towards this is seen in the
alteration of terms in AFNOR as between the previous and the 1991 edition.
82 JCT 80, clause 135 and in particular 1355.
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The achievement of completion is taken as the end and aim of a building
contract representing the conclusion of the contractor's obligation as to
performance of the work, providing both the dividing line for risk, and
rights to payment. English law admits of degrees of completion by reference
to the concepts of the entire contract and the evolution of substantial
completion. The process is one of determining the intention from the
construction of the parties' contract, and the term "practical completion" has
been in the RIBA/JCT forms since their inception. ICE 91 uses "substantial
completion" but again as a term internal to the operation of the contract.
Acceptance of the work, reception, is a civil law concept deriving from the
impact under Roman law of approval which was critical to the transfer of
risks in the work and the right to payment. Described as "une operation
con tradictoire " it was by historical use intended to accord a final discharge
of the contractor in respect of the satisfactory performance of the work so that
after completion, followed by inspection and approval of the work by the
employer there is a signing off, normally in writing, and the contractor no
longer carries liability for defects, except those that are hidden, vices caches
As a principle reception is part of the framework of French law and the Code
Civil in relation to the obligations under it, and is not a matter for choice by
the parties as to its use.
Acceptance was one of the areas of the GAIPEC investigation, and its
recommendation closely followed the French model; that acceptance be a
G. Liet-Veau,c, le Dmit de Ia Construction, 9th Edition.
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unilateral act imposed by law, irrespective of the terms of the parties'
contract, and representing an agreement as to completion of the contractual
obligations and that the building is ready for use and occupation. The
Discussion Paper raises questions as to difficulties of application and
consequences that illustrate the necessity for an appreciation of civil law
principles associated with it, and which themselves mirror disputes under
English law as to what represents substantial completion, and whether it or
practical completion has been achieved.2
I	 ftadical Completkn - JCT i
Under JCT 80 the contractor 's express obligation is to "complete" the works
on or before the "completion date",3 but despite this term it is to complete the
works by that date in the sense that practical completion" is used. 4 By clause
17.1 the achievement of practical completion is made the subject the opinion
of the architect. When of that opinion he is obliged to issue a certificate to
that effect, and practical completion is then deemed to have taken place on
that named date for all the purposes of the contract. Those purposes include;5
the times for the commencement of the defects liability period 6 and the
period of final adjustment of the amount to be paid as the Contract Sum,7
and for the release from the insuring obligation, 8 and of the first part of the
retention.9
Practical completion of the works is a matter of recognition decided
independently, in that by that mechanism the parties are committed to an
opinion of the architect who, although engaged by the employer,' 0 must form
2 EC, The Commission Staff Discussion Paper, Concerning Possible Community Action With Regard
to Liabilities And Guarantees In The Construction Sector, June 1993.
Clause 23.1, defined to include any extension of time.
J . Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v Westminster Corporation (1969) 1 W.L.R. 1448 at 1458 (CA); a decision on the
1963 Edition and (1970) 1 W.L.R. 637 (H .L.).
It ends the contractor's primasy right and obligations to carry out works, including vanations, and
the period in respect of which any liquidated damages may be payable. It also is the date after
which the employer may assign the right to bring pmceedings in his name (Clause 19.1.2).
Clauses 17.2 and 173.
' Clause 30.6.
Clause 22, Insurance of the Works.
Clause 30.4.12 in conjunction with dause 17, and ultimately the whole of the retention.
An employer is in breach if he does not have an architect in place to perform the function;
Cmudace Ltd. v London Borough of Lambeth (1986) 33 B.L.R. 20 (CA).
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and act on it independently," albeit not as arbitrator, and exercising
professional skill. Despite the contract not defining the meaning of practical
completion it can been collected from other terms that give It purpose; so
that the extent of the requirement for practical completion Is derived from
the presence or absence of contractual obligations for work after that date:
"... what is meant is the completion of all the construction work that
has to be done . After practical completion (the contractor) may be
required to make good any defects, shrinkages or other faults which
appear in the defects liability period
(it) is provided in order to enable to those defects which are not
apparent at the date of practical completion to be remedied. If they had
been then apparent, no such certificate would have been issued.
It follows that a practical completion certificate can be issued when
owing to latent defects, the works do not fulfil the contract
requirements and that the contract can be completed despite the
presence of such defects."2
The "construction period" 3 must therefore continue until the works are
done without patent defect, and practical completion is not achieved if patent
defects exist; but it was expressed that it could not mean ucompletion down to
the last detail, however trivial or unimportant" for that would constitute the
provision for liquidated damages a penalty.' 4 This has been applied in
relation to "practical", permitting certification where there are very minor
items of deficiency, being de minimis .'
The same mechanism applies if different dates are provided for completion
in sections, but the parties are able themselves to take the matter out of the
hands of the architect if the employer wishes to take possession of any part(s)
of the works, and where the consent of the contractor, which must not be
unreasonably withheld, is obtained,' 6 in which case practical completion is
deemed to have taken place.'7
H Sutdiffe v Thackrah (1976) AC. 727 (H.L), particularly per Lord Reid at 737.
12 j Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v Westminster Corporation (1970) 1W.LR. 637 (H.L) per Viscount Dilhorne at
646.
'	 Kaye (P. & M.) Ltd. v Hosier & Dickinson Ltd. (1972) 1 WLR. 146 (H.L.). per Lord Diplock at 165.
' J.Jaivis& Sons Ltd.v WestminsterCorporation (1969) 1 W.LR. 1448 (CA) perSalmon U. at 1458.
' H. W Nevill (Sunbiest) Ltd. v Wm. Press & Son Ltd. (1981)20 B.LR. 78 at 87.
Clause 18.1, Partial possession by Employer.
Provision is made by clause 18.1.1 to .4 for that date to be applied for defects liability, insurance,
retention and liqidated damages purposes and adjustments.
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2	 SuItaigiaI Cnniiplcfion - ICE 91
Under ICE 91 the works required to be completed ilshall be completed within
the time so stated?i.is By clause 48 (1) it is for the contractor when he
considers that the whole of the works 19
 has been substantially completed to
give notice to the engineer, and such notice is to accompanied "by an
undertaking to finish any outstanding work in accordance with the
provisions of clause 49 (1).P20 The parties will be taken to have contemplated
less than the finished work as requisite for substantial completion, and
certainly not limited to de minimis matters; the time for them to be done, if
not specified by the contractor in his undertaking after agreement between
engineer and contractor being as soon as practicable during the "Defects
Correction Period".21
The nature of engineering as opposed to building works is inherent in the
approach. Substantial completion is more likely to be associated with the
operation of the works after testing, nevertheless completion is less distinct
because of the continuing obligation in Clause 49 (2) to "deliver up to the
Employer the Works ... as soon as practicable after the expiry of the, ... Defects
Correction Period in the condition required by the Contract (fair wear and
tear excepted ...". There is no bar to substantial completion by the existence
even of patent defects or the need for changes, for, to the end of such deliveiy
up and apart from the ability to defer remedying them within his
undertaking to finish outstanding work, the contractor is to "execute all work
of repair amendment reconstruction rectification and making good of defects
of whatever nature as may be required of him ... during the ... Defects
Correction Period .J'.22
It is for the engineer to issue a Certificate of Substantial Completion stating
' Clause 43, Time for Completion.
Or any Section in respect of which a separate time for completion is provided.
20 Clause 49 (1), Work outstanding "The undertaking to be given under clause 48 (1) may after
agreement between the Engineer and the Contractor specilr a time or times within which the
outstanding work shall be completed. If no such times are specified any outstanding work shall be
completed as soon as practicable during the Defects Correction Period."
21 Clause 1 (1) (s), Definitions: ... stated in the Appendix to the Form of Tender calculated from the
date on which the Contractor becomes entitles to a Certificate of Substantial Completion .... In
engineering contracts it is unusual to be less than 1 yeal and for some elements may be 2 years.
22 Clause 49 (2), Execution of work of repair etc.
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the date on which in his opinion the works were substantially completed fr
accordance with the Contract" (including therefore the provisions as to
outstanding work) or instructions as to work that in his opinion requires to
be done before such certiflcation. Further, by Clause 49(4), and separate from
certification where the contract requires completion by section, 24
 if the
engineer considers that "any part of the Works" has been substantially
completed and has passed any prescribed final test he may issue a certificate
in respect of that part. This is separate again from use and occupation of the
works by the employer. Some is contemplated without impact, for only if it is
of a "substantial part" may the contractor request and the engineer "shall"
certify for that part.26
Foreign to civil law eyes, such discretion, as in JCT 80, is ripe for dispute with
liquidated damages dependent on the date certified, 21
 but it is magnified
under ICE 91 as to the extent of "outstanding work" to be accepted. These
prevalent English forms permit though of challenge to the date certified and
by their arbitration clauses give power to the arbitrator utO open up, review
and revise" any certificate, opinion and decision of the architect or engineer.
3	 IaRtctpkxi
Whilst it has always had its application under French law, reception was
specifically introduced into the Code Civil provisions in amendments in
1967 to Articles 1642-1 and 1646-1, and it was given additional functions and
significance in France in the law of 4th January 1978 introducing the new
elements of Article 1792. Vitally, the decennial guarantee liability under
23 Clause 48 (21, Certification of substantial completio the engineer is given 21 days (mm receipt of
the contractor's notice to issue the certificate or the instructions for work required to be done If
instructions are given the contractor is entitled to the certificate "within 21 days of completion to the
satisfaction of the Engineer of the work specifed ...".
24 By its definition in dause 1(1) (u), a Section" requires to be identified.
25 
"Any part of the Works" is neither defined nor limited. The issue of a certiicate for such part deems
the contractoor to have undertaken to complete any outstanding work in that part. By the proviso to
Clause 49 (1) liquidated damages are reduced by reference to the value of the part agaisnt the
whole.
Clause 49(3), Premature use by Emplcei again, the contractoor is deemed to have undertaken to
complete any outstanding work in that part.
27 Previous editions of the I.C.E. Conditions used the term maintenance which may have easier to
apply.
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Article 1792 is applicable where reception has taken place. 28 The extent or
nature of the procedures as to reception which parties may introduce remain
the subject of debate, especially where these could impinge on the application
of the principle, 29 and they are essentially similar to those referred to in the
Discussion Paper.
Article 1792-6 al. I provides 30 that reception is the act by which the employer
declares his acceptance of the work, with or without reservation; taking place
on the application of either party, either amicably or in default by operation
of law, and judicial determination. The parties' contracts ordinarily have
provisions relating to reception and although it seems there was a school of
thought that regarded the law as to reception as not susceptible to
amendment by contract, the practice appears not to follow this. Article 1792-6
has been held not to exclude the possibility of tacit acceptance, which has
always been one of the exceptions to the normality of a written record.
Further, taking possession of itself is insufficient to characterise the requisite
unequivocal volition of the maître d'ouvrage to accept the works.32
Article 1792, with the expressed effects in Articles 1792-6, 1792-3 and 2270 of
bringing about the commencement of the periods for repairing defects
notified, or reserved matters, and the two and ten year liabilities
respectively,33 does not reduce the need to appreciate previous operational
rules, rather it raises new issues for consideration. The development of the
concept of reception over the years, and the importance of the discharge of
liability accompanying it, had led to a division into provisional and
definitive acceptance, reception provisoire and definitive , and in public
works contracts there remains the requirement for both types of reception.
Minor defects, imperfections in details or minor work not done need not
28 Civ. 3, 12 th January 1982, D. 1991-2. Bull. civ III, no.8.
29 M-A. & P. Flamme, le Dmit des Constructeurs, 1984. G. Liet-Veau,ç Reception des Ouges. (1979)
Gaz. Pal. 2. Doctr.414.
° Article 1792-6, at. 1: "La iception est l'acte par lequel le inaftre de l'ouvra8-e declare accepter
!'ouwage ac ou sans zse,ves. Elle inter.'ient a Ia dernande de la partie La plus diigente, salt a
l'amiable, soit a défaut judidairenient. Elie est, eu tout état de cause, prononcée
contradictoiremen t.
Civ. 3, 12th October 1988, Bull. civ III, no. 137; D. 88. IR. 246. Tacit acceptance, 13 reception tadte
may come about: Versailles, 4th December 1987, D. 1989.139, note Karila.
32 Civ. 3,4th October 1989, Bull. civ. Ill, no. 176; Gaz.. Pal.199O. 1. Somm. 214, obs. Peisse.
" And in consequence the identification of the end of the limitation penods.
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prevent provisional acceptance, but the fundamental effect of final
acceptance provides the discharge for the contractor.
The prime function from the origins of reception is preserved in the sense
that there is scope for its operation outside those defects and circumstances
that fall within Articles 1792 and 2270, so to exonerate the contractor from
liability for apparent defects which were not reserved. Dispute is likely
where the greatest care is lacking in formal reservations from reception, and
also in respect of the nature of hidden defects not the subject of release in
their relationship with such defects as were apparent yet not reserved. It is
for the juges du fond within their jurisdiction as to fact to decide whether
the particular defect affecting the building was or was not known to the
maître d'ouvrage at the time of reception definitive . Strict limits have
however been placed on the concept of a visible defect so that it is visible
only if it can be detected by a laymen. Defects are regarded as hidden either if
the causes of the problem could not be determined at the time of reception,
or if serious consequences affecting the soundness of the structure appear
only after acceptance.
Article 1792-6 al. 2 provides a guarantee of satisfactory completion, garantie
de parfait achêvement. By this the contractor is bound for the period of one
year, adopting reception as its commencement. This guarantee extends to the
remedying of all defects identified by the employer, whether those reserved
matters referred to in the report at the time of reception, or by written
notification of those which come to light after reception. To English eyes
this is a statutory defects liability period. It may however have an effect of
making an employer less reluctant to agree to reception, for with the
obligation on the contractor to remedy all deficiencies, whether reserved in
the report of reception and thus necessarily apparent, or whether revealed
after it within the year, the traditional formalities, procedures and impact
appear less significant on this count. The effect of reception is that
reservation as to any defect at that stage renders the decennial guarantee
Civ. 3, 3rd November 1983, Gaz. Pal. 1984. 2577. note Liet-Veaux.
" Article 1792-6 al. 2: "La garantie de parfait athévement a Laquelie I'entrepmnew est tenu pendant
un délai d'un an, a compter de La léception, s'étend a La i4'aration de tousles déso,dres signalés
park rnattm do l'ouvage, soit moyen de reserves mentionnées au pivces-verbai de thception, soit
par vie de notification écfite peur celri z#léspest&iewement a Ia zeception".
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inapplicable to it on the grounds that it then comes within the garantie de
parfait achèvement. This though is ameliorated in that even where defects
are noted at the time of reception but their full extent was not apparent, the
Cour d'Appel has decided that there is no bar to their constituting defects
susceptible to the decennial guarantee. The provisions of Article 1792-6 are
not exclusive of Articles 1792, 1792-2 and 1792-3 for the maître d'ouvrage
may pursue the contractor under the decennial guarantee for those defects
within its scope revealed in the year after reception .'
Article 1792-6 al. 3 provides that the times necessary for the carrying out of
the remedial work are to be agreed by the employer and contractoif 8 but, by
Article 1792-6 al.4, 39 in the absence of such agreement or in the event of
failure to execute them within the time provided, the works may, after due
notice, be carried out by the employer at the expense and risk of the
contractor in default. Under Article 1792-6 al. 5'° the requirements under the
garantie de parfait achèvement, by way of the execution of works, are for the
agreement of the parties, but in default determined judicially. The guarantee
does not, by Article 17926,4l extend to work required to remedy the effects of
fair wear and tear, and use.
4	 AFNOR91
The distinction between the parties' freedom to adopt their own scheme for
closing down their relationship, as in JCT 80 and ICE 91, and the imposed
concept of reception is seen in the AFNOR provisions. Following the Code,
Civ. 3, 10th Januaiy 1990, BuJI. civ. Ill, no. 6; Gaz. Pal. 16-18th December1990, Somm., obs. Peisse.
Civ. 3,4th Febmary 1987, Bull. C III, no.16.
Artide 1792-6 al. 3: "Les délais nécessaires a l'e.técution des traut de zépanition soft ktes d'un
commun accoxri par le maître de l'ouvrage et I'entrepmneur concemé". IThe time necessaiy for the
execution of the works of repair are fixed by the agreement of the employer and the cntractor.l
° Article 1792-6 al. 4: "En l'at'sence d'un tel acconl ou en cas d'inexécution dans le delai fi".4 les
traux peu vent, aprés mise en demeum mstée infructeuse, étre eécutés aux fzais et zisques de
l'entrepreneurdéfaillant." I In the absence of such agreement or in the event of failure to execute
them within the time provided, the works may, after due notice, be carried out at the expense and
risk of the contractor in default.]
° Article 1792-6 al. 5: "L'esécution des travaux e'agés au titre de Ia g-arantie de parfait achèvernent est
constatée d'un conrniun accord ou.. a defaut. judiciaitement. IThe execution of the works required
under the gazantie de paifait achèvement is to be determined by agreement, or in default by
judicial proceedings.l
Article 1792-6 at. 6: "La gazantie ne s'étend pas aux travaux nécessaires pour remédier aux effets de
!'usure nomiale cu de !'usage." I The guarantee does not cover work necessaty to remedy the
effects of ordinaty wear or use I
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reception is stated as the act by which the employer declares his unqualified
acceptance of the worlcwith its date providing the starting point f or the
liabilities and guaranties under Articles 1792, 1792-2, 1792-3, 1792-6 and 2270,
and occurring either by mutual agreement or by judicial decision. Unlike
contracts in the public domain provisional acceptance is ouste. It is a final,
once-only event, definitive en seule fois and follows its origins of
discharging the contractor from all of his contractual obligations, but with the
expressed exception consistent with Article 1792-5 of those imposed by the
Code."
Where the works are carried out by entrepreneurs groupes the request for
reception must be by the authonsed agent of all the contractors, and in the
same manner as for separate or general contractors. 45 Reception may not be
requested until all of the work to be carried out by the entrepreneurs
groupes, or where separés or general the work of that contractor, has been
completed, unless the contract documents have provided for acceptances of
parts, reception partielles, whether individual buildings or elements of the
works. 46
The importance attached to reception as a process under law, and that its first
mode is agreement, is reflected in the provisions bringing the parties
together to effect it. Inspection for agreement on reception requires positive
action by the employer, who must specify the date for inspection within
fifteen days from receipt of the contractor 's request, with the date not more
than twenty days from it. 47
 Failure in this, or failure to attend the inspection
or be represented entitles the contractor to seive formal notice requiring the
fixing of the date under the same time scheme; continued failure enables the
contractor to have that fact recorded and served by court official, huissier de
justice. Thereafter the employer has thirty days to comply, failing which,
42 Article 15.1.1 to 15.1.4.
' Article 15.1.1. This is identified in Article 132.2.4 as one of the special characteristics of this contract
foim.
" Article 15.1.2.
' Article 15.2.1.1.1; the requirement is to give notice to the employer by registered letter with recoitled
deliver) with a con' to the employer's agent, that the works may be taken over (mm a fixed date
which must fall between the 8th and 15th day following the date of posting of the request, unless the
Employer agrees to an earlier date.
Articles 15.2.1.11 and 15.2.12.2.
Articles 1521.1.1 and .2. This period may be extended to take account of paid public holidays.
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reception is deemed to have taken place, unqualified by any reservations, on
the date of receipt of the formal notice.48
At the conclusion of the inspection, which becomes the material date, 4° the
employer must give his decision, being one of refusal or acceptance, with or
without qualification, 50
 and the report prepared by the employer's agent must
be signed by the employer and provided to the contractor forthwith, or
notification given within five days. 51 Following this the contractor has
twenty days to dispute any reservations by service of formal notice, failing
which he is deemed to have accepted such reservations.52
Where the report makes reservations by reason of omissions or
imperfections it must identify them, and require remedies, and unless
otherwise agreed the contractor has ninety days to correct them, and then
request their withdrawal. 53 A refusal of reception is justifiable only on
grounds that the work is not finished or that the extent of defects is such as to
equate to a failure to complete, or which necessitate re-doing works, and the
same procedure for resolving disputes applies, but, generally, where it is
impossible to achieve reception by agreement the decision is for the court.54
AFNOR 91 also provides that entry into possession is at the time of
reception, but this does not apply where the time for completion has passed
exclusively through the contractor's fault and the employer wishes to take
possession.55
 The garantie de parfait achèvement under the contract,
Artide 15.2.2.13.
Whether of Ia zception or of refusal; Article 15232.
5° Article 15.2.3.1.
' Article 15233. The report. le pvcès-verbai , is as refened to in Artide 1792-6 al. 2.
52 Article 15.23.4. Artide 19 contains the pmvisions as to Disputes, Contestations. Article 19.1 enables
either party to give formal notice of failure to abide by the terms of the contract requiring
compliance within a period not less than 15 days, unless provided otherwise in the special
conditions. Arbitration is not compulsory for by Article 19.2 the parties are required to consult as to
whether to submit their dispute to arbitration or not. Unless otherwise stipulated by the special
conditions disputes that are not able to be resolved by arbitration are, by Article 193, to be brought
before the court having jurisdiction over the place of performance of the work.
5° Articles 152.5.1, .2, .3, .4 and .5. The contractor's request must be by recorded delivery. Failing
cormction by the contractor and after formal notice the employer may have the necessary work
done at the expense and risk of the contractor. In the absence of agreement on any of these matters
within 30 days the dispute is to be settled pursuant to Articles 192 and 193.
Aitides 15.2.6 and 15.3.
5° Articles 152.4.1 and .2. In this event inspection of the work before taking possession must take place
not less than 15 days after format notice has been given to the contractor to complete; a detailed
survey is to be prepared and given to the contractor and the employer may then enter into
possession andanange for final completion.
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expressed as irrespective of Articles 1792 to 1792-3 and 2270, follows the
requirements of Article 1792-6.
5	 Réctpticin outside France
Belgium did not introduce the equivalent of the 1978 Loi Spinetta, and, with
the original text of Article 1792, and with no provision in any code, or in the
legislation protecting purchasers of dwellings to be constructed, that defines
reception , its jurisprudence, procedures and effects are much debated on
questions of form and timing, tacit acceptance, and on the necessity for
provisional and definitive acceptances. 59
 The principle of the legally binding
act of a declaration by the employer is fundamental, but it is the effect of the
agreement that provides controversy"
In Germany, in contracts under the VOB 6' conditions there are specific
provisions constituting amendments to the BGB code, including provisions
as to acceptance of the work, so that it may be governed by the BGB or the
VOB conditions. When governed by the BGB and whether the contract is for
work or for services, acceptance may be written or inferred, including from
taking possession, and reservations are essential because of the four-fold
impact of acceptance whereby: risks are transferred from the contractor to the
owner the burden of proof in the event of defects in the work is reversed
from the contractor to the owner, the end date of the warranty period which
the law provides for the owner is by reference to the date of acceptance; and,
Articles 16.1 to 16.5. It provides a time limit for rectification of notified defects of 60 days.
Artide 1792, original form, [If a building built for a lump sum price fails wholly or in part through a
defect in construction, even through a defect in the ground, the architect and contractor shall be
liable for 10 years.]
Lol Breyne of 9th July 1971 and Royal Decree of 21st October 1971.
M-A & P. Flamme, Le Droit des Constructeurs, 1984.
'° La zéception prosoize does not by itself give the degree of agreement of the type required for the
commencement of the ten year prescription period. By it the parties are not taken to have
derogated from the custom that provisional acceptance only constitutes a first stage towards the
requisite a8reement, Cour de Cassation, 4th Maith 1977, J.T. 621, obs. Bruyneel.
SI Verdingungsordnung fur Bauleistungen the conditions applicable to construction work which were
negotiated with the building industiy and which are coinpulsoty for government contracts and
frequently incorporated into private contracts
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the contractor is given the right to receive all contractual remuneration.62
Acceptance is equated with conformity by the contractor with the contract,
and taking possession within the contract is regarded as tacit acceptance so
that even early possession forced on an owner requires explicit rejection of
acceptance. Defects are those known, not hidden, and, regarded as a
conscious act of the owner, the effect of acceptance without reservation is the
loss of the rights to secure repair of the defects, or reduction in the price, 63
 but
not to the right to damages. TM
 Reservations must be made at the time of
acceptance, not before or afterwards, but whilst this may appear to require a
positive approach of the owner the initiative to achieve acceptance rests
firmly with the contractor.
The impact in Germany of acceptance and the necessity for knowledge creates
problems as to intermediate examination of work or examination on its
completion. There appears less of the concern apparent in France towards
protection of the owner and his treatment as a layman, and whilst German
law does not start out with a duty of examination of the work except where
both parties are in the business, failure to examine and lack of notification
gives rise to deemed approval, albeit such approval, whether tacit or express,
covers only those defects which ought to have been discovered upon
acceptance and upon proper examination of the work.TM
The effect is that close attention to inspection is required to avoid the pitfalls
52 BGB 11 640; E. J . Cohn, Manual of German Law. BGB 640 provides that the employer is bound to
accept the work completed in accordance with the contract, as long as acceptance is not rendered
impossible by reason of the nature of the work. If the customer accepts defective work, despite
being aware of it, he only retains the rights conferred by ¶1 633 and Ii 634 if reservations as to the
defects are made at the time of acceptance. BGB 633 and 634 enable an employer to fix a period
for the removal of defects that destroy or diminish the value of the work or its fitness for its ordinaiy
or stipulated use. In default the employer may himself remove the defect and claim compensation.
Approval of the work, whether express or implied by law, operates as a waiver of all contractual rights
otherwise available in the case of delivezy of defective work. This does not amount to a waiver of tort
in the case of personal injuty suffered as a result of such defects.
BGB ¶ 635 provides that if the defect is caused by a circumstance for which the contractor is
responsible, the employer may demand compensation for non- fulfillment, instead of cancellation
or reduction of the price, under 634.
The reception of and development of the Roman law in Germany through the Pandectist School was
central to the approach to the drafting of the BGB with the view of the typical citizen not as an
artisan but as a monied entrepreneur or landed proprietor, with business expenence, capable of
succeeding in a society with freedom of contract and able to take his own steps to protect him selL
Defects fraudulently concealed are not covered by the rule, but the employer is obliged to give
notice immediately after they have become manifest, BGB 11370- 1, and 11370-3. Under Swiss law
the employer is obliged to examine the work delivered to him as soon as feasible in due course of
business and notice of defects must be given.
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of acceptance. The BGB rules may be amended by agreement, in particular
where general conditions such as the VOB conditions apply Under these,
acceptance is more onerous for the owner, for; unless otherwise agreed, it is
deemed to take place within twelve days following written notification of
completion of the worlç and taking possession gives rise to acceptance at the
expiration of six days. 67
 The VOB conditions are used in a majority of
building contracts in Germany and with the propensity towards use of
several contracts between owner and various contractors engaged in a
project, as opposed to one main contractor, successive acceptance of parts is
usual 48
6	 English Law
Acceptance and Substantial Performance
As the end of the contractor's obligation of a contractor to perform the basic
work and supply of materials under a building contract, parts of the doctrine
of reception are recognisable in English law in the principle of substantial
performance, without the necessity for consideration of standard conditions
providing for certification and its consequences. However, it is without act of
the employer that substantial performance impacts on the parties so as to
° VOB conditions Article 12: "1. If a contractor requests acceptance after construction work has been
completed the client shall have 12 working days in which to effect this. Any period may be agreed. 2
Special acceptance may be given for the followin& on request: a) isolated parts forming a whole, b)
parts on which continuance of the work is dependent. 3. In the event of a substantial defect
accceptance may be refused until repairs are made. 4. Formal acceptance shall take place when
one of the contracting parties requires it. Each party may then have recourse to an expert at its own
expense. The experts report is to be put in writing after joint negotiation. The report must record
any reseivations relating to known defects and to penalties, and any objections by the contractor.
Each party is to receive a copy. 5. When one of the contracting parties is freed fmm his obligations
with respect of paragraphs 2, 4 or 4 above, this discharge shall also apply to their legal
representatives and their subcontractors, except where the latter have acted with intentional or
gross negligence. 6. If a third party daims against one of the contracting parties for any loss for
which the second contracting party is responsible by virtue of paragraphs 2, 3 or 4, the former may
request that the latter release him frem his obligations with regard to third parties. He must not
accept or satisfy claims by third parties without first pmviding the other party with an opportunity of
being represented."
The Italian Codice CiviJe expressly links the right of the contractor to payment with acceptance and
embodies the owners right and his obligation to check completed works as pmvided in Article 1665:
"Verification and payment for the works. The Owner, before receiving delivety of the works, has the
right to verify the completed works. The verification must be made by the Owner as soon as the
contractor makes it possible for him to pivceed with it. If, notwithstanding the installation of the
contractor, the Owner delays his verification without justifiable grounds. or does not communicate
within a short period of time his findings, the works are considered accepted. lithe Owner takes
deliveiy of the works without reservation, this is considered as an acceptance even if verification has
not taken place. Unless otherwise agreed, or by contraly custom,, the contractor has the right to
payment of the consideration when the work is accepted by the Owner."
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give rise to the right of the contractor to receive his contractual
remuneration, and it is in this context that the principle developed. This
though is only one aspect of the function of reception , for while in that
context substantial completion constitutes an acknowledgment at law of the
discharge of the contractor it is only discharge from any requirement for
further performance in order to recover the contract price. Substantial
completion under English law does not release the contractor from the
consequences of any failure to perform or complete fully in respect of his pre-
existing contractual obligations, in that the employer may have recourse to
them to establish breaches of contract and so recover damages, or to diminish
the price. When achieved, substantial completion places the burden on the
employer to assert and prove any breach and starts time running in ordinary
circumstances for the purposes of the Limitation Acts, and transfers risks in
and from the works from the contractor to the employer.
The impact of an entire contract in English law, under which complete
performance of the building contract is required before the right to payment
arises, 69
 is reduced by the application of the concept of substantial
performance, where substantial benefit short of that complete performance
has been conferred on an employer. 70
 This has been equated to acceptance in
the sale of goods, 71
 but although the circumstances of possession and benefit
ordinarily associated with substantial performance are used to provide a
mechanism for securing payment in building contracts, and can be seen in
comparison and contrast with events that may constitute reception tacite
under jurisprudence , they alone cannot properly found a principle of
acceptance with the full rigour of reception.
Where building work is carried out on the land of an employer, and so
Cutler y
 Powell (1795) 6 Term. Rep. 320.
° Considered under Récept ion and Payment.
Hoenig v. Isaacs (1952) 2 All ER 176, per Lord Dennin& M.R. at 181: lust as in a sale of goods the
buyer who accepts the goods can no longer treat a breach of condition as giving a right to reject but
only a right to damages, so also in a contract for work and labour an employer who takes the benefit
of the work can no longer treat entire performance as a condition precedent, but only as a term
giving rise to damages.
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attached, it becomes the property of the employer. tm
 Acceptance inferred from
receipt and use of goods or failure to reject is not a valid basis for utilising the
principle as In the sale of goods. At the origins of the doctrine of substantial
performance the inference that had to be made to secure payment for the
uncompleted part of the work under an entire contract was of a new
contract,tm but:
"Where, as in the case of work done on land, the circumstances are
such as to give the Defendant no option whether he will take the
benefit of the work or not, then one must look to other facts than the
mere taking the benefit of the work in order to ground the inference of
a new contract... The mere fact that a Defendant is in possession of
what he cannot help keeping or even has done work on it, affords no
ground for such an inference."14
Whilst it was at one time suggested that there was a doctrine of acceptance
applicable to building contracts in English law there is little to support this.75
The central feature is that a building owner does not accept work by resuming
or continuing in possession of the land on which the work is done:
"Indeed, the term, 'taking possession' is scarcely a correct one. The
owner of the land is never out of possession while the work is being
done. But, using the term in a popular sense, what is he under the
supposed circumstances to do? The contractor leaves an unfinished or
ill-constructed building on his land; he cannot without expensive, it
may be tedious, litigation compel him to complete it according to the
terms of his contract; what has been done may show his inability to
complete it properly; the building may be very imperfect, or
inconvenient, or the repairs very unsound, yet it may be essential to
the owner to occupy the residence, if it be only to pull down an replace
all that has been done before."76
There are circumstances where use and occupation do give rise to substantial
performance, and where acceptance occurs so as to render payment
appropriate without substantial performance, but this does not deprive an
72 When materials are brought onto the site by the contractor they remain, subject to contra!y terms,
his property until affixed to the land by being built into the works, Tnpp v Armitage (1839) 4 M. & W.
687. "Materials provided by the buider and portions of the fabric, whether wholly or partly finished,
although intended to be used in the execution of the contract, cannot be regarded as appropriated
to the contract or as "sold" unless they have been affixed to or in a reasonable sense made part of
the corpus ...', Seeth v Moore (1886) ii App. Cas. 350 (H L), per Lord Watson at 381.
Applebyv Myers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
Sumpterv I-ledges (1898)1 Q.B. 673 (CA), perCollins U. at 676.
Editions previous to the 9th and (current) 10th of Hudson's Building and Civil Engineering Contracts
had suggested the doctrine, but analysis by Professor Duncan Wallace showed it not to be so.
e Muniv v Butt (1858) 8 E. & B. 738 per Lord Campbell Cj.
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employer of his right to seek damages for defects, and this is true where the
employer pays the contractor in full." This is not at odds with reception to
the extent of the question of payment as it presupposes purported
completion, as with "a building built" within Article 1792 of the Code Civil
or a notification of completion within the German VOB conditions, but it
does highlight a potential dissimilar result stemming from possession
without reservation. The basis for the principle in English law that payment
is no bar to subsequent action lies in the veiy nature of the building contract
that defects may not be apparent at the time when those features exist that
may amount to substantial performance and so require payment. The
principle extends even to payment under a judgment, with the reason
expressed in Davis v Hedges :78
"The hypothesis, is that the plaintiff suing for the price is in default.
The conditions on which he can bring his action are usually simple
and immediate. The warranted chattel has been delivered, or the
work contracted for has been done, and the right to bring an action for
the price, unless there is some stipulation to the contrary, arises. On
the other hand, the extent to which the breach of warranty or breach
of contract may afford a defence is usually uncertain; it may take some
time to ascertain to what amount the value of the article or work is
diminished by the plaintiff's default. It is unreasonable therefore, that
he (the plaintiff builder) should be able to fix the time at which the
money value of his default shall be ascertained. In many cases the
extent to which the value of works may be diminished by defect in
their execution may be altogether incapable of discovery until some
time after the date for payment has arrived. Surely the right to redress
for the diminution of value, when discovered, ought not to depend on
the accident whether the contracting party in the wrong had or had not
issued a writ for the price."79
On these grounds, and consistent with the independence of the covenant to
complete in accordance with the contract from that of payment, the fact that
the employer had the ability to utilise the existence of breaches in
diminution of the price claimed and recovered even by action was held not
to deprive the employer of the right to damages, and this applies to payments
on account or interim certificates. 8° The heritage of reception in civil law
" Considered under Reception and Payment.




° Cooperv Uttoxeter Burial Board (1864) 11 L.T. 565.
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inevitably governed French law in its development of the post-reception
guarantee, for otherwise the abrogation of its nature so as to permit an action
on the contract obligations throughout the limitation period as in English
law would have destroyed the other elements of the transfer of risk and the
right to payment.
Acceptance and Appm val
The requirement that work be carried out and materials supplied to meet an
approval has been a feature of the history of the building contract in England,
and it remains in the standard forms. Unusually, that person is the employer
himself,8 ' in which case the approval will override any other provision or
standard as to the work and the employer will indeed bar himself from
action for defective work This was the result in Bateman v Thompson ,83
where the work was to be done with the best materials and also to the
satisfaction of the architect and of the employer, for whom there was an
express right to recover for defects discovered within twelve months. The
architect certified his satisfaction which was binding, and the employer as
was held, expressed his satisfaction by payment following such certificate.
The converse, namely that an employer's approval is a condition precedent
to payment, does not however follow84
Where the work is required to the approval or satisfaction of an independent
third party then it depends on the terms of the contract as to whether and
when that approval becomes binding. 85 Express words such as "the certificate
of the engineer ... shall be binding and conclusive on both parties" 86
 are used,
but generally with the facility for challenge in arbitration. In NCB v Neil it
was concluded that there was no rule of law or construction applicable to
" "There is, after all, nothing o prevent a party from requinng that work shall be done to his own
satisfaction', Minster Trust Ltd. v lIapps Tractors Ltd. (1954) 1 WLR. %3 per Devlin J
. 
at 973. The
same point would arise if the requisite satisfaction is of an agent of the employer it may 'be plain
that he is to function only as the alter eso of his master" and not independently as ordinarily
applicable to a certifier.
82 In National Coal Board v Neill (1985) 1 Q.B. 300, the position was reviewed, but by reference to the
satisfaction of a third party.
83 Bateman (Lord) v Thompson (1875) Hudson's Building Cases, 4th edtion, Vol.2 36.
84 Considered under Recept ion and Payment.
Such approval may well be required to be expressed by certification.
Kenney v Barrow-in-Fumess Corporation (1909) Hudson's Building Cases, 4th ed. Vol.2, 411 at 413
(CA). ICE 91, clause 66(4) uses "final and binding".
National Coal Board v NeilI (1985) Q.B. 300.
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building contracts that a contractor is to be taken to have fulfilled his
obligations upon the expression of satisfaction of the independent
professional where the contract provides for the work to be executed in a
stipulated manner, as well as to that person's satisfaction.0
Conversely, in Atu UI Haq v City Council of Naimbi 89 the conclusion was
that where the contractor was obliged to execute works "under the direction
of and to the entire satisfaction in all respects of the Engineer" a certificate
issued at the beginning of the maintenance period which started "when the
Works have been executed according to the provisions of the Contract and to
the satisfaction of the Engineer" terminated the contractor's obligations,
subject to the maintenance provisions, and prevented a claim for damages
for defects. 9° This decision was criticised,9 ' and the criticism judicially
approved,92 but there seems no good ground for suggesting that finality
should not be introduced at the beginning of the maintenance period if that
is what the parties have provided, and indeed that is the result which the
doctrine of reception would have produced, with the vital distinction that
the finality of the contract obligation starts the guarantee obligation, and does
not leave the employer without remedy.
Finality and discharge
With their English origin but intent for use in countries governed by civil
law the FIDIC°3 conditions point the way to the central aspects for comparison
between the English and French approach. By clause 43.1 the whole of the
works required to be completed within a particular time "shall be completed,
58 In National Coal Board v Neil, the British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers' Association
conditions (1956) were applicable. The relevant provision was that all work to be done under the
contract should be executed in the manner set out in the specifications, and, to the reasonable
satisfaction of the engineer the engineer had certifled his satisfaction in an unqualified manner, but
the obligation to satisfy the engineer was held to be cumulative with the other obligations. JCT 80 is
considered latet
Atu Ul Haq v City Council of Nairobi (1962) 28 B.L.R. 76 (P.C.).
° The conclusion as to whether a certificate is binding and conclusive Mmust depend upon the
construction of Ethel particular contractual documents and though a consideration of the opinions of
courts on other wonis in other contracts in other cases is of assistance the adjudication ... involves
thereafter a return to a study of the contract under review
In the 9th edition of Hudson's Building and Civil Engineering Contracts (1965).
92 Billyack v Leyland Construction Co. Ltd. (1968) 1 W.L.R. 471, inability to rely on lack of satisfaction of
a local authority when resisting a claim for payment.
4th Edition, 1987. The scheme follows that of the ICE conditions.
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in accordance with Clause 48, within the time stated Clause 48.1
provides that when the works have been completed and passed any
prescribed tests the contractor may give notice,s with an undertaking to
finish with due expedition any outstanding work during the defects liability
period. The engineer then must within twenty-one days issue a certificate
stating the date on which in his opinion the works were substantially
completed or give instructions specifying all work required to be done before
its issue, which has to meet his satisfaction. The opinion of the engineer
may therefore permit of completion with the existence of patent defects.
The defects liability period is calculated from the date of substantial
completion as certified, and the obligations of the contractor during it as to
completion of outstanding work and remedying defects are "to the intent
that the Works shall, at or as soon as practicable after the expiration of the
Defects Liability Period, be delivered to the Employer in the condition
required by the Contract, fair wear and tear excepted, to the satisfaction of the
Engineer
The nature of the contractor's obligation as to carrying out any particular
work to achieve completion or in the defects liability period is unexceptional
to the French view, 99
 for the obligations under Article 1792-6 would
The time is calculated from the commencement date and sublect to extension. Provision is also
made for completion of any Section.
The notice is deemed to be a request for a "Taking-Over Certificate.
By dause 48.1 the engineer must also notify the contractor of any defects in the works affecting
substantial completion that may appear after such instructions and before completion. The
contractor is entitled to receive the Taking-Over Cerificate within 21 days of completion, to the
satisfaction of the engineer, of the works specified and remedying of the defects notifIed. A similar
scheme to ICE 91 is applied by Clauses 482 and 483 in respect of parts of the works.
Clause 49.1, Defects Liability Period: In these Conditions the expression "Defects Liability Period"
shall mean the defects liability period named in the Appendix to Tender, calculated from: (a) the
date of substantial completion of the Works certified by the Engineer in accordance with Clause 48,
or (b) in the event of more than one certificate having been issued by the Engineer under Clause 48,
the respective dates so certified; and in relation to the Defects Liability Period the expression "the
Works" shall be construed accordingly.
Clause 49.2 Completion of Outstanding Work and Remedying Defects: 'To the intent that the
Works shall, at or as soon as practicable after the expiration of the Defects Liability Period, be
delivered to the Employer in the condition required by the Contract, fair wear and tear excepted, to
the satisfaction of the Engineer, the Contractor shall: (a) complete the work, if any, outstanding on
the date stated in the Taking Over Certificate as soon as practicable after such date and (b) execute
all such work of amendment, reconstruction, and remedying defects, shrinkages or other faults as
the Engineer may, during the Defects Liability Period or within 14 days after its expiration, as a result
of an inspection made by or on behalf of the Engineer prior to its expiration, instruct the Contractor
to execute."
" M. Fillet, How certain provIsions of the FIDIC contract operate under French law. (1992) 9 1.C.L.R.,
121.
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comprehend those within clause 49.3. Equally in England a failure to comply
with defects liability obligations would give the employer an action for such
particular breach, without the necessity for provision for recovery internal to
the contract." This disposes of difficulties with completion in relation to
defects that are patent or become apparent within a short time. It is in
relation to the discharge from liability under the contract that contrast is
highlighted. First, as the nature and effect of the discharge, and second as to
the manner of its achievement.
In England there is nothing to prevent an employer looking to the basic
obligation of the contractor to carry out and complete the works in
accordance with its terms in order to found a cause of action on the contract
itself within the permitted limitation periods. In France the development
and use of reception in the Code Civil imposes on the parties so that the
employer, whilst losing the ability to rely on the pre-existing contract to
found his rights, has substituted for him the scheme of the biennial and
decennial guarantees, being provisions d'ordre public. By reason of
reception, which is the start in time of the guarantee obligations of the
contractor, the employer in France does not have recourse to an action for
breach of the contract provisions.'°1
Whilst in England finality and so discharge of a contractor's obligations
under a building contract may result from the terms used and the
circumstances, the role of the professional intervenes with the function of
independently certifying deciding and opining so setting himself apart from
acting in that respect as agent of the employer.' 02
 Under JCT 80 the fact of the
issue by the architect of the certificate of practical completion is not
conclusive against the employer that apparent defects do not exist, and the
contractor cannot rely on the architect's inspection or lack of it in revealing
'°° Clause 49.4, Contractor's Failure to Catty Out Instructions: in case of default on the part of the
Contractor in canying out such instruction within a reasonable time, the Employer shall be entitled
to employ and pay other persons to cany out the same and if such work is work which, in the opinion
of the Engineer, the Contractor was liable to do at his own cost under the Contract, then all costs
consequent thereon or incidental thereto shall, after due consultation with the Employer and the
Contractor, be determined by the Engineer and shall be recoverable fmm the Contractor by the
Employe and may be deducted by the Employer from any monies due or to become due to the
Contractor and the Engineer shall notify the Contractor accortlingly, with a copy to the Employei'
lot Cass. Civ. 3, 13th April 1988. This does not apply in the case of fraud or a default of the contractor
that might give rise to a liability in tort, or in a case of gross misconduct, Cass. Civ. 3, 23rd July 1986.
Keating on Building Contracts, 5th edition, discussed at Ch. 5.
334
defects as an excuse for not complying with the contract.'° 3
 It does however
lead towards the final ceitiflcate,'° 4
 which has an effect in any proceedings
arising out of or in connection with the contract, whether by arbitration or
otherwise, as:
"conclusive evidence that where and to the extent that the quality of
materials or the standard of workmanship are to be to the reasonable
satisfaction of the Architect . the same are to such satisfaction ...".'°
As conclusive evidence the final certificate is not open to contradiction,'° 6
 and
it is as binding as to fact as if it was an arbitrator's award, 107
 but is not an award
or subject to the Arbitration Acts. 108
 It is only conclusive however on those
matters with which it deals, and even in the above respect the extent to
which the quality of materials and the workmanship are to be to the
reasonable satisfaction of the architect may or may not represent a significant
element of the contractor's obligations, for specification requirements under
the contract may apply without reference to the architect's satisfaction. 109
 Such
discharge, to the extent that a true construction of the specification may
reveal, is binding unless the conclusive effect is negated by resort to the
exception of either the employer or the contractor commencing arbitration or
other proceedings before or within twenty-eight days of the issue of the final
certificate.°
Under FIDIC the obligation on the contractor is not just to execute and
103 East I-lam Borough Council v Bemani Sunley & Sons Ltd. (1966) A.C. 406 (H.L.).
104 JCT 80, Clause 30.8: "The Architect ... shall isue the Final Certificate ... not later than 2 months after
whichever of the following occurs last: the end of the Defects Liability Penod, the date of issue of the
Certificate of Completion of Making Good Defects under clause 17.4 the date on which the Architect
sent a copy to the Contractor of any ascertainment ....
105 Clause 30.9.1. By clause 30.10, save for the Final Certificate as provided, no certificate of the
Architect shall of itself be conclusive evidence that any works, materials or goods to which it relates
are In accordance with this Contract." There are other effects, including entitlement to final
payment.
106 Kaye (P&M) Ltd. v Hosier & Dickinson Ltd. (1972) 1 WL.R. 146 at 169 (H.L.).
107 Goodyear v Weymouth Corporation (1865) 35 LJ.C.P. 12 at 17.
'° Sutdliffe v Thrackrah (1974) AC. 727 (H.L.).
'°° JCT 80, Clause 2.1: "The Contractor shall ... carry out and complete the Works shown upon the
Contract Drawings and described ... in the Contract Bills .. using materialsand workmanship of the
quality and standards therein specifle, provided that where and to the extent that approval of the
quality of materials or of the standards of workmanship is a matter for the opinion of the Architect
such quality and standards shall be to the reasonable satisfaction of the Architect."
° JCT 80, Clause 30.9.2 and .3.
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complete the works but to do so "to the satisfaction of the Engineer".' 1 ' What
then of the act of reception as the act of the employer? To constitute the
engineer as agent of the maître d'ouvrages may be unobjectionable but this
does not accord with the independent role between the parties required
under English law, nor that in which the parties by these conditions will
have cast him, for by imposing obligations to meet the engineer's satisfaction
they give him discretion which has to be exercised impartially 112
 The
engineer's opinion as to completion, or as to any other opinion, instruction,
determination certificate or valuation, may be disputed and is susceptible to
arbitration and its opening up and review. First though the requirement is
for the dispute to be referred to the engineer himself for a decision to which
effect has to be given and which becomes final and binding unless due notice
of arbitration is served, and until it is revised in an amicable settlement or
award."3
 The result is undoubtedly a conclusion of disputes, but comparison
with the longstanding concept of reception illustrates that the English
approach, of reliance on the professional as both agent and quasi-arbitrator,"4
is at odds with that in France. This becomes apparent also in relation to final
payment to which reception gives rise.
Clause 13.1, Work to be in Accordance with Contract: "Unless it is legally or physically impossible,
the Contractor shall execute and complete the Works and remedy any defects therein in strict
accoitlance with the Contract to the satisfaction of the Engineet..". Commented on byA Norris, The
FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering Construcion- 4th edition 1987- The
Works Quality, Defects and End Preduct. (1989) 6 I.C.L.R. 390.
112 Clause 2.6, Engineer to Act Impartially: "Whereve under the Contract, the Engineer is required to
exercise his discretion by: (a) giving his decision, opinion or consent, or (b) expressing his satisfaction
or appreval,. or (c) determining value, or (d) otherwise taking action which may affect the rights and
obligations of the Employer or the Contractor he shall exercise such discretion impartially within the
terms of the Contract, and having regard to all the cirrumstances. Arty such decision, opinion,
consent, expression of satisfaction, or appreval, deteiminationof value or action may be opened up,
reviewed or revised as previded in Clause 67."
" FID1C, clauses 67.1 to .4.
Apart from the point that at the veiy time when the employer requires the assistance of his engineer
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1	 The Right to and lime for Payment
Entire Contracts
The impact of reception in providing the right to payment may be viewed in
the light of an entire contract under English law, under which the obligation
to make payment does not arise until the whole of the work is entirely
performed. They are indivisible obligations and entire fulfilment is a
condition precedent, so that the former does not arise until the latter is
performed in every respect. Undoubtedly parties are at liberty to contract of
those terms, and whilst an entire contract will be given its effect, only the
clearest of language is permitted to deprive the contractor of any payment
until completion to every minor detail. In Appleby v Myers,' where the
plaintiff contracted to erect machinery at the defendant's premises at specific
prices for particular portions and to keep it in repair for two years with the
price to be paid upon completion, the principle from Cutter v Powell 2
restated, and with the identification of three routes to recovery:
"...the plaintiffs having contracted to do an entire work for a specific
sum, can recover nothing unless the work be done, or it can be shown
that it was the defendants fault that the work was incomplete, or that
there is something to justify the conclusion that the parties have
entered into a fresh contract."
Equally, without agreement to the contrary or a custom to that effect the base
proposition is recognised in civil law that the workman must complete the
(1867) L.R.2C.P. 651.
2	 (1795) 6. Term Rep. 320.
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promised work before he can claim any remuneration. 3 In England this rule,
which might have been thought to have been waning in effect, 4 was applied
to prevent recovery under a contract for installing central heating where a
host of defects led to conclusion that substantial performance had not been
achieved. 5
 Its scope is much reduced by virtue of interim payments, for,
where the contract provides "for progress payments to be made as the work
proceeds, but for retention to be held until completion. Then entire
performance is usually a condition precedent to payment of the retention
money but not, of course, to the progress payments. The contractor is
entitled to payment pro rata as the work proceeds, less a deduction for
retention money. But he is not entitled to the retention money until the
work is entirely finished, without defects or omissions."6
Substantial Completion arid Independence of Terms
"When a contract provides for a specific sum to be paid on completion of
specified work, the courts lean against a construction which would deprive
the contractor of any payment at all simply because there are some defects or
omissions."7
 This process in respect of the ordinary lump sum contract for
building work in England again provides lessons both ways in comparison
with some of the civil law elements of reception.
Subject always to any other terms of the contract that affect the right to or
time for payment, once there has been substantial completion then the
contract price is due, against which the employer may establish the existence
of defects as breaches of contract for the purposes of deduction by set-off or
counterclaim. The root of this principle is in the ability of the employer to
recover damages:
The German expression for the obligation to perform first is Vorleistungspflicht. The moment of
payment in relation to completion gives rise to differences. In Austria the term in its Civil Code, j
1170 is "nach vollendetem Werk", after completion of the work. In Switzerland payment is upon
delivery of the work ,Code of Obligations artide 372 -1. In Germany and Italy acceptance of the
work is the appropriate time: Thei der Abnahme des Werkes" German BGB 641-1; "quando
lopera e accettata dal committente" Italian Codice Civile Article 1665 al.5..
Through the application of the principle of substantial performance; Hoenig v Isaacs (1952) 2 All ER
176 (CA.).
Bolton v Mahadeva (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1009 (CA.). But note that no claim for a quantum meruit ws
made upon which advantage could have been taken of the finding that the deficiencies could be
repaired for £174, as against a contract sum of £560 plus extras properly totalling £61.
'	 Hoerng v Isaacs (1952) 2 All E.R. 176 (CA.) per Denning U. at 181.
Hoenig v lsaacs (1952)2 All E.R. 176 (CA.) per Denning L.J. at 181.
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U• where mutual covenants go to the whole of the consideration on
both sides, they are mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other.
But where they go only to a part, where a breach may be paid in
damages, there the defendant has his remedy on his covenant, and
shall not plead it as a condition precedent.'4
The independence of the obligations and the facility of the remedy in
damages was the expression of a mechanism for construing the contract to
avoid the impact of completion as a condition precedent to payment, but
another was the examination of the extent to which the obligation to
complete had to be achieved before it could be used to defeat an obligation to
pay:
"In the one case, the performance of the warranty not being a
condition precedent to the payment of the price, the defendant, who
had received the chattel warranted, has thereby the property vested in
him indefeasibly, and is incapable of returning it back; he has all that
he stipulated for as a condition of paying the price, and therefore it was
held that he ought to pay it, and seek his remedy on the plaintiffs
contract of warranty.
In the other case, the law appears to have construed the contract as not
importing that the performance of evely portion of the work should be
a condition precedent to the payment of the stipulated price, otherwise
the least deviation would have deprived the plaintiff of the whole
price; and therefore the defendant was obliged to pay it, and recover for
any breach of contract on the other side."9
This "other case" describes the route of substantial performance for the first
element identified in Appleby v Myers, namely showing that the "work be
done"; while the third, that of imputing a new contract in the circumstances,
has been reflected in the perception of an agreement by conduct,'° or an
implication of a promise to pay arising from acceptance or waiver, or benefit
received. The second element, of showing some default on the part of the
employer, would be reflected in some act preventing a contractor prepared to
remedy defects from so attempting, which is the appropriate course before
resort to litigation to recover the lump sum."
The test of the work being done, though in some respects not in accordance
Boon v Eyre (1779) 1 Hy. BL 273, per Lord Mansfield Cj..
Mondel v Steel (1841) 8 M. & W. 858.
'° Holland, Hannen & Cubitts (Northern) Ltd. v W H. T. S. 0. (1981) 18 B.L.R. 80 at 125.
II BoltonvMahadeva (1972) 1W. L R. 1009 at 1025 (CA)
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with the contract, is linked with possession, use, or benefit of the work in
considering substantial performance. The possession taken by the employer
was a significant consideration in Dakin v Lee where the plaintiff builders
succeeded at first on their claim for the price of the work notwithstanding
failure to fulfil specification provisions on the grounds that "... where a
building or repairing contract has been substantially completed, although not
absolutely, the person who gets the benefit of the work which has been done
under the contract must pay for that benefit." 12
 The argument, that no
promise to pay could be implied from the fact that the defendant occupied
the house because the work was carried out on the employer's land and
therefore could not be rejected, being described as fallacious in circumstances
where the work had been substantially completed though not entirely in the
manner provided for in the contract. The result was the same on appeal:
"The work was finished ... I cannot think of a better word to use ... Take
a contract for a lump sum to decorate a house; the contract provides
that there shall be three coats of paint, but in one of the rooms only
two coats of paint are put on. Can anybody seriously say that under
these circumstances the building owner could go and occupy the house
and take the benefit of all the decorations which had been done in the
other rooms without paying a penny for the all the work ..."
The inference of a fresh contract to pay may arise from acceptance of the
work, but mere possession will not be determinative as illustrated by
Sumpter v Hedges,' 4 where the builder, having left unfinished his contract to
build houses, was unable to recover on his claim for his part finished work,
although the defendant carried on and completed the works.' 5
 The
abandonment was critical to the decision that nothing could be recovered
albeit:
there are cases in which, though the Plaintiff has abandoned the
performance of a contract, it is possible for him to raise the inference of
a new contract to pay for the work done on a quantum meruit from
the Defendant's having taken the benefit of that work, but in order
that that may be done, the circumstances must be such as to give an
option to the Defendant to take or not to take the benefit of the work
done. It is only where the circumstances are such as to give that option
12 U. Dakin & Co. Ltd.v Lee (1916)1 K.B. 566, Ridleyj. at p. 569.
' Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. at 578 and 579.
Sumpterv Hedges (1898)1QB.673(CA).
' Progress payments had been made at earlier stages in the works.
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that there is any evidence on which to ground the inference of a new
contract.
Where, as in the case of work done on land, the circumstances are such
as to give the Defendant no option whether he will take the benefit of
the work or not, then one must look to other facts than the mere
taking the benefit of the work in order to ground the inference of a
new contract . The mere fact that a Defendant is in possession of what
he cannot help keeping, or even has done work on it, affords no
ground for such an inference. He is not bound to keep unfinished a
building which in an incomplete state would be a nuisance on his
land."6
A different result might be possible from a restitutionaiy approach, but a
perception of benefit received or accepted to permit this cannot easily be
reconciled with the fact of ownership of the land by the owner and the
inability to reject. The availability of a restitutionary claim requires the
voluntary acceptance of a benefit which is not satisfied merely by continued
occupation by an employer of his own land.17
The requirement for substantial performance cannot be ignored for, without
other factors, the line that prevents recovery of the contract sum may
prevent a remedy in restitution.18
 This was the result in Bolt on v
Mahadeva "where on appeal it was found that a contract for a domestic
central heating and hot water system had not been substantially performed
because of a category of defects:
". such that it does not heat the house adequately and is such, further,
that fumes are given out, so as to make living rooms uncomfortable,
and if putting right of those defects is not something which can be
done by some slight amendment of the system, that I think that the
contract is not substantially performed."2°
Benefit there may have been even though the heating was up to thirty per
cent below the requirement, but the detriment clearly weighed in favour of
the conclusion as "the fumes ... made some of the living rooms (to put it at
the lowest) extremely uncomfortable and inconvenient to use".
'° Collins U. at 676.
' But. interestingly, the builder in Sumpterv Hedges did have a claim for the reasonable value of
loose materials left on site.
' B irks, An lntmduction to the Law of Restitution. p.239; Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th ed.,
p. 439 and 441.
'° (1972) 1 W.L.R. 1009.
20 Cairns, U. at 104.
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Acceptance, not constituting a discharge from liability but giving rise to a
right to payment, may, unusually, be inferred without substantial
performance. This occurred where A under a contract built a sewer but not
the pumping station that was to serve both A's and B's land; B then built a
pumping main as a temporary measure and connected up his own sewers to
the one built and thus having accepted the benefit work of A's work was
liable for payment of the contract sum less the cost of the pumping station.21
Acceptance is also reflected in waiver so as to give rise to the same result as
substantial performance:
"Even if entire performance was a condition precedent, nevertheless
the result would be the same, because I think the condition was
waived. It is always open to a party to waive a condition which is
inserted for his benefit. What amounts to a waiver depends on the
circumstances. If this was an entire contract, then, when the Plaintiff
tendered the work to the Defendant as being a fulfilment of the
contract, the Defendant could have refused to accept it until the defects
were made good, in which case he would not have been liable for the
balance of the price until they were made good. But he did not refuse
to accept the work. On the contrary he entered into possession of the
flat and used the furniture as his own, including the defective items.
That was a clear waiver of the condition precedent. Just as in a sale of
goods the buyer who accepts the goods can no longer treat a breach of
condition as giving a right to reject but only a right to damages, so also
in a contract for work and labour an employer who takes the benefit of
the work can no longer treat entire performance as a condition
precedent, but only as a term giving rise to damages. The case becomes
then an ordinary lump sum contract governed by the principles laid
down in Mondel v Steel and H. Dakin & Co. Ltd. v Lee. The employer
must, therefore, pay the contract price subject to a deduction for defects
or omissions."22
Instalments and Final payment
Agreement or custom generally give rise to payment by instalments. Whilst
the entire contract a contract is an important starting point, and impacts on
the release of retentions, detailed conditions in the standard forms of contract
21 Tannenbaum Meadows Ltd. v Vight Winston Ltd. (1965) 49 D.L.R. (2d) 386, Ontano Court of
Appeal. A's conduct might have amounted to a repudiation but was not accepted.
22 Hoenigvlsaacs(1952)2A11 ER. 176 (CA), per Lord Denning. M.R.at 181.
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make provision for progress payments, and a contract which gives the
contractor an enforceable right to instalments cannot be an entire contract to
that extent because the contractor has the right to call for fulfilment of the
employer's obligation to pay before he has completed his own promise.
The right to payment by instalments does not in all cases require express
provision before it may be implied, for a man who contracts to do a long
costly piece of work does not contract, unless he expressly says so, that he will
do all the work, standing out of pocket until he is paid at the end. He is
entitled to say . there is an understanding all along that you are to give me
from time to time at reasonable times payments for work done."24
Under AFNOR 91 a maître d'oeuvre is provided for, who is entrusted by the
employer with the task of directing the work, as well as acting in relation to
reception and payment for the work. 25
 The entitlement of the contractor to
payments stipulated by the contract is expressed as on the discharge of his
obligations7 and instalments are to be paid within 30 days of the submission
of his progress report, état de situation. This report has to show the work
done from commencement valued under the terms of the contract, 27 and any
additional work orders, distinguishing where applicable work performed by
sub-contractors. 28
 Failure to produce the report at the due time entitles the
employer to ascertain the work performed at the contractor's expense. The
maître d'oeuvre has to verify it, draw up a provisional account and a
certificate for the difference between that account and sums previously
certified, apply any deduction for work done at the contractor's expense, and
23 Terty v Duntze (1878) Hudsons Building Cases, 4th ed. Vol.2,389.
24 The Tergeste (1903) p.256 at page 34, Phillimore J
. 
Under the Swiss Code of Obligations, Article 372
al. 2, where work is to be delivered in parts and remuneration has been agreed for each of the parts it
is payable at the time of deliveiy. Even where no pnce was agreed a shipwright who had agreed to
carly out a thorough repair on a ship was held entitled to demand payment for part of the work he
had carried out, Roberts v Havelock (1832) 3 B & M. 404.
25 AFNOR 91 article 1.4.15.
Article 18.1, - de !'observation par I'entmpreneur de sos obligations.
27 Artide 17.1. The report is to be prepared monthly or otherwise as specified. It has to reach the
maître d'oeuvre on the date provided for orwithin ten days of the beginning of the month.
28 It also has to show materials on site or in the workshops of the contractor for which payment
prcsion has been made, the reimbursement of advance payments, and the composition of the
performance bond retention funk articles 17.1.2 to 5. The application of price adjustment formula
may be dealt with in a separate document, article 17.1.6. There are provisions for valuing work
ottlered by injunction and urgent work, and reference to any special provisions for valuing off-site
materials.
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send them to the contractor29
Except for the onus on the contractor to produce the report the mechanism is
that followed in JCT 80,° and neither interim verification in AFNOR 91 nor
certification in JCT 80 are an expression of finality.3'
The final accounting under AFNOR 91 is linked to reception for within 120
days of it the contractor must send the final statement of what he considers
due.32 The maître d'oeuvre must draw up the final account within 60 days of
receipt and send it to the contractor who has 30 days to comment, in default
of which he is deemed to have accepted it, and the employer has 40 days to
accept or reject those comments in default of which he is deemed to have
accepted them. 33 Payment on the final account is due 30 days after the
contractor's notification, whether comments are made or not, but where
there is disagreement any sum resulting from the determination of it is due
within 20 days. Accordingly the achievement of reception is in these terms
the equivalent of substantial completion under English law for the final
payment due does not include the retention.35
Acceptance, Approval and certification
The reference to acceptance in relation to payment of the price requires a
view of approval. The principle that an acceptance of the work, in the
absence of a provision making it binding on the employer, will not prevent
an action for damages is relevant to the recovery of payment. This
obsevation appears equally applicable to approvals. The less ready the court
to infer that approval shuts out the subsequent ability to rely on the contract
obligations to found recovery of damages, the less ready to conclude that
approvals constitute conditions precedent to payment. The converse is that
29 Articles 17.4.1.1 to 6. Upon disagreement by the contractor another certificate is to be issue within
ten days if the point is accepted.
JCT 80 clauses 30.1 to .4.
AFNOR 91 article 17.4.1.1: ... cette véni'Ication n'a qu'un caractère provisoire et ne peuf etre
oppesee a une vézifIcation definitive des mémoires. [this verification is only provisional and
cannot be used to counter the definitive verifification of accounts.] This is to be compared with JCT
80 clause 30.10 and the final accounting provisions in clause 30.6.
32 Article 175.1, unless some other period is stipulated.
" Articles 175.1 to .3 and 17.6.1 to .4.
Articles 18.4.1 to .4.
Article 18.4.1: "... amputé de Ia retenue de garantle ..7
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the more an approval is a condition precedent the more it precludes suit.
However, it is at this point that the impact of the independence of the
approver or certifier intervenes. Whilst 19th century dictum, that In
modem times the doctrine of conditions precedent has been considerably
relaxed, and there is no disposition in the courts to consider stipulations in
that light unless the terms of the contract clearly require it", was applied to
decisions of employers themselves and their employees or agents, it has not
much governed the development of law in regard to such stipulations in
building contracts in the case of certification, although it still holds good that
the courts are reluctant to regard the satisfaction of a party to be binding if it
can be avoided.37
Where the approval is of the employer himself,38
 the onerous nature of the
condition is treated with caution, so that disapproval must be honest and
reasonable.39
 The result is that a person is more likely to be held bound by his
personal approval than that of a third party, particularly a person owing him
no duty at all.4°
In the majority of building contracts in England, and in the FIDIC form, work
is required to the satisfaction of an architect or engineer Two separate points
ordinarily arise. First whether the builder must obtain the necessary
approval before he can claim payment and second whether the employer is
bound once the stipulated approval is given. These are not the exact
converse,41
 as seen in JCT 80 where a certificate is required for interim
payment but is not binding even without the overriding arbitration clause.
There are three avenues to obtaining payment where the satisfaction of a
38 Dallman v King (1874)4 Bing. N.C. 105, per Vaughan J., at 110.
Hudson's Building and Civil Engineering Contracts, 10th Edition.
Or his agent, where he is the true agent, Minster Trust Ltd. v Trapps Tractors Ltd. (1954) 1 WL.R. 963;
and not acting in the independent manner required of an engineer or architect as referred to in
Sutcliffe v Thrackrah (1974 ) A.C. 727 (H.L.).
For the reason that the contractor is in a difficult position if the employer contraly to the premise
that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, can assert disapproval and therefore failure to
complete to deny payment.
40 Billyack v Leyland Construction Co. Ltd. (1968) 1 W.L.R. 471.
They are not converse as the employer may be able to allege defective work, either because the
need to obtain satisfaction or approval is not a condition at all and is subordinate to the obligation to
perform in accordance with the contract, or, because if it is a condition it is treated as an added
protection.
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third party is involved. First obtaining the satisfaction, conformity in other
respects with the contract being subordinated to that and not a condition,:
second, obtaining the satisfaction and conforming to the contract where both
are conditions: and third carrying out the contract work as specified with the
satisfaction not being a condition at all or with the employer being unable to
rely on the absence of the expression satisfaction to deny payment. 42
 Only in
the third case can there be recovery without the specified satisfaction.
Whether and to what extent the employer is bound will depend on whether
the certification or approval is overriding for the event, or is not a condition
at all, or is seen as an added protection, and the event of payment may be
treated as independent. This is well illustrated in Billyack v Leyland
Construction where a contractor sold a house in the course of construction
and agreed to "build and complete in a workmanlike manner and in
accordance with the specification", which provided that "excavation,
concreting ... will be carried out in accordance with by-laws of the local
authority and to their satisfaction". By the agreement the second half of
purchase price was payable "on the issue of the certificate of habitation by the
local authority which certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the
completion of the said dwelling house". The foundations were not properly
constructed and they infringed the by-laws, and underpinning was required.
When sued, the builder argued first that the certificate was an independent
reason why the purchaser was barred from claiming second, that the
provision for satisfaction in the specification overrode the obligation to
comply with the by-laws; and third that the express requirement to comply
with the by-laws negatived any implied term as to the design or suitability of
the foundations. It was held that the certificate of the local authority was
designated to regulate payment, and not as to the quality of the work; that the
provision for the local authority's satisfaction was an added protection for the
purchaser and did not override the express obligation as to workmanship;
and that there was nothing in the contract inconsistent with the threefold
implied undertakings as to good workmanship, suitable materials and fitness
for purpose.
42 For example in the case of some impediment placed in the way by the employer himself. as in
Creudace v London Bomugh of Lambeth (1986) 33 B.L.R. 20, where the want of appointment of than
architect resulted the inability to rely on the absence of certification.
Billyackv Leyland Construction Co. Ltd. (1968) 1 W.L.R. 471.
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The requirement for a certificate upon which payment is due is an ordinaty
feature of the standard forms, 44 and although obtaining the certificate is
fundamental to the right to payment arbitration is available to resolve
disputes as to certification. Certification for interim payment is frequently
dissociated from an expression of satisfaction, 45 notwithstanding that it may
be for the total value of the work properly executed" in the opinion of the
architect. The mechanism for arrival at the appropriate values does not
represent any gulf between the process in England or France, and in principle
it should only be expressions of opinion by the architect or engineer if and
where they impose finality that should cause concern, but even here the
ability to challenge is open through arbitration.
2	 Price Ieductkxi
The independence and preservation of the right of the employer under
English law to bring an action in damages for breach of contractual
obligation, from the right of the contractor to recover payment is an
important aspect. It releases what would otherwise be a constraint of the
achievement of total completion, and leaves the contract obligations extant
for recourse to them whether in respect of patent defects that do not affect the
ability to recover payment of the price, or in the event of latent defects. The
importance for comparative purposes is also that such ability survives both
completion and payment of the price in full or even under a judgment for
the price, save where under the particular contract terms approval or
certification negates it. The achievement of reception in contrast by virtue of
its doctrine in civil law removes the right to sue for damages for breach of
the contract obligations, bringing to an end both the contractor's obligations
as to performance as well as liability in damages for breach of them. After
reception it is the garan tie that is fundamental to recovery, but the
principles of price reduction and refusal to perform give scope for relief for
" As inJCr 80, dause 30.1.1.1: The Architect ... shall ... issue Interim Certificates stating the amount
due to the Contractor from the Employer and the Contractor shall be entitle to payment therefor
within 14 days from the date of issue of each Interim Cerificate."
As provided in JCT 80, clause 30.2.1.1, whereas clause 30.10 provides that " ... no certificate of the
Axchited ... shall of itself be conclusive evidence that any works, materials or goods to which it relates
are in accordance with this Contract", save as to the fInal certificate.
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deficient performance.
In England where the buyer has not paid the price he may refuse to accept the
goods or pay for them. Under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 he can reject
defective goods if the defect is a breach of a condition provided he has not
accepted them, On rejection he is entitled to the return of the price if paid.
Hence the difficulty of application of this principle to building contracts.
Whilst an effect of reception in civil law is to entitle the contractor to
payment, there is a liability for defects governed by special rules in that whilst
the presence of latent defects in the subject matter of a sale does not
constitute default giving rise to damages a choice of remedies is made
available: either price reduction or rédhibition . The prima facie ability at
common law to recover as damages the difference in value of defective work
and its value as it should have been under the contract, or the cost of putting
them in that condition is contrasted with the liability in civil law derived
from the Roman actiones redhibitoria and quanti minoris. This second is
the price reduction where comparison is sought with English principles
governing the right to deduct damages from the price, 46 in that the right to
damages, being preserved, is available, subject to express exclusion, to be set
off against the price.47
In French law the obligation to pay the price may disappear upon a claim for
the remedy of the action rédhibitoire which involves returning the subject
matter or its equivalent, hence the practical difficulty of its use in building
contracts. The purchaser though has at his disposal the two actions,
rédhibitoire, and action estimatoire for price reduction, and he may even
after he has brought one of them institute the other provided there has not
been a ruling on his claim by a decision made in a judgment, and provided
the vendor has not accepted it. 48 The choice is jealously guarded and the
purchaser has the freedom to choose his option without having his
G H Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, A Comparative Account. Though the amount
available for deduction on this basis is damages, which may not be calculated on the same basis as
that for price reduction.
Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd. v Modern Engineeting (Bristol) Ltd. (1974) A.C. 689 (H.L.). For sale of
goods section 53(1) (a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 applies.
Civ.2, 11th July 1974, Bull. civ. 11,231.
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intervening attempts to remedy the defect taken into account.49
Price reduction was the subject of the Roman actio quanti minori and for
example, where Articles 1641 and 1643 apply in the case of sale, 5° Article 1644
enables the purchaser to achieve this result through the medium of the
adjudication of experts It differs from damages and is based on
restitutionary principles, and although the process of the reduction in French
law has been described as one of setting off damages against the price, 52
 this
does not reflect its true nature.
A claim under civil law may be one to have the price reduced in the
proportion which the actual value bears to the value which it would have
had if not defective. It is not a claim for loss of the bargain although the
entitlement to such damages exists if there was an express warranty or
fraudulent concealment. Nor is it right to view the facility in English law for
setting off damages as the only mechanism for comparison, when
considering the building contract. Certainly a set-off is a defence, TM
 and the
cross-claim for damages for breach may be used "as a shield, not as a sword",
but there is a special rule affecting building contracts that reflects and
alleviates the difficulties of rejection:
"The principle is that when the buyer of the goods or the person for
whom the work has been done is sued by the seller or contractor for
the price
° Civ. 3, 17th Februaiy 1988, Bull. civ. 111,38.
° The seller's guarantee liability against hidden defects which render the subject unsuitable for the
use for which it is intended, and the liability despite the seller not knowing of them himself unless he
had stipulated that he would not be under any such liability (with the ability to exclude or limit
liability substantially restricted by presumption of knowledge of the vendeurprofessionel).
Artide 1644: 
'Vans !e cas des a,fides 1641 et 1643, I'acheteur a le chohc de rendrn Ia chose et de sefaize restituer Ie pii ou de ganler la chose et de de se faire rendie une partie du pth. telle qu'eIle
sera arbitrée par epezfs." [ Within the circumstances of Articles 1641 and 1643, the purchaser has
the choice of restoring the thing and recovering the price, or of keeping it and receiving back part of
the price, such part to be adjudicated by experts.] It has been held however that where there is a
difficulty of operation resulting fmm a latent defect which only detracts temporarily from the
purchaser's use of a property sold, there is no justification for the vendor to suffer a price reduction,
Civ. 3,25th Januazy 1989, D. 1990, 100, note Dagorne-Labbe.
52 Mazeaud, Lecons 111,2 no. 947.
As does Treitel, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Volume VI!, Ch. 16, Remedies for
Breach of Contract,. 16 - 68, "Common law systems do not recognise the principle of price-reduction
for defects in goods (as opposed to damages which can be set off against the price)."
' Hanak v Green (1958) 2 Q.B. 9 (CA). This may include a set-off of mutual debts and equitable set-
off where the matter relied on by a defendant would formarfy have given rise to injunctive relie(
against the plaintiff's daim,. namely to prevent him from relying on one covenant without taking
account of the defendant's rights under anothei an equity that "impeached the title to the legal
demand', Rawson v Samuel (1841) Cr. & Ph. 161, Lord Cottenham LC. at 179.
Stooke v Taylor (1880)5 Q.B.D. 569, Cockbum C.J. at 575.
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"it is competent for the defendant ... not to set off, by a proceeding
in the nature of a cross action, the amount of damages which he
has sustained by breach of the contract, but simply to defend
himself by shewing how much less the subject matter of the action
was worth, by reason of the breach of contract;"56 ."
While it is said that common law systems do not recognise the principle of
price reduction for defects as opposed to damages that can be set off against
the price, 58
 this is not so in respect of the building contract. It is a true
abatement which the common law gives as an alternative to the setting of of
a cross claim for damages:
"This is a remedy which the common law provides for breaches of
warranty in contracts for sale of goods and for work and labour. It is
restricted to contracts of these types. It is available as of right to a party
to such a contract. It does not lie within the discretion of the court to
withhold it. It is independent of the doctrine of" equitable set-off"
developed by the Court of Chancery to afford similar relief in
appropriate cases to parties to other types of contracts ... That it was no
mere procedural rule designed to avoid circuity of action but a
substantive defence at common law was the very point decide in
Mondel v Steel
The liability for price reduction in France is independent of fault and is not
assessed by reference to the expectation interest of the purchaser on which
damages would be assessed. Nor is it as a principle necessarily a matter of
assessing the cost of remedial work Although the principle of assessment
under this Article is one of preventing enrichment of the vendor rather than
compensating the purchaser for not having received what he bargained for,
Mondel v Steel (1841) 8 M. & W. 858. The passage cited is at 871-872.
Modem Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. v Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd. (1974) AC. 689, Lord Diplock at 717:"
a building contract is an entire contract for the sale of goods and work and labour for a lump sum
price payable by instalments as the goods are elivered and the work is done. Since the turn of the
nineteenth century at least ... there has been a principle of law which is applicable to contracts of this
type ... That principle is stated authontively in the judgment of Parke B. in Mondel v Steel (1841)
who described it as "established by that date. In so far as it applies to contracts for the sale of goods
it has been incorporated in section 53 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893; in so far as it applies to contracts
for work and labour it rests upon the common law. The principle is that when the buyer of the goods
or the person for whom the work has beeen done is sued by the seller or contractor for the price.";
adding O in the words of section 53 (1) (a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the buyer may "Set
upagainst the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price."", now Sale of
Goods Act 1979.
G.l-l. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract. Treitel pOintS to specific performance of contracts for
the sale of land with compensation, being an abatement of price, as the nearest analogous principle,
but the principle deriving (mm Mondet v Steel would seem not to have been considered.
Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. v Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd. (1974) A.C. 689, Lord Diplock at 717.
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the sale of newly Constructed premises is likely to involve resort to Article
164560
 and the presumed knowledge of the vendeur professionel . The
vendor of a building to be constructed is not liable for the action estimitoire
In respect of patent or latent defects under Articles 1642-1 or 1646-1 where he
has agreed to the repair of such defects, and the achievement of reception
will negate the ability to bring any such claim in respect of the contract for
work and labour. In England:
"It is . open to the parties to a contract to exclude by express agreement
a remedy for its breach which would otherwise arise by operation of
law ... But in construing such a contract one starts with the
presumption that neither party intends to abandon any remedies for
its breach arising by operation of law, and clear express words must be
used in order to rebut this presumption."6'
3	 Refusal to Perkwin
In France it is not only the mechanism of price reduction that impacts on
payment. The defence of refusal to perform, exception d'inexécution
provides an effect of which extends beyond the field of termination and into
that of payment. The distinction in England between entire and independent
obligations does not have a doctrinal counterpart but its equivalent effect is
achieved by the categorisation of obligations that are or are not required to be
performed in advance of another. Where required as in the performance of a
contrat de Iouage d'ouvrage then failure will give rise to the ability to rely on
the exceptio non adimpleti con tract us 62 and partial or defective performance
would be such a failure.
An example of this civil law application from German law is of a builder
who fails to complete the work because he runs out of money, being the same
circumstance as in Sumpter v Hedges . The same result applies and he
cannot recover the price, for the builder is bound to perform in advance of
payment, which becomes due on acceptance,'3 but the remedy is temporary in
° Artide 1645: "SI Jo vendeur connaissait les vices de la chose, il est tenu. outie La restitution du przx
qui1 en a mç. de tous los dommages et interéts envet l'acheteur [If the vendor knew of defects in
the subject matter, he is liable ot the purchaser for all damages, in addition to the restitution of the
price.l
Modem Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. v Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd. (1974) A.C. 689, Lord Diplock at 717.
U Mazeaud,, Leçons III 2 no. 1355.
German BGB ii 641.
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that the refusal to pay will be upheld until cure of the defect, a waiting
position."
The stipulation for instalments reduces the impact of the rule but the
principle is seen in the terms of AFNOR 91, that it is upon the discharge of
his obligations that the contractor becomes entitled to demand the payments
provided for in the contract terms and at the specified intervals. 65
 The point
is illustrated in respect of non-payment, for in France failure by an employer
to perform a requirement for payment of an instalment would under the
principle make available to the contractor the defence of refusal to perform
further, subject to the restraints that it may be invoked only in good faith and
where the failure is regarded as sufficiently serious.6°
In England the approach of the independence of the obligation on the
employer to pay from the obligation of the contractor to complete leads to the
analysis of the obligations by reference to repudiation, so that although
contract terms may give express rights on non-payment there is no general
right of the contractor to suspend work if the employer is in breach of his
payment obligation.67 Unless there is a breach of condition or a fundamental
breach by a party, the other is not discharged from his obligation to perform,
and an employer's failure to pay an instalment will not ordinarily be
sufficient to amount to a repudiation.68
Seen through the standard forms, AFNOR 91 modifies the civil law principle
in the terms dealing with extension of time resulting from delay attributable
to the employer, with a prohibition on the contractor from suspending the
work for non-payment without a formal notice at least fifteen days in
advance, but rendering the employer liable for the consequences of any
interruption resulting from his failure to discharge his obligations and the
Mazeaud, Leçcons II, 1 no. 1132.
65 Article 18.1: - Dmits aux Palernents. De l'observation par lentrnpreneur e sos obligations résulte
pour Jul le dmit d'exiger los paienients stipules a son inairhé et ce dans les conditions et aw..
epoques fàées par ce1ui-d." [The observation L' the contractor of his obligations has the result of
entitling him to demand the payments stipulated in the contract at the intervals pmvided for them.]
The exceptio was sought to be iritreduced by the contractors in the Court of Appeal in the
Eurotunnel case, as considered under Specific Performance.
67 Lubenham Fidelities & Investments Co. Ltd. v South Pembmkeshire District Council (1986) 33
B.L.R. 39 (CA), at 70.
66 Mersey Steel & lmn Co. Ltd. v Naylor Benzon & Co. (1884) 9 App. Cas. 434 (I-iL.).
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effects such failure might have on the performance of work 69
 There is also
express provision for interest on overdue payments.'° JCT 80, whilst leaving
open the route of acceptance of repudiation, 7' deals with the matter of non
payment of certificates as a ground for determination by the contractor of his
employment after notice 7
 FIDIC addresses such default of the employer in
both ways by entitling the contractor to terminate, or to suspend work or
reduce the rate of work with the financial consequences borne by the
employer.73
The EC Discussion Paper identifies acceptance as "of fundamental
importance with regard to the construction process", but to English eyes the
questions raised as to its form, timing and as to reservations are swept into
the one question of whether on the face of it the contractor has done the job.
In this respect the flexibility of the common law, the lack of the guarantee
obligation, and the continuance of the ability to pursue the remedy of
damages after completion and despite payment reduce the "fundamental
importance" to a question of fact. Conversely, a requirement for the
introduction of the guarantee obligation as a harmonising measure would
not only require answers to such questions, but, critically, involve analysis of
its relationship with the action for damages. If in replacement of such action,
then the involvement of the employer in the act of acceptance would require
him to have the advice of architects and engineers for his own protection,
and not opinions manifested in any quasi-arbitral manner74
AFNOR 91, article 7.5.2; Prolongation resulting from Employer's Delays. 73.2.1 Delay in Payment
The contractor may not in any circumstances suspend work on account of default in payment
without having given at least 15 days' notice in advance, by registered letter to the employer and the
mattre d'ceuvre. The employer shall be liable for the consequences of all interruption resulting
from any failure to abide by his obligations, and in particular any repercussions which it might have
on the execution of work of others.
70 AFNOR 91, artcle 18.7.
' JCT 80, clause 28.1: "Without prejuice to any other rights and remedies which the contractor may
possess... .
72 JCT8O,clause28.1.1.
FIDIC, clauses 69.1 and 69.4.
".. the system could not have been allowed to exist, had it not been that it has been found that
persons in the position of engineers or architects are able to maintain, and do maintain, a fair and
judicial view with reganl to the rights of the parties" per Lord Alverstone, Hickman v Roberts (1913)
AC. 229 at 234. J
. 
Barber, Rules of Conduct for the Engineer. (1988) 5 I.C.L.R. 290, including a section,
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1	 Third Party BeifiIs
Part of the GAIPEC report related to the transfer of rights to successive
owners, with the proposal of automatic transfer, and the Discussion Paper
raises questions as to the extent to which the transfer of liability proceedings
to successive third parties should be restricted, all of which require thought
for their potential implementation and impact. How far off though does
English law stand at present in respect of benefits of non-contracting parties
and is its proposed direction likely to be viable?'
Whilst the normal intention of contracting parties is that the rights and
obligations to which the contract gives rise should be theirs alone, discharge
of the liability may be required by rendering performance to a third party.
This though is performance of an obligation not owed to the third party and
is distinct from an attempt to contract in such a way that the third party who
is not a party to the contract is entitled to receive the performance and to
require it in his own name and in default of its performance.
The concept of contracts for the benefit of third parties has for a long time
attracted debate because of the practical need to give effect to such benefits,
notwithstanding difficulties perceived in recognising the concept as a legal
institution. The fact of sub-contracting raised in the EC Discussion Paper as a
problem area to be addressed, highlights the conflict between the structure of
contractual relationships against a desire to permit benefits to extend beyond
the parties to them.
It may well be that contract, as seen through an English common lawyer's
Law Commission. Consultation Paper No. 121, completed on 23rd Oct. 1991, Privity of Contract:
Contrads for the Benefit of Third Parties.
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eyes, is not the appropriate or sole medium through which to attempt to
meet the need, or by which to provide mechanisms for enforcement.2
Judicial apphcations which have utilised contract to achieve such an end
have applied a desire to achieve an individually merited result. In that light,
they do not give good ground for the criticism of contract, or of the sphere in
which contract properly operates. Rather they point the way towards either
the need for some further and specific exceptions from the confines of
contract, or the need to develop existing mechanisms outside those confines.
The constraints on contract in this area, as seen in England, may be of such
general benefit to the regulation of commercial affairs as not to warrant the
criticism of them as unjustified, and as to warrant the provision of specific
alternative means for overcoming injustices or advancing redress in
particular areas.
It was by specific exception that both Roman law, and civil law jurisdictions
in recent times, proceeded. Contrary to the use by English lawyers of the
phrase jus quaesitum tertlo to suggest a Roman law heritage of rights of
third parties under contracts to which the common law has obtusely closed
its eyes, Roman law considered that there was no independent right in a
third party who was a stranger to a contract. 3 That was the rule.
Subsequently, it is true, exceptions were admitted, but they were only by way
of exception so as to enhance, not diminish, the premise.
Zweigert and KOtz cite one of those exceptions, namely the case of a gift made
on terms that the donee was to do something for a third party where the
third party was given an actio utilis against the donee. However, the
exception has less to do with a derogation from the basic rule of contract than
with the rules as to gifts. 4 The actio utilis was not thought of in terms of
2 Zweigert & Kötz, An intmduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed. where it is suggested that the obstacle
to recognitIon is "a rather dimensional and unabstract way of looking at the pmblem", but that is to
assume that contract should be taken to be the boundaiy within which the facility for third parties to
receive the benefit of an intention to beneilt them should be constrained.
Ulpiar Digest 45, 1,38, 17.
As with a contract by which one person bound himself to give a thing to another so with the gift of a
thing. Neither made the other the owner. A further step was necessary namely the handing over, the
traditlo, implying first that it was the real and absolute owner who transfened it and second that he
placed the new preprietor in actual possession of it. Gifts in consideration of death represented an
exception ( mortis causa donatlo) where death occuned without any traditlo. Equally so did a gift by
legacy. It is thus unsurprising that where the donor was alive the mechanism by which to perfect the
gift should have been the actio utilis by way of addition to the niles as to gifts, and not otherwise.
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contract. If A deposited property with B or lent it to him on terms that he
was to redeliver it to C)
 then C had an actio utilis against B. 5 Whilst this
might appear more like contract than trust there was no attempt made to rest
it on any principle of contract law; 6 "It has been shown that this had nothing
to do with contract, but was a condition for the recoveiy of property unjustly
detained. It looks more like trust than contract, but is in fact no more than a
sporadic decision on general grounds of equity." 1 It remained true that in
principle a third party could not acquire rights under a contract, although the
need for specific exceptions had arisen in Roman times, 8 just as it has done
subsequently. These relate to particular areas of difficulty, dealt with
Individually as they arise, as indeed has been done in France.9
Debate on English law ordinarily starts with the observations in Dunlop v
Seifridge as to fundamental principles:
"One is that only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it.
Our law knows nothing of a ius quaesitum tertia arising by way of
contract. Such a right may be conferred by way of property, as, for
example, under a trust but it cannot be conferred on a stranger to a
contract as a right to enforce the contract in personam"°
Notwithstanding argument as to the source of the restriction, 11 the general
rule has been thought to include the doctrines of both privity and of
Digests, 3.42.8.1, from Diodetian. The text refers to propter aequitatis rationem. It was this that was
invoked in the exception referred to above where the actio utiis was attached to the voluntaty gift
juxta donato,is voluntatem.
Although the Law Commission refer to it in this context.
Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law - A Comparison in Outline. The other
Instance cited in Zweigert and Kötz as the Roman law recognition of contracts for the benefit of third
parties is in dispositions from "one member of a family to another member or to a trustee with the
direction that the transferee, possibly on the death of the transferor, transmits the property to third
parties, normally descendants in need of support". Pethaps what was in mind was the adjudicatlo
in the division of family estates where the entirety of nghts passed in succession to the persona of
another. This, under the law of succession was by fictitious sale to a familiae emptor who was the
heir, or who was, after the death, to distribute the property according to the wishes expressed in the
testaments. The testator had to disinherit eveiyone by name who had a natural claim on his
property, and there had to be an heir who was to succeed to the persona of the testator so as to
continue the testators legal existence. One of the rules applicable on acceptance of the position of
heir so as to enable him to receive the property was to render him bound to give effect to the
dispositions of the testator. This was the trust (fidei-conzmissa) binding on the heir.
Another exception under Roman law was where a pledgee had sold the pledge on terms that the
debtor was to have the right to repurchase it for the amount of the debt, Digests 13.7.13 proemium.
The Code imported the exception by way of gift to the premise that agreements bind only the patties
to them. Life assurance contracts were a particular exception, and the special area of sub-
contractors is considered under Features of Subcontracting in France.
Dunlop Pneumatic lyre C. Ltd. v Selfridge & Co. Ltd. (1915) A.C. 847, Viscount 1-laldane at 853.
" Frequently taken to have been established by Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B. & S. 393, freitel, The
Law of Contract, 8th Ed. 1991; but a contrazy view was expressed by Lord Denning in Drive Yourself
I-lire Co. (London) Ltd. v Strutt (1954) 1 Q.B. 250.
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consideration. The Law Commission included third party rights in its
programme for the codification of the law of contract, and felt that reform of
privity could not be undertaken usefully without reform of the doctrine of
consideration.' 2
 Recently though," it has been expressed that reform of the
third party rule,' 4
 being concerned with who can enforce contracts, could be
undertaken without such a reassessment, and without prejudicing the rule
that consideration must move from the promisee."
The essence of the current proposals of the Law Commission is, by
legislation, "to allow actions by third parties when to do so gives effect to the
intentions of the parties." Criticism of the rule over the years has come
from academics,' 7
 and the Law Commission's former proposals, 18
 that when a
contract by its express terms purports to confer a benefit directly on a third
party he should be able to enforce it in his own name, were cited with
approval in Beswick v Beswick ." The case for reform is made on the
grounds that the third party rule is a comparatively modern development of
which the judicial basis is obscure, 2° that the present law causes hardships and
defeats the intentions of parties who wish to benefit a third party; and that
exceptions to the rule have been created on an ad hoc basis without thought
12 The production of a code of contract was suspended 8th Annual Report 1972-3, Law Comm. No. 58.
13 Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 121, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third
Parties.
'4 A person cannot enforce a right under a contract to which he is not a party.
Viscount Haldane's speech in Dunlop v Selfridge continued from the above: "... A second principle
is that if a person with whom a contract not under seal has been made is to be able to enforce it
consideration must have been given by him to the promisor or to some other person at the
promisor's request," so Identifying the distinction between the privily rule and that of consideration;
supported by PS. Atiyah, Consideration in Contracts: A Fundamental Restatement, (1971).
Consultation Paper No. 121, para. 1.5.
Professor A. L Corbm, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties. (1930) 46 L.Q.R. 12; M.P. Furmston,
Return to Dunlop v Selfridge? (1960) 23 M.L.R. 373; R. Plannigan, Privily - the End of art Era (Error).
(1987) 103 L.Q.R. 564 Bayleveld & Bmwriswood, Pnvity, fransMty and Rationality (1991) 54 M.L.R. 48.
(1937) Command Paper No. 5449.
Beswick v Beswick (1%8) AC. 58, at 72 per Lord Reid who hoped that all the cases which "stand
guard over this unjust rule" might be reviewed.
20 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B. & S. 393 in fact did not really establish a rule. It proceeded on an
admission of an extant rule. A's argument was: "now settled that an action for breach of contract
must be brought by the person from whom the consideration moved." On Is argument that
general rule was admitted, but that there was an exception, namely contracts made by parents from
purpose of providing for children. Wightman J
. 
- "it is now established that no stranger to the
considerations can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit." Crompton J
. 
- "The
modern cases have in effect,. overruled the old decisions, they show that consideration must move
from the party entitled to sue upon the contract." "It would be a monstrous proposition to say that a
person was a party to the contract for the purpose of suing on it for his oi advantage, and not a
party to it for the purpose of being sued." The basis on which T lost in Tweddle v Atkinson was that
the agreement sued on was post nuptial and natural love and affection did not support
consideration, so that the agreement sued on was without consideration.
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for the overall development of the law2'
How though would the proposals impact on the building world, and would
they assist harmonisation? The effect would be to create general rights
available to third parties very much akin to rights in tort which were created
in Dutton,22 and Anns,23 and which have been curtailed. 24
 Such a step may be
neither commercially desirable nor justified by actual or potential injustice,
and would appear to extend beyond the needs identified by GAIPEC or the
end of harmonisation.
Exceptions to the rule against prMty do not form a coherent body of law, but
they may be workable; and those based on the common law and equity are
capable of being adapted to suit the needs of justice. Material exceptions to
the rule already extant in the building field are not considered in the
Consultation Paper. In the construction industry, there are well established
commercial practices based on the rule of pnvity and any change would
produce complications leading to more frequent litigation, as well as a
likelihood of contracting out. The Commission's acknowledgement and
acceptance of the ability to contract out emasculates argument as to a need for
overall change; points towards a more targeted approach where necessary;
and, contrary to its aim, sets out a convincing case for retaining the present
law25
 The implementation of any change in the rule would lead to a number
of structural difficulties which do not yet appear to have been addressed.
The Consultation Paper touches on the subject of construction but does not
consider the scope of the contractual arrangements, nor does it reflect the
reasons why particular modes of contracting are adopted. These are not
peculiar to England. Construction work often involves financial risks which
exceed the resources of the participants; most contractors have an annual
21 The previous Law Revision Committee's report, and judicial comment that reform should come
from the legislatureLl937) Cmnd. 5449; Midland Siicones Ltd. v Scruttons Ltd. (1%2) A.C. 446, at 467-
8, per Viscount Simonds; but more recently in Woodar Investment Developments Ltd. v Wimpey
Construction (UK) Ltd. (1980) 1 W.L.R. 277 Lord Salmon at p. 291 hoped that the House of Lords
would reconsider the law concerning damages for loss suffered by third parties, unless altered l
statute.
Dutton v Bognor Regis U.D.C. (1972) 1 Q.B. 373 (CA).
23 Anns v London Borough of Merton (1979)A.C. 728 (H.L.),
24 By Murphy v Brentwood D.C. (1991) 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.).
25 Particularly paragraph 4.3 of the Consultation Papet
358
turnover which greatly exceeds their financial assets, and few if any firms of
architects or engineers could individually meet the claims which are
regularly brought against them. The factor which makes it possible for the
industiy to function in the way that it does is a careful structuring of
liabilities, now based exclusively on the law of contract. Casting aside the
rule of privity would have a serious effect on this structure, the precise
nature of which is difficult to predict.
The Consultation Paper correctly observes that the numerous contracts
typically involved in construction projects are currently regarded as
enforceable by and against only the parties to the contract. The chain of
liability was a strong policy ground in the consideration of implied
warranties. 26
 Undoubtedly there was an attempt to apply the law of tort as an
exception to the privity rule, but the process, which took some 20 years to
work through the courts has substantially ground to a halt. 27
 As the law
currently stands, although most of the participants in the construction
industly would be held to owe duties of care in tort, such duty would not
cover economic loss as now understood, with the result that this type of loss
may now be claimed only between parties to a contract.
The recent up-surge in use of the express collateral warranties which seems
to be looked on in the Consultation Paper with disfavour, is a direct reaction
to the demise of the law of tort, but they are not new. They are a useful, and
now inevitable, device for creating and regulating liabilities. They introduce
certainty where the law of tort involved doubt, and are to be preferred to the
recommended solution of a general alteration to the law of privity, which
would not diminish demand for them. Their adaptation would provide the
appropriate mechanism to meet the guarantee proposals of GAIPEC, if
implemented.
Collateral warranties were developed in the construction industry after
Gloucestershire v Richardson 28 In the subsequent development of standard
28 Young & Marten Ltd. v McM anus Childs Ltd. (1%9) 1 A.C. 454 (1-LI.).
2? As considered under Fault, Tort and Economic Loss, The English Experience.
28 Gloucestershire County Council v Richardson (1969) 1 A.C. 480 (H.L), They had been suggested in
argument in the Court of Appeal, (1%7) 3 All E.R. 458 (CA), by Russell U..
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forms of warranty, mostly issued by the RIBA/JCT, 29 consideration has been
given to the precise obligation to be undertaken, and warranties have worked
well in practice. There are many disputes as to breaches and their extent; but
there are no reported cases in which the meaning of the obligation under the
warranty has been disputed. Greater Nottingham v Cementation 3° shows a
warranty being held to represent the limit of the obligation undertaken by
the warrantor. If the warrantee can nevertheless claim the right to enforce
some other contract made by the warrantor, the system becomes uncertain or
even breaks down.
There has been a rapid redevelopment of interest in collateral warranties as a
means of replacing or substituting the uncertainty of rights in torts, and all
sides of the industry seized upon the opportunity to define precisely what
duties were to be taken on. This led to the development of a number of new
forms with the involvement of professional bodies, major funders and users.
In addition, it was realised that there was no point in warranties that were
not effectively backed by insurance, and this has now led to the development
of a new generation of standard forms of warranty which are the product of
lengthy and tough negotiation, and represent obligations seen as fair and
acceptable by all sides of the industry.
The existence of large numbers of warranties should not be regarded as
reprehensible or as imposing a burden through the weight of numbers,
against the advantage of certainty and the confidence of insurance backing. A
development in this field is on the effect of assignment of warranties, 3' and
draftsmen will have to succeed in fulfilling requirements or overcoming
problems which emerge.32
3° The 1973 form was issued by the R.I.BA, it was redrafted with additions to become the jer form
NSC/2 with slight amendments in 1987 and 1988; Keating on Building Contracts, 5th Edition, p.799.
3° Greater Nottingham Co-operative v Cementation Piling (1989) Q.B. 71 (CA).
'I J Cartwright, Warranties and Duty of Care Documents: Problems of Assignment. In Legal
Obligations in Construction, tiff & [avers (eds.); l.N.Duncan Wallace, Assignment of Rights to Sue
for breach of Construction Contracts. (1993) 109 LQ.R. 92, and note at (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 42 on Linden
gardens Trust Ltd. v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd. (1993) 3 W.LR. 409.
32 The NHBC scheme in this regard is a good example. The difficulties ansing from the mere
prohibition on the builder objecting to third party enforcement were highlighted in the challenge in
Marchant v Caswell & Redgrave and N.l-I.B.R.C. (1976) J.P.L 752. A prospective appeal from the
builder's unsuccessful challenge was not pursued, but the decision was doubted and not followed in
Kijowski v New Capital Properties Ltd (1987) 15 Con. L R. 1.
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Although warranties represent the latest and most important development
in the structuring of contractual obligations in the construction field, the
conventional arrangement of main and sub-contracts, and of consultancy
agreements, is also based upon the rule of privity. The contracting parties
enter into their obligations in the knowledge that contractual rights are
exercisable only by and between the parties to the contract in question. An
example of this is the elaborate procedures developed for nominated sub-
contracts, with the employer selecting who is to carry out certain elements of
the work, but the contract under which the work is performed is between the
nominated sub-contractor and the main contractor. This system has been in
operation for many years and has resulted in a number of significant
decisions of the courts, 3' and the process itself has been accepted as creating
no privity. Such direct relationships as the parties have wished for have are
created by direct warranties. In regard to nominated sub-contractors, these
warranties cover not only liabilities but also matters such as the avoidance of
delay on the part of the sub-contractor and an obligation to operate the direct
payment provisions in the main contract in favour of the sub-contractor, on
the part of the employer, and such a provision shows a precise form of
regulation.
Another area of positive reliance on the rule of privity is the management
contract; developed by professional institutions over a number of years, and
under which much construction work is undertaken in England. The
essence of a management contract is that the obligations undertaken by the
management contractor are significantly limited compared to the position
under a conventional contract; the physical work is performed by selected or
nominated sub-contractors, the management contractor's role being to
manage the whole operation for a fee. The management contractor's limited
financial interest in the project is reflected in significant limitations on the
contractor's liability in respect of breaches committed by the sub-contractors.35
" The simple expedient of the collateral warranty/contract was successfully used in Shanklin Pier Ltd.
v Detel Products Ltd. (1951) 2 K.B. 854 where owners entered into a contract to have their pier
painted. The supplier of the paint was held to have warranted that it would last for seven years, and
when it did not the owners were held entitled to recover direct on the warranty.
NW Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board v Bickerton (TA) & Son Ltd. (19713) 1 W.L.R. fy07 (H.L.);
Fairclough Building Ltd. v Rhuddlan Borough Council (1985) 30 B.L.R. 26 (CA.); Petty Bilton Ltd. v
GLC (1982)1 W.L.R. 794. (H.L.).
Chester Grosvenor Hotel Co. Ltd. v Alfred McAlpine Management Ltd. (1992) C.I.L.L 740; where an
early non-standard form was held to have this effect.
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The employer will usually secure direct warranties from the sub-contractors
to provide rights of action, and the structures of such are based on the pnvity
rule, with the parties negotiating for the degree of liability which they find
commercially acceptable. If protection of consumers is the end to be achieved
then imposition may replace negotiation.
Much construction work is carried out under complex contractual
arrangements. Major town centre developments often involve outside
funders, a local authority acting as freeholder of the land and prospective
lessor, and specially created development companies, whose ownership will
be part of the financial package. The viability of the development will also
depend on pre-letting arrangements which will themselves require direct or
assigned warranties from contractors, sub-contractors and professionals; and
there will be detailed insurance arrangements, with bonds and guarantees to
allocate levels of risk f or all involved. Such transactions are created on the
basis of the rule of privity and the contractual complexity of arrangements is
no disadvantage: it is desirable that each party knows what is taken on.
One argument in favour of the overall reform appears that the creation of
third party rights in contract should be capable of being achieved by 'laymen
left to themselves",37 but what is proposed in requiring a search for
implication or an intent to benefit third parties would not create certainty,
but invite litigation. The proposed answer, to overcome the argument that
the promisor might face actions from the promisee and the third party, that
there is only one promise which once enforced is extinguished, is of
importance in building contracts, particularly in regard to claims for payment
where one out of a number of contracting parties has become insolvent. This
question is closely regulated in most construction projects and mechanisms
are created with the aim of providing security, as with the retention fund.
These avoid competing claims, if properly set up and operated. That the
right should become extinguished by whoever manages first to enforce it
Although many of these arrangements are specific to the construction industiy, it would not be
realistic to seek to exclude construction contracts frum any general change in the law of pnvity The
vanety of foims of such contracts is such that a satisfactoiy definition would be vely difficult to
achieve, and the complexity of construction contracts is not unique. Shipbuilding and offshore oil
installations are comparable areas.
' Consultation Paper paragraph 4.4 (i).
36 The Retention Fund could be regulated by legislation itself if required, as in France.
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would be an undesirable departure from such arrangements.
The simple proposition that a third party should be able to sue but not be
sued,39 is likely to be equally difficult to preserve in practice. Where payment
is sought, the effect of set-off typically produces problems. Where both
contracting parties are promising parties against the third party, in the sense
of mutually dependent obligations, it would be unjust to permit the third
party to sever the mutual covenants. If, as proposed, the promisor could
raise defences that he could raise against the promisee this would permit set-
offs, and the effect would be that the third party's benefit would be subject to
him underwriting the obligations of the pronlissee to the proniisor. It seems
to have been forgotten that the rule of abatement is available in building
contracts, even apart from set off.4°
The recognition that such proposed reform might prejudice the rights of
contracting parties to vary or rescind the contract is important in that it is a
major factor in building contracts that the subject matter of the obligation
may vary, and invariably does, sometimes in significant respects. The
employment of the contractor may be terminated under the contract, with
the obligation to carry out the work being transformed into an obligation to
pay contractually assessed damages, as loss and expense. It is difficult to
conceive of a third party right to take the benefit of an obligation which may
change so drastically. The duty of the supervisor under standard forms
includes a considerable discretion in regard to settlement of monetary
disputes, approvals and acceptance of non-conforming or varied work. Such
matters will change and often prejudice the rights of the third party. Is the
third party to have a right to intervene? Would the third party, in the
alternative, have a claim against the supervisor for having prejudiced the
third party's rights?41 The Consultation Paper does not address these
difficulties, nor can they be covered by a simple statement of principle.
Two overriding grounds for this blanket reform as advanced are the need for
° Not seen as an impediment h, the Law Commission.
° Mondel v Steel (1841) 8 M. & W. 858. None of the comparative materials referred to in the
Consultation Paper even remotely suggest that third parties become involved on questions of the
civil law remedies of reduction in price or the aceptio.
' Where the contractor himself is unlikely to have a claim against the supervisor Pacific Associates v
Baxter (1990) Q.B. 993 (CA).
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coherence and the desirability of the rule being consumer accessible. Greater
coherence may be desirable, but it will not be achieved nor permit useful
comparison without garnering and examining the extant exceptions. There
are highly material statutory exceptions to the privity rule such that, in some
areas, it is virtually non-existent. As to the consumer argument, there is no
reason why laymen without assistance in the creation of third party rights,
should be the test. 42 In the field of construction contracts, there is general
awareness of the effect if not the precise definition of the pnvity rule, in that
bargaining is for agreements which bind and benefit only the parties to them.
Consumers are more likely to require specific and focused assistance, not a
general right to wallow in the mass of paper that frequently accompanies
operations under building contracts.
If the proposals were to proceed, it would be necessary to consider what
limitation rule should apply to third party rights. This is a particular point
for thought raised by the EC Discussion Paper. At present, the limitation
rights of the actual contracting parties depend upon the distinction between
simple contracts and contracts under seal. It would seem anomalous if the
third party could take advantage of a longer limitation period when not a
party to the contract at all. If the third party right were to be regarded as akin
to a right in tort, that would involve a potentially different starting point.
The statutory tendency for the duration of the right has been to create a
special limitation period, as under the Defective Premises Act 1972, the Civil
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, the Latent Damage Act 1986, and the
Consumer Protection Act 1987. These will all be relevant because they create
distinct, and, potentially, rival claims.
A further aspect to be considered would be the effect, as against the third
party, of exclusion and limitation clauses in the principal contact. This has
been the subject of decisions by which at common law third parties have
been unable to rely on an exclusion clause in the contract, unless it was made
as agent for them and certain other conditions are fulfilled. 43 Again it would
42 The parties in Beswick v Beswick and Woodar Investment Development Ltd. v Wimpey
Construction UK Ltd, being the main cases cited by the Law Commission as showing the injustice,
had all been represented by solicitors in the transactions.
Junior Books v Veitchi Co. (1983) 1 AC. 520; Southern Water v Lewis (1984) 27 B.L.R. 116, The
Aliakamon (1986) AC. 785.
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create uncertainty for the third party to avoid exclusions which bore on the
essential risks between the contracting parties, and so the cost. The questions
posed on this aspect by the EC Discussion Paper contemplate exclusion of
liability as against successive owners, raising force majeure , acts of third
parties or client fault as examples for consideration.
There seems little merit in blanket reform. Instead, effort should be made to
identify any areas where further exception is desirable or to examine
anomalies within the particular exceptions to the privity rule. Such a
method is more likely to permit securing results that are susceptible to
harmonisation. The Law Commission identifies the law of trusts as an
exception to the third party rule, but there is no recognition of the scope for
development available in this area which would appear as an appropriate
vehicle for giving overall effect to third party rights." The citation of cases
purporting to show the disfavour of the law of trusts towards enforcing third
party rights does not show this at all; 45 rather they reflect the terms by which
the parties expressed their intention to benefit third parties. 46 The test
proposed of an intention to benefit appears as the very test for the
"exception" of the trust."
The description of the trust "as at best a circumvention and at worst a fictional circumvention of the
third party rule", para 3.4, represents a dimensional view that presumes contract to be the only
mechanism for giving effect to third party rights.
Gandy v Gandy (1915) A.C. 847 (CA) is cited as an acknowledgment that Tweddle v Atkinson
established the "true common law doctrine". The case arese out of a separation deed. H and W
were trustees; H agreed to pay an annuity to the trustees for maintenance of the children; the
plaintiff child reached 16; H refused to continue maintainence. The trustees refused to let their
name be used in the action to enforce covenant. It was held that the plaintiff was not in position of
cestul que trust and could not sue, but liberty to add wife as plaintiff. Cotton U. "as a general rule a
contract cannot be enforced except by a party to the contract ... That nile is subject to this exception;
if the contract although in form It is with A is intended to secure a benefit to B so that B is entitled to
say he has a beneficial right as a cestu! que trust under that contract than B would in a Court of
Equity be allowed to insist upon and enforce the contract." However the pointer to the trust as a
potential vehide for development is also contained in the judgment is not refermd to, namely "But
whatever may have been the common law doctrine, if the true intent and the true effect of this deed
was to give the children a beneficial right under it, that is to say, to give them a right to have these
covenants performed, and to call upon the trustees to pmtect their rights and interests under it, then
the children would be outside the common law doctrine, and would, in a Court of Equity, be allowed
to enforce their rights under the deed."
For example in Re: Sinclair's Life Policy (1938) Ch. 799, where the matter decided was an intention to
create a trust. At page 803 the point was made that S had not bound himself to keep up payments on
the policy, and could himself have surrendered it and kept the money. There was an "intention" to
benefit the infant, but the answer simply was that S had omitted to express his intent by using the
mechanics available to him. A different result, under the dual intention test, is unlikely.
As in Candy v Gandy. Also Re: Sindair's Life Policy for with nothing to oblige S to keep up the policy
there was no ground on which the infant would have been entitled to sue for damages, or require S to
keep up the policy, or to claim if the policy had been suffendered. In those circumstances it was
impossible to say there was a trust. The court was searching not just for an intent to benefit the
infant, but for circumstances to infer an obligation that was enforceable. The former existed, the
latter did not.
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Important exceptions exist other than those in the argument in the
Consultation Paper. One of the areas in which privity was a problem was
domestic housing where purchasers who took a conveyance of nothing but
the land on which a house had already been built found themselves with no
rights to obtain redress for defective work This was the position in which
Dutton was decided,48
 but by 1972 the problem had largely been solved
without the recourse to tortious liability. First, it was held in Hancock v
Brazier , that the contract of purchase of a house to be constructed was
subject to implied terms which would give the purchaser effective remedies
against the vendor. Second, during the 1960's, the construction industiy set
up the NHBRC,5° which created a series of forms of contract, backed by
insurance, giving effective rights to new houseowners extending in some
cases beyond the normal period of limitation. 51
 These rights were expressed
to be assignable to successive owners, and were held to be enforceable.52
Third, there was the Defective Premises Act 1972 creating the duty on persons
taking on work to see that it is done properly and rendering rights under the
Act enforceable by any person acquiring an interest in the dwelling.53
The combination of these measures creates a viable exception to the privity
rule providing a code both certain and successful in its operation, and an
example of how the rule can be successfully abrogated in particular areas. A
further exception is section 38 of the Building Act 1984, including the
provision that "Breach of a duty imposed by Building Regulations, so far as it
causes damage, is actionable except in so far as the regulations provide
otherwise ...'Y' The principal difference is that the Defective Premises Act
may apply apart from Building Regulation matters; but significantly, the 1984
Dutton v Bognor Regis UDC (1972) 1. Q.B. 373 (CA).
Hancockv B. W. Brazier (Anerley) Ltd. (1966) 1 W.L.R. 1317.
5° Now the National Housebuilding Council (NHBC).
For example, giving 10 years protection against major structural defects.
52 Marchant v Casweil & Redgrave and N.H.B.R.C. (1976) J.P.L. 752, but doubted and not followed a
decade later in Kijowski v New Capital Properties Ltd (1987) 15 Con. L R. 1.
Considered under Liability for Defects. The purchaser's rights cannot be excluded by contract and
there is specific provision for the limitation period which applies. The judgment of Lord Bridge in D
& F Estates considered the Act and the Law Commission Report;, which were cited as palt of the
reasoning by which the the decision in Dutton was questioned,, and the claim in tort dismissed.
" Section 38(1) (a). The section has not yet been brought into force except for the purpose of enabling
regulations to be made. A general consideration of the section is in Keatin& Building Contracts, 5th
Editions, 372-375; the view is expressed that actions under the Act may well effectively supercede
those under the Defective Premises Act 1972.
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Act covers building work generally, not limited to dwellings. There has been
debate as to whether the 1972 Act should now be extended to cover
commercial pmperty, but there is no suggestion that the 1984 Act would not
cover commercial buildings.
Other exceptions include the Consumer Protection Act 1987, following the EC
Product Uability Directive, which creates statutory rights similar to those that
might be available either in tort, or in contract but for the privity rule. The
Act imposes strict liability within special limitation periods. With regard to
rights under contract, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 permits
claims between contract breakers who have contributed to the plaintiff's
damage. Under both statutes, a third party may effectively enforce a right
under a contract to which he is not a party.
The proposal to allow a remedy to a third party when to do so would give
effect to the intentions of the contracting parties, would involve a further,
probably preliminary, level of litigation in many cases, even where the terms
of the contract as regards the benefit sought to be enforced are themselves
clear. Unlike the law of tort, where courts have determined that duties of
care exist in broad circumstances, every contract would need to be considered
individually, and at the expense of the losing party. A remedy under a
warranty involves no such uncertainty.
Additionally to being specifically acknowledged, it follows from the proposed
test of intention that there could be contracting out, and any change as
proposed would be likely to result in the immediate introduction of non-
third-party-right clauses. This might create a demand for indemnities against
the possibility of third party rights being claimed. The result may therefore
be that the cases in which third party rights would be claimed would be those
The point was considered by the Insurance Feasibility Steering Committee of NEDO in preparing
the BUILD Report, NEDO 1988.
Law Commission Paper paragraph 5.11. If the intention of the contracting parties is to benefit a third
party, and to make it enforceable by the thiti party then the expression of that positive intent can be
implemented by joining the third party and contracting under seal. Sealing is not the formality it
once was. For companies, signature by a director and secretary, or two directors, has the same effect
as if executed under seal, section 36A(4) Companies Act 1985, and a document intended to be a
deed is presumed to be so delivered on execution, section 36A(5). For individuals, section 1 of the
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Pmvisions) Act 1989 came into force on 31st July 1990, abolishing the
formal requirement of a seal. What is necessary is the expression of intent.
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in which, by inadvertence, the parties omitted to contract out. 57
 The
recognition of a right to contract out necessarily means that in some cases
third parties may think they have rights only to find that they have been
removed by terms of a contract on which they wish to sue.
If third party rights were claimed generally in respect of construction
contracts, a number of interesting points arise, of which limitation is one.59
Tort claims were regularly brought because the contractual time limit had
expired.6° Is the third party, therefore, going to be able to avoid a limitation
defence under one contract by suing on another contract under which the
claim is not statute barred? Additionally, most construction contracts and
sub-contracts contain arbitration clauses, and arbitration is regarded as the
exclusive remedy for challenging decisions by the contract supervisor.6'
Under present English arbitration law, intervention by the third party in an
arbitration would be difficult or impossible. 62 The transfer of a third party's
right, statutorily, into some right in the award is not however proposed.63
The recommendation advances a dual intention test; that the third party
should be able to enforce a contract in which the parties intend he should
benefit, but, "should not be allowed to sue on any contract which is simply
made for his benefit or which merely happens to benefit him or on which he
has happened to rely" 64 Unless the clearest language is used, there are likely
to be great arguments as to whether the necessary dual intention exists. The
suggestion is for the apparent widening of the test of construing contracts
This would be a curious circumstance in which to start investigating intention to benefit a third party
Without any restriction on contracting out an exclusion of third party benefit would soon become a
standard term. As between the contracting parties the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 may be
considered, but if the tern is not unfair between them the third party would have no ability to class it
as such. A solution to this might require some form of control or registration of contracting out.
s It has been a real issue in a good proportion of building defect claims, in which area third party
rights would be exercised, if available.
° The Consultation Paper cites the "decline in Third Parties' rights referred to by J . Bates, Collateral
Warranties (1990) Estates Gazette 13.10.90 p.57, but this was in fact the author's expression of the law
as regards liability in tort. There has never been a decline in rights conferred by the parties'
contracts where they have made them. Any "difficulty" is the failure to get the contractual
documentation in order at the outset, or a change of intent subsequently.
Northern Regional Health Authority v Derek Crouch Construction Co. Ltd (1984) Q.B. 644 (CA.).
62 Mustill & Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, 2nd Edition.
' Even where there is not an arbitration clause, and no subsisting dispute between the immediate
parties to the contract, there is a point, recognised in the Consultation Paper, para. 5.26, as to whether
the promisee should be made a party to the litigation. Nothing is advanced as to who should make
himaparty. lfthepmmiseeisnotapartyitisdifficulttoseehowthethirlpartycanfightthecase,
but a dispute subsequently might arise between the immediate contracting parties.
64 Paragraph 5.10.
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which identifies intentions objectively, but it is not clear whether this view is
to be on the same principles than presently applicable. 65 A wider test akin to
the approach of the French courts of gathering intent from beyond the limits
existing under English law, may not trouble businessmen, but its expression
would have clearly to spell out such a major change in the ascertainment of
contractual intent, particularly if business efficacy between the contracting
parties is to extend to the third party or if the officious bystander is to do his
turn in the third party's absence.67
Proposals to enable non-contracting parties to invoke the benefits of the
contract inevitably involve questions as to the burdens and of necessity the
terms of the contract with exclusions and limitations of liability, which may
negate the end. Conversely to prevent or restrict exclusions or limitations
inevitably affects the balance of risk between the contracting parties
themselves. In both these ways the ability for successive owners to benefit
from the building contract by enforced assignment or transfer would be an
unhappy way forward. 66
 Such mechanism would be likely to add another
layer of terms that would attach to existing standard forms.
2	 Standazd CciidIlis and EC Ctnpelilkzi Law
The feature of standard conditions as national norms may itself require
consideration for the achievement of harmonisation, and community law
already has a potential impact on the use of such conditions. Whilst one of
the policies of the Treaty of Rome in respect of competition is undoubtedly
towards prevention of restrictive practices which interfere with the
integration of the markets of the Member States into a single market, a
second policy is the protection and promotion of competition itself, affecting
Prenn v Simmonds (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1371 (H.L.). The approach in France is to gather the real intention
of the parties where the words are not clear and precise, considered under Contract and Precontract.
The suggestion is that "surounding circumstances" are wider than an objectively determined
intention. Reference is made to the intent to benefit test inthe USA which has "failed to achieve
consistent result?, para. 5.12.
Such point might curtail the scope for viewing reliance l, a third party as a surrounding
circumstance.
Or even without actual assignment, where parties may be treated as having contracted on the
footing that the contracting party would be entitled to enforce contractual rights for the benefit of
those who suffered from defective performance; as in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v Lenesta Sludge
Disposals Ltd. (1993) 3 WL.R. 408 (I-fL.), at 430.
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agreed bases for tendering, in addition to price fixing or market sharing
agreements. The veiy use of national standard forms may be seen as an
impediment to the fostering of competition.
Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome prohibits all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market, and any prohibited agreement is automatically
rendered void and unenforceable by Article 85(2).° Article 85 identifies
particular prohibited agreements and concerted practices to include those
which "directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions", so that agreements as to the use of standard conditions
or forms of contract are likely to fall within the prohibition and require
application for exemption. 7' If Article 85(1) is satisfied, 72 then the
considerations of the EC Commission whether to permit exemption from the
"Decisions by associations of undertaking" would include rules of trade associations and their
decisions; and "concerted practices" would in any event take in such behaviour as fell short of
"agreements". Practical co-operation could well lead to a conclusion of a concerted practice or
even evidence an agreement, and whilst similar or parallel behaviour may not itself constitute a
concerted practice it is suspected that it would be regarded as evidencing it; ICI v EC Commission,
(No. 48/69] (1969) C.M.L.R. 557.
° Any agreement, decision, or concerned practice which would otherwise be prohibited may achieve
exemption from the prohibition by Article 85(3) where it contributes, amongst other things, to
promoting technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit and which does not: "(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) affoni such undertakings the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question." It is only the
EC Commission that may grant this exemption so that where a national Court is asked to sanction or
enforce any agreement or consider a challenge to one it will, it appears, have to proceed on the
basis of the actual prohibition under Article 85(1), for there is no provisional validity during an
application for exemption, albeit that account of any application or doubt as to exemption may be
reflected in an adjournment of proceedings pending decision by the Commission, as in Brassene
de Haecht v Wilkin (No.2) [No. 48/72] (19Th) C.M.LR 287.
Categories of agreements or concerted practices which are treated as anti-competitive within the
scope of Article 85, subject to the question of incompatibility with the common market, are
identified although not exhaustive or definitive of the type of restriction that might fall within the
scope of the prohibition. Without doubt agreements which directly or indirectly fix trading
conditions are regarded as anti-competitive; but questions will arise as to the impact on
arrangements less than complete agreements, for instance the drafting and use of the variety of
conditions of contract by the trade and professional bodies in the construction industiy.
72 The form of agreement would be irrelevant and it is likely that a "gentlemans agreement' would be
covered; Re: Cartel in Quinine (1969) C.M.L.R. 41.
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prohibition become critical.13
Article 86 prohibits "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it ... as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States". 74 There is no provision for any exemption from
this prohibition and it applies "not only to practices that may cause a direct
prejudice to consumers but also to those that cause a prejudice to consumers
through interference in the structure of actual competition." tm Article 86 has
been found to apply to some suppliers of construction materials which have
dominant positions in specific geographical and product markets,16 and
whilst abuse of a dominant position in a substantial part of the EC may be
difficult to substantiate against individual contractors in the highly
fragmented construction industry, the position of employers in the utilities
industries, will come under scrutiny together with groupings of contractors,
sub-contractors or employers in or for the use of conditions of contract?7
With the expansion of the Commission's programme for integration the
result is likely to lead to greater consideration of the circumstances in which
' In the case of the Agreement of the International European Construction Federation (FIFC) and the
Comité European des Equipements Techniques du Batiment, which standardised tender
procedures for the supply of specialised technical equipment, the Agreement included measures
favouring consultation with a limited number of firms, especially sub-contractors, for the supply of
the equipment, and established a system for compensation for unsuccessful but valid tenders,
where tendering costs were high. Ultimately the EC Commission permitted exemption on the basis
that the co-operation provided by the Agreement was likely to help premote, or in any event
maintain, market access for small and medium sized enterprises, as indicated in the Commission's
18th Report on Competition Policy but amendments had been required during consideration of the
exemption application to delete aspects which could give rise to restraint on price competition.
induding automatic indemnification of the unsuccessful tenderers, and disclosure of the sub-
contractors consulted and the amounts of their tenders.
Examples only of such abuse are given and include "(a) directly or indirectly imposing ... unfair
trading conditionsand (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other
parties of supplementaiy obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection th the subject of such contracts."
Europemballage Corpn. and Continental Can Co. v EC Commission [No. 6/721 (19Th) C.M.L.R. 199 at
224.
As in, BPB Industries plc. EEC (O.J. No. LlO/50) 13th Januaiy 1989; and, Italian Flat Glass EEC (Oj.
No. L33/44) 4th Februaiy 1989. Certainly the jurisdiction of Community Law depends on the
requirement that there be an effect on trade between Member States, to distinguish it from the
application of national rules. For an effect on trade it must be possible to foresee, on the basis of
objective factors, and with a sufficient degree of pmbability, that it may have an influence, direct or
indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States such as to hinder the
attainment of the single market In the Community Consten and Grundig v EC Commission No. 56
and 58/41(1966) C.M.L.R. 418.
" The requirement will it seems be interpreted broadly so that conduct in and affecting one Member
State may be seen as impeding the policy of the common market, and for the purposes of
determining whether a dominant position is enjoyed, the relevant market will be considered both
ratione loci and ratione rnatenae.
371
standard conditions are drawn and used within this context of EEC
competition policy and the influence of the Community on national law in
this area will undoubtedly expand. Already though the Community law is
enforceable in national court&" such that Articles 85 and 86 have direct effect
so as to create rights enforceable by the individual where extant national law
would not otherwise grant an adequate remedy. 79
 It is likely that in England
Articles 85 and 86 would give rise to a cause of action for both damages and
for an injunction at the suit of a party affected by the abusive conduct of a
dominant undertaking or by the operation of a prohibited agreement.° The
right of action arises through Community Law being introduced into the UK
to give an action for breach of statutory duty and it will be of increasing
importance how the issue of an actual or potential effect on inter-state trade
would be addressed.81
The approach of the English courts to the findings as to the elements within
Article 86, particularly a pattern of inter-state trade and effects on it, may be
In the UK by the European Communities Act 1972, Section 2(1).
Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v Milk Marketing Board (1984) A.C. 130 (HL)per Lord Diplockat 141. A
remedy by way of injunction exists to prevent breaches of Article 86, which, as determined by the
European Court of Justice in Belgische Radio en Televisie v S.V. SABAM (No. 127/731 (1974) 2
C.M.LR. 238, produces direct effects in relations between individuals, and creates direct rights in
respect of the individuals concerned which the national Courts must protect. In the Garden Cottage
Foods case it was held that "A breach of the duty imposed by Article 86 not to abuse a dominant
position in the common market or a substantial part of it is categorised in English law as a breach of
statutoly duty that is imposed not only for the purpose of promoting the general economic
prosperity of the common market but also for the benefit of private individuals to whom loss or
damage is caused by a breach of that duty", Lord Diplock at p.14!.
80 The Garden Cottage Foods case was an interlocutoiy appeal; but, it was expressed that in the light of
the Belgische Radio case and Rewe-Zentralfinance e.G. v Landwirtschaftskaminer fur das Saarland
(No. 33/761 (1976) 3 E.L.R. 1989 (which latter was to the same effect as respects the duty of national
Courts to protect rights confen-ed on individual citizens by directly applicable provisions of the
Treaty and Sections 2(1) and 3(1) of the European Committees Act 1972), it was difficult to see how it
could ultimately be successfully argued that a contravention of Article 86 causing damage to an
individual does not give rise to a cause of action in English law in the nature of a cause of action for
breach of statutory duty. Subsequently, in respect of Article 30, which provides: Quantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the
following pmvision. be prohibited between member states7, the Court of Appeal held in Bourgoin
SA. v Ministiy of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1986) 1 Q.B. 716 (CA) that the Treaty of Rome
had not created any procedures or remedies and had only provided that the national courts should
afford no less favourable remedies than those available for the breach of a similar right in national
law, and should not so adapt procedures as to defeat the enforcement of such rights; and that whilst
a breach of that Article, as a breach under English statute would afford a right to judicial review, it
would not give rise to a claim for damages, since it was to be regarded as of the nature of making an
invalid order or one in excess of power. In argument, it was advanced that Artides 85 and 86 were
based on re-existing competition law giving rise to relief by way of damages, so as to distinguish
the position under Article 30, and the court considered that Artide 86 gave rise to a right to damages
on breach as well as injunctive relief.
" This is particularly so because of the encouragement given by the Commission to parties to seek
remedies available from EC competition law through national courts, coupled with increasing
awareness within Member States of the possibilities afforded by the direct effect of Artides 85 and
86; EEC 17th Report on Competition Policy.
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anticipated to follow the principle that includes any indirect or potential
effect which might possibly impede the realisation of the single market, 82 but
when considering standard conditions it is instructive to view an approach
of the English Restrictive Practices Court in the context of the potential
impact of Articles 85 and 86.
The provisions of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 were considered in
the Birmingham Association of Building Trades Employers Agreement case
concerning the agreement between members under which the association
recommended the use of JCT standard forms.83 During the hearing the
recommendation for use of the standard forms was withdrawn, and replaced
by one merely to press for the use of the forms "where such conditions are
appropriate", "that is to say that members shall endeavour to persuade the
building owner or his professional adviser to use the standard forms of
contract unaltered or failing that altered as little as possible."84
The relevant rules were that:
"All members ... shall (i) conform with the requirements and
recommendations made from time to time in regard to any form of
contract formally adopted by the federation (ii) and otherwise members
shall on all occasions press for the use of such conditions as may be
issued under the approval of the federation [where such conditions are
appropriatel (iii) Provided that in exceptional circumstances the
federation ... may authorise the use of any other form of contract,
subject to such conditions by way of amendment as may appear
necessary (iv) but on no consideration shall a member sign a form of
82 La Technique Miniere v MasChinenbau Wm GmbH [No. 56/65] (1966) C.M.LR. 357. Albeit that in
Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns Ltd. (1986) 1 W.LR. 558, in granting an injunction on the basis of Article
85(1) and other Community regulations restraining exclusion suppliers (mm the tied houses, the
court rejected the point that the conditions of agreement had any effect on trade between member
states.
Re: Birmingham Association of Building Trades Employers' Agreement (1963) 1 W.L.R. 484. The
National Federation of Building Trades Employers, then had some 13,846 members comprising
about two-thirds of all builders in England and Wales, and there were 252 local associations of which
the Birmingham Association had about 200 members. The local associations were grouped into 10
regional federations and the rules of the National Federation, the Midland Federation and the
Birmingham Association were initially identicaL The Act applied to the construction or canying out
of buildings, structures and other works by contractors, It was repealed and replaced by the 1976
Act.
84 There were 10 standard forms of conditions of contract the subject of the recommendation
including the the four major JCT forms of main contract, local authorities and private editions, with
and without quantities. two standard forms of sub-contract. the standard form of tender for
nominated suppliers and the small works' Conditions of Estimate, all issued under the sanction of
the Royal Institute of British Aithitects, the N FBTE and the Royal Institution of Chartered
Surveyors save for the sub-contract forms which were issued respectively under the sanction of and
approved by the N FBTE and the Federation of Associations of Specialists and Sub-Contractors, and
under the sanction of the N FBTE and appmved by the National Federation of Plastering
Contractors.
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contract which has been objected to or declined by the federation on
account of its arbitrary and inequitable conditions, unless the
federation shall otherwise decide."
The constitution of the association had to be read as if containing the
agreement of members to comply with the recommendations; but it was
contended, and rejected, that the recommendation in its original form
amounted to no more than one to press for use of the forms whenever
appropriate, so as not to constitute restridions. Of the four elements of the
relevant rules (i) (iii) and (iv) were not even defended as justifiable; but (ii),
as amended, was argued and tested under the yardstick of whether the
restrictions gave to the public as building owners "specific and substantial
benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed by them." It failed, and
was likewise declared contrary to the public interest.
Whilst acknowledging differences, there are striking similarities with
Articles 85 and 86, so that, subject to the application of incompatibility with
the common market and effects on trade between Member States the scope
for challenge to the use of the standard conditions is wide, both where
"concerted practices" not amounting to agreements may be found, and where
"abuse" may be found by employers imposing conditions as tender
requirements, giving rise to "unfairness" in the wider context of a dominant
position and trade between Member States.
The rejected grounds in the Birmingham case, of specific and substantial
benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed by the public, are
material in contemplating the prospects of an exemption under Article 85(3),
Section 6 (7) "Where specific recommendations (whether express or implied) are made by or on
behalf of a trade association to its members ... as to the action to be taken or not taken by them
this Act shall apply in relation to the agreement for the constitution of the association ... as if it
contained a term by which each such member ... agreed to comply with those recommendations
and any subsequent recommendations made to them ... -.
Section 6: "(1) .... applies to any agreement ... being an agreement under which restrictions are
accepted ... in respect of the following matters ... (a) the prices to be charged, quoted or paid .... (b)
the terms or conditions on or subject to which goods are to be supplied ... (c) the quantities or
description of goods to be pmduced ... (e) the persons or classes of persons to, for or frem whom, or
the areas or places in or from which, goods are to be supplied ... (3) 'agreement' includes any
agreement or anangement, whether or not it is or is intended to be enforceable ...; and 'restriction'
includes any negative obligation, whether epress or implied, and whether absolute or not...".
' Section 21: "(1) ... a restriction accepted in pursuant of any agreement shall be deemed to be
contraly to the public interest unless the couzt is satisfied of any ... of the following circumstances,
(b) that the removal of the restriction would deny to the public as purchasers, consumers or users
other specific and substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed by them as
such, whether by virtue of the restriction itself or of any arrangements ... resulting therefmm ..7.
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with the requirement to show that the agreement or concerted practice
"contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives." The perceived foundations for the use and
benefits of the principle standard forms in the U.K were measured and
rejected against a yardstick similar in substance to that for exemption, and
even the diminished force of the term to press for use of the forms where
appropriate did not survive.88
It is not far fetched to envisage challenge to the gathering of national bodies
of trade and professional associations for the production of standard
conditions particularly where the result is adopted in a manner that reflects a
concerted practice. Such challenge might come from sources outside the
state, and, once raised under Article 85, it may only be a start or even a
parallel step to challenge as an abuse under Article 86. There is the potential
that national standard conditions or conditions sought to be used by
undertakings based on them will be opened to review in the context of abuse
and affecting trade between Member States that "may in particular, consist In:
directly or indirectly imposing other unfair trading conditions".
88 The court set out the grounds in these terms: "It is said, and we accept it, that owing to 0) the
complexity of most building operations, where hardly any two are alike owing to differences
between sites and building owners requirements, (ii) the complicated relationships arising
concerning not only builder and building owner, but also architects, quantity suweyors, and sub-
contractors, and (iii) the need for making provision in advance for the almost inevitable changes
and variations that take place in the course of construction, special skill and experience are
required in drafting building contracts. That skill and experience, representative of the great
majority of parties interested, has been brought to bear on the production of the seven standard
forms issued with the sanction of the RlBA. since they are the work of the JCI, which is a standing
body constantly considering the current foims and from time to time revising them in order to
effect improvements and keep abreast of developments. Indeed, new and much redralted editions
of each of the four main contract forms, resulting from several years work by the JCT, were finally
approved by its constitutent bodies during the hearing of the reference and we were told that they
would by now be available to the public. The public as building owners benefit, it was said, by the
availability of such forms and by their use wherever appropriate because they are fair to all parties
and well known to builders. The latter point was said to be of importance in keeping tender prices
down, since builders invited to tender on unfamiliar conditions are, as we find, apt to raise their
tenders in order to cover unknown contractual contingencies. Similarly, the sue of well-drafted and
well-known (onus was said to lessen the likelihood of disputes with consequential waste of time and
money. Many similar arguments were advanced in relation to the three forms not resulting from
the deliberations of the jcr namely, the two sub-contract forms and the conditions of estimate, it
being stressed in relation to the two former that it was important, as was admitted by the registrar,
that sub-contract forms should be geared into the main contract forms. We were not invited to
examine many of the detailed provisions of the 10 forms before us or any of the previsions of the
newly drafted forms, but there was a body of evidence called comprising architects, quantity
surveyors and builders to the effect that whilst no standard form could be perfect, the forms before
us were well drafted and were fair to the parties concerned."
375
The Impact of contract provisions is wider than as between contracting
parties, for attempted imposition of conditions reflecting nationally
individualistic perceptions and practices could well constitute abuse affecting
trade between Member States. The European Parliament's call for the
standardisation of contracts and controls in the construction industiy and for
harmonisation of responsibilities, is on the implicit assumption that this
would foster trade between Member States, but even when tested against the
EC's perceptions for competition, any set of standard conditions that reflects
nationally individualistic perceptions and practices could be seen as abuse
detrimental to trade between Member States.91
As stated in the Mathurin Report "the free movement of goods and services
would be achieved more easily in the field of construction if the Member
States of the Community could reach agreement in the context in which
operations to take place; on, essential requirements, role of participants,
drawings and specifications, contract documents, and responsibilities."92
Undoubtedly the "co-existence of different systems of responsibility - sectoral
regulations, common law, specific law, model contracts" - leads to multiple
complications that may deter participation, with disparities and peculiarities
constituting a real obstacle to competition. It is again not far fetched to
envisage that conditions of contract not unfair between employer and
contractor within the national laws of the Member State may be subject to
investigation as unfair, as affecting trade between Member States, but,
whether or not such investigation will even be called for by the application
of Article 86, it is the desire to facilitate greater cross border trade in the
construction industry that has led to the consideration of methods of
harmonisation of responsibilities.
Whilst a series of goals as to the responsibilities and risks to be superimposed
In the UK: Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. In the EEC: Commission of the European Communities.
Proposal for a Council Direction unfair terms in Consumer Contracts. 3rd September 1990.
European Parliament. Resolution 12th October 1988.
°' Standard forms are perhaps the evocation of the worst elements of nationalism amongst legal
systems where they do not aspire to principle, but represent the lowest common denominator of
national sectional interest. As a means of uniformity in diverse systems they would have to be
subjugated to principle, if not devised to represent it.
92 EC Commission, Mathunn, Final Report. 2nd Februazy 1990, p. 2-3.
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on nationally favoured contracts would not meet the full vision of harmony,
or overcome differences in practice, the growth of subsidiarity as a principle
may render the identification and implementation of such goals the
acceptable limit of it. The idea of a European standard form of construction
contract, however, would encapsulate those responsibilities and provide a
vehicle for harmonisation.93
3	 A Standard standt1-fLm?
The EC Discussion Paper asks again whether a Standard Community
Contract should be created, contemplating that the parties would be free to
choose it, and that national laws would remain unaltered. It identifies three
questions: how can genuine freedom of choice be ensured if the parties'
economic weight is not the same; would the choice result in national rules
being waived, and if so, how; and, should such a standard contract apply to
construction works as a whole or could it only cover one or more
participants?
Economic weight of parties' will always be a factor affecting contract terms,
and the choice raised will take place in the market place. 94 Whether the
choice is made to use the standard contract will depend on the risks and
responsibilities to which it would give rise as against other available options,
and that will depend on the effects of national legal systems in respect of the
chosen terms. 95 The distinction for the application of the standard contract,
between construction works as a whole and limited participants, indicates
that the question is directed more towards those to be within a code of
responsibilities than terms governing the actual design and execution of a
building project, because of the range and number of participants.
The idea that harmonisation might be achieved by the adoption of standard
and uniform contract documentation mooted in the Mathurin Report was
Professor C.M. Schmitthoff, The Unification and Haxmonisation of Law by means of Standani
Contracts and General Conditions. (1978) 17 l.C.L.Q. 551.
04 W.DSlawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-Making. (1971) 84 Harv.
LRev. 529.
Resistance may involve conflicts over accepted terms, The Battle of the Poms Standard Form
Contracts in Comparative Perspective. (1985) 34 I.C.L.Q. 297
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not favourably received, and not advanced. Proposers acknowledge that
there would be a need for the provisions of such a contract to have the same
meaning in whatever part of the Community they are applied or enforced so
necessitating the adoption of precise and contemplate lengthy definitions of
those terms if necessary.97 Undoubtedly that mechanism would require
implementation by legislation, in the sense that Community regulations and
directions would be necessary, and to give it statutory force, however that
assumes a degree of harmony and unity of principle to exist at the outset into
which agreed terms can be received to achieve a uniform effect throughout
the Community.
There is however in existence already a unifying influence of the
Commission towards this end, and standard general conditions of contract
have been adopted by the Council of Ministers, although they were prepared
for use outside the Single Market. The use of the terms is mandatory
through the funding of construction projects by the European Development
Fund (EDF) in overseas countries. 99 The first version was produced in the
early 1970's, and it took many years for agreement to be concluded on the
new versions. These include Regulations, covering eligibility and tendering
General Conditions for application to works, supply and service contracts,
and Procedural Rules for Conciliation and Arbitration.
Both the background to and the results of this long period of discussion
reflect features of different approaches currently debated on proposals for
harmonisation within the Community. The former EDF Conditions derived
from French initiative, related to countries whose legal systems were mostly
based on the French model, and not unnaturally followed the French CCAG
terms for public works contracts. The number of acceding States grew to
A standard form was not within the list of measures that the EC Commission recommended in its
response to the Mathurin Report, Commission Working Document 111/3750/90 - EN, Rev. 1, July
1990.
J. Uff and N. Jefford, Harmonisation within the European Community in the field of Construction
and its effects on Liability and Disputes, in Legal Obligations in Construction. (1992).
In March 1990 the Council of Ministers adopted a new set of conditions for projects in African,
Caribbean and Pacific States. This ACP form is found at Oj. L382, 31st December 1990. In
December 1991 the Council adopted a similar set for projects in Overseas Countries and Territories,
and this OCT form is at Oj. L40, 15th Februaiy 1992.
The EDP was created in 1958. It provides funds for developments in Thini World countries that are
historically linked with Europe. The EDF Conditions of Contract were introduced through the Lomé
Convention, first signed in February 1975. The fourtl and currently governing, Lomé Convention
was signed inDecember 1989.
378
include a good proportion whose systems denved from common law, where
the FIDIC forms were used in preference to the then non-mandatory EDF
Conditions. The desire though was to have the same standard form, and
this was achieved through negotiating committees.'°°
The Conditions reflect a compromise, and whilst the FIDIC 4th edition may
have formed the base, those elements that discouraged its use in countries
whose systems derived from the Code Civil have been overcome,
particularly the dislike of the quasi-arbitral role of the engineer. The former
EDF Conditions had no provision for appointment of someone to direct
performance, so leaving the responsibility for all matters, including dealing
with variations, ascertaining payments and confirming provisional and final
acceptance, with the employing body.'°' The increased complexity of projects
has rendered necessary such a person, and the EDF Conditions now require
an official and supervisor responsible for such tasks, but after consultation
with both the contractor and employer.
The former provision that the contractor might "avail himself of facts
alleged against the Administration and which would involve him in delay
and/or detriment in order to obtain, where appropriate an extension of the
periods of performance, the revision or rescission of the contract and/or
damages" might have been understood in conjunction with code provisions,
but the basis for claims is now spelt out and they involve the supervisor's
decision, albeit after consultation. The ability to order variations is "for the
proper completion and/or functioning of the works",'°2
 and the scheme for
termination is specified, with both areas identifiable from FIDIC.
From this detailed and negotiated compromise between the civil and
common law approaches, emerges a form which would inevitably be a
starting point for any standard conditions within the Community. The
position of the supervisor carries the responsibility for deciding such matters
as the value of variations, additional payments and extensions of time, and
The Eunpean International Contractors Group also assisted with representation.
lOt The former EDF Conditions in fact were published in English. Commentaiy on compaiisons was
given by N. Gould. European Standard General Conditions of Contract? IBA Conference Paper,
September 1992.
102 EDF Conditions, 1992, Article 37.
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while he must consult with employer and contractor, the quasi-arbitral status
is not present. While his decisions will be subject to challenge in arbitration,
they are acts of the employer, and the compromise places the supervisor
closer to the position of the maitre d'oeuvre as seen in French practice than
to the engineer under FIDIC This appears a viable way forward on the basis
that employers should be able to have their consultants as their true advisers
throughout the project, and the historically derived dual role of the
professional, which carries its own difficulties, ought not to prevail.
Deriving from this lesser impact of the supervisor's role is the corollary of a
greater involvement by the contractor in drawing up the detailed
programme for approval, which reflects procedures seen in the AFNOR
conditions.
The power of the principle of reception is shown in that the EDF Conditions
have not imported the concept of substantial completion as it appears in
FIDI although, interestingly, provisional and final acceptance are utilised
for the purposes of maintenance obligations, but not to permit the taking
over and use of the works before completion.'° 3 The supervisor's action is
limited to verification of the works with a view to such provisional and final
acceptance. There is no blurring of the time of completion, in the sense of
practical completion or when certified, and liquidated damages are payable
for delay to the date of actual completion.'°4
While the EDF Conditions utilise similar circumstances from FIDIC for
extensions of time and additional payments, 105 and force majeure is a ground
for extension, this concept is deployed separately and additionally in its civil
law role, so that "Neither party shall be considered to be in default or in
breach of his obligations under the contract if the performance of such
obligations is prevented by any circumstances of force majeure ". To the
extent that the contractor's delay in performance or other failure to perform
is the result of an event of force majeure he is exempted from liability under
the performance guarantee, liquidated damages and termination for
default.'°6 Further, the approach towards subcontractors bears the imprint of
'° EDF, 1992. Articles 57 to 62.
104 EDE1992,Article3ó.1.
'° ED F, 1992, Article 21 utilises he phrase 'artificial obstructions or physical conditions.
toe EDF,1992,Article6ó.
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the French legislation of 1975 relating to direct payments, and no distinction
is drawn between domestic or nominated subcontractors. The retention is
expressed as by way of guarantee to meet the obligations during the
maintenance period, and again the French influence of the permissible
retention guarantee instead is present.'°7
The consensus to bring about the new EDF Conditions is without doubt a
major achievement, but a similar consensus for a form within the
construction industries of the Community is less certain, while the
imposition of a form as the means to achieve harmonisation is even less
certain. 108 Such a form though would lay out the ground and undoubtedly
assist understanding and so widen the scope for competition in that way. It
could be introduced into public works contracts in the context of public
procurement, if at first on a voluntary basis. Although the diversity of
practices to be addressed extends further than the terms and mechanics of a
contract document, the advance of Community legislation controlling
procurement shows that this is no bar to the implementation of certain
general requirements.
4	 Ways Fward?
Even if the will was present in order to advance the goal of competition, the
imposition of uniform contract terms might be the antithesis of the essential
freedoms within which the aspirations for a common market and trade
between Member States are to exist. Standard words do not produce standard
results. Standard words of description as to meanings of words are equally
unlikely to produce standard results.
A vision of harmonisation requires more than standardisation of terms,
which upon different applications would prove counter-productive. The
lOT EDF, 1992, Article 47.
The Institution of CMI Engineers advanced its New Engineering Contract" in a consultative edition
in 1991, and following consultation the first edition was published in 1993; M. Barnes (1991) 8 IC.L.R.
247 and (1993) 10 LC.L.R. 228.
°° Professor S. Arrowsmith. An Overview of EC Policy on Public Procurement: Current Position and
Futurre Prospects. (1992) 1 PubI. Proc. L.R. 29; although problems are inevitable, ACo,g
Implementing 1992 Public Pmcurement Policy: Public and Private Obstacles to the Creation of the
Single European market. (1992)1 PubI. Proc. L.R. 139.
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aspiration of standardisation may more easily be achieved by adopting a
series of goals as to the responsibilities and risks to be undertaken by the
contracting parties. These would then in time represent the norms
associated with building contracts, and become superimposed to the end that
provisions would be interpreted and applied so as to fall within and meet
those goals. In this way a common law of European dimension would begin
its evolution, drawing on the principles and mechanisms embodied in the
history and approach of participating nations. But is this forelorn hope?
If standard results from terms are the goal in respect of the construction
process then true harmonisation first requires analysis of the ends and aims
of the laws of the nations that make up the EEC, and the distillation of
principles, to arrive in the first instance at a code of responsibilities attaching
to those who take on functions in relation to building work. Then, with
experience, restriction on exclusion or modification can develop, with
implementation by Community regulation and through national legislation
as widely or narrowly as Community consensus requires or permits.
In this way responsibilities and rights of the parties involved in the
construction process move towards harmony, apparent and actual disparity
between national laws and practices recede, and national peculiarities in the
organisation and methods of the construction industries are not required to
be subjected to minute examination as part of the process. A regime may
thus be established under which decisions of national courts, reflecting the
inevitable multitude of fact situations, are taken with reference to, and for
the benefit of, an increasing body of decisions across Europe applying the
provisions of such a code. Guidance from the decisions of the European
Court of Justice will aid understanding and promote harmonisation.11°
The receipt of Community-led legislation is no longer unknown in the UK
and familiar elements of legislation are inevitably likely to be further affected
by Community regulation in substantial ways.' 11
 The organisation and
methods of the construction indushies in the individual nations as reflected
"° G. Slynn, lntmducinga Eurpean Legal Order. (1992) The Hamlyn Lectures.
" The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1976, and unfair terms in consumer contracts, as now derived from
the recent EC Directive which has rseulted from the proposal of September 1990.
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in methods of procurement and standard conditions are open to challenge
under existing Community legislation," 2
 and this will continue not just by
additional regulation, but by greater awareness of the ability to challenge
procurement and contractual practices in national courts.' 13
 The impact of
Articles 85 and 86 on standard conditions is a potential area, and the
burgeoning of detailed Community regulation is likely to widen the scope for
consideration of unfairness within Article 86."
The reception of a code of responsibilities or liabilities into English law is far
from difficult, as perceived by the view of English law set out in Mathunn.
A limited code already exists in the Defective Premises Act 1972. It is limited
by its reference to dwellings but, as appreciated by Mathurin, it provides an
important basis for liability by way of statutory duties that cannot be excluded
or restricted by contract. Undoubtedly the traditions of practitioners give
priority to allegations in relation to terms of contracts, express or implied,
and their breach, yet, in principle, the 1972 Act imposes a code that effectively
renders reference to contract terms supplementary or even unnecessary, in
pursuit of damages, and the like effect would gradually emanate from a code
with a wider jurisdiction than dwellings."5
The attitudes disclosed following the publication of the Mathurin report
included a feeling of concern that harmonisation would bring about the loss
of the common law impact in the field of construction contracts, which has
hitherto been substantial. Particularly, FIDIC was concerned at a move away
from the common law system, on which its forms of conditions of contract
are based, towards the civil law system.u6 The fear is not justifiable, for
England has capacity to offer and to influence as well as receive, as the
112 In both national courts, General Building & Maintenance Ltd. v Greench London Borough
Council (1993) The Times 9th March 1993, and in the European Court of Justice, The Commission of
the European Communities v Ireland [No. 45/87] (1988) E.C.R. 4929, 44 B.L.R.1 (the Dundalk case).
M. Bowsher, Prospects for Establishing an Effective Tender Challenge Régime: Enforcing Rights
under EC Procurement Law in English Courts. (1994) 1 PubI. Proc. L.R. 30.
114 L. Ainsworth, Competition Law Enforcement in Construction and M. Bowsher, Competition Law
within the EEC and its effect on Construction, in Legal Obligatios In Construction, Uff & Layers
(eds.).
The vehicle exists in the shape of section 38 of the Building Act 1984, and the power to make
regulations under it.
FIDIC conference work-shop, Tokyo, September 1991. Report (1992) 9 I.C.LR. 68. The fear was
expressed as "allayed", particularly as the ministerial representatives of the member states in a
meeting of the GRIM, [Groupe Réglementation, Information Management) had decided on 25th
October 1990 that the totality of his proposals were unnecessaxy since the areas recommended for
harrnonisation did not in their opinion form bamers to trade.
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example of the new EDF Conditions shows in drawing on a common law
understanding. Nor should the door be closed to the opportunity to test
one's system and concepts in a wider context.
Equally important is that there can be no general assumption that the civil
law countries are at one," 1
 and that it is only the common law that is the odd
man out. This may be so in terms of background, but is not so in ultimate
goals. Within the civil law countries a different legal policy towards the
same derived rule is likely to pose problems greater than those that may
follow from the need to first identify the effective rule under the common
law 8 An English attitude that somehow common law is external to Europe,
and needs protection from it, must be overcome.
The feature in respect of construction that appears divisive between England
and the civil law in France is in the background to responsibility. To be
forced to put one's hand on it identifies that background as the influence of
the separateness of the role of the engineer or architect, and through that
historically embedded role the influence on and of standard conditions."9
Separateness, whereby the existence of responsibility to the building owner
for the success of the project requires a contractual search, is often diffuse in
nature. This is distinct from the responsibility assumed from the fact of
involvement in the project and the guarantee obligation attaching to that,
derived from a responsibility of status and developed through the legislative
changes in France. Separateness is reflected also in the mechanisms of the
construction contract in England and the superimposition of an independent
role attributed to the professional who is in fact engaged by the employer.
This again dissipates clarity of responsibility, and there is no fundamental
difficulty in removing the function of decider or resolver from those to
whom responsibility may be attributed.
A Shalakani, The Application of the FIDIC Civil Engineering Conditions in a Civil Code System.
(1989) 6 I.C.L.R 226.
For example the same original decennial liability was contained in Article 1645 of the former
Netherlands Civil Code as in Article 1792 of the Belgian Code. Whereas in Belgium the liability is
treated as one of public policy from which there can be no exclusion, both the level and duration of
such liability could be validly limited by architects, engineers and contractors thmugh their
conditions of contract.
"° Brabant, Les Marches Publics et Privés dans la C.E.E. et Outre-Mer, Vol. 1 p. 118 and 2481. and F.
Einbinder, The Role of an Intermediaty between Contractor and Owner an International Projects: A
French Contractor's Viewpoint. IBA Conference Paper, September 1992.
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The disparity of national systems of construction should not override the
ability to achieve a uniform code of responsibilities if this is to be the aim,
nor should the disparity of national systems of law. The process for and
achievement of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods may
show the way. The Hague conference of 1964 was a significant undertaking,'2°
and whilst determining principles on which the uniform law should be
based,' 21 it also laid the path for development and wider application.' 22 This
was and is unification involving States of the civil law system and the
common law family, overcoming the conceptual distances dividing the two
as well as differences within the civil law systems.' 23
 The accepted solution
in many cases was the common law rule, and the dangers of the use of words
denoting different concepts in different systems were avoided.'24
The adopted drafting intent, which could well be a model for a code
applicable to construction responsibilities, was not to bring about
compromise, but aimed at setting in a clear understandable language, the
important principles which could be considered as practicable and reasonable,
proper to indicate the future direction of the law.' 25
 However the production
of a code of responsibilities should not be an end in itself, it has to have scope
for evolution.
That the area of construction was selected by the European Parliament for the
advancement of harmonisation is understandable because of the substantial
interest in health and safety and consumer protection, within it. Beyond this
the goal to be achieved remains uncertain as reflected in the retreat from the
wide scope of the Mathurin Report, and the questions in the EC Discussion
120 It was commenced more than thirty years earlier by the International Institution for the Unification
of Private Law [the Unidroit or Rome Institutel. and resumed in 1951. The 1951 resumption was
recoZnised as important by the Benelux States "as the existing legal differences were prejudicing
the functioning of the common market." Professor 0. Riese, International Problems in the Law of
Sale: Some Comparative Aspects of the Law Relating to the Sale of Goods. (1964 ) 1.C.L.Q. Suppl.
PubI. 9, 35.
121 It also appointed a special commission to draft the text.
122 Revision took place at an open forum In the Hague, in 1985, with participation from a far wider group
of nations than those involved in 1964.
123 Discussed in A Szakats, The Influence of Common Law Pnnciples on the Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods. (1966) 15 l.C.L.Q. 749.
124 For example the word "warranty".
125 Professor Riese, op. cit.. The areas addressed covered many from which those concerned with
harmonisation of responsibilities for construction could draw guidance, such as hidden defects, the
relationship between the action for reduction of price and damages, and specific performance.
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Paper of June 1993, which, although deriving from the specific pointers of
GAIPEC, are really addressing the fundamental point of what needs to be
done and why. Construction contracts are but one application of private law,
and its selection raises the problem of how far the process is to be taken and
of the ability to consider it as a discrete subject.
A warning of Sir Otto Kahn-Freund was that:
"[tihe selection of areas of law to be harmonised must be dictated by
practical requirements and by nothing else. The harmonisation of
fundamental principles of private law, of the general principles of the
law of contract, tort or property, of family law or of the criminal law
does not belong to these requirements. It is not needed for a
functioning and successful economic community. It would not even
be a requirement for a political community, not even for a very close
federation."
and he concluded the point by saying:
"To labour this point is quite unnecessaiy but I desired at the outset to
register my conviction that to harmonise entire legal systems is, from
the point of view of the political, economic and cultural future of
Europe, a work of supererogation, and, moreover, the work perhaps
more of a Sisyphus than of a Hercules."126
The Resolution passed by the European Parliament in 1989 "on action to
bring into line the private law of the Member States' t27 requested "that a start
be made on the necessary preparatory work on drawing up a common
European Code of Private Law." Individual aspects of private law had been
addressed but to meet the needs and objectives of the single market without
frontiers more was needed than the mere coverage of individual subjects.
What was seen as needed was the unification of major branches of the law
and the creation of "a modernised common system of private law." The
Resolution therefore requested that the Member States be invited to state
whether they wish to be involved in this enterprise, and that committees of
experts be set up to define the priorities and organise the whole undertaking
of unifying the private law of those States. The scope of the Mathurin Report
would have been a very good reason for not approaching the construction
120 Frem a speech by Sir Otto Kahn-Freund to a Conference on "New Perspectives for a Common Law
of Eumpe', Florence, 1978. Kahn-Freund, Common Law and Civil Law - Imaginary and Real




EC 1989 C 158/400 (26th June 1989).
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industry in isolation from a wider view of private law.
There is no doubt that progress has been made through Community
legislation, and that unification or harrnonisation of law in the traditional
legislative sense will be needed for quite some time. However, unification of
law is not costless and its cost may in some cases outweigh its benefits. The
tendency has been towards specific areas and particular topics, and
considerable problems arise from treating this as the only method of unifying
or harmonising the law One problem is that in this increasingly complicated
patchwork the unified rules will often overlap, and clash with the non-
unified rules of national law. The fragmentary character of unified law
creates additional complexity of the legal system. Further, unification of the
law relating to construction contracts cannot be approached without
considering general concepts of contract and tort. These basic concepts may
well take the same verbal forms in different legal systems, and it is tempting
to adopt them in uniform rules without more, but if this is done then, when
the national courts actually have to apply them, it will be discovered where
beneath the same words lie dissimilar concepts.
Another cost of the unification of law through codification may be the
tendency to petrify the law by restricting the individual States' competence to
adapt it to changing social or economic conditions. By participating in
unification a State normally gives up its freedom to revise the uniform law
in the light of later developments, and amending a uniform law is a
cumbersome process requiring the co-operation and agreement of other
States. For these reasons, unification of law through codification
significantly reduces a state's power to react to social and economic change,
and so tends to restrain competition among legal systems for the best
solution of a given problem.
Unification of law in the traditional legislative sense will however be
implemented in Europe for the foreseeable future, and this should be
accompanied by a corresponding movement in legal study. The movement
should aim at the identification and learning of legal principles which the
European nations have in common, a form of European common law The
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legal historian, Professor Coing pointed out that the adoption of uniform
statutes is not the only way to legal uniformity and that it may also be
achieved through a uniform learning based on a uniform common stock of
legal ideas, principles and rules. The significance of this for the future may
lie, suitably adapted, in:
"the immense role academic learning has had in the formation of our
common legal heritage, in the Middle Ages as well as in the Age of
Enlightenment ... We must revise the idea which dominated ... in the
19th century, that national [law] must be the basis of legal training
what we must aim for is ... to present the national law in the context of
those legal ideas which are present in the [law] of different nations,
that is, against the background of the principles and institutions which
the European nations have in common."28
What is likely to be useful is discussion of legal principles from a non-
national comparative viewpoint, to see the extent to which there exists in the
particular field a common stock of principle and rules used throughout the
laws of the European nations, in other words, a European common law.'29
There is not however a legal literature tackling the task of developing
principle in a European common law, certainly in the field of building
contracts. This thesis is but one student's attempt at a view that could be
multiplied and expanded.
Despite their common tradition, the European legal systems have charted
individual courses for years. They have sat in their niches, walled off from
each other by the boundaries of the nation and by the barriers of politics,
economics and language.'' Against this, they have all been exposed to
similar social and economic forces, to the consumer protection movement,
to the need to protect the environment, and more. The common stock of
European legal principles and rules may lie hidden, yet the working
128 Coing. European Common Law: Historical Foundations, in: New Perspectives for a Common Law of
Europe (ed. Cappelletti 1978) 31-44, at 44. His main example was the ius commune as it was
developed in Continental Europe on the basis of Roman-Canon law. This ius commune was applied
by the courts as a merely subsidiaty source of la in the sense that it was followed only where no
local or national rules existed. When there was a gap in the local or national rules or when they were
ambiguous they were interpreted in the light of the ius commune.
Advocated by Professor H. Kotz in his Paper,, European Common Law as an Academic Subject.
Conference of the Society of Public Teachers of Law. (1992).
'3° The view of Professor Kotz is attacked by Professors Fnedman and Taubne; Legal Education and
Legal Integration, in Integration Through Law, edited by Cappelletti, Secombe and Weiler, Book 3,
Forms and Potential for a European Identity, 345. They assert that the search for common ground in
European legal systems is a doomed hopeless hunt for lost doctrines. But surely the search is not for
the lost?
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hypothesis should be that it is there, waiting to be brought to light by an effort
on the part of comparative lawyers. This is the observation that, despite the
differences in their historical development, conceptual structure and style of
operation, different legal systems often give the same or very similar
solutions to the same problems. Under similar pressures in similar societies
the law is apt to change in the same direction, even though the legal
techniques used to achieve that change may differ. The means of change of a
legal system are determined by legal tradition, and this suggests that the
search for common cores should be guided by the basic principle of the
function. Reception and substantial completion is just one example.
The conceptual contexts and national doctrinal overtones are important for
understanding, and while solutions attempting to satisfy a particular need do
not depend on the headnotes of judicial opinions, but on what is actually
being done, both need to be viewed, although not necessarily in the
compartments constructed in national legal systems in order to make the law
orderly and uindable.
The Commission of European Contract Law is publishing general principles
of the law relating to the performance and non-performance of contracts, and
UNIDROIT is working on principles for international commercial contracts.
If these initiatives simply mark out areas of agreement and disagreement,
and assist in constructing a European legal understanding of concepts large
enough to be functionally comparable, they will contribute to a thinking that
is perhaps more central to the idea of a common law and of greater necessity
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